Does Life Tenure Make Judges More Independent? A Comparative Study of Judicial Appointments in India
Document Type
Article
Disciplines
International Law
Abstract
For a long time, legal realists have argued that the process of constitutional adjudication can seldom be neutral or devoid of judges' value preferences and that judges of constitutional courts decide cases on the basis of pre-existing social and political commitments.I As a consequence, much attention has been focused on the appointment process of politically visible judiciaries. There is a vibrant comparative literature on the process of judicial appointments within different 2 national systems. Empirical scholars of constitutional law have long been concerned with questions such as whether the process of appointing judges should be political, whether judges should reflect the demographic characteristics of the society in which the court is situated, and for how long judges should serve on a court. This last question - length of tenure - is especially important in the U.S., where scholars have repeatedly argued against the system of life tenure for Supreme Court judges.
Recommended Citation
Chandrachud, Abhinav, "Does Life Tenure Make Judges More Independent? A Comparative Study of Judicial Appointments in India" (2013). Connecticut Journal of International Law. 533.
https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/cjil/533
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