Date of Completion


Embargo Period



Truth, alethic pluralism, deflationism, correspondence theory of truth, domains, mixed discourse, taste discourse, epistemic theories of truth, propositions

Major Advisor

Michael Lynch

Associate Advisor

Jc Beall

Associate Advisor

Marcus Rossberg

Field of Study



Doctor of Philosophy

Open Access

Open Access


In this dissertation, I argue that we should be pluralists about truth and in turn, eliminativists about the property truth. Traditional deflationists were right to suspect that there is no such property as truth. Yet there is a plurality of pluralities of properties which enjoy defining features that truth would have, were it to exist. So although, in this sense, truth is plural, truth is non-existent. The resulting account of truth is indebted to deflationism as the provenance of the suspicion that truth doesn't exist. But it would be hasty to simply classify the account as deflationary. Each of the 'truth-like' properties that it recognizes is highly substantive--that is, complex and explanatorily potent. So we should deflate truth by recognizing that it doesn't exist, but we should also recognize that one of the most vital tasks in truth theory is to discover the essences of the many truth-like properties. My aim here is to do precisely this.