Three essays in market channel economics

Date of Completion

January 2006


Economics, Agricultural




This dissertation studies issues related to a market channel. The first essay uses IRI coffee data to estimate six games that model retail-manufacturer interaction with a mixed Logit demand specification. The six games include a vertical integration model, a vertical Nash game, a manufacturer Stackelberg game, a generalized manufacturer Stackelberg game, a retailer Stackelberg game and a generalized retail Stackelberg. The best-fit generalized manufacturer Stackelberg game indicates that coffee manufacturers have significant channel power and price transmission is very poor in the US ground coffee market. The second essay develops a price collar theory for linking prices in a market channel by regulation to redress channel power. Under certain conditions changes in post-regulation retail, wholesale, and input factor prices can be predicted. The theory is then applied to the Southern New England fluid milk market to demonstrate how price collars can be used to eliminate excessive profits. The third essay develops an efficient bargaining framework in a multi-brand setup and applies it to analyzing the strategic effect of private label products. Empirical results show that private label gives retailers bargaining power over factory brands in the Boston fluid milk market.^