Date of Completion

4-9-2015

Embargo Period

4-9-2015

Keywords

analyst forecasts, agency theory, assurance game, investor scrutiny

Major Advisor

David Souder

Associate Advisor

Timothy Folta

Associate Advisor

Greg Reilly

Associate Advisor

Michael Willenborg

Field of Study

Business Administration

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Open Access

Open Access

Abstract

The current management literature recognizes securities analysts as institutional monitors influencing managerial decision-making, but this research takes a deeper look at the interdependence between manager and analyst self-interests to reveal exchange behavior at the manager-analyst interface. Integrating agency theoretic arguments of self-interest and bonding with game theoretic principles of reciprocity and assurances, I examine how manager and analyst self interests shape managerial behavior. Drawing on a sample from the insurance industry from 2001-2012 I isolate a discrete managerial self-interested behavior by observing risk aversion in claim reserve levels. I find managers increase their self-interested behavior when analysts issue optimistic forecasts, but optimism has diminishing returns as managers perceive overly optimistic forecasts as challenging performance targets. Strong performance minimizes investor scrutiny, which strengthens the relationship between forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior. I further advance a model that incorporates analyst interest in obtaining internal access to firm operations and managers. When accessible managers coordinate with optimistic analysts managers are assured that overly optimistic forecasts will not constrain their self-interested behavior. However, contrary to expectations, managerial accessibility weakens the relationship between forecast optimism and managerial self-interested behavior, suggesting managers maximize their self-interested behavior when they restrict their accessibility.

Download

Share

COinS