Date of Completion
4-10-2013
Embargo Period
3-29-2015
Keywords
Philosophy, Epistemology, Intuition, Seemings, Justification
Major Advisor
Dr. Michael Lynch
Associate Advisor
Dr. Joel Pust
Associate Advisor
Dr. Donald Baxter
Associate Advisor
Dr. John Troyer
Field of Study
Philosophy
Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Open Access
Open Access
Abstract
Rationalism is the view that intuitions are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification. The first part of this dissertation is an exposition and defense of this view. I begin with an account of what it is for a proposition to seem true, arguing that seemings are a sui generis, irreducible propositional attitude that is importantly related to, yet distinct from, perceptual, memorial, and introspective experiences. I then defend the view that intuitions are seemings of a certain sort. I argue that seemings generally, and thus intuitions in particular, are a defeasible source of non-inferential justification, and I defend the epistemic value of seemings and intuitions against various objections. The second part of my dissertation assesses a familiar argument in defense of the epistemic value of intuitions. Roughly, the argument goes like this: “to have an argument which gives us a reason to reject the epistemic value of intuitions, one must rely on intuitions as though they had epistemic value. Thus, such arguments are self-defeating and are therefore unable to give us a reason to reject the epistemic value of intuitions.” Against this, I argue that some self-defeating arguments can give us a reason to not believe in the epistemic value of intuitions. I conclude my dissertation by addressing certain puzzles raised by the phenomenon of self-defeating arguments.
Recommended Citation
Silva, Paul Jr., "The Epistemology of Intuition and Seemings" (2013). Doctoral Dissertations. 27.
https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/dissertations/27