Document Type
Article
Abstract
Alexander's Dictum--"to be is to have causal powers"--appears to furnish an argument against the reality of familiar medium-sized objects. For every time a familiar object appears to cause a familiar macro-event, it sets up a rival claim by its component microparticles to have caused the complex swarm of microphysical events that composes into that macro-event. But this argument, argues this paper, wrongly assumes that even after familiar objects are removed from the picture, there is a phenomenon of joint causation which unites all and only the microparticles within each familiar object.
Recommended Citation
Elder, Crawford, "Alexander’s Dictum and the Reality of Familiar Objects" (2003). Philosophy Articles. 1.
https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/philo_articles/1
Comments
Published in Topoi, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 163-171 (2003). The original publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/.