Document Type

Article

Disciplines

International Law

Abstract

When Deputy Prime Minister of India L.K. Advani was asked what the focus of his meetings with the Americans would be during his visit to Washington last year, he replied: " . . . it would be the attitude and approach of my host which would affect many things."' As if to hint at the attitude the Americans might wish to display, Advani went on to recall fondly his visits to the Soviet Union in the 1970s, when India enjoyed close relations with America's Cold-War enemy: "You could see the warmth on the people's faces. Which is still there."' It would be a mistake to conclude from these remarks that the Indian deputy prime minister is motivated primarily by the emotional response of foreign nationals when calculating India's foreign policy. But it would not be entirely wrong to surmise that the man widely believed to be India's leader-in-waiting does desire, if not outright affection, at least just a little respect from the world's sole superpower. Also, it would be wise to note that the recent dramatic, and unprecedented, rapprochement between India and the United States has not made Advani forget that his country has close, historical ties with other great powers.

The emergence of the United States as the most powerful nation in history puts an emerging power such as India in a bind. If the United States is, in the words of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, "the indispensable nation," then for a country such as India it is also the unavoidable nation. India, like most of the rest of the world, with the possible exception of North Korea, has no alternative but to engage with the United States. It needs and desires a stable, productive relationship with the global hegemon. Indeed, it has much to gain in its own national and regional ambitions by hitching its star, as it were, to the great American Milky Way. In fact, a closer relationship with the United States is perhaps the most critical component in India's efforts to transform itself from a developing country and an emerging power into a developed country and a major world power.

Yet, India remains leery of being dictated to by the United States. It cannot, if it wishes to protect its own interests, allow itself to become, nor even be perceived, as a mere client state in the service of American hegemony. In a world tilting toward unipolarity, India must balance the inevitable engagement with the superpower against what multi-polar and multilateral options it can preserve or enhance. These include India's bilateral relationships with other major powers, such as Russia, China, and members of the European Union, as well as India's participation in regional organizations such as ASEAN and SAARC. In a changed world dominated by the United States alone, India is redefining its role in the Nonaligned Movement, of which it was a founder and a key leader for decades. In line with that tradition, India has embraced a leadership role for the interests of the "South," along with Brazil, China and South Africa, within the World Trade Organization, as evidenced in Cancun last year, and played host this past January to the WTO alternative, the World Social Forum (WSF), featuring anti-globalization activists from France's Jos6 Bov6e to India's own Arundhati Roy.' Perhaps the multilateral institution to which India attaches the most importance is the United Nations, in which India has historically played a major role, despite lacking a seat on the Security Council as currently configured.

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