Document Type

Article

Disciplines

International Law

Abstract

From the first reading, I have been captivated by Robert Wade's descriptions of corruption in southern India, and in particular by his description of the relationship between the government engineers in charge of water distribution and the farmers.' I was struck by how familiar that dance between the engineers and the farmers felt. Wade writes of government engineers who rake off substantial bribes from the farmers they serve. Sometimes the farmers pay the engineers to gain assurance that the water to which they have a right will be forthcoming; sometimes the farmers pay the engineers to gain water to which they would otherwise have no right.

In thinking about that narrative, it is useful to keep in mind the following concept, which I will discuss below: anti-corruption, or honesty, does appear to be, today, an international norm. Further, the narrative itself supports two conclusions which together form the primary focus of this paper. First, corrupt behavior is opportunistic and, therefore, inefficient. Thus, it is fundamentally undesirable even to those who approach these issues from a "law and economics" perspective. Second, corrupt behavior is not merely a passive, albeit noxious, reality. Instead, corrupt behavior is far more dangerous than that; it takes on a life of its own, and can infect and destroy an existing honesty norm.3 The way in which corrupt behavior infects is very similar to the way that overfishing destroys the oceanic commons and pollution destroys the atmospheric commons. Therefore, an international, concerted effort to support and protect the honesty norm is entirely defensible.

Accessibility Requirements

1

Download

Share

COinS