Document Type
Article
Disciplines
International Law
Abstract
The focus of this article is the chief mechanism of governance, public administration, and the way that corruption control in market democracies influences that mechanism. There are three issues related to the role of corruption control that make it an important topic for those interested in government ethics and the evolution of democratic government. First, corruption control, as it has evolved in the United States and elsewhere, is associated with bureaucratic pathologies that degrade the quality of public service. Second, the application of market mechanisms to public administration in the reinventing government movement in the United States (part of what is called the "third way" elsewhere) generally neglects the problem of official corruption. Third, the revival of interest in the idea of civil society in market democracies presents a means of evaluating the integrity potential of administrative reforms like the reinventing government movement.
These issues are related historically and mark out the development of corruption control in market democracies, and in the United States in particular. The first issue, the adverse effect of corruption control on public administration, includes the history of the anticorruption project in the United States, from the idealism of the Progressive Movement to the legalism of contemporary corruption control. The intertwining of bureaucratic pathologies and the anticorruption project motivated the reinventing government movement. However, in order to avoid the gravitational pull of rule-laden corruption controls, the movement has neglected government ethics almost entirely. Most recently, students of civil society have produced a body of work that promises to address the dilemma confronted by the reinventing government movement by breaking the hold of bureaucracy without abandoning government ethics. The following argument will explore the three issues in turn and conclude with prospects for corruption control in market democracies.
Recommended Citation
Anechiarico, Frank, "End-Runs and Hairy Eyeballs: The Costs of Corruption Controls in Market Democracies" (1999). Connecticut Journal of International Law. 331.
https://digitalcommons.lib.uconn.edu/cjil/331
Accessibility Requirements
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