Document Type

Article

Disciplines

International Law

Abstract

This article examines three cases of attempted mediation of civil wars in the Balkans in the 1990s (Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia) and analyzes them with respect to the degree of legalization of the mediation. Legalization in this context means the framing of political disputes in terms of legal rights, principles, and entitlements in preference to more concrete political goals. This article builds a theory of the interaction of legalization and mediation around familiar insights from game theory, showing legalization frequently frames political disputes in ways that are less amenable to negotiated settlement. It argues that unthinking reliance on international law as the basis for a just settlement can, in fact, reduce the flexibility necessary to reach viable political solutions to armed conflict. It also shows that mediation is not just a reaction to conflict, but a parallel theater for conflict that can influence its course for good or ill. These three cases from the former Yugoslavia therefore challenge the common notion that legalization always has salutary consequences for the international system. The conclusion is that legalization can be detrimental to mediation in a number of concrete and predictable ways.

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