Date of Completion

Spring 5-1-2024

Thesis Advisor(s)

Keith Simmons

Honors Major

Philosophy

Disciplines

Epistemology | Metaphysics

Abstract

In both George Bealer’s moderate modal rationalism (MMR) and Peter Kung’s modal evidence from imagination (MEI) intuition plays an indispensable role in modal knowledge. However, these modal epistemologies differ in whether modal knowledge is based on intuitions yielded by concepts or by imaginations. Both MMR and MEI take intuitions to be sui generis propositional attitudes, basic epistemic units, reasons for belief, and sources of evidence. However, MEI holds that sensory and intellectual content can prompt a rational intuitions. On the other hand, MMR is restricted to intuitions yielded by non-sensory content. According to MMR, intellectual intuitions about privileged concepts give us modal knowledge, whereas in MEI, intuitions generated by sensory imagination provide evidence for modal knowledge. There are a good reasons to believe that MEI is preferable as an intuition-based modal epistemology. Arguments against MMR, such as that necessary a posteriori propositions are semantically stable, that contrary to MMR’s claims, nonrational intuitions can contribute to a priori modal knowledge, and that concepts do not provide modal structure, if successful, weaken or rebut MMR. On the other hand, many criticisms of MEI fail, as one can give an account of modal evidence from narratives, knowledge of necessity and impossibility out of imagination, and the relationship between MEI and a priority. If successful, the arguments presented against MMR show it to be false, and the concept-based approach to modal knowledge questionable. If the defense of MEI is successful, it has been shown to withstand considerable criticism.

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