Date of Completion

8-9-2019

Embargo Period

8-7-2019

Keywords

truth, logic, pluralism, realism, anti-realism

Major Advisor

Michael P. Lynch

Associate Advisor

Dorit Bar-On

Associate Advisor

Jc Beall

Associate Advisor

Stewart Shapiro

Associate Advisor

Keith Simmons

Field of Study

Philosophy

Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Open Access

Open Access

Abstract

In this dissertation I analyze two theories, truth pluralism and logical pluralism, as well as the theoretical connections between them, including whether they can be combined into a single, coherent framework. I begin by arguing that truth pluralism is a combination of realist and anti-realist intuitions, and that we should recognize these motivations when categorizing and formulating truth pluralist views. I then introduce logical functionalism, which analyzes logical consequence as a functional concept. I show how one can both build theories from the ground up and analyze existing views within the functionalist framework. One upshot of logical functionalism is a unified account of logical monism, pluralism and nihilism. I conclude with two negative arguments. First, I argue that the most prominent form of logical pluralism faces a serious dilemma: it either must give up on one of the core principles of logical consequence, and thus fail to be a theory of logic at all, or it must give up on pluralism itself. I call this "The Normative Problem for Logical Pluralism", and argue that it is unsolvable for the most prominent form of logical pluralism. Second, I examine an argument given by multiple truth pluralists that purports to show that truth pluralists must also be logical pluralists. I show how this argument fails, and in fact, the truth pluralist is committed to logical monism. I then show how this type of logical monism can account for the logical behavior that the truth pluralist was hoping for, by engaging in a classical recapture program.

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