Document Type

Article

Disciplines

International Law

Abstract

How effective is legalization in the most difficult cases? That is, will states accept outcomes that cannot rely on self-interest, reciprocity, or centralized enforcement? Does legalization ensure compliance even when the stakes are highly salient and the risk ofconflict renewal and escalation is greatest? From past studies of international conflict, we know that territorial disputes are the most prone to conflict and most likely to lead to war. Exchanging territory or redrawing borders is most often a zero-sum game with few, if any, reciprocity incentives to abide by the change; indeed, there are domestic and international incentives to renew claims and conflict. Thus, issues involving territory (as compared to other issues) are "hard" cases for law and therefore compliance with any agreements or other arrangements that involve territory. This study examines whether the legitimacy of territorial transfers dampens the prospectsforfuture conflict and continuing territorial claims. Legitimacy (and illegitimacy) from internationalegal sources are examined, as well as those beyond legal concerns are examined A statistical analysis of all territorial transfers from 1816-2008 reveals that legal agreements provide legitimacy to territorial changes and lessen violent conflict and competition in the future, but often only under specified conditions. Nevertheless, illegitimacy from non-legal sources, namely transferring territory to an enemy, was more influential in affecting future conflict prospect.

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