Document Type

Article

Disciplines

International Law

Abstract

Many countries protect the moral rights of artists out of a romantic notion that these rights arise out of a deep and inherent tie between artists and their work.' Chief among these rights is the right of integrity, through which artists may prevent changes and mutilation of their art, even if those works and their copyrights have been sold.' The United States has been reluctant to jump on the international moral rights bandwagon, which has earned the United States much criticism from scholars and commentators.' But the right of integrity is an outdated concept for several reasons, and when considered in context with the digital technology easily available to the public, it becomes apparent that advocating for this moral right is unrealistic.

It is widely acknowledged by scholars that digital technology makes the enforcement of moral rights on an international scale a very complicated task.4 Before the rise of digital technology and the internet, works of art existed only physically, with fewer ways to alter them. Any such altered works generally stayed within the boundaries of a single nation.' Now, however, a variety of programs ranging in complexity from Microsoft Paint to Adobe Photoshop make art, especially digital art, more malleable than clay.' The internet then makes it simple to ignore international boundaries and transmit altered artwork to a global audience. Moral rights infringements can occur with a few clicks of the mouse. Yet in light of all this, academic commentators almost unanimously call for a stricter and more harmonized international moral rights regime, trying to protect artists out of reflex.

This outcry ignores the reality of the situation. Today's technology makes it so easy to alter works and transmit them that any attempt at international moral rights legislation is futile. Add to that the historical difficulties in harmonizing international moral rights law,' and what was an impractical task becomes complicated as well. More importantly, the new possibilities offered by digital technology require that the focus shift away from the interests of artists, who are not any worse off now than they were before. This note explains in detail why the new status quo brought about by digital technology renders attempts at international moral rights harmonization almost pointless. Part I provides a brief explanation and background information on moral rights. Part II explains why an attempt to harmonize the world's moral rights laws is difficult and impractical. Part III elaborates on why, even if such harmonization were plausible, the moral right of integrity is obsolete in the face of the digital world.

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