Document Type

Article

Disciplines

International Law

Abstract

On June 28, 2003, IG Metall, the German metalworkers union representing over 2.5 million workers in East and West Germany,' announced its biggest defeat since 1954. Thousands of metalworkers in East Germany, who went out on strike four weeks prior, returned to work.2 They were negotiating for a thirty-five-hour work week, gradually phased in by 2009, which would bring East German workers on par with their counterparts in West Germany.

Negotiations between IG Metall and the employer associations over a shorter work week began in January 2003.4 Employers took a hard line and negotiations went nowhere, even after IG Metall led several warning strikes.' With no agreement in sight, IG Metall decided to hold a strike vote in May 2003. Over three-quarters of its members voted in favor of the strike, which began on June 2, 2003.

he strike had devastating effects in both East and West Germany. Volkswagen took a big hit in both parts of the country, halting production on the Golf, its best selling model.' BMW had to lay-off 10,000 workers in West Germany, unable to pay their salaries.' Government officials began to voice concern about the effects of the strike on the German economy.

On June 27, 2003 the employer association made its final offer." The union had made significant concessions and proposed an "opening clause" to allow postponement of the reduction of hours to as late as 2011.12 Conversely, the employer associations argued that companies should be able to individually set their own hours, depending on their financial ability to decrease the work week. '" By the next day, it was obvious that the parties had reached an impasse. IG Metall decided to call off the strike.' Klaus Zwickel, leader of the union, conceded, "[t]he bitter truth is that the strike has failed."'" The union was giving up.

Union strife continued throughout the summer as Klaus Zwickel announced on July 21, 2003 that he would resign from his position early "rather than accept his deputy [Jirgen Peters] as his successor."' 6 Zwickel blamed Peters for instigating the disastrous strike and unsuccessfully tried to sabotage Peters' candidacy, even with the support of the German government behind him. 7 Although the executive board of the union was skeptical of Peters, rank-and-file members appreciated Peters' militant stance.' On August 31, 2003, IG Metall delegates, at the union's national convention, elected Peters as their new leader and Berthold Huber, head of the union's Baden-Wtirttemberg district, as vice-chair. 9 "The percentages of votes obtained by both candidates, 66% and 67%, respectively, were the lowest ever obtained in an uncontested leadership election in IG Metall's history."

The question now is whether the union can survive on radical strategies. and tactics, especially in a fragile economy. In fact, the government, under Chancellor Gerhard Schr6der, and employer associations are pushing for drastic reform, including cuts in social security;2 other health and pension benefits;" a broader right to terminate employees;23 and giving works councils greater power to negotiate with employers over issues traditionally left to unions. ' For the first time in fifty years, the future of IG Metall and other German unions is uncertain.

These recent developments in Germany cast doubt on the future of German labor relations. It is anyone's guess whether German unions will withstand these defeats or whether this is the beginning of a long, tough road ahead. This Note will predict the future of German labor relations by comparing the labor-management relationship in both Germany and the United States. Part II of this Note describes the actors of collective bargaining in each country. Part III will briefly characterize the political, cultural, and economic environment in which collective bargaining takes place. Part IV illustrates the process of collective bargaining in each country. Part V describes the differences between strikes and lock-outs in each country. Part VI outlines the legal framework, explaining how collective bargaining in each country is unique. Lastly, Part VII examines whether German unions can learn any lessons from their American counterparts and Part VIII predicts the German labor situation in the future.

Accessibility Requirements

1

Download

Share

COinS