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Social Movements and Mainstream Media: Framing Processes in an Ideologically Segmented TV News Field

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Malaena Jo Taylor, PhD

University of Connecticut, 2017

Abstract

This dissertation examines television news coverage of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements. Theories regarding the relationship between media and social movements are mostly based on outdated models of media and journalistic norms. In addition, the literature on framing is underdeveloped in that it has focused on the process of creating frames and the implications of collective action framing; less is known about the process of frame usage in non-print media. My dissertation addresses these two problems. I develop the partisan media paradigm, an improved framework for understanding media coverage of social movements, by reformulating a dominant theory of media protest coverage, the protest paradigm, to account for the realities of today's ideologically segmented media landscape. I contribute to the under-theorized area of framing by conceptualizing frames as gateways and identifying trajectories frames can take in mass media discourse. This research is important for three main reasons: a) it contributes to knowledge across the disciplines of sociology, political science, and communications studies; b) it compares a right-wing and a left-wing movement to help explain how for-profit media's adherence to the status quo bounds the mainstream news field with hegemonic limits that confine political discourse at both ends of the right-left spectrum; and c) it provides important insights into the process of media framing for other types of political and cultural discourse, beyond that of social movements.

Social Movements and Mainstream Media: Framing Processes in an
Ideologically Segmented TV News Field

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B.A., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2009

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A Dissertation

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

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at the

University of Connecticut

2017

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APPROVAL PAGE

Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation

Social Movements and Mainstream Media: Framing Processes in an
Ideologically Segmented TV News Field

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CHAPTER 1.

INTRODUCTION

Mass media coverage of social movements is the primary way that the public and political elites become informed about movements' existence, message, and actions (Koopmans 2004; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012), but the field of mass media in the U.S. has changed dramatically since many of the theories sociologists use to describe the relationship between media and movements were first developed. According to data from the General Social Survey,¹ 84% of Americans read a newspaper at least a few times a week in 1972. By 1982, just after the first 24-hour cable news network began broadcasting, this number dropped to 75%. In 2010, the number had plummeted to 54%. Americans have relied on television for most of their news for the past several decades,² yet most research on media coverage of social movements focuses on newspaper coverage. To complicate matters further, two of the three major cable news networks, Fox News Channel and MSNBC, have a blatant ideological bias, and market their programs to viewers who adhere to one particular political ideology or the other. Journalistic norms of objectivity identified by scholars in the 1970s no longer apply to all journalists across media outlets. Taken together, these facts complicate our understanding of media coverage of social movements.

¹ See <https://gssdataexplorer.norc.umd.edu/>. Accessed September 3, 2017. 2016 data on Americans' newspaper consumption shows that just 34% read a newspaper at least a few times a week.

² Kohut et al., "Americans Spending More Time Following the News." Pew Research Center, September 12, 2010 at <http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/legacy-pdf/652.pdf>. Accessed September 3, 2017.

The purpose of this research is to develop a more complete framework for analyzing media coverage of contemporary social movements. As a political institution, media have influence over political discourse (Cook 1998; Sparrow 1999) and media frames have an affect on public opinion (Detenber et al. 2007; Walgrave and Vleigenthart 2012).³ The institutional power that mainstream media wield in American politics deserves to be examined closely, but has not received adequate attention from social movement theorists. Although social movements target various institutions (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008), and many are not concerned with the state at all (e.g. Rupp and Taylor 2003; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004), this research focuses on political movements that target the state. Because of the highly partisan political climate of post-9/11 U.S. and the relatively recent phenomena of ideologically driven media outlets dominating the mass-consumed news media field (Levendusky 2013), it is important to reconsider the relationship between the media and political movements.

In this dissertation, I build on theories of media power based on framing processes in an ideologically stratified television news field, using the case of news coverage of two social movements. I ask: What factors influence how coverage of social movements changes over time? How can existing theories of media coverage of social movements, developed decades ago, apply to the contemporary movement and media fields? What is the process by which media actors (e.g. news anchors, field reporters, political pundits) use frames to describe social movements, and what can this process tell us about political discourse in general?

I examine two movements that have a slight overlap in motivations, with very different goals and tactics. The two movements began their activities during the first term of the Obama

³ Admittedly though, the relationship between media and public opinion is dialectic; see Gamson and Modigliani 1989

administration, about two years apart. The Tea Party Movement (TPM hereafter) started in early 2009; it is a conservative, right-wing movement focused on limited government, decreased taxation, and increased states' rights (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Zernike 2010). The "TEA" in tea party is often cited as an acronym standing for "Taxed Enough Already," which framed taxes as the movement's overriding concern. The most common refrain heard from TPM activists in 2009 and 2010 was that they wanted to "Take America Back," which framed ridding government of liberals and restoring a constitutionally limited government as their overall goal. The Occupy Wall Street (OWS hereafter) movement began over two years later, in the fall of 2011; it is a progressive, primarily leftist (though anarchists and libertarians played a large part as well) movement concerned with limiting corporate control of government and financial institutions, and increasing social welfare (Gitlin 2012). The rallying cry of OWS, "We are the 99%," framed class inequality as the movement's overriding concern.

In the next two sections, I briefly describe the origins, goals, motivations, and tactics of the two movements. I then compare the two movements and their relationships with the media, and explain what TV news coverage of these two movements can tell us about the process of media framing. I chose the TPM and OWS because they each represent one side of the left-right political divide in the U.S., they were both active during the first term of President Barack Obama, and they each received a great deal of media coverage over an extended period of time. I then define some key terms, and conclude this chapter with an overview of the dissertation.

The Tea Party Movement

Despite considerable attention from ethnographic researchers (e.g. Braunstein 2014, 2015; Prior 2014; Rohlinger and Klein 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Zernike 2011), the origins of the TPM are difficult to untangle. Small, local tea party protests were held as early as

January 2009. However, the grassroots 2008 Ron Paul presidential campaign, as well as tax protests such as those that took place in Connecticut in 1991 and California in the 1970s, were concerned with similar issues and used imagery such as the Gadsden flag (see Image 1), which came to be a symbol of the contemporary TPM. These are all very much tied to the principles and ideologies of the U.S. Libertarian Party. The organizers of “porkulus” protests in early 2009 claim to be the original Tea Partiers, and they are mostly libertarians (Bennet 2010; Zernike 2010).

The TPM as we know it today began in February 2009, shortly after CNBC commentator Rick Santelli delivered an live on-air, soapbox-style rant against the Obama administration’s proposed stimulus package (Quayle 2009). Santelli’s live and unexpected statements were widely publicized and led dozens of small groups that formed as early as 2007 to coalesce online and organize the first national Tea Party protest on February 27, 2009. Thousands of protesters took to the streets on February 27 bearing tea bags and signs with slogans such as “Taxed Enough Already” and “Free Markets, Not Free Loaders.” Throughout 2009 and 2010, TPM affiliated groups held scores of large-scale protests and smaller rallies.

From early 2009 through at least 2016, the TPM was made up of many small, grassroots groups,⁴ and a handful of nonprofit organizations such as Americans for Prosperity, the Tea Party Express, FreedomWorks, and the Tea Party Patriots (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Though the focus of particular groups may vary, the TPM is known for supporting “free market” capitalism, a static and literal reading of the constitution that limits federal government power but protects individual states’ rights (Schmidt 2011), and American patriotism. According to

⁴ In 2010, there were at least 2 thousand such groups listed on <http://www.teapartypatriots.org/allgroups.aspx>, last accessed March 9, 2011. Vanessa Williamson claims that just over one thousand of them were active groups that held regular meetings and many others were “just a guy with a website” (quoted in: Gordon 2013).

Image 1. The Gadsden Flag is a Revolutionary War symbol used by the Tea Party Movement and other right-wing groups



their mission statements,⁵ many of the groups opposed taxes, “big government,” socialism, communism, and the Obama administration.

The TPM did not utilize disruptive tactics in their protest events. In a book about the Tea Party published in 2009, Bruce Bexley lists “four easy steps to throwing your own Tea Party” (pp. 72-79). Step three instructs readers to contact local town officials to get permission for any event: “contact your local government to find out if you need a permit. Call both city hall and your county commissioner. Tell them you’re planning a peaceful demonstration and would like to know if you need to file any paperwork... Also tell them you’d like police present at the event if possible” (p. 73). Anecdotal evidence, including my own ethnographic research of a TPM

⁵ Downloaded from <http://www.teapartypatriots.org/allgroups.aspx> March 9, 2011 and analyzed in my Masters thesis (Taylor 2011).

group in New England in 2010, suggests many TPM groups followed this advice.⁶ The TPM's open embrace of law enforcement is evidence of their pro-status quo stance and sharply contrasts the Occupy movement's relationship with police.

Beginning with the 2010 mid-term elections, the TPM shifted from a protest movement to a wing of the Republican Party. In 2010, 138 Tea Party-affiliated candidates ran for seats in Congress, and 44 of them won their races.⁷ That year, Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann of Minnesota founded the Tea Party Caucus, a congressional caucus for members of the House of Representatives who support the TPM. The Caucus has been effectively inactive since 2013, though many of its original members are now members of the House Freedom Caucus, which was founded in 2015. According to Gary Jacobson, professor of political science at UC San Diego, there were between 50 and 80 "true believers" of tea party values serving in Congress in 2013.⁸ Many of those who won in 2010 and 2012 are still serving as of October 2017.

Scholars have shown that as movements become professionalized, their use of disruptive tactics decreases and their use of institutionalized tactics such as lobbying or filing lawsuits increases (Kreisi et al. 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994; McCammon 2003; Staggenborg 1988).

⁶ For example, the Richmond Tea Party requested a refund from city of Richmond, Virginia for \$10,000 in October 2011. Richmond Tea Party activists claimed they spent this money on permits and police presence for three rallies they held at the same site where Occupy Richmond activists set up their encampment (and Occupy activists did not pay for permits). The city responded by conducting a tax audit on the group; see <https://richmondteaparty.com/city-of-richmond-responds-to-our-refund-request/> (accessed August 30, 2017).

⁷ According to *The New York Times*, 129 Tea Party candidates ran for seats in the House of Representatives, and 9 ran for Senate seats. 40 won House seats and 4 won Senate seats. See: Kate Zernike, "Tea Party Set to Win Enough Races for Wide Influence." *The New York Times*, October 14, 2010. Accessed August 21, 2017 at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/us/politics/15teaparty.html>

⁸ Gordon, Claire. "By the Numbers: The Tea Party." *Al Jazeera News*, November 5, 2013. Accessed August 14, 2017 at: <http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2013/11/5/the-tea-party-bythenumbers.html>

The TPM began moving away from protest tactics and toward institutionalized tactics in 2010, when they began to formally infiltrate the Republican Party. TPM activists also ran for local and state offices, and started non-profit organizations. There are 24 Tea Party-affiliated nonprofit organizations listed at Pro Publica's Nonprofit Explorer website.⁹ All but one is a 501(c)(4) – the Tea Party Patriots Foundation, Inc. is a 501(c)(3).¹⁰ Only two – First Coast Tea Party, Inc. and North East Tarrant Tea Party, Inc. – filed 990 documents with IRS for 2016 as of August 2017.

As the movement grew, there was infighting as some groups engaged in a power struggle to control the message and image of the TPM. For example, the co-founders of the Tea Party Patriots had an internal struggle over the direction of the group and sued each other over control of the group's website and logo (Kochheiser 2011). The February 3, 2010 episode of *American Morning* on CNN includes a story about the power struggles within the TPM. CNN correspondent Jim Acosta says that some tea party activists fear that their movement "is about to be hijacked by one of the established parties," and activist Jim Knapp is quoted as saying "I don't think there's any question the GOP has their tentacles into the tea party." The story goes on to explain how the Tea Party Express is run by Republican elites who have infiltrated the TPM. The Tea Party Express began as a bus tour across the U.S. in the summer of 2009, but by early 2010 had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars, which it contributed to Republican congressional candidates. It is currently branded as "the largest and most successful political

⁹ Tigas, Mike, Sisi Wei, and Alec Glassford. August 10, 2017. Pro Publica Nonprofit Explorer. Accessed August 24, 2017 at: https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/search?utf8=✓&q=tea+party&state%5Bid%5D=&ntee%5Bid%5D=&c_code%5Bid%5D=

¹⁰ A major difference between these two types of nonprofit organizations is that 501(c)(3)s cannot endorse candidates or engage in political activities, while 501(c)(4)s can.

action committee within the Tea Party movement.”¹¹ As of this writing, the Tea Party Express most recently endorsed Republican Karen Handel in her 2017 bid for Georgia’s 6th Congressional District (which she won), and Josh Mandel in his bid for the 2018 Senate seat in Ohio.

The Occupy Wall Street Movement

The Occupy movement in the U.S. began with Occupy Wall Street in September 2011. Because the Occupy movement was typically referred to as Occupy Wall Street, even when protests were held in other locations under local names such as “Occupy Oakland” and “Occupy Boston,” I will use “Occupy Wall Street” (OWS) as the moniker to denote all Occupy protests and the movement in general.

Similar to the TPM, OWS seemed to have begun as the brainchild of several unrelated people within the course of a year, and ended up converging due to the influence of a mass media outlet. According to Todd Gitlin’s (2012) well-researched account of the origins of OWS, freelance journalist David DeGraw called for a “99 percent movement” in February 2010. This led to bank protests in June 2011, in which people across the country protested big banks such as Wells Fargo and Bank of America, closed their accounts, and moved their money to local credit unions.¹² Almost simultaneously, anti-corporate magazine *Adbusters* put out a call to occupy Wall Street in Manhattan and chose the date of September 17, 2011 to gather. The call was presented as a poster in the July issue of the magazine, which depicted a mash-up of phrases such

¹¹ Tea Party Express, “History.” Updated 2016. Accessed August 31, 2017 at: <http://www.teapartyexpress.org/history>

¹² On November 5, 2011, after OWS had picked up steam, activists organized another Bank Transfer Day, which they claimed as a great success. See: http://www.alternet.org/story/153019/move_your_money_day_a_success%3B_over_%2450_mil_lion_withdrawn_from_big_banks, accessed September 4, 2017.

as “social justice” and “protest plutocracy” in the shape of a fist. The bottom of the poster read “#OCCUPYWALLSTREET September 17th” and advised: “Bring tent.”

While *Adbusters* is an alternative media outlet and CNBC is as pro-capitalist and mainstream as media gets, each were responsible for giving an emerging movement a name and a date to begin national protests. In the case of OWS, activists ended up converging at Zucotti Park in Manhattan. They occupied that space from September 17 through November 15, 2011, living communally and sleeping in tents. Within weeks of the first occupation, cities across the U.S. – and even internationally in the U.K., Australia, Hong Kong, and elsewhere – had their own Occupy encampments.

Disruptive tactics are those that interrupt normal routines (Tarrow 2011). By occupying public (or in the case of Zucotti Park, privately owned) spaces for days, weeks, and even months at a time, OWS’s entire strategy was disruptive. OWS groups in various cities also held marches in which they disrupted traffic¹³ and even commerce activity.¹⁴ OWS attempted to shut down the New York Stock Exchange on November 17, 2011, but local authorities found out about their plans beforehand and were able to prevent them from doing so with blockades and a large physical presence of riot police. With the exception of a few isolated events in which individual protesters vandalized buildings or threw rocks or bottles at police, all OWS tactics were non-violent. However, that did not stop many media outlets from focusing on those isolated individuals and framing OWS activists as violent.

¹³ For example, Occupy Wall Street activists in Manhattan blocked vehicular traffic on the Brooklyn Bridge for hours on October 1, 2011, resulting in the arrests of over 700 protesters. See <https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/oct/03/occupy-wall-street-brooklyn-bridge-arrests>. Accessed September 2, 2017.

¹⁴ Occupy Oakland marched to the port of Oakland on November 2, 2011, effectively shutting down operations at the nation’s fifth busiest port for hours. See <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/occupy-oakland-shuts-down-port/>. Accessed September 3, 2017.

Because OWS approached protest from the virtually opposite political ideological orientation as the TPM, they did not seek out permits for their protest events. As scholar and Occupy Oakland activist Michael King (2013) argues, the protest permit itself is a form of state repression. Without permits, however, the state had even more ammunition to justify their oppression of peaceful protesters. Thousands of OWS activists were arrested in just the first few weeks of activity.

The majority of OWS arrests occurred after protesters had occupied a space for weeks at a time. OWS protesters occupied their spaces non-stop, overnight, for weeks or months, and police would eventually ask them to vacate. Those that did not vacate were usually arrested.¹⁵ There are exceptions to this rule, of course. Activists at OWS protests that took place at foreclosed homes were often arrested the day of the first protest for refusing to leave. There were also arrests for violent behavior, though whether protesters or police instigated the violence was not always clear. Some other charges include disturbing the peace or disorderly conduct, which sometimes occurred when small groups of protesters shouted really loudly, sometimes with bullhorns, to interrupt political speeches and foreclosure auctions.¹⁶ In contrast, no TPM activists were arrested at TPM protests; however, there is no record of TPM protests lasting more than a few hours long, let alone days or weeks or months.

An overarching message of OWS was the direct critique of capitalism. Through interviews with 192 OWS organizers, Mark Bray (2013: 4) found that 78% were anticapitalist. Anarchist leaders of the movement fought to keep their messaging palatable to a wider range of

¹⁵ A lot of arrests were justified by activists' illegal use of tents on public land. See quote from police here: <http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/3-arrested-after-police-raid-occupy-riverside-.html>. Accessed September 10, 2014.

¹⁶ Martin, Adam. January 25, 2012. "The Weirdest Things Occupy Protesters Get Arrested For." *The Atlantic*. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/weirdest-things-occupy-protesters-get-arrested/332658/>. Accessed September 4, 2017.

constituents without losing sight of their true goals, which were far more radical than liberal ideas of social justice (Bray 2013). Like the TPM, the OWS movement did target the state; however, and in contrast to the TPM, OWS also targeted corporations, the banking industry, and capitalism in general. It is hard to say whether the state was the primary or secondary target (Wang and Piazza 2016), but there is no denying that OWS targeted the state.

Like the TPM, OWS had its fair share of infighting (Gitlin 2012: 94-99), though no lawsuits were filed. Most OWS encampments had dispersed by winter of 2012, though May Day protests affiliated with OWS were held across the U.S. in 2012, and many OWS activists continue to converge at their original spaces every September 17 to mark the anniversary of the first occupation.

While the TPM turned from street demonstrations to electoral politics, OWS turned from street demonstrations to direct actions to create the societal change they want to see. OWS activists around the country helped people who had their homes foreclosed, Occupy Sandy activists helped victims of Hurricane Sandy, and Occupy Madison, the one non-profit organization affiliated with OWS,¹⁷ provides tiny houses for the homeless. As I will argue later, the prefigurative politics of the OWS movement tend to not be digestible by the mainstream media, and so these tactics fail to garner much mainstream press.

Comparison and Relationship with Media

Despite being ideologically opposed in terms of the goals each seeks, both movements were at least partly, if not substantially, motivated by concerns about government spending. Where TPM activists decried government spending on social programs and stayed silent on

¹⁷ Tigas et al. 2017. Accessed August 24, 2017 at: <https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/461581696>. See <https://occupymadisoninc.com/about/history/> (accessed August 24, 2017) for more information about Occupy Madison, Inc.


government spending on things such as corporate welfare and the military, OWS activists demanded more spending on social welfare and decried corporate bailouts, military spending, and political campaign financing. Both TPM and OWS protesters cited the bank bailouts as one of their main grievances, but each movement had a different motivation for protesting the bailouts, with OWS blaming government and Wall Street bankers, and the TPM blaming government alone.

While their grievances have some overlap, their goals are distinct (see figure 1). TPM goals include electing like-minded people to political office in order to achieve legislative goals such as lowering taxes, decreasing social welfare spending, and lowering the national debt. This stands in contrast to OWS statements that claimed they wanted nothing to do with political parties and rejected support from political elites of the Democratic Party (Fouhy 2011; Palmer 2011). OWS goals focused on economic justice and social welfare. As a way of further explaining the backgrounds of these two movements and describing the relationship between the media and each movement's constituents, I use public opinion data to discuss the ideological and cultural differences between OWS and TPM supporters and their media consumption choices in Appendix A.


In addition to their different goals and motivations, the movements employed different tactics. TPM activists conducted protests and rallies with permits and had no incidents of violence and no arrests, while OWS occupied spaces either without requesting permits or after permits had expired; thousands of OWS activists were arrested. Scholars have argued that institutionalized tactics such as those taken by the TPM should lead to outcomes that favor movements (Amenta and Young 1999), while others argue that disruptive tactics such as those used by some OWS activists are more likely to lead to success (Gamson 1975; Piven and

Figure 1. Some Goals and Grievances of the Tea Party and Occupy Movements

Grievances



Goals



Cloward 1979), but mass media frames could have just as much impact on outcomes as protest tactics alone.

Both movements were spurred to action, at least in part, by mass media outlets. The original idea and call to action for OWS came from *Adbusters* magazine (Gitlin 2012), and OWS received positive coverage from progressive media outlets, including cable news network

MSNBC, nationally syndicated radio shows *Democracy Now!* and *The Thom Hartmann Program*, and *The Nation* magazine. The TPM, by contrast, had help from far more mainstream media outlets. Rick Santelli's original call for a "Chicago tea party" aired on the business-focused cable news network CNBC. By April 2009, cable news network Fox News Channel (FNC) began promoting "tax day tea parties," with program host Glenn Beck going so far as to ask his viewers to register online at his website if they planned on attending a tea party protest.¹⁸

There is also an intriguing relationship between the TPM, television news, and public opinion research. In March 2009, Fox News/Opinion Dynamics conducted a national poll of 900 registered voters in which they asked: "Would you be willing to join a symbolic tea party to protest excessive government spending on April 15 2009?" Thirty-six percent of respondents said yes. Shortly thereafter, FNC program hosts Sean Hannity, Glenn Beck, Neil Cavuto, and Greta Van Susteren announced that they would be doing live versions of their shows at Tea Party protests on April 15, a symbolically significant date because it is the deadline to file taxes in the U.S. During the week leading up to April 15, FNC began heavily promoting what it called "FNC Tax Day Tea Parties."¹⁹

These ties with mass media outlets have implications for the ways movements are presented by the media, with outlets that promote mobilization of a movement being more likely to provide biased, positive coverage of movement events. At the same time, media outlets that

¹⁸ On the April 8, 2009 episode of *The Glenn Beck Program* on FNC, Beck promoted the tax day tea party protest in San Antonio, where he would be attending and broadcasting his program live. He said "If you are going to the San Antonio tea party Wednesday, make sure you go to 'GlennBeck.com' and register right now." He ended that day's program with: "Hopefully, the folks all around the country will join us at these tea parties."

¹⁹ For example, on the April 12, 2009 episode of *Fox News Watch*, anchor Bill Hemmer promoted what the on-screen chyron called "FNC Tax Day Tea Parties" hosted by the four network personalities: "Can't get to a tea party? Fox Nation hosts a virtual tea party. You can check it out on the site for the tea party in your area."

target audiences from the opposite side of the political spectrum may be more likely to provide negative or delegitimizing coverage of a movement. The current reality of our ideologically segmented television news marketplace complicates the way scholars have traditionally explained media coverage of social movements. In this dissertation, I combine insights from the political science, communications, and sociology literatures on mass media and social movements in order to provide a unique framework for analyzing media coverage that is applicable to the contemporary U.S. media field.

Significance of the Study

In this dissertation I develop an improved framework for understanding news coverage of social movements, which I call the partisan media paradigm, and a framework for understanding the framing process in television news coverage, which I call the gateways model. The partisan media paradigm has two components. First, as I demonstrate in chapter 3, the extent to which a media outlet covers a social movement in a negative or positive way is dependent on the perceived ideology of the media outlet's intended audience. The second component, demonstrated in chapter 4, is that substantive coverage of social movements can, and often does, occur even when negative frames are used in news reports, and regardless of whether or not the coverage is focused on protest activity. In chapter 5, I pull from the partisan media paradigm to develop the gateways model for understanding the process by which framing devices act as gateways to either open paths to substantive coverage or to shut off communication.

My framework reformulates a dominant model for understanding media coverage of protests, the protest paradigm. The protest paradigm, which I describe in great detail in chapter two, was developed in the early 1990s and has come under scrutiny over the past 5 years, yet no critics have been able to offer an improved framework for understanding protest coverage. My

proposed solution, which accounts for the realities of today's ideologically segmented media landscape, overcomes the problems recently identified in the protest paradigm literature without tossing the theory out entirely, and contributes to knowledge across the disciplines of sociology, political science, and communications studies. In addition, identifying the trajectories frames can take will contribute to sociology's subfield of collective behavior and social movements by providing important insights to our understanding of media framing processes for social movement coverage. Understanding these processes will help scholars understand the process of media framing for other types of political and cultural discourse, and will help activists tailor their messages in such a way that the message falls within the hegemonic limits of television news while still communicating the problems and potential solutions they have identified.

Definitions

Throughout this dissertation, I use a few words and phrases that can have different meanings across and within disciplines. In this section, I provide definitions for each word or phrase that is important to my overall argument but could have a contested meaning.

Status quo

Literature on media and social movements that I cite throughout this dissertation tends to discuss media coverage of social movements in terms of whether or not the movement challenges the status quo; however, they all neglect to define the term "status quo" (Boyle et al. 2012; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999; McFarlane and Hay 2003; Reul et al. 2016; Smith et al. 2001; Trivundza and Brlek 2017; Weaver and Scacco 2013). Therefore, I provide a definition of status quo that can apply to the movements described in prior research, as well as to the TPM and OWS.

The *New Oxford American Dictionary* defines status quo as “the existing state of affairs, especially regarding social or political issues.” Some take this to mean the political state of affairs on a micro scale that changes depending on which political party occupies the White House or holds the majority of seats in Congress (e.g. Cook 1998). When I use the phrase, I mean the existing social and political state of affairs in the U.S. on a macro scale. For example, statements or concepts that uphold the status quo in the U.S. include: capitalism is the best economic system, people who serve in the U.S. military are patriotic and heroic, the U.S. government is legitimate, the middle class is the most important class, the economy should always be growing, American patriotism is a virtue, the constitution should be revered, etc. Those who challenge the status quo by offering a critique or suggesting an improvement to the overall system tend to be marginalized in mainstream media, if they are paid any attention at all.²⁰

I do not mean to suggest that there is and always has been one and only one status quo; the concept itself is a social construction. What can be considered “status quo” is unique to each nation-state and varies across time and society. Clearly, cultural norms change over time in any society, and the status quo changes along with it—albeit both tend to happen at a relatively slow pace. In addition, “status quo” may not carry the same meaning to all actors within a single society or subculture. For instance, some in the U.S. might say that same-sex marriage challenges the status quo of the “traditional,” heterosexual family structure, while others argue that it upholds the status quo of marriage as a state-sanctioned institution (e.g. Conrad 2014). The question of whether advocates for same-sex marriage are challenging or upholding the status quo may be blurry or ambiguous, and convincing arguments can be made on either side.

²⁰ Gitlin (1982: 250) refers to this as “the hegemonic limits” of television.

However, most OWS and TPM goals, like the goals of social movements that “protest paradigm” scholars have typically used in case studies, clearly fall on one side or the other of this somewhat blurry pro- and anti-status quo divide. For instance, a statement like “unregulated capitalism is the best economic system for a free and fair society” upholds the economic status quo in the U.S. While TPM activists would agree with this statement, OWS activists would firmly disagree. Scholars tend to concur: the TPM is a pro-status quo movement (Haltinner 2016; Weaver and Scacco 2013), and OWS is an anti-status quo movement (Bray 2013; Morgan and Chan 2016).

There are some exceptions: some TPM activists held more radical views, and some OWS activists were more moderate. TPM activists who advocated for abolishing the Federal Reserve and those who were blatantly racist were pushed out of the mainstream TPM and cast as “fringe elements.” Likewise, some liberal and progressive OWS activists had no desire to overthrow capitalism; instead, they argued that the system could be improved through government regulation. Like any large social movement, both the TPM and OWS had some heterogeneity and not all members agreed on everything. In both cases, the activists who aligned more closely to the status quo, or were at least capable of framing their arguments in hegemonically acceptable ways, were the ones who were most respected by mainstream media outlets such as FNC and MSNBC. As media and communications scholars have long shown, mainstream media always support the status quo, whether consciously or not (Donohue et al. 1995; Lee and Solomon 1990; McFarlane and Hay 2003; McLeod and Detenber 1999; Sparrow 1999).

For example, TPM activists were consistently framed as patriotic by most TV news outlets, based on the way they dressed (American flags adorned many of their t-shirts), some of the protest signs they carried (e.g. “Stop shredding our Constitution”), and the words they used to

describe themselves (many local groups included the word “patriots” in their monikers). OWS, on the other hand, was only presented as patriotic by some alternative media outlets and by MSNBC—that is, until Iraq war veteran Scott Olsen was badly injured by police at an Occupy protest in Oakland, CA. Because American hegemonic norms tell us that anyone who serves in the U.S. military is inherently patriotic, Olsen’s injury and subsequent hospitalization was presented by most TV news outlets as a heroic and patriotic stand against an oppressive and overly aggressive police force. The one consistent message across media outlets, which aligns with the status quo, is that patriotism is a *good* thing. An argument that patriotism is a negative quality that divides and dehumanizes citizens of the world, for example, would be a challenge to the status quo.

Mainstream and Alternative Media

Protest paradigm literature, which I reference throughout this dissertation, dichotomizes media into mainstream and alternative categories (Boyle et al. 2012; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999; Shahin et al. 2016; Trivundza and Brlek 2017), but fails to provide a clear definition for either of those terms. Hertog and McLeod (1995: 3) are the only ones to offer a clear definition:

The mainstream press—influenced by the hiring of traditional journalists, powerful social actors and institutions, and the expectations of mass audiences—produces content that is generally consonant with mainstream social values and ideology (Lippman 1965). This content contrasts with that provided by the alternative press, which services a very different audience and draws creative talent who view the world in a very different way.

To be more clear, I add that mainstream media reach a large audience and are for-profit and corporate-owned, while alternative media are smaller scale, targeted to niche audiences, and offer critiques of the status quo or hegemonic norms. In this dissertation, I only examine mainstream media coverage.

Some might argue that FNC and MSNBC should not be considered mainstream media. Indeed, FNC anchors regularly criticize what they call mainstream media, thus positioning themselves and their network as an alternative media source. Although both MSNBC and FNC present information in different ways based on what they perceive their target viewers deem acceptable, both reach millions of viewers, are run by for-profit corporations, and neither of them challenge the status quo. Anchors on MSNBC will agree with OWS activists who say there is a problem with the current capitalist system, but they stop short of anything beyond regulating that system. They would not support, nor give serious airtime to, activists who argue for a complete restructuring of the entire economic system. Likewise, anchors on FNC agree with TPM activists who criticize the Obama administration's economic policies, but stop short of publicizing the "fringe" elements of the movement that have called for abolishing the Federal Reserve. As I will argue in chapter 3, FNC and MSNBC are neither mainstream nor alternative in terms of the dichotomy presented by protest paradigm scholars; instead, they fall into a third category of mainstream, yet ideologically driven, news.

Alternative media outlets are those that directly challenge the status quo. On the right, there are radio programs such as *The Alex Jones Show*, magazines such as *The New American*, and websites such as infowars.com and Breitbart.com. On the left are radio programs such as *Democracy Now!*, magazines such as *Adbusters* and *Jacobin*, and websites such as shadowproof.com and truth-out.org. All of these cater to narrow audiences and offer direct critiques of hegemonic norms.

Frames and Framing

Originally conceived by Erving Goffman (1974), framing involves the social construction of a social phenomenon; he defined frames as "principles of organization" (p. 10). To

sociologists David Snow and Robert Benford (1992: 137), a frame is “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.” Media scholar Robert Entman (1993: 52) is more succinct, defining the verb form of the word: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text.” In general terms, a frame is a boundary that focuses on some elements while leaving other elements out of view.

Drawing attention to these different definitions of frames and framing (along with even more definitions I do not list above), communications scholars have recently called for a realignment of our understanding of framing. Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar (2016: 8) urge scholars across the disciplines of sociology, communications, and political science to “abandon the general term ‘framing’ altogether and instead distinguish between different types of framing.” In this dissertation, I focus on media frames and media framing.

Media framing explains how one event can be described in completely different ways by different journalists without altering any facts about the event. For example, if 100 activists gather in a public space and 90 of them stand peacefully, holding protest signs that clearly articulate their message, while 5 of them are dressed in fairy costumes and engage in some sort of performance art, and another 5 throw glass bottles at police, three distinct stories can be produced. Depending on which frames journalists choose to present, one might tell the story of peaceful protesters who have an important message, another might tell the story of a few ridiculous individuals dressed in costumes that have no apparent meaning, and another might tell the story of a violent protest in which activists viciously attacked police. The act of creating and telling each of these stories is media framing in practice.

Media frames are the words and phrases used by journalists and other media actors to convey their interpretation of some phenomenon. In the example above, the journalist who tells the story of the peaceful protest will use a “peaceful” frame, along with other frames that might normalize or legitimize the movement (e.g. “normal,” or “patriotic”). The journalist who tells the story of the activists in fairy costumes will use frames that highlight individuals’ appearance or behavior (e.g. “freak,” or “ignorant”). Finally, the journalist who tells a story of activist attacks on police will use frames that demonize protesters (e.g. “violent,” or “radical”).

Chapter Outlines

In chapter 2, I outline my theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship between mass media and social movements. I give an overview of the literature on the relationships between social movements and mass media, where those approaches are lacking, and how I will address and develop them in later chapters. I integrate literature on media power (Cook 1998; Hallin 1986; McChesney 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Schudson 2002; Sparrow 1999), the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999), and framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Maney et al. 2009; Snow et al. 1986) in order to form the partisan media paradigm, a more complete framework for analyzing U.S. television news coverage of social movements in the 21st century. The partisan media paradigm views the television news field as a source of power that promotes and upholds hegemonic norms, which affects social movements and, ultimately, social change.

In chapter 3 I use mixed methods, analyzing over eleven thousand TV news transcripts to track the ways in which TV news media discuss social movements and the characteristics of activists over time. I ask whether the protest paradigm framework is still relevant in a contemporary TV media field in which some networks target narrow niches based on political

ideologies. The protest paradigm is widely cited in sociology, communications, and political science research on media coverage of social movements. It argues that all mainstream media cover protest events in ways that marginalize protesters, commensurate with how radical a movement is perceived to be (McLeod and Hertog 1999). I find that news coverage of each movement differs in measurable, patterned ways depending on the tactics of each movement and on their respective alignments with the status quo. In line with the protest paradigm (McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999), coverage of OWS is driven by violence and arrests, while coverage of the TPM switches from largely adhering to the protest paradigm to ignoring TPM protest events and focusing on a more legitimized form of electoral politics coverage. Additionally, and in contrast to the protest paradigm literature, I find that some TV news outlets shift between mainstream and alternative categories (McLeod and Hertog 1992) depending on whether they are covering the TPM or OWS, and that this shifting can best be explained using an adapted version of Hallin's (1986) theory of spheres of political discourse. My findings lead to the formulation of the partisan media paradigm, which accounts for an ideologically segmented mainstream media field.

In chapter 4, I use quantitative methods to test whether TV news transcripts covering the TPM and OWS support or contradict prior research on framing and substantive coverage of social movements (Amenta et al. 2012; Boykoff 2006; Taylor and Gunby 2012). While some scholars have argued that coverage of violent protests opens the door to more coverage of the underlying issues (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002), others found that the violence frame does not lead to more substantive coverage (Boykoff 2006). Still other research has found that coverage of protest events does lead to increased activist quoting and paraphrasing, but that coverage of social movements engaged in institutionalized tactics leads to more coverage of the

movement's overall message (Amenta et al. 2012). While my results support some of these findings, they contradict others. My results also add to existing research by expanding on the negative frames used in prior research (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Taylor and Gunby 2012), and adding positive frames. Taken together, these results provide a more nuanced picture of the relationship between various framing devices and substantive reporting than prior research has offered.

In chapter 5, I use discourse analysis to examine the framing process. I move the under-theorized framing literature forward and uncover the processes through which specific framing devices lead to substantive coverage. I illustrate how positive frames are used to emphasize aspects of a social movement that adhere to hegemonic norms on most TV news networks. On TV networks whose target audience views a social movement as outside of the sphere of consensus, negative frames are used more frequently and emphasize aspects of a social movement that violate hegemonic limits. Nevertheless, both positive and negative frames occur alongside substantive coverage of movements' issues. My explanation of the gateways model shows how negative and positive frames take specific paths to substantive coverage, exposing a communication pattern in which one frame opens up the path for other frames to be used.

In the final chapter, I explore the implications of these findings. I give further interpretations of my results, including what those results mean in the context of the contemporary media field and how they apply to broader political discourse beyond social movements. I also suggest directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MEDIA AS POLITICAL INSTITUTION

Introduction

In this dissertation, I integrate literature on media power (Hallin 1986; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; McChesney 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012), the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999), and framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986) in order to form a more complete framework for analyzing media coverage of social movements in the 21st century. Based partially on Cook's (1998), Sparrow's (1999), and Schudson's (2002) conceptualizations of news media as political institutions, this framework views the media field as a source of power that promotes and upholds the status quo, which effects social movements and, ultimately, social change.

In this chapter, I provide a summary of the theoretical framework that guides this project. I start with the theoretical foundation of the news media system as a political institution. I then give an overview of the state of the literature on the relationships between social movements and mass media, where those approaches are lacking, and how I will address and develop them in later chapters. Next, I explain the "protest paradigm," the problems with this framework, and how I incorporate insights from the organizational, political economy, and cultural models of the news in order to improve the protest paradigm model so that it is relevant to our contemporary media field. Finally, I give an overview of the literature on media and social movement framing and argue for a theoretical reorientation that pushes framing beyond the typology of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivating, toward a processual understanding of the trajectories of some framing devices.

News Media as Political Institution

Mass media are linked to political, business, educational, and religious institutions and are therefore embedded in society's power structure (Tichenor, Donahue and Olien 1973; Donohue, Olien, and Tichenor 1985; Paletz and Entman 1981; Altschull 1984). The power wielded by the American mainstream media, though limited, is treated as a taken-for-granted fact these days. However, numerous scholars in sociology, communications, and political science have developed theories that attempt to explain media power in the U.S. Cook (1998) argues that the news media are essentially an "intermediary institution" in American politics; media occupy spaces inside and outside of government, and perform roles similar to those of political party organizations and interest groups (pp. 109-110). The power media have to shape the public's understanding of political and economic issues has been questioned by some, but enough empirical research has been conducted since the 1970s to give us a good understanding of just how powerful the news media, as an institution, really is.

There are four dominant approaches to understanding news media that cut across the sociology, political science, and communications literatures: the organizational approach, the political economy approach, the cultural approach, and the agenda setting approach. The first three are primarily concerned with how the news is made, while the agenda setting model is concerned with the effects of the news on consumers. However, none of these are mutually exclusive; indeed, all are essential for explaining how media function as a political institution. I give a brief overview of each in order to provide a baseline for my overarching framework of media as political institution. I argue for a theoretical reorientation of two lines of research – the protest paradigm and media framing of social movements – each reorientation utilizes this framework as a theoretical base.

The Organizational Approach

The organizational approach to the news views the professional norms of journalism (Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; Shoemaker and Reese 1996) and the organizational practices of media outlets (Clayman and Reisner 1998; Shoemaker and Reese 1996) as the main determinants of what ends up getting covered in the news. This approach sees journalists as gatekeepers; they decide what news is worthy of being reported, and they choose which sources to use for their stories. The organizational practices of journalists and their editors are key to deciding whether a social movement event will make it into the paper or onto the television screen (Clayman and Reisner 1998). In order to get media attention, social movements must either take action that is spectacular enough to be considered newsworthy (Wouters 2013), or must have elite allies that help them gain access to make their news available to journalists (Amenta et al. 2009).

The organizational approach recognizes that who journalists rely on as sources impacts what qualifies as news and how that news is presented (Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Schudson 2002; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). Political and corporate elites are the main source of news in the U.S., and so the information that journalists receive for their stories is first filtered through those elites (Gans 1979; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). Journalists rely on political and corporate elites because they are considered “official” sources; elites have an unspoken legitimacy that adds importance to news stories. It is also efficient; these elites want their version of events to be told, so they make themselves available to journalists. This added legitimacy and increase in the efficiency of news production ultimately means that mass media, inadvertently or not, supports the status quo²¹ (Detenber et al. 2007; Fishman 1980; Sigal 1973; Soley 1992).

²¹ Of course, reliance on official sources is not the only ‘cause’ that leads to the ‘effect’ of media supporting the status quo. There is a structural bias inherent in journalism “that favors only

The organizational approach also recognizes the importance of professional ethics; most journalists pride themselves on being neutral observers and strive for objectivity in their reporting (Gans 1979). The professional and ethical codes journalists abide influence how a social movement is presented in a media report—as violent, peaceful, rational, or crazy, for example. Because the fundamental operational mode of journalists is to support the status quo, any social movement that challenges the status quo will likely get negative coverage while a social movement that supports the status quo is likely to get positive coverage; that is, if either movement receives any coverage at all.

There are several problems with the organizational approach. First, it is limited in that it underestimates forces that constrain social movements, and overestimates possibilities for change (Ryan 1991). In addition, the view that journalists strive for objectivity is contradicted by the fact that two different media outlets can present the same event in vastly different ways (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). It also places too much emphasis on the power of institutionalized norms in news routines. Boydston (2013) found that while institutional norms in newsmaking have by far the greatest influence on headlines, public opinion also has a significant effect on the news stories that end up getting front-page billing. Finally, it treats news corporations as isolated worlds, and fails to locate news practices in the larger political economy. However, as I will explain in the next subsection, the organizational model of news media is not contradicted by the political economy approach—it is strengthened by it.

The Political Economy Approach

Economic power inequality is the central theme of the political economy approach to news media. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) illuminate a link between the organizational

certain political actors, political events, political programs, and political issues” (Cook 1998: 111). This structural bias is rooted in culture and inherently supports the status quo.

perspective and political economy perspective: “the larger and more complex a media corporation is, the less influence professional routines will have on content” (p. 266). The political economy approach sees media as controlled by corporate monopolies, and a media field that acts as a propaganda machine for those who hold power in society. While the organizational approach emphasizes the news routines of journalists, the political economy approach recognizes that many of those routines are controlled by a small number of very powerful people whose ultimate goal is to maintain that power.

In order for a for-profit news media outlet to stay alive, it must sell advertisements. Therefore, for-profit media is, to a certain extent, beholden to the corporations that buy advertisements. This can prevent journalists from reporting news that might reflect badly on some corporations. For example, in 1998, investigative journalist Roberta Baskin of CBS was banned from airing her exposé on Nike sweatshops after Nike offered to financially sponsor the Olympics programming airing on their network (Tremblay 2012). In a similar vein, the rise of “infotainment” or soft news (Schudson 2003) might be partly due to higher ratings for such television programming and higher readership of tabloids; a bigger audience means that a media outlet can charge advertisers more, which means more profits for the corporate media. Infotainment is aired at the expense of more hard-hitting stories that would strengthen democracy by educating the public (McChesney 1997).

Some social movements have anti-capitalist agendas; their ultimate goals are very much against the interests of a for-profit corporate media structure. This suggests that anti-capitalist social movements will get shallow or negative coverage – if any coverage at all – and pro-capitalist or corporate-sponsored movements will receive more coverage than other types of movements, or more positive coverage than negative. Movements that are not politically

oriented and do not challenge the status quo might enjoy the same advantages. Movements opposed to specific corporations or corporate practices may not get any coverage if those corporations also have controlling interests in a television network, newspaper, magazine, or radio station.

The political economy approach to media centers on ownership; because media ownership is centralized in the U.S., with 6 corporations currently controlling 90% of all media consumed in this country, the powerful are able to easily maintain the status quo. Bagdikian (1997) argues that the lack of diversity in media ownership is directly responsible for the lack of diversity in the media marketplace of ideas: “A public used to a narrow range of ideas will come to regard this narrowness as the only acceptable condition” (p. 67). This view would lead us to expect that pro-capitalist activists will be covered positively or depicted as peaceful and patriotic on the news, and anti-capitalist activists will be covered negatively as ignorant troublemakers and shown being arrested or engaging in violence. We would then expect the majority of media consumers to accept these depictions as reality, thereby reinforcing the status quo.

Capitalism also affects which news stories become major topics of discourse. Because news outlets must compete with each other, when a “hot” story is covered on one outlet it tends to be repeated across multiple outlets that fear losing their audience if they fail to cover the story (Boydston 2013). However, the capitalist economy has led to an evolving media structure in which cable news channels attempt to appeal to narrow audiences (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; Levendusky 2013; Guardino and Snyder 2012), so those media outlets with ideologically narrow audiences may offer versions of the same story that diverge from mainstream broadcast news.

A major limitation of the political economy approach is that it denies the importance and possible effectiveness of alternative media. News generated by not-for-profit outlets is available,

though it is not as easily accessed as for-profit media. Nevertheless, the Internet now provides greater access for newsmakers and consumers alike to gather information—be it factual information or not.²² The corporate media are not the be-all and end-all of news in the U.S.; however, the medium of television news is overwhelmingly dominated by for-profit corporations.

Critics note that, using the logic of the political economy approach, a social movement protesting against economic inequality should not get any news coverage since their cause undermines that of the corporate media owners; yet, those movements do sometimes get attention from mainstream media. However, these critics ignore the fact that coverage of protests that oppose the status quo is almost exclusively marginalizing and negative (Dardis 2006; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999; Shoemaker 1984). Positive coverage occurs only if a movement does not challenge the status quo (Barker-Plummer 2002; Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Kensicki 2001). In addition, the majority of social movement actions never get any press at all (Sobieraj 2011; Wouters 2013). By giving negative coverage to anti-status quo movements, or ignoring them altogether, the corporate owners' interests are not undermined. In chapter 5, I explain how different television networks focus on aspects of social movements that either adhere to or violate hegemonic norms, and use either positive or negative frames to describe characteristics of the movement depending on the target audience of the network.

The Cultural Approach

The cultural model of newsmaking views power as interwoven with social practices, not just nested in economics as the political economy approach sees it, and not confined to work routines as the organizational approach sees it. Tuchman (1978) argues that the news is a social

²² The dissemination of “fake news” on social media became a major concern in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election (Isaac 2016).

construct (shaped by the organizational practices of reporters) and the media create and modify shared meanings, thereby shaping public definitions. That does not mean media producers alone control culture; the cultural approach recognizes that media are embedded in existing cultures, and use existing cultural symbols to shape their stories and reinforce stereotypes (Schudson 2002: 260-1).

A cultural approach sees “media as an arena of ideological struggle in which social forces contend to define an issue and its significance” (Ryan 1991: 18; see also Ferree et al. 2002). Social movements attempt to frame issues in ways that help their cause, but news producers can shape a social movement’s message, possibly distorting it. Even if media are not the sole producers of culture, they are still central to public discourse; journalists and news producers are the mediating factors between social movements and their targets (Koopmans 2004; Ferree et al. 2002). The way a movement is framed in the news has an impact on the public’s perception of the movement, and activists have little control over the way media choose to frame them (Sobieraj 2010). For example, in his study of the media’s representation of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Gitlin (1980) argues that, although coverage of the movement increased mobilization at first, the delegitimizing frames the media used to depict SDS eventually led to its unraveling.

A cultural approach to the news also includes an understanding that news producers make assumptions about what their audience will find interesting or acceptable, and journalists cover the news in ways that align with these assumed cultural values. Hallin (1986) developed the concept of “spheres of discourse” to explain why some issues get serious media attention; if a social movement’s goals are in line with hegemonic norms, news media will cover the movement in a serious way rather than a delegitimizing way. Hallin described news items as

falling into one of three spheres of political discourse: a sphere of consensus, a sphere of legitimate controversy, and a sphere of deviance. Topics in the sphere of consensus are those on which there is widespread agreement; because of this perceived agreement, news producers take for granted that the audience will agree with the journalist's view on a topic and do not feel the need to present an opposing view. Topics in the sphere of legitimate controversy are those on which the public holds differing opinions; recognizing this, journalists report on those topics in balanced and objective ways. Topics in the sphere of deviance are perceived by journalists to fall so far outside of traditional norms that they are portrayed negatively, or not portrayed at all.

Critics of the cultural approach claim that it denies the consuming public's agency in interpreting and defining situations. For example, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) argue that audiences also make their own meanings out of what they see in the media; people are not passive consumers. Entman (1989) acknowledges the agency of the media's audience, but argues that neither the media nor the audience alone can control the ways in which media mold public opinion. In addition, while Hallin (1986) applied his "three spheres" theory to mainstream media in general, I recognize that not all media outlets attempt to appeal to the widest audience possible. Wade (2011: 1181) makes the case for the idea that "under the conditions of consensus, reporters can act much like activists." She argues that, "By choosing frames that facilitate consensus, journalists can engage in advocacy and still make claims to objectivity" (ibid.: 1182). In chapter 3 I argue that – although journalistic norms require objectivity for controversial issues – FNC and MSNBC cater to partisan audiences, and so their professional norms allow journalists to advocate for causes and social movements when the cause or social movement falls within the sphere of consensus for that specific audience. I offer a reinterpretation of Hallin's spheres that sees the spheres as applying to each individual media

outlet's *intended* audience. Thus, news media geared toward a conservative audience will have a different sphere of consensus than one that targets a more liberal audience.

Media Agenda Setting

While the organizational, political economy, and cultural models focus on the newsmaking process, agenda-setting theory focuses on the effects of that process. Agenda-setting theory borrows from the cultural and political economy approaches; six large corporations control mainstream media outlets in the U.S.—they set the agenda and mold culture (McChesney 1997). According to this theory, the media do not tell us *what* to think, but what to think *about* (Cohen 1963; McCombs and Shaw 1972). The more an issue or topic is covered in the media, the more that issue or topic will be seen as important by the public.

Experimental and longitudinal research has provided evidence to support agenda-setting theory; TV news does affect which problems American viewers take to be important (Cook et al. 1983; Iyengar et al. 1982; Iyengar and Kinder 2010). The relative agenda setting power of TV versus newspapers differs depending on the situation, with newspapers usually having the stronger effect (McCombs 2004). Researchers have also found that the media's power of agenda setting is weakened among those who are more politically engaged in general, "presumably because their priorities are more firmly anchored" (Iyengar and Kinder 2010: 118). In other words, those who are more informed about politics in general are more likely to hold strong opinions about what is or is not important, regardless of whether it is being covered in the mainstream news. However, the majority of Americans are not very politically engaged, and are thus more easily swayed by mainstream media to think that the most important issue is whatever is getting the most attention in the news (see Alexander 2010).

This is pertinent to social movements because media control whether a movement's agenda gets publicity. Whether the news coverage is negative or positive, getting publicity puts the issues that the social movement is concerned with on the public agenda. Even if the coverage is shallow, and does not offer an in-depth look at the issues (Boykoff 2006; Sobieraj 2010), the movement itself becomes fodder for public debate. Are the Tea Partiers a bunch of right-wing extremists? Are the Occupiers a bunch of filthy anarchists? Agenda-setting theorists believe that if these movements are covered in the news, then news consumers will see them as important and might look further into topics to decide for themselves whether or not the issues a movement is fighting for have merit.

Members of the general public are not the only consumers of news, of course. Political elites also consume news media, and are affected by it as well. Walgrave and Vliegenthart (2012) found that media act as an intermediary between social movements and government in Belgium. Their analysis of a large data set encompassing seven years of protest events and parliamentary and legislative actions showed that the more media coverage a protest gets, the more likely it is to make it on the political agenda. The authors conceptualize the political agenda as an increase in votes held on an issue rather than votes cast *in favor of* an issue. While it may not always lead to legislative changes, the attention alone is indicative of a change in the political agenda. Thus, protests can affect the political agenda, but they do so by first getting media attention.

The Contemporary U.S. Media as Political Institution

Taken together, these four dominant models of the news point to the general idea that the news media are a political institution. While it may appear oxymoronic to refer to the plural of medium as a singular institution, sociologists define institutions broadly as “social practices that

are regularly and continuously repeated, are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and have a major significance in the social structure,” and political institutions as those that “regulate the use of, and access to, power” (Abercrombie et al. 2006: 200). The mass media is a social institution in the sense that it acts as an agent of socialization, perpetuating societal values and norms (Croteau and Hoynes 2003), and a political institution in the sense that media gatekeepers (i.e., producers and owners) decide who gets access to this particular arena of the public sphere (see Ferree et al. 2002) and thus who has the power to shape definitions of what constitutes “news.” Although some scholars refer to the media as a set of institutions (e.g. Schudson 2002; Starr 2004), the meaning is the same: this “set” is bound together and functions as a single institution on a broad level. The biases, sociocultural and economic worldviews (cultural model), and professional practices of journalists (organizational model), along with the organizational and economic considerations of media corporations (political economy model) all lead media to perpetuate hegemonic norms (Gitlin 1982), or what some call “the status quo” (Detenber et al. 2007; Dimmick and Coit 1982; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Hertog and McLeod 1995; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien 1973). This sets the agenda, not only for what the media-consuming public takes to be important, but for the legislative agendas of political elites as well (Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012).

While political scientist Douglass Cater (1959) was the first to argue that the news media are a “fourth branch of government,” Timothy Cook (1998) was the first to set forth “a clear model that sees the news media as a coherent intermediary institution without which the three branches established by the Constitution could not act and could not work” (p. 2). Cook justifies this assertion by detailing the symbiotic relationship between the three branches of government and the media, showing that government relies on the media to disseminate the news.

Although he does touch on the political economy and cultural perspectives, Cook relies most heavily on the organization model of the news to justify his assertion that news media are a political institution. Though he acknowledges differences between media outlets, Cook argues that the process of newsmaking, dictated by professional and organizational norms of journalism, causes news outlets to be more alike than they are different. For example, news organizations “converge on official sources to benefit from information subsidies, which gives them all a similar reliance on political power” (p. 76). In addition to similarities in news processes, news *content* is similar across outlets and “likeness is at its height among those news organizations that partake of the same format and conceptions of an audience, such as the three broadcast networks [ABC, CBS, and NBC]” (p. 80). As an important aside, Kerbel (1994) found that coverage of the 1992 Presidential election on ABC (one of the three major broadcast networks) was very similar to CNN (one of the three major cable networks). This indicates “the strong similarities of news processes and news content across modalities (television, radio, newspapers, and newsmagazines), size of organization, national or local audiences, etc., [which] point to the news media as a single institution” (Cook 1998: 84).

While he makes a persuasive argument for his theory, Cook fails to note that mainstream media support the status quo. He even goes so far as to criticize other scholars for asserting that mainstream media do support the status quo (p. 97). This could stem from his orientation as a political scientist. As a sociologist, I see the status quo as the existing social structure and values, on a macro level (see chapter 1 for my full definition). Cook seems to see status quo on a micro scale, specifically entailing the existing state of affairs according to whoever is in political power at a given point in time. Thus, Cook might see a reporter criticizing a Republican-controlled Congress for drafting a bill without holding hearings as anti-status quo because of its

criticism of the party in power, while I would argue that it is supporting the status quo by subtly perpetuating the idea that Congress has legitimate authority to hold hearings, draft bills, and debate and vote on them. Rather, a criticism of the *existence* of Congress would be anti-status quo. In fact, when Cook (1998) writes: “journalism, as a collective enterprise across individuals and indeed across organizations, implicitly contains an entire series of assumptions about how the world works, and how the world should work, that bring with it a limited set of political interpretations” (p. 166), I see that as an implicit acknowledgement that news media uphold the status quo.

Another political scientist, Bartholomew Sparrow (1999), relies on the organizational, cultural, and political economy models about equally in his rationalization of the news media as a political institution. In contrast to Cook, Sparrow shows “that the media may be considered essentially conservative in the sense of upholding the status quo” (p. 137). He comes to this conclusion from a political economy perspective that focuses on media ownership, advertising, the profit motive, and conflicts of interest, but also the culture of news organizations, the hierarchical relationship between media owners, executive producers, and the journalists who are subordinate to them both, reliance on a limited number of “official” sources – i.e. political elites – and the limited repertoire of news frames.

Sparrow argues that the news media are not “public guardians, able to protect the national interest against government corruption” (p. 2). Rather, the media are highly constrained in their coverage of politics and economics because they are subject to external control from political elites who choose what information to give journalists, and from corporate executives who make the final decision on what will be printed or broadcast. Referring to the limited repertoire of frames journalists use, Sparrow claims (p. 124):

[T]he casting of news in nationalist, democratic, pro-capitalist, anti-communist, and individualist frames is consistent with the pro-market and strong-defense positions of the U.S. government... these frames are also consistent with the continuation of existing budgets and administrative configurations.

Thus, the way journalists frame news stories also supports the status quo. This is true of mainstream media, including mainstream news outlets that cater to partisan audiences.

Although the press in the first hundred years of America's existence as a sovereign nation is described as being highly partisan (Ladd 2012; Starr 2004), today's press, especially cable news networks Fox News Channel and MSNBC, is even more polarized and contentious (Levendusky 2013). This is important to consider because partisan media outlets cover issues so differently, which suggests that there is not a singular public that is affected by media coverage, but a segmented public that is affected by only the specific media they consume. Although the partisan media tend to cover the same stories, they each advance different interpretations of those stories. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) found that the effects of partisan media are minimal; rather than changing people's minds, partisan media simply attract those who are already politically like-minded, and reinforce their existing views.

The ideologically segmented television news field and the status of news media as political institution have implications for social movements. The cultural, organizational, and political economy aspects of newsmaking each influence which movements receive coverage, how much coverage they get, and the quality of that coverage (e.g. shallow or substantive, positive or negative). In the next section I review the relevant literature on the specific relationship between news media and social movements.

Social Movements and the News

The best explanations for the relationship between media and social movements incorporate more than one of the newsmaking models described above. Coming from the

organizational, political economy, and cultural perspectives, scholars have examined how news routines, media ownership, and social movement goals and tactics explain why movements seek media attention, why and how movements get media coverage, what kinds of coverage they get, and how that coverage influences some social movement outcomes. In this section I give a brief overview of the state of the literature on media and social movements and identify areas in need of further development, which I address in this dissertation.

Researchers have found that most social movements receive little to no news coverage (Sobieraj 2011; Wouters 2013) and those that do get media attention tend to receive negative or shallow coverage (Amenta et al. 2009; Boyle et al. 2012; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011). News media tend to focus on drama and spectacle rather than substance; descriptions of protests focus on the activities and behavior of activists, especially if violence is involved, while largely ignoring the issues being protested (Amenta et al. 2009; Boykoff 2006; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011). Coverage can bring public attention to the movement itself, but rarely to the substantive issues the movement would like to be brought to the public's attention; this undermines movement agendas (Smith et al. 2001). However, some research shows that favorable coverage does occur in some circumstances (Amenta et al. 2012; Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Weaver and Scacco 2013), and in-depth coverage can occur even when negative framing devices are used in that coverage (Taylor and Gunby 2016).

Many studies have shown that news media are critical of groups that challenge the status quo (e.g. Entman and Rojecki 1993; Gitlin 1980; Hertog and McLeod 1995; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999; Murdock 1981; Shoemaker 1984; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011) while other types of movements tend to be covered positively (e.g. Kensicki 2001; Milne 2005; Rohlinger 2002; Walgrave and Manssens 2000). Shoemaker (1984) found that movements that are

perceived as anti-status quo, or deviant, (such as the KKK and the Communist Party) are delegitimized by media, and movements perceived as mainstream or low in deviance (such as the League of Women Voters, the NRA, and the NAACP) are legitimated. There is a relative consensus among scholars of media and social movements that the more radical change a movement seeks, the less impartial and objective news coverage is, and movements have little to no control over how the media frame their issues (Baylor 1996; Entman and Rojecki 1993; McCarthy et al. 1996; Sobieraj 2011).

Most research on the relationship between movement outcomes and media focuses on the media's effect on movement mobilization. It has been established that more mass media coverage, no matter what kind, leads to increased movement mobilization (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Banerjee 2013; Koopmans 2004; Lipsky 1968; Myers 2000). The consequences of negative or positive coverage have not received as much scholarly attention as the consequences of coverage in general, but negative coverage may lead to movement disintegration if the issues the movement attempts to bring into the public consciousness are ignored or ridiculed to the point of damaging a movement's credibility (Gitlin 1980). In addition, if the movement has political goals, the elites who are capable of changing legislation to address movement concerns may not take the movement seriously, and will ignore their concerns.

Others conceptualize media coverage as a movement outcome in itself, asking questions such as why some movements get more media coverage while others get less (Amenta et al. 2009; Andrews and Caren 2010). Scholars have found that protests that are violent and/or involve arrests get more news coverage (Amenta et al. 2009; Amenta et al. 2012; Earl et al. 2004; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; McCarthy et al. 1996; Murdock 1981; Sobieraj 2011). The focus on violence at social protests may be explained by cultural values – the American

consumer's "deep fascination with violence and transgression" (Schudson 2002: 262) – just as much as organizational journalistic norms. Some suggest that when media cover violence and/or arrests, they fail to cover the issues or to give activists the chance to speak for themselves (Boyle et al. 2012; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999). Other scholars have argued that coverage of the violence at the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle actually led to more in-depth coverage of the issues being protested (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002). Boykoff (2006) challenged this argument directly, and found no correlation between the violence frame and substantive coverage. However, he did not examine different types of the violence frame, instead combining descriptions of actual violence, the potential for violence, and a lack of violence into one broad frame. In chapter 4, I test whether various forms of the violence frame are correlated with substantive coverage.

Despite the problems with negative and shallow coverage, social movements still seek out media attention. Although there are multiple public spheres (Habermas 1996), mainstream media is the dominant force, or "master forum" (Ferree et al. 2002), and movements see mass media as the primary mode of access to the public sphere (Sobieraj 2011). When a social movement gets media attention, it informs the public of the movement's very existence and can increase mobilization just by making it known to the public that such an organization is out there (Gitlin 1980; Vliegenthart et al. 2005). News coverage is also necessary for achieving outcomes such as standing and positive framing, which can help social movements to influence political agendas (Koopmans 2004; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012).

Indeed, some movements are covered positively or legitimized by mainstream media. Positive coverage of a movement with political goals can lead to political elites taking those concerns seriously and making at least symbolic gestures to address the concerns (Walgrave and

Vliegenthart 2012). However, positive coverage has only been found to occur if a movement does not challenge the status quo (Barker-Plummer 2002; Kensicki 2001). Barker-Plummer (2002) argues that the National Organization for Women was seen as legitimate and not as big a challenge to the status quo as radical feminists; they operated through institutionalized means, so they got positive coverage. Kensicki (2001) argues that the uniformly positive coverage of a deaf students' movement relied on the following factors: organized protests were peaceful; elites were assimilated within the protest movement; the movement had corporate sponsors; activists worked well with, and had access to, journalists; and the focus of the movement was narrow (one goal).

While not challenging the status quo can help a social movement get good press, the perception that a movement is for or against the status quo can vary by media outlet. Hallin (1986) developed the "spheres" concept to explain why some issues are not covered objectively by mainstream media, and explained how protests against the Vietnam War moved over time from the "sphere of deviance" through the "sphere of legitimate controversy" to the "sphere of consensus," although the public's view of this changed faster than the mainstream media's. As I will explain in more detail in chapter 3, not only can perceptions change over time, but different media outlets can present opposing perceptions simultaneously. For example, a program airing on Fox News Channel might present the Tea Party movement as a group of average Americans holding a patriotic rally, but flip the channel to MSNBC and you might see the Tea Party movement presented as a bunch of racist freaks who hate the President, protesting policies they do not understand.

While news coverage of protests is important, relatively few scholars have paid attention to the fact that movements are often covered for reasons that have nothing to do with protest

events. Some suggest that news outlets operating in competitive capitalist systems imitate each other, often chasing the hot new story of the day (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Boydston 2013; Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2010). This can lead to a social movement becoming a story in itself. Seguin (2016) argues that this kind of media attention to social movements is due to positive feedback: “like other positive feedback systems, media attention is path dependent and routinely punctuated by large cascades of attention” (p. 998). If one movement becomes the “hot new story,” journalists sometimes go out of their way to mention the movement in relation to some other news item; in other words, “past attention encourages future attention” (Seguin 2016: 1016). This happened with both the TPM and OWS, but the TPM “cascade” lasted much longer. News coverage of protest events changes over time and is sensitive to ongoing political processes such as the response of the government to contentious protest behavior (Gottlieb 2015; Oliver and Maney 2000). In chapter 3, I explore how TV news coverage of the TPM and OWS change over time in patterned ways related to the tactics of each movement *and* with their respective alignments with the status quo.

Amenta and colleagues (2012) examine both protest and non-protest focused coverage, and take a “story-centered” approach to evaluating the quality of media coverage a social movement gets. They find that when a story is initiated by disruptive social movement action (which the authors define as any protest, march, or demonstration, whether or not it includes civil disobedience), the movement’s message is less likely to be covered. In contrast, when a story is initiated by institutional action such as running candidates for office or fighting to pass legislation, the movement’s message is more likely to be covered (p. 89). Their study is limited in two important ways: they are looking solely at the case of the Townsend Plan, which was active in the first half of the 20th century, and the only form of media they examine is newspaper

coverage. In chapter 4, I test whether this theory holds for two 21st century movements and their television (TV) coverage.

While it is important to consider news coverage that does not center on protest events, the fact remains that most coverage of social movements does focus on protest events. One strand of theory that I have not touched on yet, but which has significantly contributed to our understanding of how and why social protests get such negative coverage, is the protest paradigm. This model is based on the idea that media outlets adhere to different journalistic paradigms, an organizational approach that recognized multiple journalistic routines (Chan and Lee 1984). In the next section, I describe the origins of the protest paradigm and explain how it developed, recent critiques of the model, and how I intend to address those critiques.

The Protest Paradigm

The idea that there are three distinct journalistic paradigms of protest coverage originated with Chan and Lee (1984) and was further developed by a handful of U.S. scholars in the communications field into what is now known as the protest paradigm. A product of news production traditions and norms, the protest paradigm is “a routinized pattern or implicit template for the coverage of social protest” said to be followed by mainstream media outlets in the U.S. (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 311). In contrast to the three journalistic paradigms of protest coverage that Chan and Lee (1984) describe, McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999) argue that mainstream U.S. media outlets tend to adhere to one paradigm when covering social protest. Once thought of as a rather straightforward framework that applies to all mainstream news coverage of protest events, the protest paradigm has recently come under scrutiny (Reul et al. 2016; Trivundza and Brlek 2017; Weaver and Scacco 2013). In this section, I give an overview

of the protest paradigm literature and offer a modification of it that addresses the problems highlighted by these recent critics.

Origins of the Protest Paradigm

Chan and Lee (1984) developed their theory based on the reality that the press in Hong Kong “is linked to political party organizations, is loyal to party goals, and caters to partisan audiences” (p. 185). Chan and Lee use the concept of a paradigm to mean “a ‘metaphysical’ world view or gestalt that defines the entities of concern, indicates to journalists where to look (and where not to look), and informs them about what to discover” (p. 187). Arguing that political ideology structures journalistic paradigms of protest coverage, the authors observed three distinct journalistic paradigms: the rightist paradigm was more likely than the leftist and the centrist to support the status quo, to politicize civil protest that does not support the status quo (i.e. to compare it to other political events and to blame it on external manipulation rather than genuine grass-roots activity), and to define protests as defying traditional morality.

Journalistic paradigms “make newspapers attribute different cause-and-effect relationships to civil protests and assign varying degrees of support to protesters” (Chan and Lee 1984: 188). In Hong Kong, the rightist paradigm “cannot condone civil protests in which the low rises against the high” and stands closer to “the status-quo-minded policies of the Hong Kong government” while the leftist paradigm represents the exact opposite of the right (ibid.: 189). Centrist newspapers would “support a *mild* civil protest participated in by a *large* segment of potential readership with a *clearly just cause*” (ibid. 190, emphasis in original). I agree with Weaver and Scacco (2013) that the U.S. media landscape of today looks far more like what Chan and Lee describe of Hong Kong in the 1980s than it did in the 1980s and 90s when U.S. communications scholars began formulating the protest paradigm. However, Weaver and

Scacco, who correctly point out that the TPM is a status quo-oriented movement, fail to connect this concept to journalistic paradigms of FNC, MSNBC, and CNN.

Scholars in the U.S. saw journalistic paradigms as a foreign phenomenon and reconceptualized this framework as “the protest paradigm” to fit the U.S. context. To Chan and Lee (1984), the political ideology with which each media source is aligned constitutes a distinct paradigm, while McLeod and Hertog (1999) conceptualize the protest paradigm in the U.S. context to be a form of social control that all mainstream media exert over society. Rather than three journalistic paradigms of protest coverage, McLeod and Hertog argue that there is one paradigm of protest coverage in the U.S. media, which they call “the protest paradigm.” The work of other protest paradigm scholars focuses on what factors determine adherence to the protest paradigm (e.g. Boyle et al. 2012), how closely mainstream media outlets adhere to this specific paradigm (e.g. Reul et al. 2016; Weaver and Scacco 2013), whether media outlets in other countries adhere to the protest paradigm (e.g. Shahin et al. 2016; Trivundza and Brlek 2017), and how adherence to the protest paradigm affects viewers (e.g. Detenber et al. 2007). I argue that this U.S. media context has changed, and that the TV news landscape in the 21st century U.S. now looks very much like the newspaper landscape of Hong Kong in the 1980s. Thus, recent claims that the protest paradigm is no longer a useful framework (Weaver and Scacco 2013) are misguided, while claims that it cannot be applied across all media (Reul et al. 2016) are on the right track but do not offer a solution.

The U.S. Protest Paradigm

McLeod and Hertog are widely credited with developing the protest paradigm for the U.S. context. Inspired by research on media and protest movements from a decade earlier (e.g. Chan and Lee 1984; Shoemaker 1984), McLeod and Hertog developed the protest paradigm to

explain how negative coverage of social protest comes about. Shoemaker (1984) argued that the more radical a movement is perceived by journalists, the more likely that coverage the group receives will be negative. McLeod and Hertog (1999) used this as a base from which to argue that the more radical a movement is perceived to be, the more closely journalists will adhere to the protest paradigm when covering the group (p. 311). McLeod and Hertog theorized that the more a social movement challenges the status quo, the more forcefully the mainstream media will exert social control by using marginalizing frames (i.e., adhering to the protest paradigm) in its coverage of the movement. This was supported by Boyle and colleagues (2012), who also found that a group's tactics are the main determinant of whether journalists will adhere to the protest paradigm when covering a social movement; more extreme or militant tactics led to stronger adherence to the protest paradigm.

Where Chan and Lee focus on a Hong Kong news press that can clearly be divided into left, right, and centrist camps – each with more than one newspaper to act as a loudspeaker – McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999) focus on a U.S. press that they see as entirely centrist and driven by journalistic norms, as the organizational model of media would lead us to expect. Although they also include what they call “alternative media” – newspapers produced by and for narrow subcultures (e.g. the anarchist press) – McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999) assume uniformity across mainstream media outlets that does not apply in today's ideologically segmented media field.

Hertog and McLeod (1995) compared coverage of anarchist protests across media types and formats and found that the differences between mainstream and alternative media accounted for far more variance than different forms of media (TV vs. newspapers) and news organizations (e.g. city- vs. state-wide newspapers). However, TV news today is far different from what it was

in the 1990s. In part due to the neoliberal shift in U.S. media (Guardino and Snyder 2012), it is segmented in such a way that different networks have different journalistic norms (what Chan and Lee refer to as journalistic paradigms). Therefore, a social movement could be seen by one network as deviant while another network finds it within the sphere of consensus (Hallin 1986).

The protest paradigm was developed using the cases of anarchist and left-leaning social movements, but it can apply to any movement. Weaver and Scacco (2013) were the first to test whether the protest paradigm can be applied to a right-wing movement. They found that it can, and that the application of marginalizing frames is conditional on the ideological leaning of each media source (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 62). However, their explanation – “Marginalization tactics once used *against* left-leaning protests have now been adopted by a left-leaning cable news outlet” (ibid.: 74) – is rather simplistic and misses the larger point. They could have used this case to argue that mainstream media outlets can sometimes act much like alternative media outlets. Instead, they conclude that “news coverage of protest movements can no longer be discussed in terms of ‘the’ protest paradigm if use of legitimation and marginalization frames continues to fall along the lines of party or ideology” (ibid.: 78).

While I agree that the original conceptualization of the protest paradigm needs to be readjusted to account for today’s evolved media landscape, I disagree with Weaver and Scacco’s (2013) argument that “the” protest paradigm needs to be thrown out entirely. While they see marginalizing and legitimizing framing devices falling along the lines of partisan political ideology, I argue that these framing devices fall along the lines of spheres of consensus. Each political party or ideology has its own sphere of consensus – what is considered acceptable or deviant. Indeed, McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999; also see Hertog and McLeod 1995) did not claim that all media adhere to the protest paradigm; rather, they distinguished between

mainstream and alternative media, and made many of the same claims that Weaver and Scacco (2013) make. Thus, it is not the protest paradigm as a general framework that needs to be thrown out, but the idea that media outlets fall into either one of two categories – mainstream or alternative – and that those categories are static.

The protest paradigm can still be a useful framework, but criticisms against it need to be addressed. Reul and colleagues (2016) are on the right track when they say that we need to “let go of the notion that the protest paradigm is an univocally applied set of social control mechanisms occurring in similar ways across media” (p. 4). But they fall short of offering a solution to the problem. Trivundza and Brlek (2017) come closer when they argue that a major shortcoming of the protest paradigm is that it focuses exclusively on negative framing and neglects the potential for positive coverage. They mention Hallin’s spheres, but fail to articulate a redefinition of the protest paradigm that accounts for all variations of legitimizing and delegitimizing coverage. They also fall into the same trap that Weaver and Scacco (2013) find themselves by ignoring the fact that the concept of journalistic paradigms originated with the idea that different media outlets can cover the same movement in opposite ways (Chan and Lee 1984). Likewise, Boyle and colleagues (2012) admit that the rise of partisan news networks such as FNC and MSNBC “suggests that the notion that more extreme groups will be treated more critically needs continued review and analysis as the nature of news production and dissemination continues to evolve” (p. 139).

In today’s TV news field, cable news outlets FNC and MSNBC may act more like alternative media or more like mainstream depending on what they are reporting. It is not just that alternative news sources treat protesters who challenge the status quo in a sympathetic way—it is that each news source has its own political orientation; some protest movements will

be against it, others in support of it. In Hallin's (1986) terms, each news outlet has its own sphere of consensus. In chapter 3, I develop an integration of Hallin's spheres and the protest paradigm to explain how today's TV news field will treat a given social movement.

Framing

One cannot discuss media coverage of social movements without discussing framing. As Entman (1993: 52) succinctly states: "To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text." The framing perspective was conceived by Erving Goffman (1974) and was developed by social movement scholars to explain mobilization (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). Frame analysis, the empirical compliment to the framing perspective, has been developed by sociologists and communications scholars since Goffman's (1974) seminal work. While decades of scholarship have brought us a depth of knowledge on frame development and framing effects, framing still remains under-theorized and conceptually vague across disciplines (Cacciatore et al. 2016). In this section I give a brief overview of framing as it applies to social movements and media research, and identify areas in need of further development.

A Brief Overview of the Framing Perspective in Social Movement Research

David Snow and colleagues, inspired by Goffman's (1974) work, developed the social psychological perspective on collective action framing. Collective action framing refers specifically to the tactics social movement actors employ to organize their ideas in order to mobilize potential activists (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988). To Snow and Benford (1992: 137), a frame is "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and

sequences of actions within one's present or past environment.” In other words, frames are boundaries that focus on some elements while leaving other elements out of view.

Snow and Benford (1988) identified three components to collective action framing. Activists identify the problem (diagnostic framing), identify a course of action (prognostic framing), and create a call to action (motivational framing). These diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames are actively created and re-created through social interaction among activists and between activists and constituents, the media, and other power holders (Evans 1997). Gregory Maney and colleagues (2005) added to our understanding of collective action framing by showing how activists can construct their frames as a challenge to hegemony, harness hegemony for their own subversive purposes, or use both strategies as a hybrid form of framing (see also Coy et al. 2008; Maney et al. 2009).

A movement puts its own frames forward, hoping media outlets will pick up on them and use these frames in their coverage. A frame must have resonance – similar to what Snow and Benford (1992: 140) call “potency,” qualities that culturally resonate with constituents – if it is to succeed in provoking reactions from the media or the public (Koopmans 2004). Coordinating and testing frames for cultural resonance at the national level has been a successful strategy that movements have used to get media to focus on their preferred frames (Rohlinger 2002). Drawing on master frames is the most effective way of doing this because master frames are those that are most culturally relevant and accessible (Snow and Benford 1992). For example, an OWS master frame was economic injustice and a TPM master frame was out-of-control government spending. Journalists and pundits whose voices are amplified by media outlets use competing frames, which “chip away at the mobilizing potency of the original master frame” (Snow and Benford 1992: 150).

Marc Steinberg (1998: 845-846) critiqued Snow's and Benford's perspective for focusing on "deliberate and focused persuasive communication" and argued for more examination of framing's discursive foundations. Steinberg, inspired by the work of sociocultural psychologists (e.g. Wertsch et al. 1995), views framing as a type of discourse that can both empower and constrain the production of meaning; "hegemony can be achieved by drawing on interpretive repertoires to bound the dilemmas that can be represented...a cornerstone of hegemony, is the capacity to construct silences within common sense" (Steinberg 1998: 855). In chapter 5, I show how some frames can create silence, in effect shutting down dialog. In addition, Steinberg calls on researchers to investigate "how the boundaries of the field shape the construction of their repertoire" (ibid.: 858). In chapter 5, I examine specifically how TV news as a bounded field shapes the way frames are used in a discursive process.

Media create meanings that are consumed by the public, thus the way that media frame issues and events has consequences (see Detenber et al. 2007; Iyengar 1991; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; McLeod and Detenber 1999; Nelson et al. 1997). While we know a lot about the process of creating frames, and the implications of collective action framing (e.g. Burke and Bernstein 2014; Coy et al. 2008; McCammon et al. 2001; Prior 2014; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow and McAdam 2000; Zoch et al. 2008), we know less about the process of frame usage in non-print media. In his "Insider's Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective," Benford (1997: 410) called for "the development of a sociology of framing processes" that has yet to be fully addressed. In chapter 5, I move beyond the processes of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing to explain the process of framing that occurs within TV news discourse, which I call the gateways model. My analysis of media framing of two different

social movements over multiple years of coverage addresses Benford's (1997: 411) call for "systematic empirical studies across cases, movements, and time."

Frames and Framing in Media Research

It is important to consider the ways in which media frame social movements since news reports are often the first way that the public hears about a movement and its grievances (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Stryker et al. 1999), and research has suggested that the way media frame issues has an affect on the potential for movement success (Banerjee 2013; Gamson 1998). "The movement-media transaction is characterized by a struggle over framing" (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993: 118) in which activists put forth their collective action frames, and media outlets adhere to journalistic and organizational norms to frame their news stories. Social movements attempt to transform dominant discourses (Naples 2003) but media elites attempt to shift those discourses back to the status quo.

Some communications scholars see framing as equivalent to agenda-setting (e.g. McCombs et al. 1997), while others see framing as complimentary to but distinct from agenda-setting (e.g. Scheufele 1999). Scholars who agree with this second line of thought argue that, rather than setting the agenda, frames prompt news consumers to think about issues in a desired frame of mind (Iyengar 1990, 1991). Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143) define a frame as a central theme or "organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them." In chapter 5, I analyze the framing devices used on a "strip of events" to uncover how central themes are presented by journalists, and how those themes can be modified by guests on TV news programs, thus prompting the audience to switch frames of mind.

The concepts of thematic and episodic framing, developed by Shanto Iyengar (1991, 2005), describe the two broad ways news media present topics to the public. Episodic framing of social movements focuses on individual protest events, while thematic framing focuses on the broad context of the issues a movement is protesting. Episodic news frames divert attention away from the issues and make the public less likely to support measures to resolve those issues (Iyengar 1991). In chapter 4, I test whether event-related coverage is more likely to include more episodic or thematic framing. Smith and colleagues (2001) found that arrests and violence at protest events generated more episodic and less thematic coverage of movements than did demonstrations that were not violent; events with violence or arrests “were about half as likely as nonconfrontational events to be framed in a way that favored demonstrators” (p. 1414). In chapter 5, I ask how those frames come about, and describe the process of TV news framing that can open paths from one frame to another, and transform episodic coverage to thematic coverage.

My analysis is informed by the concept of discursive legacies, which are “well-established, repetitive, restrictive, and culturally recognized ways of talking and writing about a particular issue over time” (Coy et al. 2008: 163). Even though the TPM and OWS represent opposite ends of the political spectrum, used different tactics, and are opposite in terms of support for the status quo, the frames journalists use are limited and framing devices for both movements should be more similar than different (Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999). In chapter 3, I present evidence that nearly all of the same frames were used in coverage of both the TPM and OWS, but the frequencies of each frame vary by TV news outlet and movement tactics. Movement actors are typically delegitimized in the media with discursive legacies in the form of frames such as violent, freak, ignorant, insane, or extremist. This delegitimation is the most

common kind of coverage that has been documented by social movement researchers (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Gitlin 1980; Sobieraj 2011). In prior research (Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 2016), I tested whether negative frames and substantive coverage were mutually exclusive. I examined TV news coverage around protest *events* specifically and found that negative frames such as freak and ignorant correlate strongly with substantive coverage of social movements. I build on this in chapter 4 by examining positive frames as well as negative frames. In addition, scholars are beginning to question the assumption that frames are static across time and media outlet (Trivundza and Brlek 2017). In chapter 5, I show how some frames can be used to different ends by competing media outlets.

I add to our understanding of framing by looking at TV news, where most others look at newspapers. This is important because TV news is less scripted, and guests on TV news programs can challenge the journalists' narrative, which opens up discursive space in ways that are not possible in print media. Framing devices combine to communicate an overall frame (Pan and Kosicki 1993; D'Angelo 2002; Entman 1993), but in TV news conflicting framing devices can be presented by several speakers, thus communicating a more complicated story. I extend the work of Maney and colleagues (2009), who theorize the ways in which activists and the power-holders they challenge attempt to persuade the public, by examining the ways that participants in TV news discourse use frames to extend or cut off paths to other frames, and thus to alternative ways of understanding social movements and the issues with which they are concerned.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I gave an overview of the literature on the relationships between social movements and mass media, where those approaches are lacking, and how I will address and

develop them in later chapters. In this dissertation, I integrate literature on media power (Cook 1998; Hallin 1986; McChesney 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Schudson 2002; Sparrow 1999), the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999), and framing (Benford and Snow 2000; Maney et al. 2009; Snow et al. 1986) in order to develop the partisan media paradigm, a more complete framework for analyzing U.S. television news coverage of social movements in the 21st century. This framework views the news media field as a source of power that promotes and upholds the status quo, which effects social movements and, ultimately, social change.

The theoretical foundation of news media as political institution grounds this research (Cook 1998; Schudson 2002; Sparrow 1999). This grounding takes into consideration the power for-profit media have to maintain the status quo through their coverage of social movements. This dissertation puts the communications and political science literature into dialog with sociological literature on media and social movements, advancing social movement theory by focusing on the interplay between culture and power in media coverage of social movements, similar to the way that Maney and colleagues (2009) highlight the same interplay in the production of collective action frames. It also advances our knowledge of the relationship between social movements and the contemporary TV news field by reframing the protest paradigm in terms of Hallin's spheres in order to account for the ideological segmentation of TV news outlets. Finally, it advances framing by outlining the process by which a given framing device can take several paths of discourse that vary by the speaker, the media outlet, and the topic of conversation. I argue for a theoretical reorientation that pushes framing beyond the typology of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivating, toward a processual understanding of the

trajectory of framing devices when used in an ideologically segmented, pro-status quo, non-print media field.

In chapter 3, I develop the partisan media paradigm, an integration of Hallin's spheres and the protest paradigm that explains how today's TV news field will treat any given social movement. In chapter 4, I examine the implications of the partisan media paradigm by testing whether various negative framing devices are correlated with substantive coverage. I extend prior research by testing whether news coverage initiated by protest action will be more likely to include standing, whether news coverage initiated by institutionalized action such as electioneering will be more likely than protest coverage to include the message behind the movement (Amenta et al. 2012), and whether negative framing devices are more likely to be correlated with substantive coverage than positive framing devices (Taylor and Gunby 2016). In chapter 5 I explain the gateways model, which moves beyond the processes of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing to explain the process of framing that occurs within TV news discourse.

CHAPTER 3.

TV NEWS COVERAGE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OVER TIME

Introduction

One of the goals of any political social movement is to sway public opinion in some way. For example, one of the most common goals stated by the local Tea Party groups that were active in 2009 and 2010 was to “make our voices heard,” and another was “to educate the American people” (Taylor 2011). Examining the amount and quality of media coverage is a way of measuring the infusion or reach of social movement frames into culture and social consciousness. As renowned sociologist and mass communications scholar Robert McChesney says: “The media system is not simply an economic category; it is responsible for transmitting culture, journalism, and politically relevant information” (McChesney 2008, p.421). When activists take some action – such as staging a protest or demonstration – some people are directly affected by that action or witness that action, but the vast majority of people who hear about the action become aware of it through mass media.

While social movements depend on media coverage to get their message out there, the media control the message, and it is not always – nor is it usually – favorable to the protesters. Much coverage adheres to the “protest paradigm” (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999). Protest paradigm coverage emphasizes actions rather than issues and focuses on activists’ norm violations, thus framing movements in negative ways (McLeod and Hertog 1992; McFarlane and Hay 2003). Researchers acknowledge that the protest paradigm is adhered to by mainstream and not by alternative media outlets; however, I argue that the definitions of “mainstream” and “alternative” media need to be reconsidered in light of the contemporary TV

news landscape. In addition, the vast majority of protest paradigm literature focuses on leftist or anarchist movements and neglects right-wing movements (see Weaver and Scacco 2013 for exception), and has not explored whether coverage of a movement changes over time.

In this chapter, I ask: Does television news coverage of each movement differ in measurable, patterned ways? How does coverage of each movement change over time? Is the protest paradigm framework still relevant in a contemporary TV media field in which some networks target narrow niches based on political ideologies?

I track the ways in which TV news media discuss social movements and the characteristics of activists over time. I use TV coverage because, despite the recent surge in using the Internet as a news source, TV is still the main source of news for Americans today, and has been for many years (Pew 2012; Mitchell et al. 2016). The format of TV news allows reporters to be more interpretive than they can be in print news (Sparrow 1999), which affects the way discourse unfolds in a newscast. I find that, in contrast to popular assumptions about media's relationships with the political left and right, there are many similarities in the substance of coverage of OWS and the TPM. However, I find that news coverage of each movement does differ in measurable, patterned ways that have to do with the tactics of each movement and with their respective alignment with the status quo. In line with the protest paradigm, coverage of OWS is driven by violence and arrests, while coverage of the TPM switches from largely adhering to the protest paradigm to ignoring TPM protest events and focusing on a more legitimized form of electoral politics coverage. Additionally, and in contrast to the protest paradigm literature, I find that some TV news outlets shift between mainstream and alternative categories depending on whether they are covering the TPM or OWS, and that this shifting can best be explained using Hallin's (1986) theory of spheres of political discourse.

Data

Most research that examines the relationship between social movements and media uses newspapers as the primary media source (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Amenta et al. 2009; Andrews and Caren 2010; Amenta et al. 2012). Because the majority of Americans have relied on TV for their news over all other sources for the past several decades (Pew 2012), it is more appropriate to study TV news coverage of social movements because its influence on cultural outcomes such as public opinion will be stronger than that of newspapers, which have steadily declined in readership over the past several decades. In order to measure the content of TV news coverage of each movement, I count all nationally televised news transcripts from ABC, CBS, NBC, Fox News Channel (FNC), MSNBC, and CNN that cover the TPM and/or OWS. I examine TPM coverage from February 19, 2009 through December 31, 2012, and OWS coverage from September 16, 2011 through December 31, 2014, about three years for each movement. Each transcript covers a maximum of one hour of broadcasting, and I measure the amount of coverage as a count variable, *TV programs*.

I acquired all TV news transcripts from the LexisNexis News online database. LexisNexis offers full transcripts of news programs broadcast in the U.S.²³; it captures all events during each 24-hour period for all networks in this study, with the exception of both FNC and MSNBC, which are only represented during the primetime hours and additional “Special Reports” that infrequently occur during the day. Because these are the two ideologically extreme networks (FNC being conservative and MSNBC being liberal), and they are equally represented in the LexisNexis database, I do not expect this to result in a bias that would systematically affect the coverage of one movement or the other.

²³ See <http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexisnexis-academic.page> for more information.

I used the following Boolean strings in my search: “tea w/1 party,” “tax AND protest,” “9/12 AND march,” “occupy w/2 Wall AND Street,” “occupy AND protest,” “occupy w/2 movement,” “occupy AND Zuccotti,” “occupy AND encampment OR camp.” This search turned up tens of thousands of results, which I read through in order to find relevant transcripts. In order to be counted as relevant, the TPM or OWS had to be discussed in some substantial way. Relevant transcripts include any mention of the social movement’s activities, characteristics, goals, motivations, successes, or failures. Examples of irrelevant transcripts include the following, from CNN’s *Newsroom* at 2:30pm on December 4, 2011 in which two employees of CNN discuss how difficult it was to narrow down the top 100 stories of the year for promotion on the CNN website: “I mean, just looking at the economy, globally, looking at the economy in the U.S. and the unemployment, how that’s led to, you know, the ‘Occupy’ movement, which is another story we’re seeing huge traction with.” There was no actual discussion of the Occupy movement; it was casually mentioned in passing as “another story” and there was no reference to an event or any feature characterizing the movement. However, such brief mentions of a movement do sometimes qualify as relevant. For example, on a December 6 2011 episode of CNN’s *Newsroom* at 10 am, the anchor states: “The ‘Occupy’ movement members are taking their protests to Capitol Hill today. The group plans to march to the capitol with representatives and occupy congressional offices for the day.” That is the only time in the entire program that OWS is mentioned. Although this represents just two sentences from a 13-page transcript, it is a report on actual activities, which is relevant.

Another example of irrelevance is when a pundit, celebrity, or politician mentions the movement briefly and without substance just to criticize it, and the statement itself is treated as a standalone story by the news producers. For example, just about every network covered (often

multiples times over the course of several days) a November 2011 speech in which Newt Gingrich, who was running in the Republican primary for president at the time, says OWS protesters ought to “get a job [and] take a bath.” When this one sentence of the speech was covered without any other mention of OWS, I counted that transcript as irrelevant and removed it from the dataset. Because news producers chose to present this as an off-the-cuff remark, with no discussion of the movement’s activities, goals, motivations, successes, or failures, it does not represent relevant OWS coverage. Instead, journalists covered this statement as a Gingrich event and ignored the OWS part of it, thereby framing it as a Gingrich gaffe. For example, in a November 21st 2011 episode of *The Situation Room* that I removed from the sample, the only mention of OWS comes when journalist Joe Johns says “Gingrich was in fine form this weekend after essentially telling ‘Occupy Wall Street’ protesters that they should go get a job after they take a bath. So after all these years, he still has a way with words.” The journalist frames this in such a way that OWS is merely a prop to introduce the Gingrich coverage. In other transcripts that I omitted from my sample, the quote was presented as one among a list of controversial statements Gingrich had recently made, and was used to introduce a story looking at Gingrich’s presidential run in depth. However, some programs covered the Newt Gingrich statement and included the sentences he spoke before the “take a bath” comment (in which he described what he thought were the motivations of OWS), or they presented the “take a bath” comment and then went on to discuss OWS; those programs are relevant and I code Gingrich’s statement under the “ridicule” frame (see below for discussion of framing).

The point of making this distinction between relevant and irrelevant transcripts is that I am primarily interested in how journalists cover social movements. Unless one of these ad hominem attacks by a pundit or politician is followed or preceded by some context about the

social movement, it is not relevant to the questions posed in this project. When journalists or news producers present these brief statements and then leave the conversation with no further comment or context, they are, by default, framing the report as something other than social movement coverage. In the case of the transcripts I excluded from the sample, journalists framed those statements as reports of politicians' activities.

However, if the pundits or politicians make claims about the goals, motivations, or general merits of the arguments a movement is making, that transcript is relevant because there is actual substance to those comments—they are not just pure spite or ad hominem attacks lacking context. For example, on a December 4, 2011 episode of *State of the Union* on CNN, Congresswoman Michelle Bachman discusses the merits of the Tea Party movement, and then states: “If you go to the essence of what occupy wall street [sic] stands for, it’s having other people pay for their stuff. That’s not where the American people are at.” In contrast to the Newt Gingrich quote, which essentially tells us that he thinks OWS protesters are lazy and dirty, and is presented as an introduction to a news report on Gingrich, not OWS, this quote tells us that Michelle Bachman thinks that OWS has an actual goal—getting other people to pay for their stuff. Although she is insulting OWS, and only mentions it briefly, she is discussing something substantive about the movement (regardless of whether or not it is true that OWS activists just want other people to pay for their stuff) and, because she discusses both OWS and the TPM, this transcript counts as relevant for both movements.

After discarding irrelevant transcripts, I was left with a total of 10,106 transcripts for the Tea Party movement from February 2009 through December 2012, and 1,267 transcripts for the Occupy movement from September 2011 through December 2014. Each transcript represents one full TV program, for a total of 11,373 programs in this analysis. I used QSR NVivo 10

qualitative analysis software for this portion of the project; the organizational capabilities of the program made analysis of the extensive amount of data significantly less challenging than it would have been otherwise.

Methods

To analyze these transcripts, I use a combination of quantitative content analysis (see, for example, Johnston 2002; Neuendorf 2001) and a form of inductive analysis that Altheide (1987; 1996) calls “ethnographic content analysis.” Using the text search feature of NVivo, I was able to measure the frequencies of some specific phrases that appear in coverage of each movement over the course of the entire 11,373 transcripts. This is useful for getting a general idea of how often certain words are used to describe activists, and in discovering some general themes in how coverage of each movement changed over time. However, for in-depth analysis of specific frames and tone of coverage (e.g. positive or negative tone), I used a random number generator to select a sample of 200 transcripts from each movement. I gathered these 400 transcripts and manually coded them using ethnographic content analysis, which involves a more reflective analysis of documents (Altheide 1987: 65, 67-68). This was necessary in order to allow for the emergence of various frames and themes as I examined the transcripts for overall tone (positive, negative, and neutral). While I developed some frames deductively based on prior research, inductive analysis was also necessary due to the large number of positive frames I found, which other researchers have not discussed in their analyses of media coverage of social movements.

Limitations

There are some limitations to this research. First, the text search feature of NVivo may turn up irrelevant information. For example, searching for the word “arrest*” results in all forms of the word, including arrests, arrested, and arresting. Therefore, if a news anchor mentions an

“arresting view” of the sunset, this would be included in the results. To correct this, I went through the results of the text search for arrest and removed irrelevant phrases. Some text searches turned up thousands of results, which were too cumbersome to sort through. To correct these, I use a four-stage coding process that I describe in more detail below.

In addition, scholars have noted that there are certain limits that should be accounted for when using media to examine a social movement (e.g., Woolley 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; Earl et al. 2004; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996). McCarthy and colleagues (1996: 479) note that researcher bias – the reliability and validity of media archives gathered by researchers – is a potential problem. To overcome researcher bias, I use the LexisNexis News database, which is regarded as the most complete archive of television, radio, and newspaper data. All other limitations identified by these scholars, such as description bias, which is media bias in the descriptions of the events journalists select to report, are part of what I am investigating.

Frame Analysis

I used a four-stage process in analyzing the news transcripts. First, I had to skim each of the over eleven thousand transcripts in order to gauge whether or not it was relevant (as I described above). As I did this, I took notes on what I was seeing in terms of how journalists were talking about each of the movements, common or interesting phrases used to describe activists, and who was doing the talking about the movements: Just news anchors? Celebrities? Politicians? I noted general themes that were apparent from quick skims of the transcripts. Second, I used the text search function in NVivo to find transcripts that mentioned protest events or rallies, political candidates affiliated with a movement, arrests, polling results, and other relevant information. This is useful for getting an overall picture of how discourse of each movement might change over time. Third, I did an in-depth reading of the sample of 400

transcripts, coding for common frames and overall tone (positive, negative, or neutral; see Dardis 2006 for a different approach to coding for overall tone). Finally, I took what I learned from the in-depth coding back to the text search and fine-tuned the search terms I used to find events, arrests, political candidates, etc. This final stage resulted in more accurate coding of overall themes than I achieved with the original text search alone.

Media Framing

Frames are boundaries that focus on some elements while leaving other elements out of view. Mass media frames can promote particular definitions, interpretations, and evaluations of movements (Entman 1993), and thus shape public opinion (Detenber et al. 2007; Iyengar 1991; Nelson et al. 1997). Journalists use framing devices in the form of words, phrases, or sentences that serve to legitimize or delegitimize social movements and their issues of concern (Gamson and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). I focus on these micro-level framing devices rather than thematic frames (Iyengar 1991) that categorize an entire news piece as having one overarching frame or another. Focusing on micro-level framing draws attention to the nuances of media coverage rather than obscuring them by painting an entire news item with a broad brush.

I examine positive, negative, and neutral frames used in coverage of OWS and the TPM. In order to draw comparisons to other studies of media coverage of social movements, I utilize some of the frames Boykoff (2006) developed in his study of media representations of the leftist World Trade Organization (WTO) protests of 1999, including what he calls the violence frame, the amalgam of grievances frame, the ignorance frame, and the freak frame. Boykoff's "violence" frame views protests in terms of the utilization of violent methods – regardless of whether such methods are used by protesters or not – and focuses on the presence or absence of

violence. The violence frame includes all references to violence, including when activists use violent tactics, when police use violent tactics against activists, when journalists say there is a potential for a protest to turn violent, and even when journalists note the lack of violence at a protest event (Boykoff 2006: 211).

The amalgam of grievances frame describes a movement as having no clear goals, no unified message, or as being concerned with too many disparate issues and thus lacking coherence. The ignorance frame focuses on the lack of understanding that social movement participants have about the issues they are protesting and includes characterization of protesters as hypocrites, or as being wrong about the issues (see also McFarlane and Hay 2003). Boykoff's "freak" frame places the focus on physical characteristics of protesters, such as costumes they wear or what their grooming habits are, but it also includes accounts of their "non-mainstream values, beliefs, and opinions" (Boykoff 2006: 216). The protest paradigm literature uses an operationalization of the freak frame that only includes physical characteristics (e.g. Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999); I follow the protest paradigm's construction of the freak frame and I add an insanity frame. The insanity frame notes the non-mainstream, or "fringe," values and beliefs of activists and includes characterization of protesters as "nut jobs," "tea brain protesters," "left wing lunatics," and "crazies," thus delegitimizing their concerns by making them out to be insane.

Through the process of qualitative analysis, I developed two additional negative frames: the racism frame, and general ridicule. The racism frame is used to portray a movement as being motivated by racism or as being composed of racist individuals. General ridicule refers to instances of Tea Partiers being referred to as "tea-baggers," a term that has sexual connotations

and was frequently followed by laughter in program transcripts²⁴, or of Occupy protesters being referred to as dirty or smelling bad, also frequently followed by laughter. These frames and others, such as accusations of being an “extremist” movement, of activists being criminals or anti-Semitic, or of believing conspiracy theories, can delegitimize a movement. The presence of any of these frames in a program will show us the extent to which the movement was covered in a negative way.

Boykoff only examined negative and neutral representations of the WTO protest movement; I expand on this typology by noting positive frames used by the media in their portrayal of both the TPM and OWS. Like Boykoff, I include references to a lack of violence under the violence frame in my analysis, but I also add a “peaceful” frame, based on inductive analysis in which I found very few references to violence or potential for violence for the TPM, and rather found numerous instances of TPM events being described positively, as peaceful. I found the same distinction in OWS coverage, where some journalists discussed a lack of violence and others never mentioned violence, opting to describe the protests simply as peaceful. The other positive frames I use were also derived from the qualitative process of ethnographic discourse analysis, and are as follows: legitimizing, normalizing, and patriotic. The legitimizing frame notes validation of the movement as being inevitable or understandable considering political realities, of members as justifiably angry, and of the movement having a political impact

²⁴ Although opponents of the movement have accused Tea Party members of being the first to refer to themselves as “tea-baggers,” I found no evidence to support this claim. I did, however, find evidence that at least one protester used the phrase “tea bag” as a verb at the first national Tea Party event. The man, protesting in Washington D.C., held a sign that read: “Tea Bag the Liberal Dems before they Tea Bag You!!” Also, in April 2009, several Tea Party websites encouraged visitors to “Tea bag the fools in DC.” See “The Evolution of the Word ‘Tea Bagger’” at <http://theweek.com/article/index/202620/the-evolution-of-the-word-tea-bagger> (retrieved May 7, 2010).

or being successful. The normalizing frame focuses on movement members being “average Americans” or as being first-time activists, working people, or just “moms and dads.” The patriotic frame focuses on movement members being motivated by their love for America, or wanting to “take back their country.”

In addition to the positive and negative frames, I note neutral coverage and movement mobilization. Neutral coverage includes descriptions of actual events without judgment, and other statements that have no discernible bias. For example, on an April 15th episode of CNN’s *Campbell Brown: No Bias, No Bull*, the host stated: “All day, we have been watching thousands, some estimates say at least 10,000 people, gather at more than 300 organized anti-tax TEA Parties. In this case, TEA stands for Taxed Enough Already.” I code these kinds of value-free statements as neutral. Mobilization is noted by the “encouraging” frame, which focuses on the hosts, anchors, and guests of programs encouraging viewers to get involved in the movement. On an episode of FNC’s *Fox News Watch* on April 12, for example, the anchor stated: “Can’t get to a tea party? FOX Nation hosts a virtual tea party. You can check it out on the site for the tea party in your area. Again, that is Wednesday, the 15th of April.” The encouraging frame goes beyond positive, to actually inciting viewers to take action and join a movement.

I did not find a single instance of a comparable “discouraging” frame to match the encouraging frame in any of the transcripts; however, the negative delegitimizing frames are all forms of what Ferree (2004) calls “soft repression.” This form of repression is deployed in the form of stigmatizing frames, which can be a force for discouraging participation in a social movement. When the anchor of a news program ridicules participants in a social movement, or claims that they are crazy or stupid, the viewer may want to distance herself from the movement (Noelle-Neumann 1974, 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1999). There may, therefore, be a

discouraging effect, but it operates in the same way that the patriotic, legitimizing, normalizing and peaceful frames operate; the positive frames I identified can serve to “softly encourage” in the same way that the negative frames discourage. In contrast to both soft repression and the softly encouraging positive frames, the encouraging frame is blatant recruitment of viewers to participate in the movement.

Using all of the frames described above, I code for overall tone per program. Rather than relying purely on qualitative analysis (see Dardis 2006), I look quantitatively at the number of positive, negative, and neutral frames used in each program in order to determine the overall tone of coverage. Overall tone includes phrases spoken by the host of a program, as well as program guests. In order to derive overall tone for each program, I tallied the number of positive, negative, and neutral frames used in each program and chose the category with the highest score as the indicator of overall tone. When the scores of the positive and negative categories were even, I coded the tone as neutral because the program gave equal voice to both sides of the issue. One would expect most programs to have a neutral tone due to professional journalism norms of objectivity and fairness (Bennett 1996). However, in this era of niche marketing in cable news, fair and balanced reporting has become nothing more than an empty slogan for some news networks. I found that FNC and MSNBC in particular were overwhelmingly *not* neutral in their coverage of either movement; they each leaned heavily positive for one movement and heavily negative for the other. When the amounts of positive and negative framing devices within one program only differed by one or two, I gauged overall tone by an in-depth, qualitative reading of the transcript (Altheide 1987; Dardis 2006; Taylor 2011). This method was necessary for about a dozen of the 400 transcripts in the sample.

As this chapter unfolds, I first examine the patterns of television coverage each movement received and how that changed over time. Research on media and social movements has focused overwhelmingly on news coverage of protest events, and has found that news coverage increases when violence or disruption increases, but the TPM continued getting coverage after their protests events largely ceased. Amenta and colleagues (2012) suggest that news coverage of social movements' involvement in electoral politics could include more descriptions of the movement's goals and motivations, but there is to my knowledge no study that actually examines media coverage of non-protest event related social movement activity. I find that coverage of the TPM continues to increase even after protest activity all but ceases due to coverage of the TPM's institutionalization in the form of professional PACs and involvement in electoral politics, while coverage of OWS all but ceases after large protest events peter out and they fail to institutionalize (Gitlin 2013). I then turn to the framing devices journalists used to legitimize and delegitimize each movement, and examine how coverage of each movement aligns with the protest paradigm. I find that, although the specific framing devices vary, both movements receive a similar share of legitimizing and delegitimizing TV news coverage. My findings lead to a new formulation of the protest paradigm that accounts for an ideologically segmented mainstream media field.

TV Coverage of the TPM and OWS Over Time

On the October 14, 2011 episode of *The O'Reilly Factor* on FNC, host Bill O'Reilly interviews Tim Graham from the Media Research Center, a conservative group that studies media bias, about the difference in news coverage of the TPM versus OWS. Graham claims that OWS is receiving far more media coverage than the TPM ever did. He says:

We have seen, in the first 11 days of these protests, 33 stories on the morning and evening shows on ABC, CBS, and NBC which auto [sic] would average out to basically

each network having a story every day. You look at the Tea Party back in 2009, we counted 13 stories in the entire year of 2009. So that would be about four stories per network all year long.

But Graham's synopsis of media coverage does not match up with reality; my data show 47 broadcast network programs covering the TPM in 2009, not 13. Even if I only count evening news programs, I have 15 – but he is counting morning and evening programs. When I look at the first 11 days of OWS protests – September 17 through the 27th – I see exactly one story on network news, and that was *Today* on NBC, on September 27th. That same program is also the only one (of those on the three broadcast networks) to cover the TPM in its first 11 days of protest (Feb. 27 - March 10). But Graham's presentation on *The O'Reilly Factor* is disingenuous, if not outright fallacious; the actual report shows Media Research Center is not looking at the first 11 days of OWS protest, but the first 11 days of October – nearly two full weeks *after* the protests began (<http://www.mrc.org/media-reality-check/tale-two-protests-media-cheer-wall-street-occupiers-jeered-tea-partiers>).

Aside from presenting the report in a less-than-truthful manner, what Graham and O'Reilly fail to acknowledge is that OWS is actively protesting each of those 11 days, where the TPM had one day of protest on February 27, followed by over six weeks of no action, followed by one day of protest on April 15, followed by eleven weeks of no action, followed by a July 4th protest. This cycle continued throughout 2009 and 2010, and major protest events only decreased after that. If we measure coverage by events, the TPM clearly received far more coverage than OWS. In its first 55 days (February 19, the day of Santelli's CNBC rant—which I discussed in chapter one—through April 17, 2009), the TPM had two major protest events and got covered on 153 TV news programs, or 76.5 TV programs for each day of activity. In contrast, from September 16 (the first day “Occupy” appeared in the news, the day before its first

protest) through November 9, 2011, OWS held 54 protests and got covered on 617 programs, or 11.4 for each day of activity. If we ignore protest events and look at the entire first year for each movement: from February 27, 2009 to February 26, 2010, the TPM was covered on 1,253 programs; from September 16, 2011 through September 15, 2012, OWS was covered on 1,160 TV news programs. Therefore, regardless of the number of protests, rallies, or demonstrations held, the TPM got more TV news coverage than OWS.

In addition to the amount of TV news coverage, the patterns of coverage over time for each movement differ substantially. Figures 2 and 3 show the frequency of coverage for each movement over time, measured in TV programs per network per week. I gathered transcripts for OWS from 2011 through the end of 2014, but less than 5% of those transcripts were from programs that aired after 2012, and virtually all of the post-2012 programs were covering some other movement and comparing it to OWS. In a graph showing the full, four-year dataset, half of the image looks like the last two months of 2012 – low and flat; therefore, I only show the 2011 and 2012 programs in figure 3. Figures 2 and 3 show a clear difference in the pattern of coverage each movement receives. TPM coverage stays high through all four years, with spikes around protest events in 2009 and early 2010, and spikes around elections and legislative news from October 2010 through the end of 2012. OWS coverage shoots up substantially after the first major arrests of activists occurred on October 1. Large numbers of arrests in 2012 are immediately followed by (or co-occur with) increases in the number of TV news programs that cover OWS. This suggests there may be a causal relationship between the number of arrests and an increase in TV news coverage, which is also suggested by Amenta and colleagues' findings (2009).

Figure 2. TPM coverage over time (TV programs per network per week; 2009 – 2012)





Figure 3. OWS coverage over time (TV programs per network per week; 2011 – 2012)



Research on media coverage of social movements would lead us to expect that OWS would get more coverage because they had more protest events, and many of those included violent incidences and mass arrests, which journalists tend to find newsworthy (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; McLeod and Hertog 1992; Murdock 1981). However, the TPM has much less frequent protest events with smaller crowds compared to OWS yet gets more TV news coverage. One possible reason the TPM gets so much more coverage is because their main movement organizations, such as Tea Party Express, begin using institutionalized tactics in the form of endorsing political candidates and lobbying for legislative goals. Their success in getting candidates elected to Congress then leads to even more coverage because of organizational norms of relying on political elites for newsworthy information (Gans 1979; Schudson 2002; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006). When some political elites are directly affiliated with a social movement, that movement will automatically get more news coverage. In addition, the TPM becomes a story in itself, which perpetuates coverage of anything movement-related (Seguin 2016).

Changes in Types of Coverage Over Time

On a May 22, 2012 episode of FNC's *The Five*, co-host Dana Perino says that the TPM stopped getting media attention because the movement had been effective, and that OWS has received so much media attention because they have been "totally ineffective." While Perino is right in one way – the TPM *protests* stop getting media attention after 2010 – my data suggest she is mostly wrong. The TPM continues to receive TV news coverage through 2012, mostly due to their influence on congressional politics. However, once it became clear that OWS was not going to be politically "effective" – at least not in the way journalists in the mainstream media understand movements to be effective – OWS stopped getting media coverage.

Figure 4. Amount and type of coverage per network (full population of TV programs)




Figure 4 shows the total amount of TV program coverage each movement received from each network in blue, and the orange and striped bars represent different types of coverage. In the OWS graph, the orange bar represents coverage of events such as protests, marches, rallies, and demonstrations. The striped bar represents coverage of protesters being arrested or of police threatening to arrest occupiers who refuse to leave their encampments. In the TPM graph, orange represents coverage related to protest events, demonstrations, rallies, and any references to “the Tea Party movement,” “Tea Party groups,” or “Tea Party activists.” The striped bar represents coverage of candidates for office who are affiliated with the TPM, coverage of the Tea Party Caucus in Congress, coverage of “Tea Party Republicans,” which typically reflects coverage of TPM-affiliated politicians, and coverage of the TPM’s effects on the legislative process in Congress. This data was gathered using the text search feature of NVivo, so it is not as reliable as the sample of 400 that I coded manually. I may be missing out on more nuanced political coverage, and some of the “movement” coverage may reflect the use of the phrase “Tea Party movement” when discussing politicians in Congress who are affiliated with the movement.

However, this does give us a general idea of how the TPM is talked about in the news over the course of nearly four years.

Compared to TPM coverage, a much higher proportion of OWS coverage focused on protest events, and, for most networks, more than half of that event coverage mentioned activists getting arrested or facing the potential of being arrested. OWS coverage is more in line with other scholars' claims that media coverage of social movements tends to focus on protesters' violence or outrageous behavior (e.g. Gitlin 1981; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Sobieraj 2011). The political coverage of the TPM on each network is also more than double each network's total coverage of OWS. These differences between coverage of OWS and the TPM suggests what others have speculated (e.g. Taylor 2011) – that coverage of right-wing movements, which has not received a large amount of scholarly attention, is very different from coverage of left-wing movements, which have been the overwhelming focus of research on media and social movements. This points to the importance of studying right-wing movements in the same ways that left-wing movements have been studied. However, the difference between the amounts of TPM and OWS coverage likely has more to do with the TPM's entrenchment into party politics, and OWS's lack of interest in doing the same. Of course, this is all tied to the TPM's status quo oriented goals and motivations.

While the goals and motivations of the TPM focused on taxes at first, a shift occurs at the beginning of 2010 when the goal becomes electing like-minded candidates to office. Figure 4 shows that less than half of TPM coverage across all networks focused on the movement itself, and, for all networks other than CNN and FNC, political coverage of the TPM exceeds activist-related coverage. The shift in TPM coverage occurs when the primaries for the 2010 congressional elections begin. Looking at figure 5, we see TV news coverage of the TPM shift

Figure 5. TV programs per month: coverage that mentions protest events vs. political candidates





Figure 6. TV programs per week: Coverage of Tea Party Politicians vs. Tea Party Movement or Tea Party Activists



abruptly in May 2010 from protest coverage to candidate coverage. Tea Party candidate coverage remains high, and grows substantially, through the end of November 2010. By the next election cycle, the novelty seems to have worn off and coverage of Tea Party candidates drops substantially, though not as much as TPM protest coverage drops. By switching their tactics from public protest to electioneering, the TPM was able to stay in the news for a much longer period than OWS. Research on media and social movements tends to privilege protest event coverage over all else, thus missing what could be important changes in coverage. When tactics change but news coverage continues, that coverage also changes in ways that have not received much attention from social movement researchers.

While TV news coverage of TPM protest events declines after 2010, journalists on TV news did not stop talking about the actual movement or its participants when they started talking about Tea Party candidates. Figure 6 shows the number of news programs that mention the TPM as a movement compared to TPM-affiliated politicians or political candidates. I used the text search feature of NVivo to find all instances of discussion of Tea Party politicians (some of the search terms include “tea party candidate,” “tea party darling,” and “tea party favorite”) and the movement itself (search terms include “tea party movement” and “tea party activists”). The amount of coverage of Tea Party-affiliated politicians only exceeds coverage of the movement or activists in 25 of the 202 weeks in my dataset, which shows that the TPM remains relevant even after becoming entrenched in the Republican Party—at least as far as mainstream TV news programs are concerned. Thus, while TV news coverage shifts from focusing on protest tactics to institutionalized tactics, the goals and motivations of the grassroots movement are still getting national news attention.

Whether the TPM infiltrated the Republican Party or the Republican Party infiltrated the TPM, the affiliation between the two solidified the status quo orientation of the movement. As for OWS, their continued use of disruptive, non-institutionalized tactics solidified their anti-status quo orientation. While the civil disobedience that leads to mass arrests is good for getting a great deal of media attention, that attention ends up being short-lived.

Much of the protest paradigm literature suggests that all mainstream media will treat status quo oriented movements positively, and deviant movements negatively (McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999; Shoemaker 1984; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). However, the protest paradigm was designed to apply to protest coverage, not social movement coverage in general. It cannot be used to predict the type of coverage a movement will get when its tactics change from disruptive to institutionalized. In the next section, I look at the sample of 400 transcripts in terms of overall positive, negative, or neutral tone to examine whether the characteristics of protest paradigm coverage (i.e. negative coverage) apply to non-protest related social movement coverage.

Changes in Tone of Coverage Over Time

Protest paradigm researchers have looked at media coverage of protest events at points in time, but have not looked at changes over time. The protest paradigm literature does suggest, though, that if a movement's tactics change then media coverage might also change (Boyle et al. 2012; McLeod and Hertog 1999). Based on these prior conjectures, we should expect OWS coverage to be more negative than neutral or positive, especially when tactics are more disruptive (e.g. blocking traffic rather than occupying public parks). Since the TPM is a status quo oriented movement, we should expect TPM coverage to be more positive than neutral or negative in the first year and then to switch to mostly neutral as the movement changes tactics


from protesting, to running candidates for office, to working within Congress.

The overwhelming majority of OWS television coverage is on protest events (166 of the 200 sampled), while the overwhelming majority of TPM coverage focuses on electoral politics (only 35 of the 200 sampled mention protest events). It makes sense to compare the full sample of 200 from each movement when we are examining coverage of each movement in general, in order to see the way coverage changes over the first 3 years of each movement's life. However, I will also compare OWS coverage to a sample of TPM coverage from its first year. In my previous research (Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 2016), I examined three 5-week periods of news coverage of the TPM²⁵ from 2009 and did qualitative content analysis of 319 television news transcripts from the 6 networks. When we look at TPM coverage that focuses on events in the first year only, 196 of the 319 mention protests, demonstrations, or rallies. One hundred ninety-two of the 200 programs in the OWS sample cover the first year of OWS activities, so in some ways it makes more sense to compare this sample to the 2009 TPM sample—at least when we are comparing the way TV news covered *protest events*.

Figure 7 presents a linear display of the tone of coverage of each of the 200 TPM news transcripts sampled from 2009 through 2012. The largest spike in neutral TPM coverage occurs between September 6 and November 4, 2010. This coverage focuses almost exclusively on TPM involvement in the Republican Party and in that year's mid-term elections. Only 4 of the 27 programs from this time period in the sample mention protests or rallies, and all 4 of those also discuss electoral politics. Few news programs from 2009 are in this sample, but we will get a better look at 2009 coverage in figure 9.

²⁵ Each 5-week period focused on one of three major Tea Party protest events, from two weeks before through three weeks after: the first national protest on February 27, the first Tax Day protest on April 15, and the 9-12 Taxpayer March on September 12.

Figure 7. TPM tone of coverage over time, TV programs per month



The largest spike in positive coverage – though it does not exceed neutral coverage – occurs during the month of August 2010, when Glenn Beck was promoting his “Restoring Honor Rally.” Beck used his program on FNC to launch monologues against his detractors (many of whom had claimed Beck was racially insensitive (or worse) for holding his rally on the anniversary, and in the exact location, of Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech) and to make claims that any criticism against Beck is equivalent to criticism of the TPM, in effect affiliating his rally with the TPM while he legitimizes the TPM’s goals and motivations. The largest spike in negative coverage occurs during the last week of July 2011 – again, not exceeding neutral coverage – and focuses on the “extremist” economic views of the Tea Party Republicans in Congress, whom journalists and pundits alleged had caused a deep fracture within the Republican Party and were holding up the legislative process.

For the most part, the tone of TPM coverage is consistent with expectations from both the protest paradigm and organizational model of news. The organizational model of the news

assumes that journalists pride themselves on being neutral observers of events (Gans 1979), which, in contrast to the protest paradigm, would lead us to expect coverage of social movements to be largely neutral. There is some positive and some negative TPM coverage, but it is largely neutral across all three years. This could be due to the fact that the TPM supports the status quo, that their tactics became institutionalized rather quickly, that TV news journalists value objective reporting, or a combination of all three.

Figure 8 shows the tone of OWS coverage over time. Combining expectations from the protest paradigm and the organization model of newsmaking, we might expect OWS coverage to be neutral at first, and then switch to negative as events become more violent and activists are arrested. However, when violence and arrests decrease, news coverage should also decrease – regardless of whether or not protest events decrease – since prior research has found that protests are over-reported when they are violent (McCarthy et al. 1996; Earl et al. 2004; Amenta et al. 2012). Contrary to what the protest paradigm literature suggests, and similar to TPM coverage, OWS coverage is more neutral than either positive or negative. The largest spike in all three tones of OWS coverage occurs in mid-October 2011 at the height of their protests and arrests, and neutral coverage heavily outweighs both positive and negative coverage.

Figure 8 shows that negative coverage of OWS does rise in May 2012 and then exceed neutral coverage in September 2012, but that may be explained more by the decrease in overall coverage than anything else. The pattern in figure 8 is very different from the pattern of TPM coverage we see in figure 7; however, we are looking at different types of coverage for each movement. It is more appropriate to compare figure 8 to figure 9, which displays the amount of coverage from a sample of TPM events in 2009—the majority of that coverage focused on protest events.

Figure 8. OWS tone of coverage over time, bimonthly TV programs





Figure 9. TPM tone of coverage over time sampled from 2009, bimonthly TV programs



The first TPM tax day protest received overwhelmingly positive coverage, while the first few weeks of OWS protests got overwhelmingly neutral coverage. Complaining about paying taxes is a common theme in American discourse and should be considered in line with the status quo. The positive coverage around the tax day protest suggests that protest paradigm scholars are correct when they say that status quo movements are likely to get positive news coverage from mainstream press.

In addition to each movement's orientation toward the status quo, the differences in tone of coverage over multiple years between these two movements may be explained by changes in each movement's tactics, as protest paradigm scholars suggest (Boyle et al. 2012; McLeod and Hertog 1999). The last significant amount of news coverage OWS gets is at its one-year anniversary in September 2012, when nearly 200 activists are arrested. A month later, at the end of October 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the U.S. and caused major damage—especially in New Jersey and New York. OWS activists formed “Occupy Sandy” and organized relief efforts for those whose homes were damaged or destroyed (Feuer 2012). Because they organized non-hierarchically, and outside of traditionally recognized relief programs such as the Red Cross, mainstream news may have seen their actions as neither newsworthy nor in line with the status quo. Their efforts only received recognition on five nationally broadcast TV news programs, and all within the first two weeks of November 2012. Meanwhile, the TPM was embedded in Republican electoral politics and was covered on 116 TV news programs during that same 2-week time period.

Summary

This analysis suggests that TV news coverage shifted along with the shift in activists' tactics. The TPM went from staging protest events and rallies to getting candidates elected to

office and then having a direct impact on the legislative process. The protest paradigm would lead us to expect TPM coverage to start out positively, and then shift to neutral as their tactics become more institutionalized. The tone of TPM coverage was mostly in line with those expectations, although there was more neutral coverage than negative or positive, and there were spikes of negative coverage even though the goals of the TPM support the status quo.

When OWS shifted their tactics from occupying public spaces and holding protests and demonstrations to using their funds to bail out people who had their homes foreclosed or donating their time and money to victims of Hurricane Sandy, mainstream TV news did not follow. Why not? Perhaps because these direct actions circumvent traditional institutional changes within the system, like lobbying for legislation or supporting political candidates, and media elites do not find those non-traditional actions newsworthy. In addition – and as I will examine in depth in chapter 5 – the goals of OWS were never fully understood by mainstream news media, so journalists likely had a hard time connecting those tactics with OWS’s overall goals or message.

Media elites seem to find disruptive protests more newsworthy than other tactics when a movement’s message does not support the status quo, and institutionalized tactics newsworthy when a movement’s message supports the status quo. However, my analysis so far has examined TV news as if all networks operate within the same paradigm, yet TV news today is segmented in such a way that different networks have different journalistic norms. In the next section I present evidence that contemporary TV news media in the U.S. are more complex than the protest paradigm literature acknowledges, and I make the case for an improved framework for understanding the protest paradigm in the contemporary U.S. context.

Reframing the Protest Paradigm

The protest paradigm that McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999; also see Hertog and McLeod 1995) describe is a framework to which mainstream news outlets adhere, but that “alternative” news outlets do not. In the previous section I showed that the TPM received a much greater amount of TV news coverage than OWS, but both movements received more neutral coverage than positive or negative overall, contrary to what the protest paradigm framework would lead us to expect. According to protest paradigm scholars, mainstream news should use mostly marginalizing frames and alternative media should use mostly supportive or sympathetic frames to describe anti-status quo movements (Boyle et al. 2012; McFarlane and Hay 2003; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Reul et al. 2016). However, I was looking at aggregate TV news coverage rather than examining each individual network. Examining the amount and tone of coverage on each network will make it clear that the protest paradigm’s definitions of mainstream and alternative need to be reconceptualized to account for the contemporary U.S. media field.

Returning to Tim Graham’s presentation on the October 2011 episode of *The O’Reilly Factor* on FNC, he claims that OWS gets overwhelmingly positive coverage on TV news and the TPM gets mostly negative coverage. Again, the data contradict his statement. Of the 200 sampled OWS transcripts, 23 were overall positive in tone, 28 were negative, and 149 were neutral. For the TPM, 17 were positive, 26 were negative, and 157 were neutral. Figures 10 and 11 show that both movements were overwhelmingly covered in a neutral way ($\chi^2=1.18, p=0.554$ suggests no significant difference between the two). However, the Media Research Center report only examines broadcast network news, not cable news. When I look only at the three broadcast networks, I have 33 episodes in my OWS sample – 2 were positive in tone, 31 were neutral, and none were negative. I have 34 episodes in my TPM sample – one was negative, one was

Figure 10. Tone of OWS Sampled Coverage by Network, 2011 – 2014 (N=200)




Figure 11. Tone of TPM Sampled Coverage by Network, 2009 – 2012 (N=200)





Figure 12. Tone of TPM Sampled Coverage by Network, 2009 (N=319)



positive, and 32 were neutral. Again, there is no significant difference between the two (Freeman-Halton extension of the Fisher exact probability test $P_a=0.807$; $P_b=0.614$).

Comparing figure 10 to figure 11, however, we see that there are differences in the ways that some networks covered these two movements. Each figure displays the amount of negative, positive, and neutral coverage each network devoted to the TPM or OWS. The three broadcast networks covered each movement with the same relative frequency, and covered each in largely neutral language, yet the cable networks covered these movements very differently. FNC and MSNBC are about inverse—which should be expected since FNC is a right-leaning network and MSNBC is a left-leaning network. However, FNC devoted a lot of airtime to the TPM and MSNBC did not reciprocate proportionately with their OWS coverage. CNN devoted the most airtime to both movements, but the proportion of negative, positive, and neutral coverage on CNN resembles the 3 broadcast networks, not either of the other 2 cable networks.

Figure 12, which displays the tone of coverage for the sample of 319 programs from 2009 TPM protest events, presents an even starker contrast between FNC and MSNBC. While CNN and the broadcast networks present mostly neutral coverage, with sparse but equal amounts of negative and positive coverage for both the TPM and OWS, over 80% of FNC programs covered the TPM positively and over 80% of MSNBC programs covered the TPM negatively in 2009. This suggests that protest paradigm conceptions of mainstream and alternative media do not adequately explain TV news in the 21st century U.S. Because looking only at the overall tone per network may lead us to miss fine-grained details in the coverage each movement receives from each network, we must first examine the framing devices used by these six networks in order to better explain the protest paradigm's relevance – or lack thereof – to the contemporary field of TV news.

Framing Devices in OWS and TPM Coverage

The protest paradigm is a routinized pattern for mainstream media coverage of social protests (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 310) that uses frames that marginalize or demonize protesters (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 217). Research on framing and news gathering suggests that journalists select frames from a limited repertoire (Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999); this would lead us to think that the framing devices journalists use in their coverage of social movements would be largely the same, regardless of the kind of social movement being covered or the network doing the covering. However, the fact that the TPM and OWS used different tactics and represent opposite poles of the left-right ideological spectrum might lead us to suspect that the framing devices used in TV news would be just as different.

Despite the differences in tactics, ideology, and the amount and types of coverage that each movement gets, table 1 shows that many of the same negative and positive framing devices are used in coverage of both movements. Because so many of the 200 OWS transcripts focus on events, and so few of the 200 TPM transcripts do, I include a column for the sample of 319 TPM transcripts from 2009 events (see Taylor 2011) in table 1. Frames used in event-related coverage tend to be quite different from frames used in other types of coverage, such as that related to electoral politics, so it is more appropriate to compare OWS frames to the frames found in 2009 coverage of the TPM.

The first two items listed in table 1 are not frames, but represent the focus of each transcript—event-related coverage, or coverage of the movement’s involvement (or lack thereof) in electoral politics. Some transcripts do not fall into either category, such as those in which program hosts or their guests discuss one or both of the movements or their issues of concern in general terms, without referencing actual events or electoral politics. Electoral politics refers to

Table 1. Number of programs in which each frame appeared at least once (Percentage of all programs in parentheses)

	OWS (N=200)	TPM (N=200)	TPM 2009 (N=319)
<i>Type of Coverage</i>			
Event	166 (83%)	35 (17.5%)	121 (37.9%)
Electoral Politics	37 (18.5%)	103 (51.5%)	25 (7.8%)
<i>Disruption</i>			
Disruptive tactics	44 (22%)	0 (--)	0 (--)
Arrests	97 (48.5%)	0 (--)	0 (--)
Violence	98 (49%)	9 (4.5%)	20 (6.3%)
Activist Violence	45 (22.5%)	2 (1%)	15 (4.7%)
Police Violence	44 (22%)	0 (--)	0 (--)
Potential Violence	11 (5.5%)	5 (2.5%)	10 (3.1%)
<i>Negative</i>			
Any negative frame	100 (50%)	63 (31.5%)	150 (47%)
Delegitimizing	35 (17.5%)	6 (3%)	119 (37.3%)
Amalgam of Grievances	41 (20.5%)	0 (--)	10 (3.1%)
Freak	18 (9%)	2 (1%)	38 (11.9%)
Insanity	11 (5.5%)	17 (8.5%)	29 (9.1%)
Ignorance	37 (18.5%)	10 (5%)	30 (9.4%)
Lazy	16 (8%)	0 (--)	0 (--)
Racism	0 (--)	19 (9.5%)	35 (10.9%)
Ridicule	19 (9.5%)	19 (9.5%)	43 (13.5%)
Radical	22 (11%)	31 (15.5%)	9 (2.8%)
<i>Positive</i>			
Any positive frame	95 (47.5%)	30 (15%)	199 (62.4%)
Legitimizing	47 (23.5%)	17 (8.5%)	183 (57.4%)
Patriotic	4 (2%)	8 (4%)	51 (15.9%)
Normal	28 (8.8%)	10 (5%)	90 (28.2%)
Peaceful	56 (28%)	0 (--)	25 (7.8%)

Note: Frames are not mutually exclusive, thus percentages do not add to 100.

the movement being mentioned in conjunction with politicians or with candidates running for office. For the TPM this most often means that a politician is described as some sort of Tea Party candidate, or is endorsed by the Tea Party, or that some politician either supports or condemns the Tea Party. For OWS, this almost exclusively means that discussion touched on OWS's failure to do what the TPM did in terms of campaigning for political candidates. In early coverage, it was discussed as a question like "Will OWS run candidates for office like the TPM did?" or "Is this the Democrats' answer to the TPM?" That soon changed to coverage of

Republican politicians and candidates condemning OWS. It then appeared in later coverage when people drew comparisons between OWS and the TPM, and was used as a way of explaining how different the two movements are. Some OWS transcripts fall into both event and electoral categories; this usually occurs when event-related coverage also includes conservative politicians condemning the movement, or speculation on whether OWS would follow the tactics of the TPM.

The “disruption” category lists frames related to arrests and violent or disruptive tactics. Disruptive tactics include blocking traffic and other forms of civil disobedience, while violence and arrests are extreme outcomes of disruptive tactics. Arrests refer to coverage of anyone being arrested at a movement-related event. Violence includes any reference to violent actions at movement-related events, or potential for violence, and it includes violence by activists and violence committed by police. References to activist and police violence often occur within the same program. Table 1 shows that all frames related to disruption occur far more frequently in OWS coverage than in TPM coverage, which is not surprising since nearly all OWS events were disruptive in some way and virtually no TPM events were disruptive (as discussed in the introductory chapter).

The negative and positive categories list frames that I described in detail in the framing section above. The “negative” frames depict a movement in a marginalizing or unflattering way, and constitute soft repression (Ferree 2004). The “positive” category lists frames that depict a movement in a sympathetic or flattering way, or – in the case of the legitimizing frame – depict a movement’s grievances, motivations, or tactics in a positive way, as necessary, worthwhile, justified, or successful. Looking at each sample of 200 transcripts from multiple years of coverage, 50% (100) of OWS programs included at least one of the negative frames listed in

table 1, and 31.5% (63) of TPM programs included at least one negative frame. Meanwhile, 47.5% (95) of OWS programs included at least one of the positive frames listed in table 1, and just 15% (30) of TPM programs included at least one positive frame.

This would seem to suggest that the TPM was covered more neutrally overall, and that OWS was covered more positively than the TPM. However, we are mostly comparing coverage of OWS protest events to coverage of the TPM's involvement in electoral politics. Comparing this OWS coverage to TPM coverage that largely focuses on events from before its entrenchment in institutional politics yields very different results. Looking only at the 2009 sample of TPM coverage, 47% (150) of programs included at least one negative frame and 62.4% (199) included at least one positive frame. This suggests that when coverage is event-related or coverage is on a new movement, coverage is less neutral overall. Whether the movement is from the political left or right might matter, considering TPM coverage included fewer negative frames and more positive frames than OWS, but what seems to matter more is the movement's relationship to the status quo, and its entrenchment in institutionalized politics or structures. Because so much of the post-2009 coverage of the TPM focused on either elections or on Congress as opposed to protest events, there was less room to bring in frames that focus on the positive or negative characteristics of activists.

TV news outlets covered the TPM and OWS in some disparate ways, but they also covered each movement similarly, as table 1 indicates. Nearly all of the negative and positive frames were used in coverage of both movements. The only exceptions are the racism frame, which is only used in TPM coverage and describes activists as motivated by racism, and the lazy frame, which occurs only in OWS coverage and describes activists as generally lazy or not wanting to get a "real" job. However, when we look at the framing devices used by each

individual network we are likely to see bigger differences, which will illuminate the problematic way mainstream and alternative media are conceptualized in the protest paradigm literature.

Mainstream vs. Alternative Media

According to the protest paradigm literature, mainstream media use mostly marginalizing frames and alternative media use mostly legitimizing frames (Hertog and McLeod 1995; McFarlane and Hay 2003; McLeod and Hertog 1999). Protest paradigm scholars do not give clear definitions of either “mainstream” or “alternative” news outlets, but based on their brief descriptions of the alternative newspapers they examine, one could infer that alternative media is that which is made by and for a narrow subset of the population while mainstream media is that which is made to appeal to the widest audience possible. For example, much protest paradigm research (e.g. Hertog and McLeod 1995; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999) uses the case of anarchist protests and the alternative media they examine are anarchist newspapers. Anarchist newspapers, produced by anarchists and read almost exclusively by other anarchists, present anarchist protests in a positive light. Mainstream media is distributed widely, appeals to a broad audience, and is produced by journalists who follow traditional newsmaking norms in terms of the types of stories they cover and the kinds of sources they rely upon (Gans 1979; Shoemaker and Reese 1996). The broadcast networks ABC, CBS, and NBC, along with cable network CNN fall into the mainstream category, as evidenced by the neutral coverage of both the TPM and OWS that indicates traditional journalistic norms of objectivity (see figures 10, 11, and 12).

Although both FNC and MSNBC are mainstream in the sense that they reach a large audience, rely on traditional sources such as political elites, and cover many of the same stories that CNN and the broadcast networks cover, their coverage of the TPM and OWS did not adhere to the protest paradigm in ways that one would expect. FNC offered positive coverage of the

TPM and MSNBC offered positive coverage of OWS in the same way that anarchist newspapers offered positive coverage of anarchist protests. However, FNC and MSNBC do not just present supportive and sympathetic frames of movements that align with their respective political ideologies; they are also far more negative than other mainstream outlets toward movements that oppose their ideologies. Pointing to evidence that MSNBC is a left-leaning network that covered the TPM more negatively than any other network, Weaver and Scacco (2013) argue that marginalization of protesters now falls along party lines and that this contradicts the protest paradigm. While they do not go so far as to develop a new framework, they suggest that there may be multiple protest paradigms based on the ideological stances of media outlets.

Although Weaver and Scacco are correct that FNC and MSNBC present news in an ideologically driven way, I disagree that this contradicts the protest paradigm framework. Instead, FNC and MSNBC each operate within their own spheres of political discourse (Hallin 1986; Taylor 2011) and do not neatly fit into either mainstream or alternative categories of media. The protest paradigm framework sees alternative media as that which is supportive of protests, and does not address extreme partisan media that would be overly negative, as FNC is toward OWS and MSNBC is toward the TPM. In this section I use the sample of 200 OWS programs and the 2009 sample of 319 TPM programs – both which contain a majority of protest coverage rather than electoral politics coverage – to make the case for a reconfiguration of the protest paradigm that incorporates Hallin’s (1986) spheres and is closer to Chan and Lee’s (1984) original conception of journalistic paradigms.

Table 2 displays framing devices used by mainstream networks ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN in one column, MSNBC in the next, and FNC in the final column. It is clear that the mainstream networks differ substantially from MSNBC and FNC. While the mainstream

Table 2. Number of OWS programs in which each frame appeared at least once, by media type (Percentage of all programs per media type in parentheses)

	Mainstream (N=143)	MSNBC (N=24)	FNC (N=33)
<i>Disruption</i>			
Disruptive tactics	35 (24.5)	3 (12.5)	6 (18.2)
Arrests	77 (53.8)	9 (37.5)	11 (33.3)
Violence	70 (49.0)	10 (41.7)	18 (54.5)
Activist Violence	27 (18.9)	3 (12.5)	15 (45.5)
Police Violence	34 (23.8)	6 (25.0)	4 (12.1)
Potential Violence	7 (4.9)	1 (4.2)	3 (9.1)
<i>Negative</i>			
Delegitimizing	15 (10.5)	1 (4.2)	19 (57.6)
Amalgam of Grievances	32 (22.4)	5 (20.8)	4 (12.1)
Freak	5 (3.5)	0 (--)	2 (6.1)
Insanity	3 (2.1)	2 (8.3)	5 (15.2)
Ignorance	20 (14.0)	4 (16.7)	15 (45.5)
Lazy	9 (9.8)	2 (8.3)	5 (15.2)
Ridicule	3 (2.1)	0 (--)	16 (48.5)
Radical	4 (2.8)	6 (25.0)	12 (36.4)
<i>Positive</i>			
Legitimizing	27 (18.9)	13 (54.2)	7 (21.2)
Patriotic	2 (1.4)	2 (8.3)	0 (--)
Normal	18 (12.6)	8 (33.3)	2 (6.1)
Peaceful	42 (29.4)	11 (45.8)	3 (9.1)

Note: Frames are not mutually exclusive, thus percentages do not add to 100.

networks used negative and positive frames at similar rates, MSNBC used far more positive than negative frames and FNC used far more negative than positive frames. All three types of networks covered OWS disruptive tactics and arrests, but mainstream networks did so at a higher rate—which is consistent with the protest paradigm. All three types of TV outlets covered OWS violence, but MSNBC focused on police violence, FNC focused on activist violence, and the traditionally mainstream networks covered both about equally.

Table 3. Number of TPM 2009 programs in which each frame appeared at least once, by media type (Percentage of all programs in parentheses)

	Mainstream (N=111)	MSNBC (N=71)	FNC (N=137)
<i>Disruption</i>			
Disruptive tactics	0 (--)	0 (--)	0 (--)
Arrests	0 (--)	0 (--)	0 (--)
Violence	16 (14.4)	9 (12.7)	20 (14.6)
Activist Violent Speech	3 (2.7)	2 (2.8)	0 (--)
Activist Physical Violence	5 (4.5)	0 (--)	0 (--)
Counter-Protester Violence	4 (3.6)	0 (--)	2 (1.5)
Potential Violence	3 (2.7)	5 (7.0)	1 (0.7)
No Violence	2 (1.8)	2 (2.8)	17 (12.4)
<i>Negative</i>			
Delegitimizing	55 (49.5)	52 (73.2)	12 (8.8)
Amalgam of Grievances	6 (5.4)	3 (4.2)	1 (0.7)
Freak	4 (3.6)	4 (5.6)	1 (0.7)
Insanity	7 (2.1)	19 (26.8)	2 (1.5)
Ignorance	11 (9.9)	17 (23.9)	2 (1.5)
Racism	25 (22.5)	10 (14.1)	9 (6.6)
Ridicule	9 (8.1)	34 (47.9)	0 (--)
Radical	2 (1.8)	7 (9.9)	0 (--)
<i>Positive</i>			
Legitimizing	56 (50.5)	21 (29.6)	106 (77.4)
Patriotic	14 (12.6)	2 (2.8)	35 (25.5)
Normal	27 (24.3)	5 (7.0)	58 (42.3)
Peaceful	6 (5.4)	1 (1.4)	18 (13.1)
Encouraging	2 (1.8)	1 (1.4)	37 (27.0)

Note: Frames are not mutually exclusive, thus percentages do not add to 100.

Because coverage of the TPM after 2010 focused so heavily on electoral politics and did not include many of the framing devices used in pre-2010 TPM coverage (as well as OWS coverage), I use the sample of coverage from 2009, which included far more protest events than the sample from 2009 through 2012 (see table 1). Table 3 displays framing devices used by the three types of networks in 2009 coverage of the TPM. Tea Party protesters did not use disruptive tactics and were not arrested, so those frames did not appear in any coverage. As in their

coverage of OWS, mainstream outlets used equivalent amounts of negative and positive framing devices for the TPM. For example, about half of mainstream programs used the delegitimizing frame and half used the legitimizing frame. MSNBC used far more negative than positive frames, and FNC used far more positive than negative frames.

Similar to OWS coverage, and consistent with the protest paradigm, all three types of networks used the violence frame in their TPM coverage. While the mainstream networks covered the 5 types of violence frames that I identified about equally, MSNBC focused mostly on the potential for TPM protests to turn violent and FNC focused on the lack of violence. MSNBC and the mainstream networks framed some of the things TPM activists said as “violent speech” while FNC did not. The mainstream networks covered a shoving match that occurred between TPM activists and some counter-protesters (people protesting the TPM’s protests) and used frames that blamed the TPM and their counter-protesters about equally. FNC only framed the counter-protesters as being physically violent and MSNBC ignored the incident entirely (perhaps because it would have depicted their preferred group, the counter-protesters, in a negative light).

The data presented in tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that mainstream TV networks still adhere to the protest paradigm: they use frames that marginalize protesters, and they use the violence frame even when there is no actual violence to report. It also shows that they use as many positive frames as negative, which literature on journalistic norms would lead us to expect (Gans 1979) but which the protest paradigm literature does not address. The data also demonstrate that FNC and MSNBC cannot be considered mainstream in the sense that communications scholars have used the term, but that Hertog and McLeod’s (1995) conception

of “alternative press” is also inadequate to capture the nuances of the contemporary U.S. television news field.

In previous work (Taylor 2011), I used Hallin’s spheres (1986) to explain the differences between FNC, MSNBC, and the mainstream networks in their TPM coverage. I argued that the TPM falls into the sphere of legitimate controversy for the broadcast networks and CNN, as journalists on those networks “are obliged to remain disinterested reporters because it is assumed that rational and informed people will hold differing views” (Taylor 2011: 46) on the TPM—or any given social movement. In contrast, the TPM falls into the sphere of consensus for FNC and the sphere of deviance for MSNBC.

In his work on UK media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War protests, Ian Taylor (2014) adapts Hallin’s model into four spheres of opinion: full legitimacy, partial legitimacy, implicit deviance, and explicit deviance. While his point that mainstream news reports of protests tend to fall within the sphere of legitimate controversy (specifically occupying the spheres that he calls “partial legitimacy” and “implicit deviance”) is well made, Ian Taylor goes so far as to say that there is no sphere of consensus in contemporary media (p. 41). I rebut that, and argue there are some things that any corporate-owned news medium will always consider to be within the sphere of consensus. The capitalist economic model is one such thing. Because all for-profit media rely on capitalism in order to survive, they take for granted that capitalism is a good system and assume that a strong majority of Americans agree. Journalists on MSNBC criticize the extreme right components of the TPM such as their interpretation of the 2nd amendment and their racism, but they never criticize the movement’s celebration of capitalism. The idea that racism is unacceptable and should not be tolerated falls within the sphere of consensus as well (although what actually *constitutes* racism is contested in often partisan ways). Indeed, FNC does not

celebrate the clear racism present in the rhetoric at some TPM protests; instead, journalists on FNC argue that the TPM is not racist and that any TPM discourse or action that can be interpreted as racist should be blamed on fringe agitators rather than genuine Tea Party activists.

The problem with Hallin's original concept is not that there is no sphere of consensus, as Ian Taylor (2014) argues, but that the three-spheres concept is only relevant to mainstream media outlets that try to appeal to the widest audience possible. My reinterpretation of the three spheres (M. Taylor 2011) sees each as applying only to an individual media outlet's *intended* audience, and recognizes that some media outlets market their news products toward narrow niches. Even if Ian Taylor is correct that there is no sphere of consensus that remains constant across all media outlets, my understanding of the three spheres is that they vary by media outlet anyway—what falls in the sphere of consensus is that with which the majority *of an outlet's audience* agrees. The audience that FNC attracts is more politically conservative than the general population, and the audience that MSNBC attracts is more politically progressive. Knowing this, each network can place a given news item in its own sphere of legitimate controversy, deviance, or consensus even if other networks would place that same news item in a different sphere.

In contrast to protest paradigm scholars who contend that media outlets adhere to the protest paradigm based on the tactics of a movement (Boyle et al. 2012) or how deviant, extremist, or militant a movement is (Hertog and McLeod 1995; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Shoemaker 1984), I find that whether a media outlet will follow the protest paradigm depends on where a social movement falls in terms of the three spheres. A media outlet will only adhere to the protest paradigm if the protest movement falls into that outlet's sphere of legitimate controversy. If the movement falls into an outlet's sphere of deviance, the protest paradigm will be taken to the next level, and marginalizing (negative) frames will be used far more than


legitimizing (positive) frames. Finally, if a social movement falls into an outlet's sphere of consensus then that outlet's journalists will go out of their way to portray the movement in a positive way and will be far less likely to adhere to the protest paradigm. Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate this quantitatively, but the protest paradigm's relation to spheres of political discourse can be explained qualitatively with the case of arrests of OWS activists.

Coverage of OWS Arrests in Three Spheres

Arrests, especially mass arrests, are among the most newsworthy things that can happen during a protest (McCarthy et al. 2008; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Wouters 2013). TV news coverage of OWS surged after the first mass arrests of activists in New York City. From the day protests started until two weeks later, on October 1st when 724 OWS activists were arrested, OWS was covered in a total of 19 programs. In the first four days after the arrests, 32 programs covered OWS—an increase of nearly 160 percent. For the next two weeks after that, OWS coverage averaged twenty programs *per day*. Another 718 activists were arrested during those two weeks (Oct. 5 through 18). Protest paradigm literature suggests that mainstream media will cover arrests using negative or marginalizing frames toward activists, while alternative media will cover arrests in ways that focus on the activists' "higher moral purpose" (McLeod and Hertog 1992: 267) and criticize police tactics. However, the ideological segmentation of contemporary U.S. television networks cannot be adequately described in this dichotomous way. It is more useful to think of media outlets as operating within spheres of political discourse rather than as either mainstream or alternative with no variation or gradations.

As I explained in chapter 2, Hallin (1986) described news stories and sources as falling into one of three spheres of political discourse in U.S. media. In this section I describe how journalists on each TV network portrayed OWS arrests, and how that case demonstrates the

Figure 13. Adaptation of Hallin's Spheres (1986: 117) in relation to the protest paradigm



link between the three spheres and the protest paradigm. Figure 13 depicts Hallin's three spheres as they align with three forms of protest coverage: protest paradigm coverage that is overly negative, protest paradigm coverage that is balanced and objective, and supportive coverage that protest paradigm scholars have traditionally attributed to alternative media. OWS coverage falls in the sphere of deviance on FNC, the sphere of legitimate controversy on CNN and the three broadcast networks, and in the sphere of consensus on MSNBC.

I coded all mentions of arrests at OWS protest events in all 1267 transcripts using the text search feature in NVivo, which allows me to analyze the entire population of transcripts rather than just a sample. My text search for arrests captured 25 words on either side of the word "arrests" (or arrest, arresting, or arrested); I read this material and coded all relevant text, removing anything not related to OWS activists being arrested. Figure 14 shows the words most


frequently used by each network in their coverage of OWS arrests, in the form of word clouds (I separate CNN from the three broadcast networks here in order to more clearly show the similarities and differences between them). Each word cloud displays the 40 words found most frequently within those coded selections; words in larger font appeared more frequently than those in smaller font.

Reading through the text coded at “arrest*,” I noticed that TV news covered arrests in 3 different ways: FNC did so in a mocking way, usually comparing OWS arrests to the lack of TPM arrests and suggesting that OWS activists deserved to be arrested; MSNBC did so in a way that criticizes the police for overuse of force; and CNN and the Broadcast networks did so in a mostly neutral way, using value-free language to describe events as they were happening. Figure 14 shows that FNC is the only network with “violence,” “injured,” and “property” in its word cloud. Describing OWS events as violent, focusing on activists and police who were injured, and discussing property damage caused by the activists allowed the conservative news network to justify state suppression of OWS; activists were behaving badly and deserved to be arrested. FNC is also the only network with “party” in its word cloud. I found that all instances of the word “party” refer to the Tea Party—the word cloud only captured words consisting of 4 letters or more, so “tea” was left out. Programs on FNC mentioned the Tea Party when reporting OWS arrests as a way to set up OWS as the opposite of the TPM, which had no arrests and which FNC portrayed positively, as a patriotic social movement. FNC used the TPM as a foil to enhance their portrayal of OWS activists as criminals.

Protest paradigm scholars describe mainstream and alternative media as having “different moral interpretations of the same events” (McLeod and Hertog 1992: 269). While FNC reported on OWS arrests in ways that made OWS activists seem immoral and deserving of punishment,

Figure 14. Word cloud for programs coded at “Arrests,” by network

Broadcast Networks



CNN



FNC



MSNBC



MSNBC covered these arrests in a sympathetic way. It is the only network with “pepper” in its word cloud, which comes from all the mentions of police using pepper spray on protesters.²⁶ MSNBC news anchors and program hosts focused on police brutality in their coverage of OWS arrests, where FNC focused on what they framed as the “bad behavior” of activists. McLeod and Hertog (1992: 270) described a dichotomous media environment: while the mainstream media “criticiz[ed] law violations, the alternative media questioned law enforcement. Police brutality was framed as being symbolic of state oppression.” Because OWS falls into MSNBC’s sphere of consensus, they focus their coverage of mass arrests on the bad behavior of police, rather than the bad behavior of the protesters. But if MSNBC is the alternative media outlet in this scenario, then FNC would fall into what protest paradigm scholars refer to as the mainstream outlet; where, then, do the broadcast networks and CNN fit?

Because McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1995, 1999) used the case of the anarchist movement to build their protest paradigm theory, and the anarchist movement is one that is so radical that it would fall into the sphere of deviance for any of the TV networks I use in this research, I argue that McLeod and Hertog’s conceptions of mainstream and alternative media are too specific to anarchism to apply to all social movements. By incorporating Hallin’s spheres, the protest paradigm can be generalized to all social movements. Ironically, this brings us closer to Shoemaker’s (1984) idea that the more radical journalists perceive a movement to be, the more negative coverage that movement will receive, an idea that McLeod and Hertog (1999: 311) used to build their case that “the more radical a group is *perceived to be*, the more closely journalists will conform to the protest paradigm” (emphasis added). Applying the protest

²⁶ Unlike the initial word search, which captured variations of the word “arrest,” the word cloud feature of NVivo does not capture those variations. “Spray” did not show up in the word cloud because of the variations in “spray, sprayed, and spraying.”

paradigm to Hallin's spheres clarifies that the protest paradigm can be adhered to without using more negative than positive framing devices and that the mainstream vs. alternative media dichotomy is too simplistic. Different media outlets can each see the same news item as falling into any of the three spheres, depending on the audience they each attract. Thus, middle-of-the-road networks ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN should find OWS to fall into the sphere of legitimate controversy, and to adhere to the protest paradigm—but in a balanced and objective way rather than an overly negative way.

As figure 14 shows, the broadcast networks and CNN covered OWS arrests in very similar ways, which are quite distinct from both FNC and MSNBC. Instead of spinning arrests as a result of activist misbehavior or police misbehavior, they cover arrests very succinctly as events occur. The broadcast networks and CNN are the only ones with “riot” and “camp” in their word clouds. These refer to the OWS “camps” that were cleared out by police in “riot” gear; protesters who refused to leave the camps were arrested. The word cloud for the broadcast networks is the only one that includes “banks.” This is not due to in-depth coverage of some sort of anti-bank motivations behind OWS protests, however; it is simply reports of activists getting arrested while demonstrating inside of bank buildings, with no context or explanation as to why they are protesting at banks. Consistent with the protest paradigm, this lack of context is typical of mainstream media coverage of social movements (see also Sobieraj 2011). Because they have much less space to report news compared to CNN's 24 hours, the broadcast networks have to provide tight sound bites that reduce the day's biggest news stories efficiently enough to fit them all into one hour. The words “protests,” “arrests,” and “police” are all the same size in the broadcast word cloud, indicative of short and to-the-point stories that describe what is happening without taking the time to explain why it is happening.

The spheres explain why so many networks that adhere to the protest paradigm do so using a balanced set of framing devices. They also explicate the idea that news outlets cannot be described simply as mainstream or alternative, but that there are three possible orientations a news outlet can take toward any news story. Thus, the protest paradigm applies to contemporary U.S. television media in much the same way that Chan and Lee (1984) described the three journalistic paradigms of the Hong Kong press.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined how the amount and type of TV coverage each movement received changed over time and what factors explain those changes. I found that news coverage of each movement differed based on the tactics each movement used and on their respective alignments with the status quo as well as their respective alignments with the spheres of discourse that correspond to each type of TV news outlet. In line with the protest paradigm, coverage of OWS is driven by violence and arrests and then all but ceases when OWS switches to focusing on non-public protest tactics such as direct assistance to needy populations. In the meantime, coverage of the TPM switches from mostly adhering to the protest paradigm to ignoring TPM protest events and focusing on the TPM's direct effects on electoral politics. OWS's anti-status quo and the TPM's pro-status quo orientations likely explain these differences.

I also showed how TV news coverage of each movement varied in terms of frequency, type, and tone across different networks. OWS received far more protest event coverage while the TPM receive far more coverage that had nothing to do with their public protests, but both movements received more neutral coverage than positive or negative. This varied by network, with CNN and the broadcast networks giving overwhelmingly neutral coverage of both

movements, FNC mostly positive coverage of the TPM and negative coverage of OWS, and MSNBC mostly negative coverage of the TPM and positive coverage of OWS. While many of the same frames were used in coverage of both movements, the frequency of framing devices also varied by network.

Finally, I explained that these variations by network do not necessarily contradict the protest paradigm, as some have suggested (e.g. Weaver and Scacco 2013). Rather, they are evidence of a more nuanced process taking place in our segmented television news landscape. By incorporating a version of Hallin's spheres that recognizes the importance of a news outlet's intended audience, the protest paradigm can be generalized to all social movements. Where a social movement falls in terms of a news outlet's sphere of consensus, deviance, or legitimate controversy will determine whether the news outlet adheres to the protest paradigm, a more negative version of the protest paradigm, or uses positive and supportive frames to describe the movement. Therefore, a media outlet's adherence to the protest paradigm is determined in part by the perceived political ideology of the outlet's target audience. In addition, this relationship between negative and positive frames and spheres of discourse should apply to any news item or news source, not just social movements.

This chapter covered the first component of the partisan media paradigm: media outlets that try to appeal to the widest audience will cover social movements in neutral or balanced ways, regardless of the political ideology of the social movement. Most research on media and social movements argues or assumes that mainstream media will use negative frames to describe activists and will not cover the substantive issues that activists raise (e.g. Amenta et al. 2009; Boyle et al. 2012; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011). In the next chapter, I cover the second component of the partisan media paradigm: that substantive

coverage of social movements occurs when negative frames are used in news reports, and regardless of whether or not the coverage is focused on protest activity. I test whether prior research that found negative frames actually predict in-depth reporting on the issues for the first year of TPM coverage (Taylor 2011), and for both right and left-wing movements (Taylor and Gunby 2016) holds for OWS and the TPM over multiple years of coverage. I also build on this research by testing whether positive frames have a similar predictive effect.

CHAPTER 4.

FRAMING DEVICES AND SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

In the previous chapter, I showed how TV news programs used many of the same framing devices in coverage of the TPM and OWS. In this chapter, I examine whether the framing devices used in coverage of each movement occur alongside substantive coverage in the form of standing (allowing activists to speak in their own words, see Ferree et al. 2002) and descriptions of activists' messages. Using a random sample of 400 TV news transcripts – 200 of TPM coverage from 2009 through 2012, and 200 of OWS coverage from 2011 through 2014 – I test whether this data supports or contradicts prior research on framing and in-depth coverage of social movements. While prior research found that the “freak” (negative descriptions of activists' appearances or behaviors) and ignorant (descriptions of activists as stupid, or not understanding the issues they are protesting) framing devices predicted different forms of in-depth coverage of the TPM and Global Justice Movement (Taylor and Gunby 2016), I find that other negative frames and also some positive frames are even stronger predictors of some forms of in-depth coverage for the TPM and OWS.

Prior Work on Framing and Substantive Coverage

Most research on media and social movements indicates that news coverage will be negative or will not bring up a movement's issues of concern (e.g. Amenta et al. 2009; Boyle et al. 2012; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011). However, some recent scholarship suggests that favorable coverage does occur in some circumstances, such as when a movement supports the status quo or when coverage does not focus on protest activity (Amenta et al. 2012; Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Weaver and Scacco 2013), even

when negative framing devices are used in that coverage (Taylor and Gunby 2016). In this section I give a brief overview of the literature on substantive coverage of social movements, and identify gaps in the literature that I attempt to fill in this chapter.

Amenta and colleagues (2012) rightly point out that the literature on social movements and media has found that media coverage of protests is rarely favorable toward protesters, but that this literature does not address the fact that movements are often covered for other reasons—not just for protests (p. 86). They take a “story-centered” approach to evaluating the quality of media coverage a social movement gets. They find that when a story is initiated by disruptive social movement action (which the authors define as any protest, march, or demonstration, whether or not it includes civil disobedience), the movement’s message is less likely to be covered. In contrast, they find that when a story is initiated by institutional action such as running candidates for office or fighting to pass legislation, the movement’s message is more likely to be covered (p. 89). Their study is limited in two important ways: 1) they are looking solely at the case of the Townsend Plan, which was a social movement that was active in the first half of the 20th century; and 2) the only form of media they examine is newspaper coverage. I bring this into contemporary times by looking at two 21st century movements and their TV coverage. Does this story-centered argument apply to TV news coverage of contemporary movements?

Recent scholarship on TV news coverage of the TPM suggests there could be support for Amenta and colleagues’ (2012) findings. Boykoff and Laschever (2011) found that 2009 and 2010 coverage depicted the TPM supportively more than twice as often as it depicted the movement negatively. In their investigation of the protest paradigm’s (see chapter 2 for an overview of this line of research) applicability to right-wing movements, Weaver and Scacco

(2013) found that protest paradigm coverage of the TPM varied by news source, and that CNN and FNC were more likely to use legitimizing frames than MSNBC. However, neither of these studies examine TPM coverage after 2010. By including coverage from 2011 and 2012 in my sample, I capture media framing of the TPM during a period in which its tactics are almost entirely institutionalized.

The protest paradigm suggests that when media cover violence and/or arrests, they fail to cover the issues or to give activists standing (Boyle et al. 2012; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999). Other scholars have argued that coverage of the violence at the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle actually led to more in-depth coverage of the issues being protested (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002). However, this argument was challenged by Boykoff (2006), who examined whether coverage of violence at protests affiliated with the Global Justice Movement – including the 1999 WTO protests – led to an increase in substantive coverage of the protester’s issues. He operationalizes substantive coverage as that which includes 5 or more sentences explaining the goals or motivations of the protesters. Boykoff (2006) uses a broad definition of the violence frame, including when reporters describe an event as having the *potential* for violence and even when they describe an event as *nonviolent* (p. 211). He found no correlation between the violence frame and substantive coverage. I improve upon Boykoff’s work by testing whether four distinct forms of the violence frame – activist violence, police violence, potential for violence, and no violence – predict each of three components of substantive coverage.

Amenta and colleagues conceptualize *substantive* coverage as that which includes both a description of the movement’s *messages* and gives activist *standing*. Standing refers to activists being given a voice by media in the form of direct quotes or paraphrasing (Amenta et al. 2012:

87; see also Ferree et al. 2002). Following my prior research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), I separate standing into these two components since direct quotes are more legitimizing than paraphrasing (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 319), and paraphrasing can misconstrue activists' meanings. I ask whether a series of negative and positive framing devices predict quoting, paraphrasing, or covering the movement's message, and then I combine the three components and test whether negative and positive framing devices predict substantive coverage.

While Amenta and colleagues (2012) have shown that substantive coverage of social movements does not occur when coverage is initiated by disruptive social movement actions, they do so using newspaper coverage of a movement from the 1930s. I move this research forward by examining a more relevant source of news and contemporary social movements. In addition to building on Amenta's work, I also build on my prior research (Taylor and Gunby 2016) by examining positive frames as well as negative frames.

In prior research (Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 2016), I tested whether negative framing devices and substantive coverage were mutually exclusive. I examined TV news coverage around protest *events* specifically and found that negative frames such as 'freak' and 'ignorant' correlate strongly with substantive coverage of social movements. The original research examined TV news coverage of the TPM and the Global Justice Movement (GJM); coverage of OWS is similar to the GJM in many ways, and different in others. The GJM and OWS share many overlapping actors, frames, targets, and tactics, which has led scholars to claim that the GJM has symbiotically coalesced into the OWS (de Vries-Jordan 2014). Key differences include the fact that OWS got more news coverage than the GJM, and that MSNBC was not nearly as partisan as it is now back when the GJM was getting a lot of media attention (from 1999-2004). The TPM coverage I used in the original research was 2009 coverage only,

and was sampled around three major protest events; the sample I use in this chapter covers 2009 through 2012 and is overwhelmingly related to electoral politics rather than protest events.

In my prior research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), I found that negative frames are significant predictors of all three components of substantive coverage. While those results were also consistent with Amenta and colleagues' (2012) finding that event-related coverage leads to more coverage of activist "standing," my research only included analysis of two negative framing devices. In this chapter, I test whether the results from that original research hold for TV news coverage across multiple years of movement activity, including additional negative frames and positive frames, and including much more news coverage that is not focused on protest events. I am also testing the theory that news coverage initiated by protest is more likely to include standing, and coverage initiated by institutionalized action is more likely to include more thematic framing—the message behind the movement (Amenta et al. 2012: 85; see also Iyengar 1991, 2005). While event-related TPM coverage made up over half of the data used in my 2016 article, only 35 of the 200 TPM transcripts in this chapter are event-related. Inversely, just 34 of the 200 OWS transcripts are *not* event-related. Therefore, I am not just comparing a progressive movement with a right-wing movement; I am comparing coverage of protest events to coverage of a movement that has moved on from protests to institutionalized tactics. Therefore, the sample of TPM coverage should be more comparable to the Townsend Plan coverage used by Amenta and colleagues (2012).

Data and Methods

Dependent and Independent Variables

My dependent variables explore whether news programs provided substantive coverage of the movements, which I gauge by coding each sentence that quoted activists, paraphrased

activists, or explained their message in the form of activists' motivations, grievances, and demands. The *quote* variable measures the number of sentences spoken by an activist in an episode. The *paraphrase* variable measures the number of sentences that paraphrased an activist in the news episode. Following Ferree and colleagues (2002), I consider quoting and paraphrasing in tandem as examples of "standing." Standing is an indicator of in-depth coverage that benefits social movements (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993) because it represents journalists giving a social movement the opportunity to speak for itself (Ferree et al. 2002). Amenta and colleagues (2012) also conceptualize both quoting and paraphrasing as standing (see also Ferree et al. 2002). However, rather than look at both paraphrasing and quotes together as examples of standing, I also analyze them separately to acknowledge that quotes, coming directly from the activists, are often a stronger form of standing than paraphrasing (see Detenber et al. 2007 for an example of the different effects on public perception produced by quoting and paraphrasing). The variable *message* refers to the presence of a description of the substantive issues behind the movement's actions. I count the number of sentences in each episode that discuss the protesters' grievances, demands, goals, and/or motivations as well as journalists' or pundits' critiques of the protest targets (Rojecki 2002). None of these variables are mutually exclusive; any or all of the frames and measures of substantive reporting can occur within a single sentence and certainly within one TV news episode.

Substantive coverage includes both standing and the movement's message. However, rather than operationalizing substantive coverage as a dichotomous variable, as Amenta and colleagues (2012) do, where substantive = 1 when both the message and either quoting or paraphrasing of activists takes place in one news transcript and 0 otherwise, I use a count variable. The count variable has a score of 1 for each sentence that either quotes or paraphrases

an activist, and for each sentence that describes the movement's message. This broader range allows the analysis to capture multiple instances of standing and reporting on the message.

In order to test whether substantive coverage occurs alongside specific framing devices, my independent variables are many of the negative and positive frames that I described in chapter 3. I include the following negative frames: freak, ignorance, insanity, ridicule, amalgam of grievances, and racism. I then run analysis on the violence frame as conceptualized by communications scholars (e.g. Boykoff 2006; but see also Dardis 2006 and McFarlane and Hay 2003, who broke the violence frame into two distinct forms), and compare results of that model to one that parses out different forms of the violence frame: activist violence, police violence, potential for violence, and no violence. Finally, I examine the following positive frames: normal, patriotic, and peaceful (see chapter 3 for descriptions of each). The peaceful frame is distinct from the "no violence" frame because the peaceful frame is overtly positive, focusing on the calm and peaceful atmosphere at the protest or the peaceful nature of the activists. The "no violence" frame places the focus on violence, with journalists or pundits often going out of their way to express surprise at the lack of violence at an event. I do not include the "legitimizing" frame (see chapters 3 and 5) because it is often indistinguishable from the movement's message, which is a dependent variable.

Control Variables

Following Taylor and Gunby (2016), my analysis includes three control variables. I control for *event-related* coverage with a dichotomous variable. A value of 1 indicates that the program was focused on a specific upcoming, current, or past protest event; otherwise, the value is 0. I control for whether or not the episode focuses on an event to distinguish protest event coverage from coverage of the movement as a whole, or of institutionalized tactics such as

Table 4. Descriptive statistics for variables used in chapter 4 analyses

	Occupy Wall Street N=200				Tea Party Movement N=200			
	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Logit DVs								
Standing	0.575	0.496	0	1	0.160	0.368	0	1
Message	0.650	0.478	0	1	0.580	0.495	0	1
ZINB DVs								
Quote	1.520	3.014	0	17	0.490	1.878	0	16
Paraphrase	0.775	1.136	0	5	0.085	0.329	0	2
Message	2.920	4.060	0	15	1.715	3.086	0	25
Substantive	5.215	6.474	0	33	2.219	4.407	0	33
Negative								
Freak	0.050	0.329	0	4	0.010	0.100	0	1
Ignorance	0.505	1.341	0	9	0.100	0.521	0	5
Insanity	0.070	0.309	0	2	0.115	0.415	0	3
Ridicule	0.215	0.856	0	7	0.155	0.650	0	7
Amalgam	0.370	0.915	0	6	-	-	-	-
Racism	-	-	-	-	0.155	0.585	0	4
Disruptive								
Arrests	1.090	1.617	0	8	-	-	-	-
Violence	1.490	2.860	0	21	-	-	-	-
Activist Violence	0.495	1.272	0	9	-	-	-	-
Police Violence	0.615	1.756	0	15	-	-	-	-
Potential for Violence	0.090	0.472	0	5	-	-	-	-
No Violence	0.005	0.071	0	1	-	-	-	-
Positive								
Normal	0.310	1.072	0	10	0.125	0.814	0	10
Patriotic	0.025	0.211	0	2	0.065	0.389	0	4
Peaceful	0.505	1.130	0	9	-	-	-	-
Controls								
Word Count	955.12	775.458	87	4015	609.21	817.553	91	6574
Event coverage	0.830	0.377	0	1	0.175	0.381	0	1
FNC	0.165	0.372	0	1	0.220	0.415	0	1
MSNBC	0.120	0.326	0	1	0.215	0.412	0	1

electioneering. I also control for which *network* produced the episode. I include the two ideologically biased cable news networks (FNC and MSNBC) as dummy variables, with the traditionally mainstream CNN and broadcast networks as the reference category. This allows me to control for different organizational norms in reporting. See table 4 for descriptive statistics of all variables used in the analyses presented in this chapter.

Methods

In my first analysis, I use logistic regression; in the rest, I use zero-inflated negative binomial regression (ZINB). This form of regression analysis is particularly suited to modeling count variables with excessive zeroes and where outcome variables' variances are larger than their means (Long and Freese 2014). My data meet both of these criteria, as table 4 indicates. Statisticians and other researchers propose that zero inflated distributions provide better statistical fit to data where the dependent variables are count variables with excessive zeroes, since failing to account for the extra zeroes can result in biased parameter estimates (Greene 1994; Hall 2000; Lambert 1992; Xie et al. 2009). After comparing the predicted and actual probabilities from four different regression models that can be used to analyze count data, I confirmed that ZINB is the best fit to my data using likelihood ratio and Vuong tests²⁷ (Perumean-Chaney et al. 2013) and HPC tests (Silva et al. 2015). See Appendix B for results of those tests.

ZINB regression assumes that the excessive zeroes in the outcome variables are the result of two different processes happening in the data. It uses a logit model to explain the outcome of zero in the dependent variable, and a negative binomial model to explain the counts for the non-zero outcomes (Long and Freese 2014). Each of several framing devices, whether the episode

²⁷ Using Vuong to test for zero-inflation in non-nested models has recently come under scrutiny (see Wilson 2015). I conduct HPC tests as an added measure.

was event-based, and the news networks comprise the negative binomial model that explains the number of sentences that quote, paraphrase, or describe the movements' message.

Due to the nature of TV news production, the time devoted to a story is decided by executive producers prior to broadcast. The amount of time allotted to a story then affects the amount of substantive coverage a journalist is able to fit into a story, though longer time allotment does not guarantee any substantive coverage. I operationalize the time devoted to a story with *word count*, which is measured by the number of all movement-related words in an episode's transcript. I include word count to ensure that my analysis of the association between the frames and substantive coverage "does not simply reflect how much the journalists could fit into each episode" (Taylor and Gunby 2016: 586). In my analyses, a low word count explains the excessive zero outcomes, since shorter news segments are less likely to include substantive coverage. Each of the three control variables could also explain the excessive zeroes, so I include them in both the logit model and the negative binomial model. When comparing models, I use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to assess model fit. Decreases of more than 10 from model to model are considered to be significant improvements in model fit (Burnham and Anderson 2004).

Results and Discussion

First, I test whether my data support the theory that news coverage initiated by protest action will be more likely to include standing, and news coverage initiated by institutionalized action such as electioneering will be more likely than protest coverage to include the message behind the movement (Amenta et al. 2012: 85). In order to directly compare my results to Amenta and colleagues', I combined quoting and paraphrasing into one variable and made that variable dichotomous (any transcript that includes either a quote or paraphrase is counted as 1,

Table 5. Log Odds Coefficients from Logistic Regression of Event-Related Coverage on a Movement's Standing and Message

	Occupy Wall Street (N=200)		Tea Party Movement (N=200)	
	<u>Standing</u>	<u>Message</u>	<u>Standing</u>	<u>Message</u>
Event	1.509** (0.497)	-0.669 (0.501)	1.091* (0.446)	1.370** (0.488)
FNC	-0.376 (0.463)	-0.361 (0.473)	-0.506 (0.545)	0.334 (0.393)
MSNBC	-0.918 (0.586)	0.777 (0.712)	-0.590 (0.555)	0.319 (0.393)
Word Count	0.002*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001* (0.000)	0.002*** (0.001)
Constant	-2.169*** (0.553)	-0.534 (0.513)	-2.069*** (0.307)	-0.816** (0.315)
LR χ^2 (df=5)	51.53***	55.21***	13.89**	29.65***
Pseudo R ²	0.189	0.213	0.079	0.109

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

otherwise it is 0), which is consistent with the way they measured standing. Likewise, I code message as '1' for any transcript that includes at least one sentence describing the movement's message, otherwise it is zero.

Because the dependent variable in each analysis is dichotomous, I use logistic regression for this first set of tests. Table 5 displays coefficients from logistic regression for both standing and the message of each movement. Looking first at the columns labeled "Standing," it is clear that my results support Amenta and colleague's assertion that protest event coverage is more likely to include standing than non-protest coverage. When coverage is event-related, the odds that a TV news program will include OWS standing are 4.522 to 1 (log odds = 1.509) and the odds of TPM standing are 2.977 to 1 (log odds = 1.091), holding all other variables constant.

Results presented in table 5 also suggest that protest events are not as detrimental to communicating a movement's message as Amenta and colleagues suggested. Although the coefficient is negative, event coverage has no significant effect on coverage of OWS's message. Contrary to what we would expect, when news coverage is initiated by a TPM protest event, the odds of that coverage containing the message behind the protesters' actions are 3.935 times higher than when coverage is not initiated by a protest event (log odds = 1.370), holding all other variables constant. Thus, the odds that event-related TPM coverage will include the TPM's message are about 4 to 1, higher than the odds that it will give standing to TPM activists (about 3 to 1).

This could be due to either the TPM or the Townsend Plan being a special case. One or the other of these two movements could be significantly different from most other social movements, and our respective results could be evidence of that. The fact that the TPM is a status quo oriented movement may be enough to differentiate it from most other U.S. social movements, at least the ones that get a lot of media attention. As supporters of the status quo, journalists are more likely to discuss the TPM's message regardless of whether the story is event-related. Alternatively, my results could be due to the medium itself; perhaps TPM newspaper data will show a result more in line with Amenta and colleagues' expectations.

Still, predicting substantive coverage based on whether that coverage is focused on a protest event is a simplistic way of examining very complex data. I turn next to specific framing devices and their relationships with different components of substantive coverage. I start by looking at negative framing devices used in both OWS and TPM coverage, then disruptive framing devices (which, arguably, are also negative) used in OWS coverage (none appeared in the sample of TPM coverage), and then positive framing devices in both OWS and TPM

coverage. Finally, I develop models that incorporate all framing devices and their effects on a count variable that measures the extent of substantive coverage overall.

Negative Frames and In-Depth Coverage

Results of ZINB regression of various negative frames on three components of substantive coverage of OWS and the TPM are listed side by side in table 6. Each of the six sets of results presented in table 6 test the same independent variables' effects on a different dependent variable. Thus, the models in table 6 should not be compared against each other (see Appendix C for incremental models for each of the three dependent variables on OWS and TPM transcripts).

The results show that many negative frames used in TV news occur simultaneously with descriptions of the messages of both movements. However, results for quoting and paraphrasing activists from both movements over the full 3-year time periods are not entirely consistent with prior research. The freak frame is almost exclusively used in live event coverage, and only appears in 2 programs in this TPM sample (compared to 38 programs in the sample from 2009 coverage, see Taylor and Gunby 2016). Because of this, as well as the fact that activists are more likely to be directly quoted in protest event coverage rather than be paraphrased, it is not surprising that the freak frame has a very strong and negative relationship with paraphrasing TPM activists. None of the 200 TPM transcripts included both paraphrasing and the freak frame. However, the freak frame is a significant predictor of both movements' messages.

I use a different coding scheme for the freak frame here than I did in prior research. In the original paper (Taylor and Gunby 2016), we followed Boykoff's (2006) lead and combined the insanity frame with the freak frame; we found it to be a significant predictor of standing for both movements, and a marginally significant predictor of conveying the message of the TPM

Table 6. Coefficients from ZINB Regression – Negative Frames

DV:	Occupy Wall Street (N=200)			Tea Party Movement (N=200)		
	Quote	Paraphrase	Message	Quote	Paraphrase	Message
Negative Frames						
Freak	0.450 (0.330)	-0.371 (0.282)	0.398 ⁺ (0.224)	0.210 (0.428)	-14.913*** (1.021)	1.099** (0.384)
Ignorance	0.033 (0.092)	-0.002 (0.097)	0.214** (0.073)	0.215 (0.938)	-0.121 (0.284)	0.557** (0.210)
Insanity	0.092 (0.357)	0.174 (0.376)	0.180 (0.155)	0.041 (0.761)	0.590 (0.570)	0.458 (0.292)
Ridicule	0.091 (0.148)	0.270 ⁺ (0.152)	-0.206** (0.077)	-0.310 (0.348)	-0.500* (0.230)	0.114 (0.164)
Amalgam	0.159 ⁺ (0.094)	0.022 (0.102)	0.385*** (0.091)	-	-	-
Racism	-	-	-	0.719 (0.760)	0.105 (0.278)	-0.038 (0.170)
Controls						
Event	0.207 (0.553)	-0.474 ⁺ (0.285)	-0.297 (0.220)	1.771* (0.747)	0.323 (1.115)	0.757* (0.308)
FNC	-1.710*** (0.467)	-1.015** (0.375)	0.124 (0.294)	-0.841 (0.651)	-2.587 ⁺ (1.476)	0.086 (0.348)
MSNBC	-0.206 (0.484)	-0.254 (0.315)	0.962*** (0.274)	2.544 (3.619)	-1.259 (0.998)	-0.121 (0.239)
Constant	0.555 (0.507)	0.758* (0.297)	0.864*** (0.205)	-0.190 (0.796)	-1.171 (0.728)	0.299 ⁺ (0.175)
Inflated Controls						
Word Count	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.015 ⁺ (0.008)	-0.007 ⁺ (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.011** (0.004)
Event	-0.978 (1.998)	-4.967** (1.790)	1.839 (1.300)	0.066 (1.361)	-1.032 (3.757)	-1.654 (2.079)
FNC	-2.212* (1.030)	-0.448 (1.662)	2.691 (1.915)	-0.798 (1.720)	-3.618 ⁺ (2.055)	-1.953 (2.574)
MSNBC	-0.752 (3.079)	2.384 ⁺ (1.370)	1.837 (1.532)	10.281 (7.030)	-18.743*** (2.258)	-1.081 (1.197)
Constant	5.248 ⁺ (2.994)	7.636*** (2.267)	1.979 (1.724)	4.466** (1.710)	4.158* (1.942)	3.087** (1.197)
Inalpha						
Constant	0.669** (0.219)	-3.040 (2.653)	-0.397* (0.163)	0.621 (0.572)	-2.614 (19.770)	-0.420 (0.265)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; ⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

but not the message of the GJM. Here, I follow the protest paradigm's operationalization of the freak frame as focusing on protesters' manner of dress, use of props, and other physical characteristics (Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999). I separate coverage of "non-mainstream values, beliefs, and opinions" (Boykoff 2006: 216) into the "insanity" frame. As table 6 shows, the insanity frame has no predictive value on any of the components of substantive coverage for either movement. Therefore, these results show that a focus on protesters' non-mainstream physical characteristics is more likely than a focus on non-mainstream values and beliefs to include components of substantive coverage.

The first three sets of results in table 6 display models for each of the three components of substantive coverage (quoting activists, paraphrasing activists, and communicating activists' messages) in OWS coverage; the second set of results display the same for TPM coverage. Appendix C contains incremental model building for each of the 6 fully loaded models presented in table 6. Predicted probabilities for each of the negative framing devices (holding all other variables at their means) in OWS coverage are depicted in figure 15, and predicted probabilities for TPM coverage are depicted in figure 16.

Table 6 shows that the ignorance frame is a significant predictor of the message for both movements. For each sentence that includes the ignorance frame, the odds of that transcript including OWS's message are 1.239 times higher (log odds increase by a factor of 0.214), holding all other variables constant, and the odds of a transcript including the TPM's message are 1.745 times higher (log odds increase by a factor of 0.557), holding all other variables constant. This is consistent with the original research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), although we found the ignorance frame to be a significant predictor of paraphrasing for both the TPM and GJM as well, while it has no significant effects on paraphrasing here.




Figure 15. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals; negative OWS frames




Figure 16. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals: negative TPM frames

For both movements, negative frames have the most substantial positive effects on coverage of the grievances, demands, goals, and/or motivations (i.e., the message) of each movement. The bottom row of graphs in figure 15 show predicted probabilities for each of the negative framing devices and coverage of OWS's message. The ridicule frame is the only frame that has a negative relationship with coverage of OWS's message. The presence of all other negative frames increase the likelihood that OWS's message will be included in a news transcript, and all but the insanity frame are statistically significant. Nearly all of the ridicule frames were found in FNC coverage of OWS; since FNC is the most hostile network toward the left in general, it should not be surprising that use of the ridicule frame is a predictor of less coverage of the actual issues with which this left-leaning movement was concerned. The bottom row of graphs in figure 16 show predicted probabilities for each of the negative framing devices and coverage of the TPM's message. Effects of the freak and ignorance frames on coverage of the TPM message are positive and statistically significant, and relatively strong.

Table 6 and figure 15 show that the freak and ridicule frames have the strongest effect on paraphrasing OWS activists, and the amalgam of grievances frame has the strongest effect on quoting OWS activists and on coverage of their message. The amalgam of grievances frame is only used in OWS coverage. Since the amalgam frame often presents a list of the movement's grievances, it should not be surprising that it is a significant predictor of coverage of the OWS message.

The racism frame, only used in TPM coverage, is not a significant predictor of any component of substantive coverage. The racism frame tends to cut off conversations about the TPM and about racism itself, leading instead to discussions centering on the act of accusing someone of being racist and ignoring the causes and effects of racism, or even a discussion about

what racism actually is. I will delve more into the racism frame in the next chapter when I examine the process by which some frames lead to more or less substantive coverage.

Many of the control variables have strong and significant effects on substantive coverage of both movements. Table 6 shows that low word count significantly predicts the excessive number of zero outcomes for both movements in all models except OWS message and TPM paraphrasing, which indicates that programs with a lower word count do not have enough room to offer in-depth coverage. The coefficients for OWS event coverage contradict research by Amenta and colleagues (2012), who found that standing occurs more when the news coverage is event-related. However, results for the TPM partially support their findings in that event-related coverage predicts standing, but contradict their findings in that Amenta and colleagues argued electoral coverage would include more in-depth discussion of the issues the movement stands for. Table 6 shows that TPM event-related coverage also included more in-depth coverage of their message. When a news transcript discusses a TPM event, the odds of that transcript including the TPM's message are twice as high (2.132 to 1; log odds increase by a factor of 0.757), holding all other variables constant.

I argued in chapter 3 that FNC and MSNBC operate as neither mainstream nor alternative media outlets. The protest paradigm literature demonstrates that alternative media – a phrase they would not have used to describe FNC or MSNBC, which are both mainstream in terms of audience access and viewership – are overly positive in their coverage of movements with which they are ideologically aligned. Results in table 6 offer further support for my argument, since FNC is significantly less likely in general to give OWS activists standing, and MSNBC is significantly more likely in general to report the OWS message. However, FNC is no more likely than any other network to do the same for the TPM. This further supports another

contention I made in chapter 3, that the TPM's orientation as a status quo movement means that it gets more media coverage overall, and more balanced coverage in general.

Disruptive Frames and Substantive Coverage

The protest paradigm literature suggests that journalists covering protest events will use disruptive frames, such as the violence frame, even when there is no actual violence to report (Hall et al. 1978; McLeod and Hertog 1999). If a protest movement that has had violent incidents in the past engages in a peaceful protest, journalists will discuss the potential for the event to turn violent or go out of their way to say that no violence has occurred. Scholars have theorized that this use of disruptive frames delegitimizes movements and causes the messages they are trying to convey to be ignored (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999). In this section I test whether those scholars are correct, or whether various disruptive framing devices are likely to co-occur with the three components of substantive coverage. Because TPM protests rarely turned violent (a shoving match at a 2009 rally between a Tea Partier and a counter-protester is as violent as it got, but transcripts covering that event did not end up in my sample) and no TPM protesters were ever arrested, and because the majority of the TPM sample did not cover protest events at all, no disruption frames occur often enough in TPM coverage to justify an examination; I focus only on the OWS sample here.

Table 7 displays ZINB regression results for disruptive frames used in OWS coverage; there are two models for each of the three dependent variables (quoting, paraphrasing, and the OWS message). Figure 17 displays predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for each of the disruptive framing devices on each of the three components of substantive coverage. In the first model in each of the three sets of models, I use the same construction of the violence frame that Boykoff (2006) uses in his analysis of GJM news coverage. These models support

Table 7. Coefficients from ZINB Regression – Disruptive Frames in OWS Coverage (N=200)

DV:	Quote		Paraphrase		Message	
Disruptive Frames						
Arrests	-0.132* (0.067)	-0.155* (0.069)	-0.013 (0.058)	-0.007 (0.065)	-0.015 (0.061)	-0.034 (0.062)
Violence	0.073* (0.029)	-	0.003 (0.027)	-	0.017 (0.023)	-
Activist Violence	-	0.014 (0.107)	-	0.032 (0.057)	-	0.051 (0.060)
Police Violence	-	0.099 (0.078)	-	-0.084 (0.115)	-	-0.000 (0.041)
Potential for Violence	-	0.370+ (0.202)	-	0.142 (0.096)	-	0.178 (0.179)
No Violence	-	1.163*** (0.226)	-	-14.933*** (1.020)	-	1.575*** (0.208)
Controls						
Event	0.606 (0.542)	0.672 (0.619)	-0.477+ (0.267)	-0.260 (0.259)	-0.097 (0.276)	-0.068 (0.287)
FNC	-1.751*** (0.398)	-1.627*** (0.424)	-0.566 (0.466)	-0.628 (0.457)	0.095 (0.254)	0.096 (0.250)
MSNBC	-0.565 (0.460)	-0.546 (0.478)	-0.265 (0.309)	-0.124 (0.323)	0.640* (0.255)	0.709** (0.265)
Constant	0.506 (0.528)	0.422 (0.591)	0.781** (0.243)	0.620** (0.240)	1.217*** (0.242)	1.160*** (0.255)
Inflated Control						
Word Count	-0.009+ (0.005)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	-0.010 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)
Event	-0.580 (2.697)	-0.637 (2.227)	-5.182** (1.921)	-4.784** (1.799)	1.779 (1.293)	1.784 (1.302)
FNC	-2.312* (1.075)	-2.256* (1.080)	-0.595 (1.838)	-0.505 (1.863)	1.789 (2.573)	1.804 (2.445)
MSNBC	-0.613 (4.962)	-0.752 (3.883)	2.422+ (1.406)	2.506+ (1.379)	1.413 (2.012)	1.422 (1.997)
Constant	4.804 (3.839)	4.909 (3.201)	7.902** (2.493)	7.469** (2.359)	1.173 (1.758)	1.157 (1.637)
Inalpha						
Constant	0.635** (0.237)	0.572* (0.241)	-2.359 (1.491)	-4.626 (14.440)	-0.010 (0.265)	-0.062 (0.261)
AIC	572.338	572.642	443.295	442.695	848.124	846.946

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001




Figure 17. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for disruptive frames in OWS coverage.

Boykoff's claim that the violence frame does not lead to in-depth coverage of a movement's issues. However, this form of the violence frame is broad and comprises various framing devices; some place the blame for violent behavior on the protesters, others blame the police. Each of these devices could have a different relationship with substantive coverage.

The second model in each of the three sets of models in table 7 lists all components of the violence frame separately. Here, Boykoff's (2006) claim is only partially supported; while activist violence and police violence have no significant effect on substantive coverage, the "no violence" framing device actually predicts increased coverage of the message and quoting activists. The odds are nearly 5 to 1 that a program that includes the "no violence" frame will also discuss the movement's message (log odds increase by a factor of 1.575). However, the "no violence" frame appeared so infrequently that it did not co-occur with paraphrasing at all, hence the strong negative coefficient.

In addition, coverage of arrests has a negative relationship with all three components of substantive coverage. This relationship is only statistically significant for quoting activists. For each mention of activists getting arrested, the odds of an activist being quoted are 0.856 to 1 (log odds decrease by a factor of 0.155), holding all other variables constant. Many activists, especially anarchists and those on the left of the political spectrum, get arrested on purpose in order to gain news coverage and bring awareness to the issues they are protesting. The results presented in table 7 and the first column of figure 17 show that this tactic does not accomplish what activists intend for it to accomplish—at least not immediately. News coverage of OWS did increase substantially after the first mass arrests, and much of that coverage did include in-depth explanations of the protesters' messages (see chapter 3). The tactic of getting arrested may not bring immediate attention to a movement's message, but sustained activity following arrests

might get more media attention than it would have otherwise, and this coverage has the potential to include deeper explanations of the movement's message.

Amenta and colleagues (2012) hypothesized that coverage of disruptive events would not lead to coverage of the issues but might lead to standing (p. 97). Results in table 7 show that this is true only when the disruptive event does not include any violence. When journalists focus on the potential for violence or the fact that the event was not violent, they are more likely to quote activists. The coefficients for activist violence and police violence are close to zero, which indicates that explicit descriptions of violence do not preclude substantive coverage.

These results highlight the importance of paying close attention to nuances when analyzing social movement media framing. Amenta and colleagues' definition of 'disruptive events' as any form of public demonstration, and Boykoff's broad definition of the violence frame each fail to capture a wider range of possibilities for predicting substantive coverage. However, my results are largely consistent with scholars who have argued that the use of disruptive frames delegitimizes movements and causes the messages they are trying to convey to be ignored (Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999). Thus far in this chapter, and in prior research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), only negative framing devices have been examined as predictors of substantive coverage. In the next section, I look at positive framing devices used in coverage of both OWS and the TPM.

Positive Frames and Substantive Coverage

The three most common positive framing devices used in coverage of both movements were the normalizing frame, the patriotic frame, and the peaceful frame (see chapter 3 for thorough discussion of each). The "peaceful" frame was used frequently in early coverage of TPM rallies, but it did not appear at all in this sample of 200 and so I did not include it in the

TPM models. I also removed the “normal” frame from the regression on TPM paraphrasing because there was no transcript in which both the normal frame and the paraphrase frame occurred—because of this, the model would not converge.

Table 8 displays the results of ZINB regression for the positive frames, with results from each dependent variable listed side by side. The first three models test the effects of positive frames on each of the three components of substantive coverage for OWS, and the last three models test the same for TPM coverage. Each of the six sets of results presented in table 8 test the same independent variables’ effects on a different dependent variable. Thus, the models in table 8 should not be compared against each other (see Appendix D for results of incremental model building). Figure 18 displays predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for each of the positive framing devices (holding all other variables at their means) in OWS coverage, and predicted probabilities for TPM coverage are depicted in figure 19.

For OWS, none of the positive framing devices are significant predictors of activist quoting or paraphrasing. However, the peaceful and patriotic frames are significant predictors of reporting OWS messages. The patriotic frame has the strongest positive relationship with descriptions of the OWS message. For each sentence that includes the patriotic frame, the odds of that transcript including OWS’s message increase by 1.88 (log odds increase by a factor of 0.631), holding all other variables constant. For the TPM, the patriotic frame has a strong and significant positive relationship with paraphrasing activists and with describing their message.

All three of these positive frames connect a social movement with the status quo. In the U.S., hard-working people, moms and dads, first-time activists (each read as “normal people”), and America-loving patriots represent the apex of the status quo. Peaceful protests are more socially acceptable than civil disobedience, and far more acceptable than property damage or

Table 8. Coefficients from ZINB Regression – Positive Frames

	Occupy Wall Street (N=200)			Tea Party Movement (N=200)		
	DV: <u>Quote</u>	<u>Paraphrase</u>	<u>Message</u>	<u>Quote</u>	<u>Paraphrase</u>	<u>Message</u>
Positive Frames						
Normal	0.150 ⁺ (0.082)	0.035 (0.047)	0.099 (0.076)	-0.125 (0.216)	-	0.136 ⁺ (0.078)
Patriotic	0.183 (0.138)	-0.414 (0.330)	0.631*** (0.088)	0.738 (0.566)	1.214*** (0.180)	0.442** (0.135)
Peaceful	0.106 (0.072)	0.016 (0.050)	0.143* (0.060)	-	-	-
Controls						
Event	0.279 (0.506)	-0.461 ⁺ (0.267)	-0.219 (0.237)	1.453* (0.665)	2.170*** (0.535)	0.293 (0.237)
FNC	- 1.410*** (0.376)	-0.537 (0.479)	0.287 (0.242)	-0.738 (0.528)	-0.487 (1.123)	-0.118 (0.341)
MSNBC	-0.482 (0.527)	-0.251 (0.328)	0.548* (0.246)	2.141* (1.049)	0.734 (0.711)	0.476 (0.323)
Constant	0.512 (0.492)	0.726** (0.250)	1.111*** (0.225)	-0.067 (0.901)	-2.958*** (0.531)	0.498** (0.170)
Inflated Controls						
Word Count	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.006** (0.002)	-0.013 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)
Event	-1.164 (1.291)	-5.148** (1.972)	1.866 (1.296)	0.054 (1.622)	39.971* (17.681)	-2.982 (2.851)
FNC	-2.028* (0.990)	-0.571 (1.866)	2.477 (2.457)	-0.684 (1.406)	37.791* (17.037)	-2.635 (2.548)
MSNBC	-1.157 (1.828)	2.427 ⁺ (1.421)	1.594 (1.659)	10.553 (9.037)	21.025* (8.532)	-0.310 (1.046)
Constant	5.504** (2.108)	7.838** (2.556)	1.655 (1.701)	4.541** (1.657)	-37.579* (15.096)	2.466* (1.013)
Inalpha						
Constant	0.688** (0.212)	-2.487 (1.726)	-0.060 (0.183)	0.559 (0.710)	19.916*** (0.103)	-0.361 (0.289)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001




Figure 18. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for positive frames in OWS coverage.




Figure 19. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for positive frames in TPM coverage.

violent altercations with police. Peaceful protests do not challenge the status quo, while civil disobedience and/or violence do. Prior research has shown that when a movement is framed as being against the status quo, the movement's underlying issues and ultimate goals are paid little attention by journalists (McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999). My results show that when a social movement is framed in a way that supports the status quo, substantive coverage is likely to follow.

However, negative framing devices might actually be better predictors of substantive coverage than positive framing devices. In the next section, I use an additive operationalization

of substantive coverage that combines both forms of standing (quoting and paraphrasing) with coverage of the movements' messages; each sentence in which any of these three components of substantive coverage occurs counts as 1, thus substantive coverage is a count variable that ranges from 0 to 33 (meaning there were 33 sentences that included quotes, paraphrasing, and/or a description of the movement's message in at least one transcript). I then test whether negative or positive framing devices are stronger predictors of substantive coverage.

Comparing Predictors of Substantive Coverage: Positive vs. Negative Frames

While some scholars have found that news coverage of social movements is likely to be delegitimizing and fail to offer in-depth coverage of the issues (Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Sobieraj 2011), or that protest coverage is less likely to offer in-depth descriptions of the issues than coverage of social movements using institutionalized tactics (Amenta et al. 2012), others have argued that certain negative frames lead to some forms of in-depth coverage (Taylor and Gunby 2016) or that coverage of violent protests could lead to more in-depth coverage of the issues (DeLuca and Peebles 2002; Rojecki 2002). No study, to my knowledge, has looked at the relationship between specific positive and negative framing devices and substantive coverage.

Rather than operationalizing substantive coverage as that which includes both standing and the protesters' message, each operationalized as a dichotomous variable (Amenta et al. 2012), I operationalize substantive coverage as a count variable that has a score of 1 for each sentence that either quotes or paraphrases an activist, and for each sentence that describes the movement's message.²⁸ This provides a better measure of substantive coverage because it

²⁸ I also constructed a weighted count variable for substantive coverage. Direct quotes are more powerful for social movements than paraphrasing, since paraphrasing can misconstrue activists' meanings (Detenber et al. 2007; McLeod and Hertog 1999), and descriptions of the issues motivating a movement are most powerful since this brings public awareness to an issue and increases movement mobilization (Gitlin 1980; Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans 2005).

captures multiple instances of in-depth coverage. For example, using the dichotomous operationalization, a news transcript in which a reporter discusses 2 distinct goals and one critical motivating factor of a movement and quotes an activist would score the same as a news transcript in which an activist is paraphrased and one goal of the movement is mentioned. Using the count operationalization that I described above, those two transcripts would score 4 and 2, respectively. Thus the count operationalization captures a greater range of substantive coverage. Descriptive statistics for “substantive” coverage, along with all variables used in the following analyses, are listed in table 4.

Table 9 displays results of ZINB regression of positive and negative framing devices on substantive OWS coverage. Model 1 includes negative frames, model 2 includes disruptive frames, model 3 includes positive frames, and model 4 includes all framing devices together. Figure 20 displays predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for each of the framing devices and the network control variables used in model 4 (holding all other variables at their means). For the sake of parsimony, I use the broad operationalization of the violence frame (Boykoff 2006) rather than separating it out into its four components. AIC scores presented in table 7 show that the models that include the four components separately were not improvements over the models that kept the broad operationalization.

The results in model 1 are about what we would expect based on the results presented in table 6. All negative framing devices with the exception of the ridicule frame are at least marginally significant predictors of an increase in substantive coverage of OWS. Similarly, the

For the weighted version of substantive coverage, each sentence paraphrasing an activist counts as 1, each direct quotation of an activist counts as 2, and each sentence that mentions a goal or motivation of the movement counts as 3. I do not present results of these analyses because they were incredibly similar to the unweighted analyses presented in tables 10 and 11.

Table 9. Coefficients from ZINB Regression of Framing Devices on Substantive Coverage of OWS (N=200)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Negative Frames				
Freak	0.428 (0.282)	-	-	0.469 (0.327)
Ignorance	0.172** (0.055)	-	-	0.176** (0.054)
Insane	0.260+ (0.134)	-	-	0.247+ (0.140)
Ridicule	-0.071 (0.078)	-	-	-0.070 (0.089)
Amalgam	0.292*** (0.085)	-	-	0.297*** (0.080)
Disruptive Frames				
Arrests	-	-0.012 (0.045)	-	0.006 (0.041)
Violence	-	0.042* (0.017)	-	-0.015 (0.033)
Positive Frames				
Normal	-	-	0.144* (0.068)	0.166** (0.064)
Patriotic	-	-	0.451*** (0.076)	0.183 (0.321)
Peaceful	-	-	0.170** (0.057)	0.180*** (0.052)
Controls				
Event	-0.049 (0.281)	0.112 (0.263)	0.010 (0.242)	-0.136 (0.267)
FNC	-0.576* (0.271)	-0.429+ (0.219)	-0.198 (0.217)	-0.356 (0.255)
MSNBC	0.552* (0.281)	0.324 (0.256)	0.244 (0.282)	0.464 (0.324)
Constant	1.474*** (0.269)	1.649*** (0.247)	1.558*** (0.241)	1.316*** (0.268)
Inflated Controls				
Word Count	-0.013 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.015* (0.008)
Event	0.483 (1.306)	0.513 (1.132)	0.348 (0.964)	0.291 (1.027)
FNC	0.511 (1.814)	0.435 (1.481)	0.723 (1.394)	0.861 (1.287)
MSNBC	0.803 (1.359)	0.700 (1.366)	0.627 (1.208)	0.786 (1.216)
Constant	2.406 (3.609)	2.201 (2.738)	2.739 (2.255)	3.068+ (1.844)
Inalpha				
Constant	-0.307+ (0.185)	-0.068 (0.171)	-0.133 (0.143)	-0.419** (0.144)
AIC	1026.922	1057.353	1046.662	1018.337

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001




Figure 20. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for variables presented in model 4, table 9

results in model 2 are about what we would expect based on the results from table 7. The results in model 3 are also expected, based on the results presented in table 8; all of the positive frames are significant predictors of an increase in substantive coverage. In addition, news coverage on FNC is less likely to include substantive coverage of OWS, while coverage on MSNBC is more likely to include substantive coverage, though neither of the coefficients for those variables are statistically significant.

In the full model, the coefficients for the violence and patriotic frames lose significance while the ignorant, insane, amalgam of grievances, normal, and peaceful coefficients remain positive and significant. These results add support to Boykoff's (2006) finding that the violence frame did not result in more coverage of protesters' messages. A mix of negative and positive framing devices, but not disruptive frames, are the best indicator that a movement will receive substantive coverage on TV news. My findings also challenge Amenta and colleagues' (2012) assertion that coverage of protest events is less likely to include substantive coverage; the event coefficient is neither strong nor significant. AIC scores presented in table 10 indicate that model 4 is the best fit to the data, and that model 1 is a better fit than either model 2 or 3. This suggests that the negative framing devices have stronger explanatory power for substantive coverage of OWS than the positive or disruptive framing devices.

Table 10 displays results of ZINB regression of negative and positive frames on substantive TPM coverage. The negative freak and ignorance frames are the strongest predictors of substantive coverage of the TPM, though the patriotic frame is significant and relatively strong as well. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for the variables in model 3 are presented in figure 21. These findings indicate support for prior research that found the freak and ignorant framing devices predict substantive coverage of the TPM (Taylor and Gunby

Table 10. Coefficients from ZINB Regression of Framing Devices on Substantive Coverage of the TPM (N=200)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Negative Frames			
Freak	1.184*** (0.283)	-	1.196*** (0.204)
Ignorance	0.639** (0.235)	-	0.661** (0.224)
Insane	0.412 (0.323)	-	0.267 (0.358)
Ridicule	0.126 (0.218)	-	0.149 (0.209)
Racism	0.138 (0.199)	-	0.057 (0.148)
Positive Frames			
Normal	-	0.080 (0.119)	0.119 (0.129)
Patriotic	-	0.686*** (0.154)	0.610** (0.228)
Controls			
Event	0.960*** (0.279)	0.554* (0.263)	0.640** (0.242)
FNC	-0.077 (0.304)	-0.225 (0.321)	-0.366 (0.244)
MSNBC	-0.319 (0.253)	0.405 (0.422)	-0.248 (0.251)
Constant	0.545** (0.180)	0.709*** (0.206)	0.569*** (0.171)
Inflated Controls			
Word Count	-0.012** (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)
Event	-1.523 (1.793)	-2.317 (1.682)	-1.970 (1.256)
FNC	-2.164 (2.588)	-3.196 (3.749)	-3.065 (2.967)
MSNBC	-1.224 (1.235)	-0.456 (1.245)	-1.008 (1.109)
Constant	3.360** (1.183)	2.898* (1.193)	3.268** (1.113)
Inalpha			
Constant	-0.108 (0.180)	0.016 (0.215)	-0.421+ (0.229)
AIC	733.464	743.270	713.551

Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001




Figure 21. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for variables presented in model 3, table 10

2016). AIC scores presented in table 10 indicate that the fully loaded model is a better fit to the data than either of the two models that only include either negative or positive frames. In addition, model 1 is a better fit to the data than model 2. Like the results from OWS coverage, this suggests that negative framing devices have stronger explanatory power than positive framing devices for substantive coverage of the TPM.

Across all three models in table 10, coverage of TPM events is significantly more likely to include substantive coverage. When a news transcript discusses a TPM event, the odds of that transcript including substantive coverage increase by 1.9 times (log odds increase by a factor of 0.640), holding all other variables constant. Again, this challenges research that contends electioneering and other institutionalized tactics will garner more substantive news coverage than protest events (Amenta et al. 2012).

None of the TV networks have a significant effect on substantive coverage in the full models for either OWS or TPM coverage. This complicates prior research that found significant differences between cable news networks in their coverage of TPM issues (Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 2016; Weaver and Scacco 2013). While some networks are more likely to use negative frames and others more likely to use positive frames, the quality of coverage between networks may not vary as much. In the next chapter, I take a closer look at the framing process and examine how framing devices used in different ways and with varying frequency by each network can end up producing similar coverage in terms of substance.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I tested whether TV news transcripts covering multiple years of social movement activity support or contradict prior research on framing and substantive coverage of

social movements. While some researchers have argued that coverage of violent protests opens the door to more coverage of the underlying issues (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002), others found that the violence frame does not lead to more in-depth coverage of protesters' issues (Boykoff 2006). Still other research has found that coverage of protest events does lead to increased activist standing, but that coverage of social movements engaged in institutionalized tactics leads to more coverage of the movement's overall message (Amenta et al. 2012).

While my results support some prior findings, they contradict others. The violence frame, even when broken into four components, does not predict substantive coverage. This supports Boykoff's (2006) research and challenges DeLuca and Peeples's (2002) and Rojecki's (2002) claims that violence or civil disobedience can lead to in-depth coverage of the issues. While event-related coverage does predict activist standing, a finding that supports Amenta and colleagues' work (2012), it also predicts more substantive coverage of a movement's issues, at least for the TPM, which contradicts their findings.

My results also add to existing research by expanding on the negative frames used in prior research (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Taylor and Gunby 2012), and adding positive frames. Taken together, these results provide a more nuanced picture of the relationship between various framing devices and substantive reporting than prior research has been able to offer. It seems that the most substantive coverage includes a mix of negative and positive frames, though it could be that some networks are more likely to use either negative or positive frames and yet still offer substantive coverage, even if the slant is overly negative or positive.

What processes explain the relationship between negative and positive frames and in-depth coverage of social movements? In the next chapter, I move the under-theorized framing literature forward by unpacking the process by which these frames lead to more substantive

coverage. I also examine the various forms of the racism frame that appear in TV news coverage, and outline the process by which some forms of this frame have the effect of shutting down the potential for meaningful conversations about issues that matter.

CHAPTER 5.

THE PROCESS OF TV NEWS FRAMING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Introduction

In the last chapter, I showed that negative frames can be strong predictors of different components of substantive coverage for social movements. In this chapter, I move the under-theorized framing literature forward and uncover the processes through which this happens. We know a lot about the process of prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational framing social movements use to create collective action frames (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1988); however, to my knowledge no sociological research has examined how media frames – which are often *not* the collective action frames preferred by activists – affect communication patterns in news coverage of social movements. Untangling the process by which frames can act as gateways to various types of discourse is important not only to our sociological understanding of social movements, but to our understanding of political discourses in the mass media field in general.

In this chapter, I unpack the processes by which specific frames lead to more substantive coverage. I also examine the various delegitimizing *and* legitimizing forms of the racism frame that appear in TV news coverage of the TPM, and explain how some forms of this frame have the effect of shutting down the potential for meaningful conversations about complex issues. I then outline a similar process that occurs in OWS coverage when journalists and pundits use the amalgam of grievances frame. I conclude by discussing the reasons for the differences in coverage of the TPM and OWS, and the further implications of media framing processes in coverage of other social movements as well as other items in the news.

Data and Method

In this chapter, I rely mostly on the sample of 200 OWS transcripts from 2011 through 2014 and 200 TPM transcripts from 2009 through 2012 that I use in chapter 4, though I also use excerpts from the full set of 11,373 transcripts from both movements (2009 – 2012 for TPM and 2011 – 2014 for OWS) as well as the 2009 sample of 319 TPM transcripts from prior research (Taylor 2011). In chapter 3, I described the coding process for all of the frames I use in this chapter. With all of the frames coded, I set out to examine how some of the most common frames are used and to theorize the process of TV news framing. In this section, I describe the method I used to analyze these transcripts.

Discourse and Frame Analysis

My approach to analyzing TV news frames is informed by discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is commonly used by those interested in the relationship between power and knowledge, and is thus informed by Michel Foucault's (1972) approach, which describes how power relationships shape institutional practices and construct subjects. Foucault's conception of "conditions of possibility" suggests "that we need to describe the various bits and pieces that had been in place to allow something else to be possible" (Kendall and Wickham 1999: 37). I apply this concept, intended for historical analysis of systems of thought and knowledge, to my analysis of TV news discourse on social movements. Throughout my analysis I keep in mind the conditions of possibility that exist in American culture, which allow the media elite to present the news in the ways that they do.

In their explanation of Foucaultian discourse analysis, Kendall and Wickham (1999: 42) argue that analysts must identify "rules of the production of statements... rules that delimit the sayable" and "rules that create the spaces in which new statements can be made." In this

chapter, I examine frames used by journalists and pundits (the media elite) and activists in TV news coverage of social movements, keeping in mind that: 1) journalists adhere to organizational and institutionalized norms in presenting news coverage; 2) the for-profit nature of corporate media requires mainstream news coverage to support the political and economic status quo; and 3) different networks cover social movements from the spheres of deviance, legitimate controversy, or consensus based on their target audience (see chapter 3). Mass media constitute a particular arena or “master forum” in which groups and individuals can enter into public discourse (Ferree et. al 2002: 10). I focus on TV news, which is just one portion of this master forum and which has its own rules of discourse that are quite different from other media such as newspapers or the Internet.

Following Naples’ (2003) materialist feminist perspective, I acknowledge that frames are “constituted in discourses that organize and are structured by ruling relations” (p. 91). These relations of ruling (Smith 1987, 1999) affect the ways frames are developed, interpreted, and reinterpreted or coopted by both movement and media actors. I pay special attention to which actors (e.g. journalists, pundits, activists) use specific framing devices as I analyze how discourse develops within a TV news program. In addition, I follow the advice of Wood and Kroger (2000), who urge discourse analysts to look for meanings deeper than the literal (e.g. possibilities of irony or sarcasm), to be aware of possible multiple functions of discourse, and to consider what is *not* said (pp. 92-93).

While discourse analysis informs my approach in an overarching way as I read the sample of TV news transcripts with power relations in mind, I use frame analysis, originally developed by Erving Goffman (1974), to systematically analyze TV news frames. Frame analysis typically examines frames as either dependent variables (e.g. how journalists build

frames) or independent variables (e.g. how frames influence an audience) (Scheufele 1999: 107). However, my analysis is not concerned with how frames are developed by journalists or activists, nor specifically with how frames influence audiences, but with the framing process as a communication pattern. I examine how frames open and/or close paths to other frames by first identifying and categorizing frames, then analyzing the pattern of discourse that develops as various types of frames are utilized by journalists, pundits, and activists.

In this chapter I argue that the TV news framing process privileges the status quo, and that a single frame can be used in various ways to legitimize or delegitimize a social movement. I articulate the gateways model of news framing, which shows how the use of one frame opens up space for the use of other frames, how some frames can be used to shut down discourse, and – based on the partisan media paradigm that I developed in the preceding chapters – how substantive coverage of activists’ goals, motivations, and message depends on which frames are used by power holders and on which network those frames are used by particular speakers.

Frame Trajectories

In chapter 4, I showed that both negative and positive frames commonly used in TV news coverage of social movements are strong predictors of substantive coverage in the form of quoting or paraphrasing activists, and covering their goals, motivations, or overall message. In this section, I provide a descriptive analysis of how those specific frames lead to or stem from substantive coverage. I identify 3 ways positive frames are used, and 6 ways that negative frames occur with substantive coverage.

Positive Frames and Substantive Coverage

In chapter 4, I showed that three positive frames significantly predict substantive coverage of social movements. The “patriotic” and “normal” frames describe activists’

characteristics: the patriotic frame describes activists as people who love freedom, liberty, and/or America, and the normal frame describes activists as moms, dads, workers, or simply “normal people” as opposed to professional activists. The peaceful frame is used to describe protesters’ tactics or characteristics, and is often used to counter the violence frame. All three of these positive frames place activists within the boundaries of the status quo: to love one’s country, to be a worker contributing to a healthy economy and/or a parent contributing to the next generation of patriotic Americans, and to respect state authority by remaining peaceful are all qualities that are valued because they perpetuate the status quo. Each of these positive frames operate as discourses of power that legitimize the capitalist state, American exceptionalism, “traditional” family values, and American military strength (good citizens demonstrate peacefully, bad citizens disobey the law and therefore deserve military/police oppression).

News anchors, reporters, pundits, and other guests – including activists themselves – use these positive frames in three ways that correspond with substantive coverage:

- 1) The normal and patriotic frames are used to justify the goals, motivations, or messages of activists.
- 2) The peaceful frame is used to create a boundary between violent protesters and peaceful protesters, and then describe the message of the peaceful ones.
- 3) The peaceful frame is used, often along with other legitimizing frames, to describe the goals and/or message of activists.

In this section I provide examples of these three forms of positive framing in TV news coverage of both OWS and the TPM.

1. The normal and patriotic frames are used to justify the goals, motivations, or messages of activists.

The patriotic frame was used often in TPM coverage. While it was typically used by program hosts and pundits on FNC, it was also used by activists themselves. For example, on a March 31, 2009 episode of FNC’s *The Glenn Beck Program*, Richard Behney, a plumber-turned-Tea-Party-organizer, is a guest. He describes the motivations and message of the TPM: “This is

not a Republican thing or a Democrat [*sic*] thing. This is a freedom-loving American thing, and we're having no politicians. We're upset at all of them... They're all part of the problem and it's time to stand up for freedom." Behney frames the motivations of the TPM as "freedom-loving" and "American" (i.e. patriotic) while explaining that one of the goals of the movement is to vote politicians, no matter their party affiliation, out of office. This goal became solidified in 2010, when dozens of congressional candidates affiliated themselves with the TPM and challenged mostly Republican incumbents. Effecting change through the ballot box rather than through civil disobedience is in line with the status quo because it legitimizes the American electoral politics process.

The patriotic frame was also used in descriptions of OWS. On a November 17, 2011 episode of *Politics Nation* on MSNBC, after host Al Sharpton criticizes those on the political right for accusing OWS activists of being disruptive troublemakers, liberal political pundit Van Jones speaks on behalf of OWS:

The other thing they're trying to say is that this is some kind of movement that is against everything American. No, it's a patriotic movement...we are supposed to be a place where equal opportunity means something. It shouldn't just be just [*sic*] a cruel joke. And we're standing up for that. That's what patriots do. You stand up and defend your country against the people who want to rig the game.

Jones equates patriotism with standing up for equal opportunity, which the political right sees as socialist (and hence, un-American). The political right and left have different interpretations of what patriotism can mean, but both definitions still support the status quo. It is not how love of one's country manifests that matters here; it is the assumption that one *should* love one's country that is in line with the status quo.

The way the normal frame was used was very similar to the patriotic frame. On this March 31, 2010 episode of *American Morning* on CNN, news anchor John Roberts moderates a

discussion with female TPM activists:

ROBERTS: ... What is it about the TEA Party that is so attractive to women?

JENNY BETH MARTIN, NATIONAL COORDINATOR, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS:

Well, the main -- our main values in TEA [*sic*] Party Patriots are fiscal responsibility, constitutionally limited government and free markets. And women, they are at home. They're making the tough decisions and having to cut the budget, figure out how to cut spending in their own homes and they understand that translates to businesses and to government.

ROBERTS: Do you agree with that, Rebecca? Is that one of the reasons why the TEA Party is attractive to you? That you handle a lot of the responsibilities at home, and so, that just -- immediately becomes a part of your politics?

REBECCA WALES, COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR, SMART GIRL POLITICS: I think most certainly. You have women who are not just mothers, they are small business owners. They are also daughters. And both the stimulus package and moving onto the health care reform package, these are things that affect women so directly on so many different levels.

Jenny Beth Martin uses traditional gender stereotypes of women's place in the private sphere to justify their place in the public sphere. To Martin, it is normal and natural for a woman to take care of her household and so it is normal and natural for her to extend this to support "fiscal responsibility" in government. Wales reaffirms this and further normalizes female TPM activists: they are also mothers, daughters, and small business owners. Because these women are so "normal," they care about TPM values such as "constitutionally limited government and free markets" and fighting against health care legislation.

The normal frame was also used to justify the motivations of OWS protesters. On an October 6, 2011 episode of *The Rachel Maddow Show* on MSNBC, guest host Ezra Klein engages in a monologue to justify the OWS movement. MSNBC is the only network on which program hosts do these kinds of monologues in favor of OWS, just as FNC is the only network to do the same for the TPM. Klein begins by asking a question he likely thinks the audience is asking themselves:

So what's bringing them out in the streets? What do the Occupy Wall Streeters, the 99 percent, want? They're not protesting because they want a revolution or communism or anarchy.

Listen to them. You should take a look at their stories, which they're telling online on a Tumblr blog.

Here's one. "I moved home in August after six months in my friend's basement. Between my low wage, no benefits job and \$70,000 in private loans, I could not afford to rent. I'm unemployed and uninsured but I am in good company. I am the 99 percent."

Another. "I am 36 years old. I have my master's degree, and I work two jobs. My husband has his PhD and works four. We have one child and health care coverage. We are luckier than most. My parents can't afford to retire. They live week by week deciding to purchase their medications or pay their bills. What happened to the American Dream?" These folks are protesting because they feel like they made a deal. You might be familiar with this deal. You worked hard, you get a good education, you probably pick up loans in order to get that education, but you do it because that is what you're supposed to do to get ahead, to reach for that brass ring you call the American Dream. But these folks, they didn't end up with the American Dream. They ended up with debt, a lot of it.

And perhaps if everyone was suffering, that wouldn't be so hard to take. But for the top 1 percent, the deal seems to have actually changed a little bit. You work hard, you actually make a lot of your own rules, and you end up with more than you ever dreamed possible. Thirty-five years ago, the top 1 percent of income earners made 9 percent of all the income in this country. Now that top 1 percent makes almost a quarter of the income in the country. That is 1 percent of Americans making nearly 24 percent of every dollar in income paid out anywhere in the country.

So you have to ask yourself, how is it that the 1 percent is doing so great? They haven't been playing more by the rules or getting more educated.

Klein sets up his monologue by presenting some negative frames that have been used by other media outlets to describe OWS protesters: communists, anarchists, people who want a revolution (read: anti-status quo). He then quotes two activists, which gives them standing, and frames them as hard-working people who just want to achieve the American Dream (read: normal). Klein goes on to describe the context of the OWS protests in depth, explaining the economic situation that has led these protesters to be (in his opinion, legitimately) angry. Klein's entire justification relies on characteristics that perpetuate the status quo. "Playing by the rules" and investing in higher education are upheld as virtuous, and the 1 percent becoming more profitable despite members of the 99% having the same education levels and playing by the rules is presented as unjust and a logical motivation to take part in OWS protests.

2. *The peaceful frame is used to create a boundary between violent protesters and peaceful protesters, and then describe the message of the peaceful ones.*

A common way reporters, pundits, and activists themselves used the peaceful frame was to create a boundary between two segments of OWS protesters. On an October 15, 2011 episode of *Newsroom* on CNN, correspondent Barbie Nadeau describes an OWS protest in Italy:

I had several people come up to me and say, you know, this is embarrassing, [*sic*] this isn't what we're here for. We're actually here to protest peacefully, to demonstrate against, you know, legitimate complaints we have against our government, about taxes and joblessness and education cuts and a variety of issues. Right now they're planning to have another demonstration either Thursday or Friday if they can get city approval, which I think they'll probably get next week because their voices were hijacked by this violent movement.

Here, OWS activists are described as peaceful through a paraphrase of an activist's comments. Part of the paraphrase includes OWS complaints about government, taxes, unemployment, and cuts to social welfare—all socially acceptable (i.e. in line with the status quo) issues to be concerned about. The reporter frames violent protesters as having “hijacked” the movement, and does not address their complaints (which are likely similar, but more revolutionary, and hence opposed to the status quo).

This process was slightly different for TPM coverage. Rather than creating boundaries between activists within the TPM, the peaceful frame was used to solidify boundaries between the TPM and leftist activists. For example, in FNC's *The Glenn Beck Program* on April 16, 2009, host Glenn Beck discusses the recent Tea Party tax day protests and mainstream media coverage of them. He says: “I haven't heard about a single report of violence. Have you? Imagine...that peace happening with the clowns at the G-20 summit. Remember, we're anti-government, which the G-20 people are [also] anti-government.” Beck compares the TPM to the G-20 protesters because one of their motivations, being against big government, is the same—but he contrasts them because he sees G-20 protesters as leftists and so associates the left with

violence and the right with peaceful protest. Strikingly, he uses the word “we” when talking about the TPM. Beck spent several weeks promoting a TPM protest that he would be attending in Texas, and then broadcast his program live from the protest on April 15. His affiliation with the TPM has been cited by many in the mainstream media as a major mobilizing factor for the conservative movement.

3. The peaceful frame is used, often along with other legitimizing frames, to describe the goals and/or message of activists.

Sometimes the peaceful frame was used to describe protesters without comparing them to a violent group. On a May 1, 2009 episode of *The Glenn Beck Program* on FNC, host Glenn Beck explains that the Tea Party “began to grow because that’s what people do. That’s called capitalism. It’s called freedom. People find their own voice and go, ‘Yes, I want some more of that.’ Thousands of people held peaceful protests all across the country.” He then goes on to explain how the “mainstream media” do not understand what the TPM is all about, but he does understand, and “pretty much all of it boils on down to [government] spending.” Beck associates the TPM with capitalism, freedom, and peace, which legitimizes their main frustration: government spending. By casting himself as an insider who understands the movement better than the “mainstream media,” from which he strategically disassociates himself and his program, Beck endears himself to his conservative viewers. Beck and his program went on to become unofficial mascots of the TPM, and Beck was the main organizer of the movement’s 9/12 march on Washington.

While not as charismatically mobilizing as Glenn Beck was for the TPM, programs hosts on MSNBC used the peaceful frame for OWS in much the same way. Other pundits on news programs did as well. For example, on an October 17, 2011 episode of *The Ed Show* on MSNBC, guest pundit Van Jones says:

You have this big peaceful nonviolent movement, that's challenging Wall Street, saying 'hey, would you get your boot off the neck of the American people?' Wall Street was responsible for the recession, their recklessness... Wall Street is the main culprit. You got a mass movement in the streets trying to deal with that.

Jones describes the movement as peaceful, paraphrases them, and then explains the context that justifies OWS activists' motivations and message. This level of OWS context rarely occurred on any networks other than MSNBC and CNN.

It is easy to see how positive frames can lead to substantive coverage of a social movement. It happens in a fairly simple way, with both the positive frame and the substantive coverage often coming from the same speaker. Negative frames occur with substantive coverage in some similar ways, but also take more complex paths.

Negative Frames and Substantive Coverage

The relationships between positive frames and substantive coverage are rather straightforward. However, negative frames often take complex paths to substantive coverage. I discovered 6 paths that negative frames can take that lead to or stem from paraphrasing or quoting activists, or explaining the goals, motivations, or context behind the issues a movement is protesting. Some of these paths are only possible in TV or radio news coverage – as opposed to newspaper or other print news – due to the open, conversational space that these forms of unscripted news provide. Speakers on TV news programs:

- 1) use frames to create boundaries between activists
- 2) use frames to discredit activists, which leads to someone else challenging that frame
- 3) present a frame in order to create an opportunity to discredit that frame and provide more information
- 4) use frames to create a discussion between several people
- 5) ask a direct question of an activist with the sole intent of making the activist look ignorant
- 6) present the message in order to counter or ridicule the message (message first, then negative frame)

While journalists most often initiate these, other elites (politicians, celebrities, and political pundits) and activists are also involved. I found that all of the negative frames I identified in chapter 3 take one or more of these 6 paths. In this section I explain the 6 paths and give examples of each in order to illustrate how negative frames co-occur with substantive coverage, as a process.

1. Negative frames create boundaries between activists.

In many programs, negative frames and substantive coverage are coupled because reporters do not present all protesters as homogenous, but instead present a dichotomous view of the different activists at a protest event. By creating distinctions between the “good” protesters and “bad” protesters, reporters can play up absurd elements of the protest as a way to gain or maintain viewership while still legitimizing the event, or at least keeping it in the sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin 1986).

An early example of negative frames being used to create a boundary between subsets of TPM activists occurs on an April 17, 2009 episode of *The Rachel Maddow Show* on MSNBC. Maddow mentions that there were a lot of “normal” attendees at the tax day tea party, but focuses on the more “deviant” messages:

The TEA parties featured a lot of mainstream Republican figures alongside the “abolish the Federal Reserve” folks, and people with messages like this. Yes, the “Obama was not born in the United States, and thus is not actually even really the president” conspiracy theorists are tea-baggers, too.

The host brings in delegitimizing frames – “conspiracy theorists” makes activists out to be fringe or radical, and “tea-baggers” is the phrase commonly used on MSNBC and sometimes on CNN to belittle activists by associating their name with a sex act – while tempering her remarks with a mention of the mainstream majority who participate in the same protest events. At the same time, she mentions two issues with which the TPM was genuinely concerned: many Tea Partiers

had a goal of abolishing the Federal Reserve Bank, which they saw as a private corporation that dictates U.S. financial policies²⁹, and many genuinely believed Barack Obama was born in Kenya and therefore an illegitimate president. Because those two issues fall into the sphere of deviance for the program's target audience, the issues themselves are framed in a way that makes the TPM look crazy or irrational. Nevertheless, the issues get airtime.

Coverage of both movements included activists themselves drawing these boundaries. On a May 21, 2012 episode of CNN's *Newsroom*, anchor Carol Costello speaks with OWS spokesperson Mark Bray about a few potentially violent activists that some media outlets have linked to OWS:

COSTELLO: ... So let's talk about these people who are arrested in Chicago. Police called them anarchists who wanted to firebomb Obama headquarters in Chicago. They had Molotov cocktails ready to go. So are these people part of the "Occupy Movement"?
BRAY: Well, you know, we've been very clear from the first day that "Occupy" is a nonviolent movement that our protest tactics have direct action and nonviolence (INAUDIBLE) are premised upon the values of nonviolence, right? So that needs to be made clear from the start and these people are not acting in the spirit of what "Occupy" is about.
Whether they've been a part of certain groups or not, I can't say. And also it's important to keep in mind that authorities have been known for using tactics of entrapment, that there have been times and they've sort of provided the materials for people and led them down this direction. So that's important to be kept in mind before we know all the details.

Bray is given standing by appearing as a guest on the program and getting the chance to denounce the alleged violent actions of a few protesters who may have affiliated themselves with OWS. Bray clarifies that OWS is devoted to nonviolent tactics, and he gets the chance to move some of the blame from OWS to the police. By bringing up entrapment, Bray is able to cast some doubt on the legitimacy of the police and their arrest of the Chicago activists.

²⁹ For more on TPM views about the Federal Reserve Bank, see: Roland, Allen L. "The Rothschild's Federal Reserve Must Be Abolished." Published online July 6, 2009 at *Infowars*. Retrieved July 13, 2017 at: <https://illuminutti.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/20120415-infowars.pdf>

2. Negative frames discredit activists, which leads to someone else challenging that frame.

Sometimes, a reporter or pundit will use a negative frame to describe a social movement with no intention of offering substantive coverage of the movement. Due to the spontaneous nature of TV news compared to print media, the negative frame still opens up the possibility for substantive coverage when other people are included in the conversation. For example, on an October 9, 2011 episode of *This Week* on ABC, regular conservative commentator George Will frames OWS as ignorant for having what he believes is a hypocritical message, and an OWS activist challenges the ignorant frame and clarifies the message:

GEORGE WILL (ABC NEWS)

(Off-camera) Mr. Lagreca, I hear a certain dissonance in your message. Your message is, Washington is corrupt, Washington is the handmaiden of the powerful. A lot of conservatives agree with that. But then you say this corrupt Washington that's the handmaiden of the powerful should be much more powerful in regulating our lives. Why do you want a corrupt government bigger in our lives?

JESSE LAGRECA (OCCUPY WALL STREET PROTESTOR)

You know, I find that a lot of these conversations about the government tend to deflect away from Wall Street, because let's be honest. The lobbyists have enormous power, and they've shut out the voice of American people. So I think we should demand a government that is listening to people. And I find it ironic that when people demand action from their government, so many people tend to overreact and say, "Well, that's out-of-control government." Our government is a function of our democracy. By attacking the government, we are attacking democracy. So to me, I think, yes, we should ask our government to represent the will of the people. And if the will of the people are demanding action, then they should follow suit.

Will repeats a criticism of OWS that was frequently presented on FNC programs, where it either went unchallenged or was challenged by liberal pundits who were unfamiliar with the messages of rank-and-file activists, and thus could not challenge the ignorant frame as effectively as LaGreca does here. LaGreca is able to clearly articulate an OWS demand: that government should function as a democracy, and listen to the people. LaGreca turns Will's criticism on its head when he says that lobbyists have shut the voice of the American people out, and thus

corporate lobbying, not government, is the corrupt power that is at the root of the problem OWS is protesting.

It is not always activists themselves who are able to challenge negative frames and offer information on a movement's grievances or demands. For example, on an April 15, 2009 episode of CNN's *Situation Room*, liberal pundit Paul Begala and conservative guest John Feehery talk with news anchor Wolf Blitzer about the TPM:

BEGALA: ...But what they're protesting is, I mean, come on, they don't want to pay their taxes. Wolf, they ought to go to Walter Reed. They ought to see guys there who have given a lot more than money to their country and don't complain a bit. They're ready to go back and serve again.

...

FEEHERY: ... This is not just about paying taxes. Actually, they're talking about the bailout and how their tax money is going to bail out Washington -- bail out Wall Street. And that's the outrage that a lot of these people feel.

Begala frames the TPM as people who lazily complain about having to pay their taxes, and compares them to wounded military veterans in such a way that makes the TPM seem unpatriotic. Feehery responds not by directly challenging Begala's negative frame, but by explaining the grievances of the TPM in more detail. Tea Partiers' grievances are not just about paying taxes, but also where that tax money is going: to bail out Wall Street. Ironically, this message is one of the very same that OWS would use two years later.

3. Negative frames are presented in order to discredit the frame(s) and provide more information.

Often times a reporter, pundit, or activist will present a negative frame with the intent of challenging that frame him or herself. On a September 26, 2010 episode of *Face the Nation* on CBS, TPM activist Sal Russo is a guest, and says:

As you know, first it was we were all AstroTurf. That somebody was paying everybody to turn out. Then we're a bunch of crackpots and nuts. Then we're a bunch of racists. And this movement keeps growing because it grows on the fundamental principle that unites all the tea party movements, and that is a belief that the federal government has become

too big, too intrusive, with the accompanying higher taxes, onerous regulations, higher deficits, and a skyrocketing national debt.

Russo presents several negative frames in order to discredit the frames and provide more information about the beliefs of TPM activists. He presents the “astroturf” frame, which delegitimizes activists by alleging that they are not grassroots, but puppets of the rich and powerful; he presents the insanity frame, in which activists are labeled “crackpots and nuts” for their political views; and he presents the racism frame, which alleges that TPM activists were motivated by their racism against the first black President of the United States. He challenges the astroturf frame by claiming the movement “keeps growing,” which suggests a grassroots element to mobilization. He then challenges the racism frame by explaining that TPM activists are not motivated by racism but by their “belief that the federal government has become too big.” He challenges the insanity frame by going on to explain that “big government” has led to oppressive regulations and high deficits and national debt. Russo is able to effectively challenge the frames that have been used to delegitimize the TPM and re-frame the TPM as a movement that supports the status quo in terms of a free market, capitalist economy.

One of the most common ways this re-framing happens is exemplified in the following October 27, 2011 clip from *The Ed Show* on MSNBC. The host, Ed Schultz, plays a video of someone else using negative frames to describe OWS, and then challenges those negative frames.

(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)

PAT ROBERTSON, HOST, THE 700 CLUB: Why are they there? Well, they’re just mad. Well, is it right for a Christian just to get involved in a protest of anger? If you’re going to demonstrate, demonstrate for righteousness. Demonstrate to lift the yoke of oppression. Demonstrate to help those that are poverty-stricken. But don’t just go out and mess up a park and just scream and tear up things.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

SCHULTZ: I think Pat Robertson has been watching too much FOX [*sic*] News. The 99 percenters are not just screaming and tearing things up. In fact, they’re doing exactly

what Robertson just advocated. They're demonstrating for righteousness. They're demonstrating to lift the yoke of oppression. And they're demonstrating to help those who are poverty stricken.

Here, the host of the program plays a clip from another program – always a program from a different network – and then criticizes that clip. Christian conservative Pat Robertson frames OWS as angry and violent, and Schultz reframes by directly challenging the violence frame. He then legitimizes OWS by explaining their motivations and goals in the same Christian-centric terms Robertson used. This type of reframing also happened frequently with FNC coverage of the TPM. A program host on FNC would show a clip from MSNBC or CNN and then discuss how wrong it was and defend the TPM by explaining their grievances and goals.

It is also notable that Schultz, one of the most outspoken supporters of OWS on MSNBC, referred to activists as “the 99 percenters.” By using the OWS frame “We are the 99%” when covering the movement, which is a collective action frame that activists developed, Schultz avoids the militaristic connotations of “occupation” (other reporters sometimes referred to OWS activists as “occupiers”) and accentuates the broad appeal of the movement, normalizing the protesters by suggesting that OWS represents 99% of Americans. Only five episodes of *The Ed Show* ended up in my sample of 200, but Schultz refers to OWS as “the 99 percent movement” or to activists as “the 99 percenters” in four of the five episodes.

4. Negative frames are used to create a discussion between several people.

Some segments of news programs include panels that feature multiple guests discussing hot topics. On these types of programs, negative frames can be used by a news anchor or pundit in order to spark a discussion. For example, a reporter on an April 19, 2009 episode of ABC's *This Week* frames the TPM activists as ignorant for protesting high taxes when the “real” issue,

according to the reporter, is hatred for the President. A commentator then defends the activists against the reporter's claim, and provides more information about the protesters' grievances.

DONALDSON: ...What they were saying is we don't like Obama and this is a proxy way to say that because it's true. He's going to lower taxes on 95% of the American public and the rest are going to have higher taxes. So, ... It's not about the level of taxes. Those rallies were mainly, it seems to me, organized to say we don't like Obama across the board...

...

NOONAN: ...I didn't think that the TEA party phenomenon was as much anti-Obama as it was anti-ruling class in a way. They were tough on the Republicans. They were mad at George Bush. They were mad at his spending and his deficits. There was a certain libertarian tilt that was a little bit new. It wasn't maybe standard old-time conservative right wing gathering [*sic*]. It was something else that was going on.

Reporter Sam Donaldson frames the TPM as ignorant on tax policy, which sparks a back and forth between news anchor George Stephanopolous and reporter Cokie Roberts (not shown), which leads to the statement by conservative pundit Peggy Noonan. Donaldson's attempt to delegitimize TPM motives is thwarted by Noonan, who provides more information about the protesters and their grievances. This discussion between commentators includes both negative and positive framing of protesters, and ends up giving the viewers a better sense of the activists' grievances and demands.

A similar pattern occurs on an October 28, 2011 episode of CNN's *American Morning*. News anchor Carol Costello presents the violence frame, police sergeant Ed Mullins confirms the frame, and OWS activist/spokesperson Dan Cantor challenges the frame and offers more information.

COSTELLO: And you say officers have been injured in Lower Manhattan, 20 officers. Tell us about that?

... MULLINS: What happens in a demonstration, when - when there is a need to take action, to correct a violation, a law, or correct an obstruction of, you know, pedestrian traffic, two things can happen. Either the protesters comply or they resist. And we've seen peaceful demonstrations in the past. We've seen sit-ins where people just get arrested, and that's the end of it.

In cases where conflict comes about and violence comes about as a result of it, we now have a situation that escalates to a whole different level, and - and that expands into other people or people that want to -

COSTELLO: So you're saying that protesters in the Occupy Movement have injured police officers in the course of arrests?

MULLINS: Yes. That's how it generally happens.

CANTOR: Well, in general, these have been overwhelmingly peaceful protests all over the country. Unfortunately, New York, the most prominent example of unfortunate action was the pepper spraying by a police captain of one of the protesters.

Listen, that - that happens and there are outliers we count on the police to exercise restraint and we count on the protesters to be non-violent. There's an irony here, of course. It becomes the decision about this, as opposed to what protesters are really about, which is why the Oakland thing was so upsetting.

It's even ironic. My favorite sign down at Occupy Wall Street, one of my favorite is, "Police join us. They're destroying your pensions, too." And I know this is, you know, on the minds of Sergeant Mullins and his members. Their pensions were undone by some of the gambling that happened on Wall Street.

So it's important to keep in mind what this is really all about, and not turn it into a battleground.

Mullins justifies the cops' use of force by claiming that OWS protesters "resisted" instead of "complying." He then blames police injuries directly on OWS activists' violence. Cantor turns the violence frame back on police by citing the example of the New York cop who instigated violence by pepper spraying peaceful protesters and claims that OWS protests have been "overwhelmingly peaceful." Cantor then quotes an OWS protest sign that conveys a central grievance of the movement and suggests that police should stop trying to control the protesters and join them instead, since OWS shares some of the same interests of the police and all of them were harmed by corrupt Wall Street practices.

5. Reporters or pundits ask a direct question of an activist with the sole intent of making the activist look stupid

On cable news programs, negative frames are sometimes presented by reporters attempting to get some controversial footage by catching protesters looking stupid. In the following example from an April 15, 2009 episode of *Newsroom* on CNN, correspondent Susan Roesgen stands amongst a crowd of TPM protesters in Chicago. She approaches a man holding

a photoshopped sign depicting President Obama with a Hitler mustache and a Gestapo uniform, and asks the man what the sign is supposed to mean. When the man says Obama is “a fascist,” Roesgen spars with the protester, telling him how offensive she thinks he is while he just keeps repeating that Obama is a fascist. Roesgen walks away from the man and approaches another man, who is holding a toddler, and the following exchange takes place:³⁰

SUSAN ROESGEN, CNN CORRESPONDENT: ...

You’re here with your 2-year-old and you’re already in debt. Why are you here today, sir?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Because I hear a president say that he believed in what Lincoln stood for. Lincoln’s primary thing was he believed that people had the right to liberty and they had the right...

ROESGEN: Sir, what does this have to do with taxes? What does this have to do with your taxes?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Let me finish speaking.

ROESGEN: Do you realize that you’re eligible for a \$400 credit?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Let me finish my point. Lincoln believed that people had the right to share in the fruits of their own labor and that government should not take it. And we have clearly gotten to that point.

ROESGEN: Wait. Did you know that the state of Lincoln gets \$50 billion out of these stimulus [*sic*]? That’s \$50 billion for this state, sir.

...[at this point a man waving a Gadsden flag physically interjects himself, making it impossible for Roesgen to continue speaking to the man with the toddler]...

ROESGEN: OK. Well, Kyra, we’ll move on over here. I think you get the general tenor of this. It’s anti-government, anti-CNN, since this is highly promoted by the right wing conservative network, Fox. And since I can’t really hear much more and I think this is not really family viewing, I’ll toss it back to you -- Kyra.

Roesgen interrupts the protester before he can answer her first question by asking him what his concern has to do with taxes. The TPM held their first major protest on tax day, which led the news media to assume the movement’s primary grievance was high taxes. Roesgen is so focused on getting her “\$400 tax credit” talking point into the conversation, which is a direct challenge to the protesters’ presumed central concern, that she ignores the man’s actual grievances. Roesgen

³⁰ Due to the chaotic nature of this transcript, I watched a video of this entire exchange in order to capture the full context of the moment. The video, retrieved July 10, 2017, can be see here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2baxw_YScxc

removes herself from the tense conversation by going back to CNN desk anchor Kyra Phillips. Despite Roesgen's attempts to focus the discussion on taxes and frame the protesters as ignorant, we do get to hear some actual grievances. One man's issue of concern is what he perceives to be Obama's fascism, and the other man's grievance is government overreach.

This form of negative framing does not always provide in-depth information about activists' goals and grievances. Often we only get the quote (standing) portion of substantive coverage, without the added depth of the activists' actual grievances or goals. And CNN reporters do not just target right-wing protesters with these confrontational tactics. On an October 3, 2011 episode of *Out Front* on CNN, host Erin Burnett ventures into Zucotti Park to speak with OWS activists. After spending some time framing the activists as hypocrites for owning laptop computers and cell phones, and using the freak frame to describe their behavior and appearance, Burnett delves into one of OWS's most salient motivations for their protest: the government's bailout of Wall Street bankers.

BURNETT: So do you know that taxpayers actually made money on the Wall Street bailout?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I was unaware of that.

BURNETT: They did. They made -- not on GM, but they did on the Wall Street part of the bailout.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: OK.

BURNETT: Does that make you feel any differently?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, (INAUDIBLE) --

BURNETT: If I were right it might?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Oh, sure.

(END VIDEO CLIP)

BURNETT: "Seriously?!" That's all it would take to put an end to the unrest?

Back behind the safety of her news desk, Burnett's facetiously delivered "seriously?" lets viewers know that she is incredulous at how ignorant the protesters are. While the clip is focused on one of OWS's most salient grievances – the Wall Street bailout – the justification for that grievance is not presented. Instead, the grievance is undermined: if these ignorant OWS

activists only knew that taxpayers profited off the Wall Street bailout, they would stop their ridiculous protests.³¹ Burnett gives the protesters standing by showing them speaking on air, but denies them full legitimacy by not airing their explanations of the movement's grievances, demands, or goals.

6. Reporters or pundits present the movement's message in order to counter or ridicule the message

While the other 5 categories of negative frames feature a frame presented first, followed by some form of substantive coverage, this final category features the grievances, demands, or goals of a social movement, followed by a negative frame. Frequently in both OWS and TPM coverage, the ignorance frame was used when explaining the protesters' grievances and demands. For example, in an October 16, 2011 episode of *Your Money* on CNN, guest pundit Stephen Moore, who is an editorial writer at *The Wall Street Journal*, discusses OWS: "On the one hand they say, you know, down with Wall Street, down with businesses, down with profit, down with corporations, and then they say we want jobs. Well, where do they think jobs come from?" Moore paraphrases OWS activists and mentions their grievances and a demand, but frames them as ignorant for having what he believes is a goal that contradicts their message.

Similarly, in the following example from an April 10, 2009 episode of MSNBC's *Countdown with Keith Olbermann*, the host of the show lists some of the TPM activists' grievances and rebukes each of them in turn.

³¹ I feel obliged to note here that Burnett's claim that taxpayers made money off the bailouts is false. The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) included taxpayer-funded bailouts of the auto industry and banking industry, was signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2008, and was revised by the Obama administration in early 2009. The 2009 revision reduced the relief amount from \$700 billion to \$475 billion. TARP was a major motivation for both the TPM and OWS movements. In March 2015, the Congressional Budget Office issued a final report on TARP. This report concluded that taxpayers lost a total of 28 billion dollars on the program. The report, retrieved July 15, 2017, is available here: <https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/50034-TARP.pdf>

They seem to be against the stimulus package, which includes several hundred billion dollars in tax cuts for people like themselves. And they seem to be against large deficits, they don't like these massive deficits. Who does? By the same token, when there are measures proposed to do something about those huge deficits, i.e., letting taxes to [sic] back to where they were in 2001, they're against it too.

The way in which Olbermann challenges each of the movement's grievances comes across as an argument that the activists are ignorant for making such claims. Olbermann asserts that TPM activists benefitted from the stimulus package that they are protesting, and that the deficit problem could be addressed by returning tax rates to pre-2001 levels, which the TPM also opposes. Despite the negative and delegitimizing portrayal of movements' messages, this form of negative framing still presents a form of substantive coverage in that it does necessarily include the movement's grievances, demands, and/or goals.


Summary

In TV news coverage of social movements, whether left-wing or right-wing, positive frames are used to uphold the status quo or to emphasize aspects of a social movement that adhere to the status quo. Negative frames can represent a movement as anti-status quo but are often used to divide activists into an anti-status quo minority and a contrasting majority of "genuine" activists who are actually normal, patriotic, and peaceful. Negative frames are also sometimes used to set up a discussion that challenges the frame and ends up offering more substantive coverage of the movement's message.

The possible trajectories of all six forms of negative framing and three forms of positive framing that I identified are captured in figure 22. Frames can act as gateways to various types of coverage. A negative frame opens a pathway for a positive frame to be used, either to directly contradict the negative frame or by the mediating mechanism of the boundary. Inversely, a positive frame can open a pathway for a negative frame to be used in the same way. This

process opens a pathway to substantive coverage. Alternatively, substantive coverage can lead directly to either a positive or negative frame, or vice versa. When two or more speakers are involved, this process can continue looping through various paths, leading to more substantive coverage and more negative and/or positive frames. I did not find any examples of substantive coverage leading directly to a boundary without a negative or positive frame as a mediating mechanism, nor did I find an example of a positive frame leading directly to a negative frame without a boundary or substantive coverage mediating that path. However, those paths are certainly within the realm of possibility.

Figure 22. The gateways model of media framing



While frame trajectories are similar across TV networks, the TPM and OWS had different manifestations of patriotism, peacefulness, and normalcy. What remains constant across TV networks is that the fundamental ideas of patriotism, peacefulness, and normalcy are positive characteristics. FNC and MSNBC may disagree on what constitutes patriotism, but they both agree that patriotism is a positive quality for any activist to have. They both adhere to the same general status quo.

In the next two sections, I focus on frames that were used almost exclusively for one movement or the other in order to further illustrate how the TV news framing process perpetuates hegemonic norms, thereby upholding the status quo. The racism frame was used exclusively in coverage of the TPM³², and is not correlated with substantive coverage of TPM issues according to my analysis in chapter 4. It was used in six distinct ways that I examine in depth. The “amalgam of grievances” frame (Boykoff 2006) was used almost exclusively in coverage of OWS, and appears in programs in ways that reveal how the mainstream media are deeply entrenched in a wider political institutional structure.

The Tea Party and the Racism Frame

The racism frame was not significantly correlated with any form of substantive coverage of the TPM in my analysis in chapter 4. This is likely because the frame is often presented without discussing the TPM, and is instead used to discuss controversial statements elites have made that accuse the TPM of racism. In this section, I analyze the ways in which the racism frame was used in TPM coverage. The racism frame was not always presented in a negative way, or in a way that would delegitimize the TPM. So, how was this frame used if not always

³² Two FNC programs did accuse OWS protesters of being anti-Semitic, but that was the closest they came to the racism frame. The racism frame did not explicitly appear in OWS coverage in my sample.

negatively? How could a seemingly negative framing device be used to actually *legitimize* the movement? In this section I unpack six different ways the racism frame was presented, and examine how and on which networks each utilization of the frame appears. I use both the sample of 200 transcripts from 2009 through 2012 (used in chapter 4), and the sample of 319 transcripts from 2009 only (from Taylor 2011; also used in chapter 3).

In TPM coverage, journalists used the racism frame in six different ways: 1) to ask whether TPM activists are racist; 2) to accuse TPM activists of being motivated by racism; 3) to distinguish between the majority of “normal” TPM protesters and the “fringe” groups of racists and extremists in the movement; 4) to ask conservatives whether they condemn the racism that is evident in the movement; 5) to discuss controversies in which elites (such as Jimmy Carter, the NAACP, and NPR executives) accused the TPM of being motivated by racism; and 6) to counter the racism frame by expressing outrage that anyone would dare accuse the TPM of being racist. Some of these versions of the racism frame are meant to delegitimize, while others are meant to legitimize the movement.

Table 11 displays each of the six uses of the racism frame. The left side of the table shows frequencies for the sample of 200 TPM transcripts from 2009 – 2012, and the right side shows frequencies for the 319 TPM transcripts sampled around TPM events. Each side displays the number of programs per network in which each type of the racism frame was used, categorized by speaker (journalist, activist, or other program guest—including political pundits, politicians, and celebrities). For example, the accusatory version of the racism frame (“Racist!”) is used by a journalist on one MSNBC program and by other guests on two CNN programs and one FNC program, for a total of four programs or 2% of the sample of 200 programs from 2009 – 2012.

Table 11. Frequencies for each of the 6 uses of the Racism frame, TV programs by network and speaker

Sample of 200 from 2009 - 2012						Sample of 319 from 2009 events (Taylor 2011)					
	Journalist	Activist	Other Guest	(total programs) % of sampled programs		Journalist	Activist	Other Guest	(total programs) % of sampled programs		
1 Racist?	2 - CNN	0	0	(2) 1%		2 - CBS 2 - CNN 1 - FNC 1 - MSNBC	0	2 - CBS 3 - CNN	(11) 3.5%		
2 Racist!	1 - MSNBC	0	2 - CNN 1 - FNC	(4) 2%		5 - CNN 2 - MSNBC	0	1 - CBS 13 - CNN 5 - MSNBC 2 - NBC	(28) 8.8%		
3 Some racist, most not	1 - CNN 1 - MSNBC	0	2 - CNN 2 - MSNBC	(6) 3%		1 - CBS 5 - CNN 1 - MSNBC	2 - CNN	2 - CNN 1 - NBC	(12) 3.8%		
4 Condemn racism?	2 - CNN	0	0	(2) 1%		3 - CNN	0	1 - CNN	(4) 1.3%		
5 Elites say TPM is racist	3 - CNN	0	0	(3) 1.5%		1 - CBS 1 - MSNBC 2 - NBC	0	6 - CNN 3 - NBC	(13) 4.1%		
6 Not Racist!	6 - FNC	1 - CBS	1 - FNC	(8) 4%		7 - FNC	2 - FNC	3 - FNC	(12) 3.8%		
(total programs) % of sampled programs	(16) 8%	(1) 0.5%	(8) 4%			(34) 10.7%	(4) 1.3%	(42) 13.2%			

NOTE: Categories are not mutually exclusive, thus percentages do not total 100.

When I examine who is using each form of the frame, and on which network, a pattern emerges. First, delegitimizing forms of the racism frame appear most often in event-related coverage rather than electoral politics coverage. This is likely because the delegitimizing forms of the racism frame describe activists, and descriptions of activists occur most often in event-related coverage. Second, there are differences in usage of each version of the frame by speaker: journalists use all forms of the frame more often than activists, and guests on news programs use the accusatory version of the frame more often than journalists or activists. Third, each version of the frame is used by networks at different rates. The TPM-friendly network FNC uses the “not racist” version of the frame more than any other version, and is one of only 2 networks on which this version appears at all. Journalists and guest on CNN use the accusatory version of the frame more than all other networks combined, and the condemning version of the frame (number 4) only appears on CNN coverage. In the rest of this section, I provide examples of each version of the racism frame in order to illustrate how each version manifests in TV news discourse.

1. Is the TPM racist?

Many journalists presented the racism frame in the form of a question, asking pundits, TPM activists, or viewers in general whether it might be true that TPM activists are racist. A prime example can be found in a September 14, 2009 episode of *Hardball* on MSNBC, in which host Chris Matthews says:

Up next: So, we have seen the protests against President Obama. And how much anger there is about the issues, and how much may be based on ethnicity, his African-American heritage? We will get into that, into how race may be fueling the backlash against President Obama, may be.

Matthews does not outright accuse the protesters of being racist; he says race “may” have something to do with their motivations, “maybe.” This form of the racism frame is usually combined with at least one of the other forms, such as pundits claiming it is just a fringe element

of the TPM that is racist, or pundits accusing TPM activists of being racist outright. For example, Larry King presents the frame in question form, asking guest Bill Maher “Is there a racist tone in this? ... is this inherent racism?” on the September 19, 2010 episode of *Larry King Live* on CNN. Maher exclaims, “Yes, Larry, it’s extremely racist. I mean it’s so funny because the tea baggers, the one thing they hate is black people... But they won’t say it.”

2. *The TPM is racist!*

This more direct use of the racism frame was the first of the six to occur in TV news discourse. It first appeared on MSNBC after the April 15, 2009 “Tax day tea protest” in an episode of *Countdown with Keith Olbermann* on MSNBC, which included the following exchange between celebrity guest Janeane Garofalo and the program’s host:

JANEANE GAROFALO, ACTOR: ... You know, there is nothing more interesting than seeing a bunch of racists become confused and angry... Let’s be very honest about what this is about. It’s not about bashing Democrats. It’s not about taxes. They have no idea what the Boston Tea party was about.

OLBERMANN: That’s right.

GAROFALO: They don’t know their history at all. This is about hating a black man in the White House. This is racism straight up. That is nothing but a bunch of tea bagging rednecks. ... Again, this is about racism. It could be any issue, any port in a storm. These guys hate that a black guy is in the White House.

This clip was replayed on rival network FNC multiple times, as I will discuss below. Although Olbermann does not present the frame himself, he agrees with Garofalo and does not question her charges of racism.

As table 11 shows, this direct form of the racism frame is used by guests most often, but journalists use it to accuse TPM activists of being motivated by racism as well. For example, on a September 16, 2009 episode of *Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees* on CNN, journalist Candy Crowley discusses the 9/12 March on Washington, saying, “Racism is there to see online and on the signs held by some protesters.” However, this form of the racism frame is overwhelmingly

presented by guests on TV news programs, not by news anchors or program hosts. Sometimes news anchors directly give guests the opportunity to use the racism frame in an attacking way, as reflected in the *Larry King* excerpt in which King presents the frame as a question and Maher's answer is a direct attack, but more often guests initiate the racism frame, as exemplified by the MSNBC excerpt above.

3. Some TPM members are racist, but most are not

One of the most common uses of the racism frame by the actual news anchors or program hosts is to present the frame in order to draw a boundary between regular protesters and an extremist minority. This use of the racism frame portrays most TPM activists as normal, and distinguishes between those normal activists and the small, fringe element of racists within the movement. For example, on a March 31, 2010 episode of *American Morning* on CNN, news anchor John Roberts says "the bulk of the TEA Party movement, regular folks who just want to have their voices heard about what's going on in politics, but at the same time, there are some extreme elements that have embedded themselves in the TEA Party movement. We've seen the racist signs at some of these rallies." The journalist makes racists out to be an "extreme" segment of the population that has infiltrated the TPM, or "embedded" itself into their otherwise non-racist protests.

Something similar happens on a July 26, 2010 episode of *Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees*. In that episode, CNN contributor Erick Erickson has the following exchange about a racist sign held by at least one TPM protester (see Image 2) with guest Michael Eric Dyson, a professor at Georgetown University: "DYSON: What I'm saying is that the witch doctor motif has been perpetuated by the Tea Party... ERICKSON: No, not perpetuated by the Tea Party, just by a few people who were crazy enough to hold up signs." Erickson distinguishes the majority of the



Image 2. Signs featuring President Obama’s face pasted onto the body of what looks to be an African witch doctor appeared at the 9/12 March on Washington and were the topic of many discussions on TV news programs

TPM from a few “crazy” people, and implies that these people do not represent the TPM as a whole. This usage of the racism frame paints the picture of a small minority of people who have infiltrated TPM rallies and twisted the true message of the movement.

This type of utilization of the racism frame ends up legitimizing the movement by setting the racist element apart, minimizing it, and contrasting it to the majority of TPM activists or their “true” message. It also shuts down any conversation about racism, what it means to be racist, and why signs such as the witch doctor motif are racist.

4. Do you condemn the racism we see within the TPM?

A fourth way journalists use the racism frame is to ask conservatives, including Republican politicians and TPM activists and leaders, whether they condemn the racism within the movement. On a September 15, 2009 episode of *Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees*, host

Anderson Cooper asks his guest, Mark Williams, who at the time was the leader of the Tea Party Express, whether he would disavow racist signs at TPM rallies. Cooper presents evidence of racism (see Image 2) at the 9/12 March that had just occurred in Washington DC a few days prior as he asks his question:

There is this witch doctor sign that has gotten a lot of play. We're showing it right now. Is that something when you see you think, ok, that is – do you believe that is racist? And if you do, is that something you would tell people in your movement who come to your rallies, look, don't be bringing that sign?

In this version of the racism frame, a journalist presents a piece of evidence and offers the guest the opportunity to refute or condemn it. This always goes in one of two directions: with the guest claiming there is nothing racist about the evidence presented, or with the guest acknowledging the racism and condemning it. In the example above, Mark Williams acknowledges the racism and personally condemns it, but says he would never tell anyone not to bring such a sign because he believes in freedom and liberty.

An example of outright denying racism occurs on a June 12, 2010 episode of *Saturday Morning News* on CNN, in which anchor Drew Griffin interviews a TPM activist, Catherine Bleish. The interview is presented as a pre-recorded video package that Griffin and his co-anchor, Suzanne Malveaux, watch and discuss together, without Bleish present. In the video clip, Griffin cites a study by the Southern Poverty Law Center and reads it to Bleish: “‘Tea parties ... are shot through with rich veins of radical ideas, conspiracy theories and racism’ Do you find that true?” Bleish’s response is a terse “No, I don’t.” The video clip is cut off at that point, and the two anchors go on to facetiously discuss how “interesting” Bleish is, and to mildly poke fun at her brief answers to Griffin’s questions. Because Bleish is not present, she is not given the opportunity to defend herself or to answer any follow-up questions. The overall effect of this particular use of the racism frame, presented as a question to an activist or pundit, is to

delegitimize the TPM. However, respondents typically condemn the racism presented by the news anchor, thus legitimizing the movement. Therefore, this utilization of the racism frame can serve to either legitimize or delegitimize the TPM, depending on the response given by an activist or pundit and the reaction to that response by journalists.

5. Elites have accused the TPM of racism

Another very common way of presenting the racism frame was to discuss controversies that emerged when elites accused the TPM of being racist. Again, this form of the frame can serve to legitimize or delegitimize the movement. It first became prominent after the 9/12 March on Washington, when controversy erupted after President Jimmy Carter, in an interview with Brian Williams on NBC's *Nightly News*, accused the TPM of being motivated by racism against President Obama. CNN covered this controversy more than any other network, and the programs that addressed it always included the viewpoints of two or more guests who debated whether or not Carter's accusation had merit (see Taylor 2011). This form of the racism frame came up again in July 2010 when the NAACP passed a resolution calling on Tea Party leaders to condemn racism within their movement, which became a topic for journalists and pundits to discuss.

In 2011, the controversy revolved around NPR. Conservative activist James O'Keefe took a hidden video of the president of the fundraising arm of NPR, Ron Schiller, making disparaging comments about the TPM in a meeting with a fake potential donor. News programs played the video clip of Schiller saying the Tea Party people are "not just Islamophobic, but really xenophobic ... they believe in sort of white, middle-America, gun-toting – I mean, it's scary." Ron Schiller ended up resigning from NPR because of the controversy, as did Vivian Schiller (no relation to Ron), the CEO of NPR at the time. CNN and FNC played this clip

multiple times over the course of a few days. On CNN, journalists and guests discussed it as an NPR controversy and never addressed whether it was true or false that Tea Partiers are racist or scary. On FNC, journalists and guests used the event to discuss their outrage that anyone would dare accuse the TPM of racism, which is the final version of the racism frame.

6. The TPM is not racist!

This sixth way of presenting the racism frame occurred almost exclusively on FNC. The only exception occurs when a TPM activist uses this form of the frame on CBS's *Face the Nation* on September 26, 2010. During an interview with anchor Bob Scheiffer, Tea Party Express chief strategist Sal Russo discusses the challenges the TPM has had to face, including being called "a bunch of racists," and then – as a way of refuting the charge of racism – goes on to explain "the one fundamental economic issue" that unites the TPM, that being government spending.

FNC is the only network on which news anchors or program hosts use this racism counter-frame. For example, on the October 14, 2010 episode of *Hannity*, host Sean Hannity reports that a recent *Washington Post* article says "there are not as many racist signs at Tea Party events as people think." Hannity uses the fact that there are fewer racist signs than one would think as evidence to bolster his argument that the TPM is not motivated by racism. The same day, on *The O'Reilly Factor*, Bill O'Reilly and his panel of guests have a more in-depth discussion about the *Washington Post* article. O'Reilly reports, "less than 5 percent of the signs dealt with Obama's ethnicity or religion at all." Guest Gretchen Carlson, one of the hosts of FNC's morning news program, *Fox & Friends*, notes, "the problem is that, if you do watch other broadcasts, you would think that it was half and half." Another guest, Fox News Analyst Margaret Hoover, brings the counter-frame full circle and states: "I've always accepted the

premise that 10 percent of people out there are crazy... At this [5%] percentage, the Tea Party is actually a more sane representative sample of Americans than ordinary Americans.” While it is not clear whether Hoover thinks racism is insane, or carrying blatantly racist protest signs is insane, she is able to use the racism frame to perpetuate the pro-status quo orientation of the TPM—as less blatantly racist than most “ordinary Americans.”

FNC program hosts talk about TPM racism for the sole purpose of refuting the frame, often by expressing outrage that anyone would dare call the TPM activists racist. This outrage is often directed at other media outlets. For example, on an April 23, 2009 episode of *The O'Reilly Factor*, the host says, “On MSNBC, Janeane Garofalo said that Americans that attended tea parties were racist rednecks. She was not challenged by the anchor.” Here, O'Reilly is shocked that the anchor of a political commentary program would fail to challenge a guest on her assertion that TPM activists are racists. O'Reilly counters the racism frame by specifically referring to activists as “Americans.” These are not your average protesters; these are normal Americans. Looking closely at O'Reilly's discourse, they are not even “protesters”; they simply “attended tea parties.” These words and phrases normalize and soften TPM activists, thus bolstering the counter-frame.

A few other FNC programs used video clips of the exchange between Garofalo and Olbermann in attempt to delegitimize the NBC network, which owns MSNBC. On an April 20, 2009 episode of FNC's *The O'Reilly Factor*, just 3 days before the excerpt quoted above, O'Reilly calls Garofalo's comments “the most hateful attacks on the tea party demonstrators the TV news business has ever seen in its history” and claims: “General Electric boss Jeff Immelt and his henchman, NBC president Jeff Zucker, have encouraged personal attacks and hate speech on the air for years, trying to boost sagging ratings at NBC. But that strategy has been an

enormous failure.” O’Reilly co-opts progressive discourse when he uses the phrase “hate speech” to describe the act of accusing the TPM of being racist. “Hate speech” is speech used by a power holder to attack a person or group based on an oppressed status (e.g. ethnic, racial, sexual, or religious minorities), but O’Reilly turns the phrase on its head and uses it to target the accusers. This repurposing of a social justice frame to bolster a conservative argument is not new (see Naples 2013), and weakens the power of the phrase “hate speech.” Thus, O’Reilly’s statement does double duty, legitimizing the TPM while also robbing the phrase “hate speech” of its exclusive meaning as a social justice frame.

This monologue on the April 20th episode of *The O’Reilly Factor* is part of a broader discourse around “liberal media” perpetuated on FNC. O’Reilly’s statements could be construed as an attempt to manipulate his audience into being completely loyal to FNC by turning them against other networks, rather than representing genuine outrage on behalf of the TPM. O’Reilly continues on the April 23rd episode of his show: “the media has [*sic*] a vested interest in making their audience think the Tea Party are racist people.” O’Reilly does not expand on this thought or offer any evidence as to why any media outlet would have a “vested interest” in making their audience think anything in particular about any social movement. Nor does he acknowledge that his program is also a part of “the media.”

Summary

While one might assume that the racism frame would automatically be negative (see Weaver and Scacco 2013), my analysis reveals that this frame can be presented in a variety of ways. Table 12 shows each form of the racism frame and whether it was used to legitimize, delegitimize, or both. All but 1 of the 6 forms were used in legitimizing ways, while just 4 of

Table 12. A typology of legitimizing and delegitimizing forms of the racism frame

	Delegitimizing	Legitimizing
1 - Racist?	X	X
2 - Racist!	X	
3 - Some racist, most not		X
4 - Condemn racism?	X	X
5 - Elites say TPM is racist	X	X
6 - Not Racist!		X

them were used in delegitimizing ways. Nevertheless, delegitimizing forms of the racism frame did occur more frequently than legitimizing forms.

It is also notable that the delegitimizing forms of the racism frame were not used by any FNC news anchors or program hosts at all. In fact, the only time discussions of racism within the TPM occur on the FNC network is when FNC hosts attempt to legitimize the movement by stating that racism has nothing to do with the motivations behind the movement³³. Most journalists on other networks bring up the frame in a neutral way in order to spur discussion, and most delegitimizing uses of the frame occur either on MSNBC or are presented by guests on programs aired on other networks. By and large it was guests on news programs that used the frame to delegitimize the TPM or portray them in a negative way.

As the transcript excerpts show, the racism frame is never actually used to discuss racism. When boundaries are used to set the racist element of the movement apart, minimize it, and contrast it to the majority of TPM activists or their “true” message, it shuts down any conversation about racism, what it means to be racist, or why protest signs such as the witch doctor motif are racist. Most controversies about racism within the TPM are presented as

³³ Once, this attempt to counter the racism frame was met with blatant accusations of racism (a counter to the counter-frame) by a liberal pundit on a FNC program. That is the only instance of a negative use of the racism frame on the FNC network in my sample.

controversies about political or media elites accusing the TPM of racism. Rather than having a conversation about what it means to be racist and discussing the reasons why anyone would think the TPM is a racist movement, racism itself was ignored and the act of accusing the TPM of racism was the controversy. This type of coverage allows journalists to avoid tough conversations about racism in the U.S. and to focus instead on the “problem” of being “falsely” accused of racism by people who like to “play the race card.” Even though the current status quo in this country supports the *idea* that racism is a negative thing, the status quo itself is supported by racism and thus is served by avoiding meaningful conversations about what racism truly means.

The racism frame did not appear in the sample of OWS coverage. One of the most common negative frames used in coverage of OWS is the amalgam of grievances, which frames a movement as one that has no unified message or no clear goals, and often occurs alongside the ignorance frame. In the next section, I describe the ways this frame appeared in TV news coverage of OWS, and theorize why it occurs so frequently for OWS and so rarely in TPM coverage.

Amalgam of Grievances: Support for the Status Quo is the Only Clear Message

In a segment of the CBS *Evening News* on October 17, 2011, the news anchor asks: “A Quinnipiac University poll out today asked New Yorkers’ view of the [OWS] protestors and 67 percent said they agree with them. But agree with what?” Again and again, across all types of TV networks, news coverage returns to the frame that OWS has “no unified message.” In his analysis of the Global Justice Movement, Boykoff (2006, pp. 220-221) calls this the “amalgam of grievances” frame, which occurs when journalists claim that activists are fighting for too

many disparate issues and thus have no clear message.

In chapter 4, I found that the amalgam of grievances frame significantly predicts coverage of OWS grievances, demands, goals, and/or motivations. This was not a surprising result, since the frame is sometimes presented as “they have no clear goal” but more often is presented as a list of goals or grievances they have, framed as being too many or as being unfocused. Boykoff (2006) developed the amalgam frame, and found that it was used in a value-neutral way about half the time and in a negative way the other half of the time in TV coverage of the Global Justice Movement (p. 222). In this section, I show that the amalgam frame, when used negatively in OWS coverage, is often used alongside the ignorance frame. In addition, its negative and neutral uses do not necessarily occur across networks in a way that one would expect based on my conclusions from chapter 3, which showed that OWS receives mostly neutral coverage from CNN and the broadcast networks, negative coverage from FNC, and positive coverage from MSNBC. I also argue that the amalgam frame, like the racism frame in TPM coverage, is used to shut down meaningful conversations about deeper issues.

Negative Uses of the Amalgam of Grievances Frame

Table 13 shows frequencies for the amalgam and the ignorance frames in OWS coverage, by network. Based on what we know from my analysis in chapter 3, we might expect the broadcast networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, to use the amalgam frame neutrally, CNN to also use it neutrally, and FNC to use it negatively. However, CBS, NBC, and FNC most frequently present the amalgam frame in a negative way and CNN presents the frame in a negative way about half the time and neutrally the other half. MSNBC only presents the amalgam frame in a neutral way, and never alongside the ignorance frame. The most overarching message of OWS was that capitalism is a flawed economic system that had caused a large wealth gap between the

Table 13. Prevalence of the amalgam and ignorance frames in OWS coverage (N=200)

	Amalgam of Grievances		Ignorance		Both together	
	TV programs	% within network	TV programs	% within network	TV programs	% within network
ABC	0	-	2	13.3%	0	-
NBC	1	12.5%	1	12.5%	1	12.5%
CBS	4	40%	3	30%	2	20%
CNN	27	24.5%	11	10%	8	7.3%
FNC	4	12.1%	15	45.5%	3	9.1%
MSNBC	5	20.8%	4	16.7%	0	-
Total TV	41		36		14	

Note: “% within network” refers to the percentage of all programs from that network in the sample of 200, hence % column does not add up to 100

richest 1% and the other 99%, which is a message that directly challenges the status quo.

Because of this, and because mainstream media have a vested interest in maintaining the economic status quo, journalists on networks that are typically neutral toward OWS use the amalgam frame to avoid in-depth explanations of the activists’ critiques of capitalism. Indeed, 34 of the 41 occurrences of the amalgam of grievances frame (about 83%) are presented by journalists.

When the amalgam frame is used negatively, it almost always occurs with the ignorance frame. Typically the amalgam frame is presented first, and then it is followed by someone, whether it is another journalist or a guest of some kind, picking one of many perceived issues or goals of the movement and criticizing it as something stupid, misguided, or just plain wrong. When a journalist is responsible for bringing both frames up, they often present the amalgam frame first, followed by a comment about how ignorant it is to have a movement with no clear goal.

An example of the most common co-occurrence of the two frames – when a journalist presents the amalgam of grievances frame and someone else brings in the ignorance frame –

occurs on an October 9, 2011 episode of *Sunday Morning* on CBS. The reporter, Rebecca Jarvis, describes OWS as “a movement whose goals still remain vague” and then interviews a “man-on-the-street” who works on Wall Street. He says: “I kind of think they are misguided in their protesting... I think they’re misguided in – in blaming Wall Street. We had very little to do with it.” Neither the man nor the reporter explains what the “it” is that the man thinks OWS is blaming Wall Street for.

Nearly all instances of the co-occurrence of the amalgam and ignorance frames are somewhat similar to the way the racism frame appears in TPM coverage—with journalists making somewhat neutral statements or asking questions, and guests following with the negative frame. An exception to this rule occurs in the following example from an October 3, 2011 episode of *The Five* on FNC. *The Five* is a show hosted by four conservatives and one liberal; they typically sit around a table and discuss current events. On this episode, conservative co-host Dana Perino discusses media coverage of OWS. Eric Bolling and Greg Gutfeld, two of the other conservatives on the show, then begin to argue with Bob Beckel, the show’s token liberal.

PERINO: ... one of the things that happened over the weekend on Twitter was people complaining that it took so long for media to cover their [OWS] story...

BOLLING: What story is it? I'm still trying to figure out what is it? Capitalism is bad? Corporations are bad?

BECKEL: That’s one of their problems. They don’t have a unifying message.

GUTFELD: They don’t have a principle.

BECKEL: Well, the principle --

GUTFELD: All they want to do is take. Take, take, take.

BECKEL: Excuse me. The principle is that these crooks who ripped off this country and sold these bad securities they knew were bad, not one of them were in jail, and they ought to be.

BOLLING: You know what, Bob. Not one of these kids knows anything about that story.

Bolling introduces the amalgam frame, Beckel strengthens the frame by admitting that he thinks OWS does not have a unifying message, Gutfeld insults OWS by claiming they have no principles other than selfishness, and then Beckel defends OWS principles by offering an

explanation of OWS motives. Bolling combats that defense with the ignorance frame: “Not one of these kids knows anything about that.” Bolling strengthens his negative frame by patronizingly adding the word “kids” to describe the activists. The debate-style nature of this program allows the amalgam frame to be introduced in a negative way and strengthened in a neutral way, which sparks further negative framing.

Neutral Uses of the Amalgam of Grievances Frame

Still, the amalgam of grievances frame appears most frequently on its own, without the ignorance frame. Journalists on mainstream media outlets seem to be unable to accept the idea that OWS has goals, and are unable to let go of the “they have no unified message” frame. This problem is most perfectly encapsulated in an episode of the CBS *Evening News* on October 17, 2011, in which news correspondent Seth Doane speaks with an OWS activist:

DOANE: ...Isn't there a danger that without specific goals that the movement will lose steam? That people could be confused about what you want?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, we have - we have goals. They may not be specific policies, but [what] we want is fundamental economic justice and a more real democracy.

DOANE (voice over): The movement's lack of clear message hasn't hurt its ability to collect money. So far, 215,000 dollars has poured in online and another \$80,000 was raised here in the park.

Even when an activist states two clear goals, “fundamental economic justice and more real democracy,” the journalist immediately goes back to this old line of a “lack of clear message.” Either there is a fundamental miscommunication happening here, or journalists are simply unwilling to go “off-script”—to let go of a frame and realign their statements when presented with evidence that their preferred frame is inaccurate. Mainstream journalists are so wrapped up in the idea that the only goal a social movement should have is a legislative goal that when activists say they have no specific *policy* goals – as the activist in this example does – the journalists see that as no goal at all. Mainstream media are entrenched in a political institutional

structure that values a narrow range of traditional, legislation-oriented social movement goals. Journalists are not asking “what are your goals?” they are asking “why don’t your goals align with our idea of what a goal should be?” If a social movement’s goals cannot be met by working within the existing political institutional structure – a structure the mainstream media have a vested interest in maintaining – then the media will say the movement has no goals at all, or that the goals are too “confusing.”

The amalgam frame also comes up in a somewhat different way. Instead of repeating that there is no clear goal, a journalist or pundit will complain about the long list of goals OWS has. For example, in a May 5, 2012 episode of *Your Bottom Line* on CNN, Will Cain, a conservative pundit, and Todd Gitlin, a liberal academic affiliated with OWS, are guests. Program host Christine Romans acts as moderator while they debate the merits of OWS. Cain says, “it’s impossible to have [a conversation] with Occupy because you can change the purpose, you can change the movement every time I speak. If [I say] it’s about capitalism – [you say] no, it’s about money and politics. You will answer a laundry list of things.” Cain somehow fails to see that capitalism is the reason that money in politics is a problem. Gitlin actually argues that economic inequality is the product of capitalism, that capitalism is to blame and that we should not accept the byproducts of capitalism, which include poverty and economic injustice—that we should not “genuflect to capitalism” as he says.

Because being “anti-capitalist” is akin to being “anti-American” in this country, many OWS supporters deny that OWS is an anti-capitalist movement and attempt to break that down into a more sympathetic list of problems, such as money in politics, the gap between the rich and poor, and the bailout of the banks while working class families lost their homes. Wanting a remedy to those problems does not necessarily make one “anti-capitalist” (though many OWS

activists do consider themselves anti-capitalist), but it does make them, at the very least, supporters of policies that would regulate capitalism. That is what Gitlin is trying to get at, but the conservative pundit will not allow him to.

The activist quoted above on CBS, who said OWS's goals are economic justice and real democracy, is saying the same thing: they want more economic regulation to narrow the gap between the rich and the poor – a gap that deregulated capitalism caused, they argue – and real democracy in the form of one vote for one person instead of one vote for one million dollars. This is all related to capitalism, and regulation of this economic system is the unifying message throughout OWS protests.

We are left, then, to wonder whether the media is complicit in silencing this overriding theme of capitalism being the problem because, perhaps, they do not want regular people to realize that. The hosts of FNC programs recognize it and use it to delegitimize the movement by framing OWS activists as communists or as being anti-American, while the journalists in mainstream media ignore it and complain that there is no unifying message, that there is this amalgam of grievances. The mainstream media acknowledge separate concerns OWS has, such as student loan debt and the housing crisis and immigrant rights, yet they refuse to acknowledge that all these different things are connected to one problem—unregulated capitalism.

Pro-Corporate Goals Do Not Need to be Clear

“The media speak mainstreamease, and movements are pushed to adopt this language to be heard since journalists are prone to misunderstand or never hear the alternate language and its underlying ideas... Movements that accept the dominant cultural codes and do not challenge what is normally taken for granted will have less of a problem, but for many movements, this would involve surrendering fundamental aspects of their *raison d’etre*” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993: 119).

Boykoff (2006) found that about 25% of news stories about the Global Justice Movement in 1999 contained the amalgam of grievances frame. I found that 41 of the 200 OWS transcripts in my sample contained the amalgam of grievances frame, about 20%. This frame did not appear in my TPM sample of 200 at all, and it only appeared 5 times in the sample of 319 from the 2009 TPM protests (Taylor 2011). Those findings are in line with Boykoff's and Laschever's (2011), who similarly found in their analysis of TPM news coverage that only 37 of the 2,299 TV news transcripts they examined from 2009-2010 contained the amalgam frame (less than 2%). So why do journalists on TV news use this frame so often when discussing OWS, but not the TPM?

TPM goals were just as "unclear" as the OWS goals described above, but they were not framed as unclear in TV news coverage. For example, "less government" was mentioned as a goal or motivation of the TPM in 80 of the 319 transcripts from 2009. Not once does any journalist or pundit question what "less government" would entail, even though TPM activists and their supporters never mention any specific policies related to shrinking government.

When OWS activists say their goals are "real democracy" or to "get money out of politics," journalists say these goals are not clear. However, when TPM activists state equally unclear goals such as "we want smaller government," with no specific policies to go along with that, the statements are taken at face value without question and presented as legitimate concerns. TPM goals are generally pro-capitalist and support the economic status quo, and OWS goals are just about the opposite; what is it about the media that makes them want to frame these things so differently? According to McChesney (2008: 34) one of the biases of journalism is that it "smuggles in values conducive to the commercial aims of the owners and advertisers as well as the political aims of the owning class." This pro-corporate bias leads journalists to present pro-

capitalist goals without question, while being highly critical of goals that threaten the economic status quo.

Perhaps the TPM's most vague goal was to "take our country back." This goal was discussed by journalists on FNC and CNN frequently, and without any criticism, let alone follow-up questions to find out what that means; no journalists in my samples asked who or what the TPM wanted to take the country back from. Another of the vague TPM goals most frequently discussed on TV news coverage was that activists wanted to "make their voices heard." This was discussed in the news as a legitimate goal of the movement—just being heard. In fact, over ten percent of the 200 TPM mission statements I analyzed in previous research (Taylor 2011) listed "making our voices heard" as one of their goals. Journalists on TV news often parroted this goal – "they're here to make their voices heard" – without ever telling us what those voices were actually saying.

The TPM was not treated any more fairly than OWS by some media outlets, though. CNN and MSNBC frequently featured both journalists and guests challenging many of the TPM goals and motivations. However, they at least made the attempt to see what those goals and motivations were—even if they were sometimes wrong. For example, on CNN and MSNBC, journalists would criticize the "taxed enough already" slogan of the TPM by arguing that President Obama had actually lowered taxes. They missed the point that the TPM was more concerned with government spending, and that most TPM activists seemed to understand that Obama had lowered their taxes, but they believed it would be short-term and that their children would be over-taxed in order to pay for all the spending Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush had done.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I introduced the gateways model of TV news framing of social movements. This process is specific to TV news and does not apply across all media formats. TV news often presents a back and forth between journalists and their guests in ways that newspapers and magazines cannot. This back and forth allows frames to be used in ways that news producers cannot always anticipate. When TV news coverage goes negative on a movement, journalists tend not to attack the movement on its issues; they attack by ignoring the issues and distracting with charges of racism, or the way that protesters frame the issues rather than the merit of the issues themselves. However, if a second person is there to respond, then the viewer may end up receiving more substantive information about the issues.

I illustrated another aspect of the partisan media paradigm: in TV news coverage, positive frames are used to emphasize aspects of a social movement that support the status quo, whether the movement is perceived as left-wing or right-wing. Negative frames can emphasize aspects of a movement that challenge the status quo, but are also often used to divide activists into an anti-status quo minority and a contrasting majority of normal, patriotic, and peaceful activists. Most substantive coverage includes a mix of negative and positive frames, and even networks that are more likely to use an unbalanced mix of negative or positive frames still offer substantive coverage, even though the slant of that coverage is overly negative or positive. I then demonstrated the gateways model, which shows how negative and positive frames take specific paths to substantive coverage, exposing a communication pattern in which the use of one frame opens up the path for other frames, not just counter-frames, to be used. These framing paths can apply to any news story—not just stories about social movements. Deciphering this

communication pattern helps us to understand why issues that are central to fundamental social problems are pushed out of public discourse.

For example, I showed how the racism frame is typically juxtaposed with a counter-frame and rarely leads to substantive coverage of TPM issues. It also fails to lead to substantive coverage of race and racism. The racism frame was used in ways that either legitimized or delegitimized the TPM, but kept the actual issue of racism at a distance. Rather than having a conversation about what it means to be racist and discussing the reasons why anyone would think the TPM is a racist movement, journalists ignored racism itself and presented the act of accusing the TPM of racism as the controversy. While the current status quo in this country supports the *idea* that racism is a negative thing, the status quo itself is supported by white racism and thus is served by avoiding meaningful conversations about what racism truly means.

I also showed how the amalgam of grievances frame is used to avoid discussions of issues that challenge the status quo. Despite many of the TPM activists' goals and grievances being no clearer than any OWS goals or grievances, journalists legitimized TPM concerns and avoided meaningful discussions of OWS concerns—which stems from pro-corporate bias (Bagdikian 2004; McChesney 2008). The broad message of OWS directly challenged the economic status quo, and the overarching goal of the movement was to bring awareness to the problems inherent in a capitalist economy—namely, that American capitalism produced a tiny class of obscenely wealthy people at the expense of a huge class of exploited workers. These “problems” are *not* problems for the political, corporate, and media elite; indeed, their wealth, power, and prestige would not exist without those problems. Because so many OWS activists were completely unwilling to compromise those fundamental aspects of their purpose, TV news

media were unable or unwilling to hear, let alone articulate, the movement's underlying ideas (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993).

Whether a social movement represents the political left, right, or something else altogether, TV news will use frames that support the status quo in their coverage of the movement—that is, if the movement gets any coverage at all. Aspects of movements that challenge the status quo will be framed negatively, and aspects that support the status quo will be framed positively. Depending on the media outlet's target audience, aspects of a movement that oppose the status quo may be accentuated or downplayed, and aspects that support the status quo might be reciprocally accentuated or downplayed. The trajectories of negative and positive frames in TV news coverage that I described in this chapter can potentially be applied to coverage of any story, especially for news items that are within the sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin 1986).

CHAPTER 6.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I return to the questions I put forward in the introduction. First, I summarize my findings and outline the contributions this dissertation makes to sociological knowledge. I then discuss the implications of these findings for social movement research, media research, and the broader implications for news discourse in general. Finally, I outline ideas for future research in these areas.

Summary of Findings

In chapter 3, I asked whether and how TPM and OWS television coverage differed, whether the amount and type of TPM and OWS coverage changed over time, and what factors explain those changes. I also asked whether the protest paradigm framework is still relevant in a contemporary TV news field in which some networks target narrow niches based on political ideologies. I found that news coverage of each movement differed based on the tactics each movement used and on their respective alignments with the status quo. In line with the protest paradigm framework, coverage of OWS was driven by violence and arrests and then virtually ceased when OWS switched tactics from disruptive protest actions to tactics such as direct assistance to the poor and to victims of natural disasters. In the meantime, coverage of the TPM switched from mostly adhering to the protest paradigm to ignoring TPM protest events and focusing on the TPM's involvement in electoral politics.

More importantly, the movements' respective alignments with the spheres of discourse that correspond to each TV news outlet affected the type of coverage the movements received from each outlet. While both OWS and the TPM received more neutral coverage than positive

or negative, this varied by network, with CNN and the broadcast networks providing overwhelmingly neutral coverage of both movements, FNC providing mostly positive coverage of the TPM and negative coverage of OWS, and MSNBC airing mostly negative coverage of the TPM and positive coverage of OWS. While many of the same frames were used in coverage of both movements, the frequency of framing devices also varied by network.

Finally, I explained that these variations by network do not necessarily contradict the protest paradigm framework, as some have suggested (e.g. Weaver and Scacco 2013). Rather, they are evidence of a more nuanced process that takes place in our segmented TV news landscape. By incorporating an interpretation of Hallin's spheres (1986) that recognizes the importance of a news outlet's intended audience, I reformulate the protest paradigm so that it can be generalized to all social movements and news media formats. Where a social movement falls in terms of a news outlet's sphere of consensus, deviance, or legitimate controversy will determine whether the news outlet adheres to the protest paradigm, a more negative version of the protest paradigm, or uses positive and supportive frames to describe the movement.

My solution to the problem of the protest paradigm is distinct from Trivundza and Brlek's (2017), who stick to Hallin's original idea that a movement can shift over time from one sphere to another within one media outlet's coverage. In contrast, I argue that Hallin's spheres should be conceptualized in a new way that recognizes media segmentation – some news outlets cater to different audiences based on political ideology – and this reconceptualization addresses all of the problems with the protest paradigm that scholars have identified over the past decade. My framework also has the potential to be applied to a variety of news stories and is not necessarily constricted to the protest paradigm or to social movement coverage. In contrast to Reul and colleagues (2016), who present Chan and Lee's (1984) idea of journalistic paradigms

as if it is their own unique concept, my results are distinct from Chan and Lee's and present a novel approach to explaining variations in coverage between news outlets. Chan and Lee's (1984) original framework does not explain how news stories that are not explicitly tied to party ideologies would be covered by media outlets from each "journalistic paradigm" in contexts outside of Hong Kong. My explanation of journalistic paradigms based on spheres of consensus is generalizable across national contexts.

In chapter 4, I tested whether TV news transcripts covering multiple years of social movement activity support or contradict prior research on framing and substantive coverage of social movements. While some researchers have argued that coverage of violent protests opens the door to more coverage of the underlying issues (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002), others found that the violence frame does not lead to more in-depth coverage of protesters' issues (Boykoff 2006). Still other research has found that coverage of protest events does lead to increased coverage of activists speaking in their own words (i.e., "standing"), but that coverage of institutionalized tactics leads to more coverage of the movement's overall message (Amenta et al. 2012).

While my results support some prior findings, they contradict others. The violence frame, even when broken into four components, does not predict substantive coverage. This supports Boykoff's (2006) findings and challenges DeLuca and Peeples's (2002) and Rojecki's (2002) claims that violence or civil disobedience can lead to in-depth coverage of the issues. While event-related coverage does predict activist standing, a finding that supports Amenta and colleagues' work (2012), it also predicts more in-depth coverage of a movement's issues, at least for the TPM, which contradicts their findings. My findings are important because they show that substantive coverage of a movement's goals and motivations can co-occur with shallow coverage

of activists' behaviors and appearances; shallow or negative coverage does not necessarily preclude an in-depth explanation of the issues. My findings also lead to new questions: are the differences between my findings and Amenta and colleagues' explained by new norms in journalism; by differences between newspaper and television coverage; by differences between coverage of a progressive movement (Townsend Plan) and a conservative movement (TPM)? More empirical research needs to be done in this area to begin answering these questions.

My results also add to existing research by expanding on the list of framing devices used in prior research (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Taylor and Gunby 2012). While prior research only examines negative frames, I add positive frames to my analysis. Taken together, these results provide a more nuanced picture of the relationship between various framing devices and substantive reporting (a combination of activist standing and in-depth coverage of the issues) than prior research has been able to offer. The most substantive coverage of social movements includes a mix of negative and positive frames, although some networks are more likely to use frames that are either more positive or more negative and yet still offer substantive coverage, even if that coverage is biased in favor of or against a movement.

The results in chapters 3 and 4 form the partisan media paradigm. This framework for understanding media coverage of social movements recognizes the ideologically segmented structure of the TV news field and the hegemonic limits of mainstream media. The partisan media paradigm holds that the way in which news is presented depends more on the perceived ideology of the media outlet's intended audience than on the tactics, targets, and message of a social movement.

In chapter 5, I explained how the relationship between negative and positive frames and substantive coverage of social movements works. This process is specific to TV news and does

not apply across all media formats, though I suspect it is similar in radio news. TV news often presents a back and forth between journalists and their guests in ways that newspapers and magazines cannot. This back and forth allows frames to be used in ways that news producers cannot always anticipate. When TV news covers a movement in negative ways, journalists tend not to attack the movement on its issues; they attack by ignoring the issues and focusing on the ways protesters appear or behave, or the way protesters frame the issues rather than the merit of the issues themselves. However, if a second person is there to respond to the journalist, then the news consumer may end up receiving more substantive information about the issues.

I illustrated how, in TV news coverage, positive frames are used to emphasize aspects of a social movement that adhere to the status quo, whether the movement is perceived as left-wing or right-wing. Negative frames can emphasize aspects of a movement that challenge the status quo, but are also often used to divide movements into an anti-status quo minority and a contrasting majority of normal, patriotic, and peaceful activists. By developing the gateways model of media framing, I showed how negative and positive frames take specific paths to substantive coverage, exposing a communication pattern in which the use of one frame can open up paths to other frames. These framing paths can apply to any news story—not just stories about social movements.

I also showed how, in TPM coverage, the racism frame is typically juxtaposed with a counter-frame and rarely leads to substantive coverage of TPM issues. It also fails to lead to substantive coverage of race and racism. While I showed how frames open pathways to other frames, they can also close off pathways to in-depth discussions that challenge hegemonic norms. The racism frame was used in ways that either legitimized or delegitimized the TPM, but kept the actual effects of racism – or even what it means to be racist – out of frame. Rather than

having a conversation about what it means to be racist and discussing the reasons why anyone would think the TPM is a racist movement, journalists ignored racism itself and presented the act of accusing the TPM of racism as the controversy. While the current status quo in this country supports the *idea* that racism is a negative thing, the status quo itself is supported by white racism and thus is served by avoiding meaningful conversations about what racism truly is.

This avoidance of meaningful conversations about racism was more recently evident in news coverage of the Charlottesville, Virginia “Unite the Right” rally that took place in August 2017. White nationalists gathered to protest the removal of a Robert E. Lee statue and were met by anti-racist counter-protesters. News coverage of this two-day event, which began with white protesters carrying torches and encircling a statue of Thomas Jefferson on the University of Virginia campus, and culminated with a white racist driving his car into a crowd of counter-protesters, killing one, focused on the sensationalism of conflict and displays of overt racism (e.g. Nazi flags) rather than the deeper issues of ongoing, structural racism that have shaped this country’s history.

In a similar way, the amalgam of grievances frame was used to avoid discussions of issues that challenge the status quo. Despite many of the TPM activists’ goals and grievances being no clearer than any OWS goals or grievances, journalists legitimized TPM concerns and avoided meaningful discussions of OWS concerns—which, I argue, stems from pro-corporate bias (Bagdikian 2004; McChesney 2008). The broad message of OWS directly challenged the economic status quo and the overarching goal of the movement was to bring awareness to the problems inherent in a capitalist economy—namely, that American capitalism produced a tiny class of obscenely wealthy people (the 1%) at the expense of a huge class of exploited workers (the 99%). This problem with capitalism is *not* a problem for the political, corporate, and media

elite; their wealth, power, and prestige would not exist without the inequality produced by capitalism. Because of this, TV news media were unable or unwilling to hear, let alone articulate, the movement's underlying ideas (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). The trajectories of negative and positive frames in TV news coverage that I described in this dissertation can potentially be applied to coverage of any story, especially for news items that are within the sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin 1986).

Implications

Cumulatively, these results provide improved frameworks for analyzing media coverage of contemporary social movements and media framing processes. The partisan media paradigm has two components: 1) the extent to which a media outlet covers a social movement in a negative or positive way is dependent on the political orientation of the movement and the perceived ideology of the media outlet's intended audience; 2) substantive coverage of social movements can, and often does, occur even when negative frames are used in news reports, and regardless of whether or not the coverage is focused on protest activity. Related to the partisan media paradigm is the gateways model, which describes a process by which framing devices act as gateways to either open paths to substantive coverage or to shut off communication. The partisan media paradigm is applicable to all for-profit media, and likely applies to mainstream nonprofit media outlets such as PBS and NPR as well. The gateways model applies to frames used in news coverage that is broadcast on television, and likely radio as well.

TV news outlets cover social movements in different ways based on the perceived orientations of their target audiences, as well as the tactics, targets, and motivations of the social movement. The partisan media paradigm accounts for the realities of today's ideologically segmented TV news landscape, thus contributing to knowledge across the disciplines of

sociology and communications studies. In addition, by identifying the trajectories frames can take in TV news coverage, I provide important insights into the process of media framing for other types of political and cultural discourse. My findings explain how for-profit media's adherence to the status quo bounds the mainstream news field with hegemonic limits that confine political discourse.

Movements that do not pose a significant challenge to the status quo are more successful at getting positive media coverage that addresses issues of substance. This may be because of journalistic norms and practices, because the media are owned and censored by a small number of powerful corporations, or because media impose cultural meanings on society. I lean toward the view that all three of these theories of media are partly true most of the time. For a movement to have a better chance of getting the kind of mainstream media coverage that would cast it in a positive light and bring public attention to the issues with which it is concerned, the movement must not be radical in ideology (right or left) nor radical in its tactics (peaceful protests get more positive coverage). If the movement has allies among the political elite or gains corporate sponsorship, its legitimacy is boosted significantly.

Additionally, if the movement's concerns can be narrowed to one goal that fits within hegemonic limits (Gitlin 1982), mass media will do a better job of articulating that goal clearly. As an example, the TPM began as an ideologically radical movement opposed to status quo institutions such as the Federal Reserve. Once the TPM was co-opted by mainstream conservative interests such as the Republican Party and others in the political and corporate elite, its media coverage grew substantially and its message narrowed. Media presentations of a movement with the primary concerns of high taxes and government overreach led to mainstream conservatives becoming activists for the first time, and the more radical originators of the

movement were pushed out and marginalized. The harshest critiques of the TPM framed the movement as extremist and/or racist. However, the racism frame as it was used in mainstream media failed to effectively illustrate *how* the TPM's message, motivations, or rhetoric were actually racist.

The pathways I identify in chapter 5 illustrate how meaningful discussions of nuanced issues can be cut off; this is not relegated to TV coverage of social movements, and can be used to explain media coverage of other issues as well. For example, President Trump has been criticized for his racist views and policies by alternative media outlets, but not by mainstream media outlets. Although some have recently called on journalists to use the term “racist” when covering Trump’s racist statements, rather than using euphemisms such as “racially charged” (Vernon 2017), that would still not guarantee any in-depth discussion of the implications of the President’s racist rhetoric. As I demonstrated in chapter 5, the hegemonic limits of media discourse prevent real understanding of the racism that may or may not underlie TPM motivations and goals; this also applies to Trump’s discourse around the Charlottesville protests³⁴ and the NFL³⁵, as well as his policies on immigration. Because the mainstream media get wrapped up in the controversy of whether or not Trump is racist, or whether or not the comments he makes or the policies he tries to implement are “racially charged,” they neglect to discuss the actual implications of having a President who is motivated by racism, or the implications of racist policies.

³⁴ Shear, Michael D. and Maggie Haberman. 2017. “Trump Defends Initial Remarks on Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides.’” The New York Times. August 15, 2017. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html>, accessed October 1, 2017.

³⁵ Griffiths, Brent D. and Henry C. Jackson. 2017. “Trump Sparks War with NFL – And LeBron.” *Politico*. September 23, 2017. Available at: <http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/22/trump-nfl-protests-football-243046>, accessed October 1, 2017.

More on the Status Quo

What the Tea Party did successfully was to get their own members to run for elected office and/or to endorse candidates that claimed to support their agenda. They then pressured legislators to stick to their campaign promises once elected. Whether it can be said that the TPM was successful in reaching their goals is up for debate. The TPM-affiliated members of Congress push a hardline agenda without support from other Republicans, and have failed to reach their goals of repealing the Affordable Care Act or decreasing the national debt.

OWS had the same level of public support that the TPM did in its first two years (around 20%, according to various nationally representative public opinion surveys), but they insisted on acting outside of political institutional structures and rejected affiliating themselves with any political party. This refusal to act within the bounds of state structures—while in line with their integrity, and a good example of prefigurative politics—severely limited their potential to influence legislative agendas, and the reforms their liberal and progressive members sought have yet to be actualized.

Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that OWS and the TPM were covered so differently because of their respective orientations with the status quo. Because the ideology of the TPM is more closely aligned with the mainstream media, the TPM gets much more mainstream attention; it does not threaten the political or economic status quo. But this answer may be too simplistic.

A more nuanced answer incorporates tactics and targets, along with cultural infusion of media coverage. Both movements received very similar tone of coverage: a little positive, a little negative, and a lot neutral. However, OWS only received coverage at all when they protested and when they got arrested – because their tactics are disruptive – whereas the TPM got coverage

for their protests, but their tactics were *not* disruptive and so they did *not* get arrested. The TPM's primary tactic during their second year was to infiltrate government and the Republican Party; once they began moving away from the protest tactic and into the traditional political realm, they continued to get media coverage. They continued to get coverage for years because they were achieving some of their stated goals, because those goals support the status quo, and because the media are going to cover electoral politics anyway.

Movements also tend to get more news coverage when they accomplish a goal that is recognized by the media as a traditional political goal (i.e., in line with the status quo). For example, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, along with members from about two hundred other native tribes, began protesting a proposed oil pipeline (the Dakota Access Pipeline) on August 10, 2016. They occupied an area of North Dakota for weeks before they got any national TV coverage at all. Lawrence O'Donnell on MSNBC was the first to report it, on August 25, and was also the second to report on it, on August 29 when he interviewed the Chairman of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Dave Archambault II. The third nationally broadcast TV report on the protest did not occur until September 5, nearly one full month after the protest had begun. This report, on a CNN program called *The Lead* with Jake Tapper, focused on the violence that erupted when the private security guards hired by the oil company unleashed dogs and pepper spray on the protesters. McLeod and Hertog (1992) similarly found that mainstream news coverage of anarchist protests appeared only after violence broke out. FNC was the last of the cable networks to report on the Dakota Access Pipeline protest, on September 9, 2016 (*Special Report* with Bret Baier), which was the day the federal government called for a halt to the pipeline.

Protesters camped out 24-7, yet received hardly any news coverage in their first 30 days of protest. As soon as the government stepped in and legitimized the protesters' demands, the national news started to cover the issue; coverage shot up from five programs during the first four weeks to twelve TV programs during the week following the government action. When the target of a social movement is a corporation or capitalism in general, it tends to take violence or legitimization from elites to get the mainstream corporate media to take notice.

I disagree with Wang and Piazza (2016: 1694), who claim: “non-state targets, such as firms and educational institutions, lack the capacity and the legitimacy to use physical force to repress violent tactics.” The case of the Dakota Access Pipeline activists, attacked by dogs and pepper spray at the hands of private security hired by Energy Transfer Partners, refutes this, as does the case of Occupy UC Davis protesters who were pepper sprayed by campus police while they sat, silently and peacefully, protesting their university's tuition hikes—not to mention the seven steel workers who were murdered by private security hired by Andrew Carnegie when they protested working conditions in 1892. In addition, the state, in the form of the police and the military, also violently represses people who protest against non-state targets.³⁶ The fact that Dakota Access Pipeline and OWS protests involved both corporations and the state complicates this—and shows that U.S. corporate and state interests have become deeply intertwined.

The partisan media paradigm and the gateways model of media framing can be used to analyze discourse beyond news coverage of social movements. Virtually any news story could fall into a different sphere of discourse depending on which TV news outlet is covering it.

³⁶ See articles accessed September 4, 2017: UC Davis protest, November 18, 2011 https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/emboldened-uc-davis-students-protest-tuition-hike/2011/11/28/gIQAd85N_story.html?utm_term=.cd09f185551f; an elderly woman, a priest, and a pregnant woman pepper sprayed at Occupy Seattle protest, November 15, 2011 <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pregnant-woman-pepper-sprayed-at-occupy-seattle/>

Depending on the sphere in which a story falls, a news outlet could provide negative, neutral, or positive coverage of the story. The process of media framing that I outlined, by which frames take paths that lead to other frames, to in-depth coverage of issues, or that block off deeper discussions, can also explain news media discourse of stories beyond those relegated to social movements. In the next section, I outline directions for future research, including some that go beyond social movement studies.

Directions for Future Research

Now that we know that different TV news outlets in the U.S. operate within different spheres of political discourse and that these spheres influence how political topics are discussed by these different outlets, that negative and positive frames can take different paths to substantive coverage, and that messages that challenge the status quo are ignored or misinterpreted by mainstream media, we should explore other issues related to these findings. In this section, I outline several possibilities for future research that were sparked by findings in this dissertation and currently remain unexplored by sociological research. I also discuss directions for future research that are tangentially related to my findings.

Future research should test whether my solution to the problems of the protest paradigm can be applied to media and movements outside the U.S. While the protest paradigm was developed in the U.S. context, several studies have tried to apply the framework to protests in other countries, with mixed results (e.g. Boyle et al. 2012; Shahin et al. 2016; Trivundza and Brlek 2017). I suspect that my solution addresses the problems scholars such as Triundza and Brlek (2017) identified, but empirical research will need to be undertaken in order to demonstrate the generalizability of the spheres of discourse in non-U.S. media contexts.

Future research should also quantify the framing paths I found in chapter 5. How often does each pathway occur, are some paths more common than others, and are there differences between networks in terms of the frequencies of each path? Does this process look similar in radio broadcasts such as Rush Limbaugh on the right of the political spectrum, Stephanie Miller on the left of the spectrum, and programs on NPR in the middle of the spectrum? Comparing radio and TV discourse in this way can tell us whether the TV news framing process I outlined in chapter 5 is applicable to non-televised media. This would clarify the extent to which the partisan media paradigm can be generalized across different forms of media.

In my analysis of frame trajectories, I found that the racism frame cut off discourse about racism itself. However, TV programs can, and often have, pushed the hegemonic limits that constrict news media (Gitlin 1982). For example, on a July 31, 2017 episode of ABC's *The Bachelorette*, contestants on the reality TV show gathered to discuss the events that transpired during the regular season—which happened to be the first season that featured an African American in the lead role, as bachelorette. A refreshingly open and informative discussion about race and racism occurred.³⁷ One black contestant explained color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva 2006) to a white contestant: “The racism that is ingrained in your behavior to the point of invisibility is still pushing you to behave...in a way that you don’t even recognize [as racist].” Similarly boundary-pushing conversations about race and gender have happened on CBS’s *Survivor*.³⁸ Future research should examine the potential that other forms of media, such as

³⁷ Beck, Lia. August 1, 2017. “The Race Conversation on ‘The Bachelorette: Men Tell All’ Is Bigger Than Lee.” *Bustle*. Available at: <https://www.bustle.com/p/the-race-conversation-on-the-bachelorette-men-tell-all-is-bigger-than-lee-73804>. Accessed September 4, 2017.

³⁸ See: Dehnart, Andy. October 2, 2009. “Jaison’s Stand Against Vile Ben’s Racism Takes Control from Russell.” *Reality Blurred*. Available at: https://www.realityblurred.com/realitytv/2009/10/survivor-samoa-ben_out/. Accessed September 4, 2017; and Smith, Zeke. May 3, 2017. “‘Survivor’s’ Zeke Smith: Why Being Vulnerable Was

reality TV programs, have to fill the cultural spaces that news media fear to tread, and should test whether the frame trajectories I outlined in chapter 5 apply to non-news media.

Following Walgrave and Vleigenthart (2012), who found that increased media attention on protest movements in Belgium had a positive effect on political agenda setting (the issues raised by those movements received parliamentary, governmental, and legislative attention), future research should examine how media framing may affect U.S. political outcomes, such as electoral or legislative outcomes, and cultural outcomes such as public opinion. However, this research should also take into consideration the ways in which media coverage and social movement outcomes are influenced by social movements' targets, as well as their orientations toward the status quo. The TPM targeted the state, got mostly neutral coverage, and had some success in terms of electing candidates for public office. OWS targeted the state, but also targeted corporations and capitalism, and also got mostly neutral coverage; few, if any, of its goals were met. OWS employed non-violent tactics and endured state suppression, while TPM used the *threat* of violence (by bringing guns to rallies or holding signs such as "we came unarmed – this time") and enjoyed some success without any state suppression. Future research should also explore the intersecting effects of political ideology, race, and protest tactics as they relate to movement outcomes, including state suppression.

Weaver and Scacco (2013) found that CNN mentioned the issues underlying TPM protests significantly more often than FNC. They explain this by conjecturing: "the lack of issue mentions potentially suggests Fox was less concerned about building the movement's authenticity" (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 76), possibly because FNC's conservative viewers

Worth the Risk." *The Hollywood Reporter*. Available at: <http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/survivor-zeke-smith-journey-being-outed-guest-column-999524>. Accessed September 4, 2017.

might automatically find the TPM to be authentic. However, another explanation could be that FNC was more concerned with building the movement into something FNC and its conservative commentators and owners *wanted* it to be: less about the constitution, less about anti-status quo goals such as abolishing the Federal Reserve, and more about lower taxes and limited government. Future research should look into how media framing processes may have enabled the Republican Party to co-opt the TPM.

In chapter 5, I briefly discussed FNC program hosts' proclivity to discount any news presented on other media outlets as "liberal media" or "mainstream media" and thus not real news. I suggested this might be an attempt to manipulate the FNC audience, turning them against all other networks and making them completely loyal to FNC. This is similar to President Donald Trump's active efforts to delegitimize the mainstream media. Future research should examine the framing processes used by Trump, his supporters, and the journalists covering Trump's and his supporters' statements.

Recently, much has been made of the "Resistance" movement against President Trump. Journalists have been writing about how this resistance movement may be the left's answer to the Tea Party, and they are expecting a 2018 mid-term election similar to that of 2010.³⁹ However, without the strong media presence and mobilization mechanism that the TPM had in FNC, the resistance movement is unlikely to move Congress as far to the left as the Tea Party was able to move Congress to the right. Future research should explore possible parallels between FNC's coverage of the TPM and MSNBC's coverage of the Resistance.

³⁹ Kabaservice, Geoffrey. March 15, 2017. "Are Democrats Becoming Extremists?" *Politico*. Available at: <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/democrats-resistance-extremists-tea-party-democracy-214906>. Accessed September 4, 2017.

Finally, I used television news – in contrast to most studies, which use newspaper data – because it is the primary way the majority of Americans get their news. However, the Internet is the fastest growing source of news for Americans—though it has still not outpaced television news as of this writing.⁴⁰ Future research should focus on the framing processes in digital media, as well as the power online news sources may have in influencing public opinion, electoral, and legislative outcomes.

⁴⁰ See <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/06/younger-adults-more-likely-than-their-elders-to-prefer-reading-news/> and <http://www.people-press.org/2011/01/04/internet-gains-on-television-as-publics-main-news-source/>. Accessed June 24, 2017.

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Appendix A: Differences Between OWS and TPM Supporters

Each movement's unique relationship to mass media is related to the political ideologies of each media outlet's target audience. Scholars of political communication such as Levendusky (2013) claim that consuming partisan media, such as FNC and MSNBC, leads viewers to have more politically polarized views, while others (e.g. Arceneaux and Johnson 2013) argue that partisan media simply reinforce existing ideologies. Are people who view the TPM positively more likely to get their news from FNC than those who view the TPM negatively? Are people who get their news from FNC less likely to support OWS? In this section, I use a public opinion survey that asks questions about TV news consumption and political views to examine the differences between supporters of OWS and the TPM and provide further insight into the relationship between the media and these movements.

Trusted TV News Sources and the Values of OWS and the TPM

Only one publicly available survey, conducted in August 2012 by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), asked respondents about their opinions on both OWS and the TPM *and* asked what their most trusted television news source is. The survey was conducted over both landline and cell phones with a random sample of 2,501 adults living in the U.S.; the margin of error is +/- 2.2% at the 95% confidence level (Jones and Cox 2012). After removing missing cases, I was left with a total of 2,213 respondents. I use this dataset to examine whether there is a relationship between most trusted news source and opinions on each social movement. PRRI includes a weight variable to conform the sample to the population; I use the weight variable in this analysis.

Support for each of the two movements is measured by the following questions: "Would you say the Tea Party movement shares your values, or not?" and "And do you think the Occupy

Wall Street movement shares your values, or not?” These are both dichotomous measures, where 1=“yes, shares my values” and 0=“no, does not share my values.” I removed from the analysis respondents who selected “haven’t heard about” at least one movement.

The PRRI survey asked a range of questions about political issues and media consumption. Most pertinent to my research is the question: “Which of the following television news sources do you trust the MOST to provide accurate information about politics and current events?” Response options include: Broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC, which were already combined in the original response option); CNN; Fox News Channel (FNC); MSNBC; public television; other; and “do not watch television news.” Based on the analysis I present in chapter three, I expect those who share TPM values to trust FNC the most, and those who share OWS values to trust MSNBC the most. I expect CNN and the Broadcast networks to be less popular among both groups.

I also include opinions on issues related to movement concerns. One of OWS activists’ main issues was the widening gap between the rich and the poor, which they often blamed on the current economic system itself. One of the TPM’s main concerns was government spending, and they often expressed strong opposition to funding for social welfare programs. In the PRRI survey, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: “The economic system in this country unfairly favors the wealthy” (which relates to an OWS issue) and “Poor people have become too dependent on government assistance programs” (which relates to a TPM issue). Answer choices for both were completely disagree, mostly disagree (which I combine), mostly agree, and completely agree (also combined). PRRI also asked whether respondents favor or oppose “Increasing the tax rate on Americans earning more than 1 million dollars a year.” This addresses both OWS and TPM concerns, as OWS protesters

frequently expressed that tax rates on the wealthy should be increased, and TPM activists frequently expressed that all tax rates should be lowered. Response options were: strongly oppose, oppose (combined), favor, and strongly favor (combined). Since so many TPM activists were very concerned about the 2nd amendment, I also include *gun ownership*, a dichotomous variable that is measured by the yes or no question “Do you or does anyone in your home own a gun?”

Additionally, I include a range of demographic variables, including race, religion, education, political ideology, and party identification. *White* is coded 1 for white and 0 for all other races. *Christian* is coded 1 for Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, Orthodox, and Other Christian, and 0 for all other religious affiliations. *Education* is measured by the question “What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?” and I use the following categories: high school graduate or less, some college or technical/vocational school, college graduate, and post-graduate work. The *class* identification variable is measured by the question, “If you were asked to use one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong in?” I combine working class and lower class into one category, leave middle class as its own category, and combine upper-middle and upper class into the third category. *Political ideology* is measured by the question “In general, would you describe your political views as...” and offers response options of very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, and very liberal. I compress these into 3 categories by combining liberal and very liberal, and conservative and very conservative. *Party identification* is measured by the question “In politics today, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?”

Table 14 displays percentages for three categories of respondents: the full sample (all respondents), those who responded “yes” to the question “do you think the Occupy Wall Street

movement shares your values, or not?”, and those who responded “yes” to the question “Would you say the Tea Party movement shares your values, or not?” I ran independent samples t-tests to compare each of the two “yes” category respondents with the respondents that answered “no.” Percentages that are displayed in bold are significantly different ($p < 0.01$) from respondents who said that they do not share OWS values, or that they do not share TPM values, respectively.

On the issues, those who say that OWS shares their values are more likely to agree that the American economic system favors the wealthy, more likely to disagree that poor people have been too dependent on government assistance, more likely to favor raising taxes on the wealthy, and less likely to own a gun. They are more likely to identify as politically liberal and to have higher education levels, and less likely to be Christian. Somewhat surprisingly, those who share OWS values do not significantly differ from the general population in terms of self-identified class status.

Those who share TPM values just about opposite those who share OWS values in regard to their opinions on the issues. Those who say the TPM shares their values are more likely to disagree that the American economic system favors the wealthy, more likely to agree that poor people have been too dependent on government assistance, less likely to support raising taxes on the wealthy, and more likely to own a gun. They are more likely to identify as politically conservative and as Republican, and they are more likely to be Christian.

As I expected, those who share TPM values trust FNC over all other news sources; however, while those who share OWS values trust MSNBC and public television significantly more and FNC significantly less than those who do not share OWS values, they trust the moderate broadcast networks and CNN at about the same rate as the general population. These results could mean that FNC’s overwhelmingly positive coverage of the TPM and negative

Table 14. Characteristics of those who share OWS and TPM values (percentages)

	Full Sample	OWS Values	TPM Values
N	2,213	502	721
Most Trusted TV News Source			
Broadcast Network	24.73	21.45	18.37
CNN	19.21	22.62	11.22
FNC	24.7	8.14	50.84
MSNBC	5.45	9.72	2.56
Public television	11.1	19.65	6.6
Other/Don't watch TV news	14.82	18.42	10.4
Issues			
<i>Economy unfairly favors wealthy</i>			
Completely/Mostly agree	67.89	86.42	44.53
Completely/Mostly disagree	32.11	13.58	55.47
<i>Poor too dependent on gov't</i>			
Completely/Mostly agree	71.34	52.95	88.23
Completely/Mostly disagree	28.67	47.05	11.77
<i>Raise taxes on wealthy</i>			
Favor/Strongly favor	63.84	83.01	41.1
Oppose/Strongly oppose	36.16	17.00	58.9
Demographics			
Gun owner	44.58	30.38	62.01
Christian	74.88	58.27	87.33
White	68.08	63.06	76.07
<i>Education</i>			
High School or less	40.74	29.79	39.83
Some College/Tech school	28.93	30.00	34.00
College Graduate	19.1	24.5	17.54
Post-Graduate education	11.23	15.72	8.64
<i>Class</i>			
Lower/Working class	42.16	42.99	41.35
Middle class	44.54	40.02	46.67
Upper-Middle/Upper class	13.3	16.99	11.98
<i>Political Ideology</i>			
Conservative	39.3	19.17	64.14
Moderate	37.19	37.17	28.22
Liberal	23.51	43.76	7.65
<i>Party ID</i>			
Republican	25.49	10.17	47.99
Democrat	33.78	50.51	14.1
Independent	37.89	35.99	35.67

Notes: Bold percentages are significantly different ($p < 0.01$) from those who say they do not share the values for each movement (non-TPM values, $N = 1492$; non-OWS values, $N = 1711$); independent samples t -test, two-tailed. Due to rounding, not all column sections add to 100 percent.

coverage of OWS (see chapter 3) have a measurable effect on viewers, which would support Levendusky's (2013) claim that partisan cable news networks have a polarizing effect on viewers. However, it could also mean that people who support the TPM are ideologically conservative already and they watch FNC because it gives them a take on the news that confirms their existing ideology, and that those who are ideologically liberal would support OWS anyway, and watch MSNBC for the same reason (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013). Either way, there is a clear relationship between the type of TV news one consumes and opinion on these two political social movements. The issue questions were all significantly different for each movement's value-sharers, and align with self-identified political party identification, which lends more credence to the theory that people have those values already and trust those news sources because they align with their worldviews.

Understanding these differences between OWS and TPM supporters gives us insight into the potential effects that the framing processes I describe in this dissertation had on mobilization of each of these movements. While previous research has suggested there was an increase in TPM mobilization due to the *amount* of overall media coverage (Banerjee 2013), I focus on the *types* of coverage, looking at specific negative and positive frames media outlets use to describe social movements. Based on the results presented in table 14, it is unlikely that many people watching CNN or broadcast networks were mobilized to join the TPM, and much more likely that FNC viewers were the ones mobilized by media coverage. In this dissertation, I examine the differences between amounts and types of coverage between media outlets and add to our knowledge of media framing practices in the context of an ideologically segmented media landscape. While I do not directly address social movement outcomes such as mobilization, my results will better inform future research on media effects on such outcomes.

Appendix B

Tables B1 through B3 test model fit for negative and positive frames regressed on each of 3 forms of in-depth coverage of OWS.

Tables B4 through B6 test model fit for negative and positive frames regressed on each of 3 forms of in-depth coverage of the TPM.

Each table is followed by likelihood ratio tests (poisson vs. zero-inflated poisson (ZIP); poisson vs. negative binomial (NB); ZIP vs. zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB); and NB vs. ZINB).

Each set of likelihood ratio tests are followed by HPC tests.

Table B1. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Quoting OWS activists

	(o1) Poisson	(o2) ZIP	(o3) NegBinom	(o4) ZINB
Freak	1.232*** (0.208)	0.645*** (0.153)	0.975+ (0.550)	0.832* (0.414)
Ignorant	0.049 (0.048)	0.088* (0.043)	0.043 (0.120)	-0.010 (0.104)
Insanity	-0.230 (0.283)	-0.520+ (0.269)	-0.111 (0.498)	-0.260 (0.442)
Ridicule	-0.513*** (0.128)	-0.309*** (0.092)	-0.139 (0.213)	-0.188 (0.186)
Amalgam	0.292*** (0.051)	0.123* (0.049)	0.328+ (0.168)	0.250+ (0.142)
Normal	0.176*** (0.028)	0.082** (0.030)	0.275* (0.140)	0.200+ (0.112)
Patriotic	-0.140 (0.242)	-0.141 (0.211)	0.054 (0.693)	0.033 (0.573)
Peaceful	0.202*** (0.036)	0.052 (0.037)	0.214+ (0.115)	0.127 (0.096)
_cons	-0.047 (0.081)	1.126*** (0.091)	-0.181 (0.183)	0.294 (0.197)
inflate				
WordCount		-0.001*** (0.000)		-0.011** (0.004)
_cons		1.277*** (0.276)		4.303** (1.418)
lnalpha			1.142*** (0.182)	0.711*** (0.209)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	875.840	655.835	597.824	573.404

Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Likelihood-ratio tests:

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: o1 nested in o2)

LR chi2(2) = 224.00
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: o1 nested in o3)

LR chi2(1) = 280.02
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: o2 nested in o4)

LR chi2(1) = 84.43
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: o3 nested in o4)

LR chi2(2) = 28.42
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -0.555
Prob > t = 0.710
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 2.277
Prob > t = 0.011
Number of obs = 200

HPC test: ZINB vs. NB

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -2.810
Prob > t = 0.998
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 4.565
Prob > t = 0.000
Number of obs = 200

All tests point to ZINB as the best model.

Table B2. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Paraphrasing OWS activists

	(p1) Poisson	(p2) ZIP	(p3) NegBinom	(p4) ZINB
Paraphrase				
Freak	-0.067 (0.244)	-0.230 (0.256)	0.007 (0.370)	-0.216 (0.285)
Ignorant	0.061 (0.062)	-0.056 (0.067)	0.062 (0.085)	-0.048 (0.072)
Insanity	0.167 (0.253)	-0.117 (0.302)	0.153 (0.379)	-0.140 (0.320)
Ridicule	0.059 (0.113)	0.182 (0.135)	0.047 (0.161)	0.178 (0.150)
Amalgam	0.205** (0.077)	0.147 (0.090)	0.232+ (0.121)	0.160 (0.099)
Normal	0.093+ (0.050)	0.037 (0.056)	0.087 (0.085)	0.042 (0.061)
Patriotic	-0.734 (0.474)	-0.542 (0.471)	-0.497 (0.623)	-0.528 (0.491)
Peaceful	0.172*** (0.052)	0.041 (0.059)	0.216* (0.090)	0.054 (0.067)
_cons	-0.550*** (0.108)	0.157 (0.149)	-0.595*** (0.140)	0.084 (0.176)
inflate				
WordCount		-0.004** (0.001)		-0.004** (0.002)
_cons		2.217*** (0.608)		2.330*** (0.687)
/				
lnalpha			-0.156 (0.330)	-1.987 (1.253)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	510.323	462.458	491.241	463.634

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: p1 nested in p2)

LR chi2(2) = 51.86
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: p1 nested in p3)

LR chi2(1) = 21.08
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: p2 nested in p4)

LR chi2(1) = 0.82
Prob > chi2 = 0.3639

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: p3 nested in p4)

LR chi2(2) = 31.61
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -1.668
Prob > t = 0.952
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 5.524
Prob > t = 0.000
Number of obs = 200

HPC test: ZINB vs. NB

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -1.770
Prob > t = 0.962
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 5.557
Prob > t = 0.000
Number of obs = 200

All tests point to ZIP or ZINB as the best model (no significant difference between the two).

Table B3. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on OWS Message

	(e1) Poisson	(e2) ZIP	(e3) NegBinom	(e4) ZINB
Message				
Freak	0.258+ (0.141)	0.191 (0.128)	0.367 (0.326)	0.313 (0.272)
Ignorant	0.198*** (0.025)	0.134*** (0.025)	0.243*** (0.067)	0.207*** (0.059)
Insanity	0.169 (0.137)	-0.037 (0.131)	0.376 (0.285)	0.265 (0.251)
Ridicule	-0.202** (0.076)	-0.160* (0.068)	-0.185 (0.127)	-0.194+ (0.115)
Amalgam	0.247*** (0.036)	0.144*** (0.035)	0.414*** (0.101)	0.342*** (0.090)
Normal	0.097*** (0.028)	0.045 (0.029)	0.177+ (0.097)	0.141+ (0.082)
Patriotic	-0.160 (0.144)	0.140 (0.130)	0.640+ (0.367)	0.552+ (0.319)
Peaceful	0.155*** (0.029)	0.121*** (0.032)	0.196* (0.080)	0.141* (0.069)
_cons	0.642*** (0.058)	1.157*** (0.062)	0.377** (0.119)	0.639*** (0.128)
inflate				
WordCount		-0.002*** (0.000)		-0.014 (0.010)
_cons		1.012** (0.331)		3.530 (2.162)
/				
lnalpha			0.041 (0.164)	-0.282 (0.188)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	1102.891	939.676	836.112	811.625

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: e1 nested in e2)

LR chi2(2) = 167.21
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: e1 nested in e3)

LR chi2(1) = 268.78
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: e2 nested in e4)

LR chi2(1) = 130.05
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: e3 nested in e4)

LR chi2(2) = 28.49
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -4.329
Prob > t = 1.000
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 5.604
Prob > t = 0.000
Number of obs = 200

HPC test: ZINB vs. NB

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -3.661
Prob > t = 1.000
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 6.836
Prob > t = 0.000
Number of obs = 200

All tests point to ZINB as the best model.

Table B4. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Quoting TPM activists

	(q1) Poisson	(q2) ZIP	(q3) NegBinom	(q4) ZINB
quote				
Freak	2.257*** (0.439)	0.670 (0.478)	2.745 (2.549)	1.155 (1.451)
Ignorant	0.768*** (0.124)	-0.119 (0.684)	1.752 (1.125)	0.439 (0.543)
Insanity	-1.322*** (0.307)	-0.153 (0.445)	0.267 (1.061)	-0.649 (0.692)
Ridicule	0.403** (0.127)	0.616 (0.701)	-0.833 (1.084)	-0.034 (0.446)
Racism	0.300* (0.144)	-0.265 (0.214)	0.512 (0.839)	0.099 (0.574)
Normal	-0.377*** (0.100)	-0.112 (0.143)	0.004 (0.567)	-0.164 (0.299)
Patriotic	1.632*** (0.230)	0.205 (0.347)	2.286+ (1.225)	1.026 (0.638)
_cons	-1.246*** (0.139)	1.233*** (0.220)	-1.633*** (0.334)	0.149 (0.533)
inflate				
WordCount		-0.001 (0.002)		-0.006* (0.002)
_cons		2.806* (1.374)		4.177*** (1.102)
/				
lnalpha			2.475*** (0.300)	1.146* (0.499)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	445.589	263.473	255.962	240.242

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: q1 nested in q2)

LR chi2(2) = 186.12
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: q1 nested in q3)

LR chi2(1) = 191.63
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: q2 nested in q4)

LR chi2(1) = 25.23
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: q3 nested in q4)

LR chi2(2) = 19.72
Prob > chi2 = 0.0001

HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson

Ho: Model A is valid
t = 0.116
Prob > t = 0.454
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 0.424
Prob > t = 0.336
Number of obs = 200

HPC test: ZINB vs. NB

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -0.244
Prob > t = 0.596
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 1.750
Prob > t = 0.040
Number of obs = 200

All tests point to ZINB as the best model.

Table B5. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Paraphrasing TPM activists

	(tp1) Poisson	(tp2) ZIP	(tp3) NegBinom	(tp4) ZINB
Paraphrase				
Freak	-11.304 (868.491)	-12.542 (2027.978)	-15.463 (7640.282)	-12.761 (1561.566)
Ignorant	0.087 (0.410)	0.791 (0.813)	0.401 (0.623)	0.092 (0.591)
Insanity	0.395 (0.596)	-1.344 (1.464)	-0.414 (1.175)	0.041 (1.007)
Ridicule	-0.594 (0.834)	-2.379 (2.235)	-1.225 (1.616)	-0.859 (1.268)
Racism	0.307 (0.277)	0.451 (0.333)	0.310 (0.354)	0.190 (0.342)
Patriotic	0.690** (0.225)	2.501* (1.018)	1.389 (0.862)	0.810 (0.763)
_cons	-2.669*** (0.285)	-2.314* (1.039)	-2.677*** (0.321)	-2.130*** (0.597)
inflate				
WordCount		0.001 (0.002)		-0.005 (0.003)
_cons		-1.022 (3.608)		1.580 (1.810)
/				
lnalpha			1.088 (0.795)	0.398 (1.452)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	127.039	122.018	126.102	129.053

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Likelihood-ratio test (Assumption: tp1 nested in tp2)	LR chi2(2) = 9.02 Prob > chi2 = 0.0110
Likelihood-ratio test (Assumption: tp1 nested in tp3)	LR chi2(1) = 2.94 Prob > chi2 = 0.0866
Likelihood-ratio test (Assumption: tp2 nested in tp4)	LR chi2(1) = -5.04 Prob > chi2 = 1.0000
Likelihood-ratio test (Assumption: tp3 nested in tp4)	LR chi2(2) = 1.05 Prob > chi2 = 0.5920

HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson

Ho: Model A is valid
t = 0.110
Prob > t = 0.456
Number of obs = 199

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 1.391
Prob > t = 0.082
Number of obs = 199

HPC test: ZINB vs. NB

Ho: Model A is valid
t = 0.110
Prob > t = 0.456
Number of obs = 199

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 1.391
Prob > t = 0.082
Number of obs = 199

There is little difference between the four tests, but HPC tests show the zero-inflated models are significantly better than the poisson and negative binomial models. There was very little paraphrasing of TPM activists (it occurred in just 14 out of 200 transcripts).

Table B6. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on TPM Message

	(te1) Poisson	(te2) ZIP	(te3) NegBinom	(te4) ZINB
Message				
Freak	1.334*** (0.310)	0.927** (0.312)	1.436* (0.721)	1.125* (0.562)
Ignorant	0.437*** (0.054)	0.391*** (0.054)	0.638*** (0.163)	0.536*** (0.132)
Insanity	0.166 (0.112)	0.019 (0.117)	0.566* (0.247)	0.404+ (0.211)
Ridicule	0.254*** (0.049)	0.237*** (0.050)	0.068 (0.147)	0.124 (0.123)
Racism	0.004 (0.105)	0.026 (0.139)	-0.087 (0.185)	-0.131 (0.163)
Normal	0.143** (0.052)	0.103* (0.051)	0.319* (0.140)	0.233* (0.105)
Patriotic	0.435*** (0.124)	0.416*** (0.120)	0.284 (0.259)	0.273 (0.207)
_cons	0.171* (0.068)	0.606*** (0.078)	0.089 (0.102)	0.406*** (0.113)
inflate				
WordCount		-0.006*** (0.002)		-0.010** (0.004)
_cons		1.765** (0.546)		2.198* (0.886)
/				
lnalpha			-0.200 (0.216)	-0.881** (0.297)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	754.614	675.723	660.747	639.153

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: te1 nested in te2)

LR chi2(2) = 82.89
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: te1 nested in te3)

LR chi2(1) = 95.87
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: te2 nested in te4)

LR chi2(1) = 38.57
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Likelihood-ratio test
(Assumption: te3 nested in te4)

LR chi2(2) = 25.59
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -4.358
Prob > t = 1.000
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 6.737
Prob > t = 0.000
Number of obs = 200

HPC test: ZINB vs. NB

Ho: Model A is valid
t = -4.154
Prob > t = 1.000
Number of obs = 200

Ho: Model B is valid
t = 6.866
Prob > t = 0.000
Number of obs = 200

All tests point to ZINB as the best model.

Appendix C

Tables C1 through C3 show stepwise models for negative frames in OWS transcripts.

Tables C4 through C6 show stepwise models for negative frames in TPM transcripts.

Table C1. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on quoting OWS activists

	(1) oq1	(2) oq2	(3) oq3	(4) oq4
Freak	0.828*** (0.177)	0.828*** (0.179)	0.466 (0.335)	0.450 (0.330)
Ignorant	-0.024 (0.107)	-0.023 (0.108)	0.034 (0.094)	0.033 (0.092)
Insanity	-0.313 (0.283)	-0.292 (0.304)	0.106 (0.354)	0.092 (0.357)
Ridicule	-0.228* (0.105)	-0.225* (0.105)	0.093 (0.151)	0.091 (0.148)
Amalgam	0.252* (0.099)	0.253* (0.103)	0.166+ (0.095)	0.159+ (0.094)
Event		0.088 (0.547)	0.214 (0.552)	0.207 (0.553)
FNC			-1.704*** (0.440)	-1.710*** (0.467)
MSNBC				-0.206 (0.484)
_cons	0.568** (0.189)	0.471 (0.509)	0.514 (0.503)	0.555 (0.507)
inflate WordCount	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)
Event		-1.314 (1.098)	-0.630 (1.059)	-0.978 (1.998)
FNC			-2.197+ (1.142)	-2.212* (1.030)
MSNBC				-0.752 (3.079)
_cons	4.207** (1.464)	5.374** (2.022)	4.791** (1.836)	5.248+ (2.994)
lnalpha	0.782*** (0.191)	0.810*** (0.209)	0.667** (0.210)	0.669** (0.219)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	574.677	577.328	573.274	577.002

Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C2. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on paraphrasing OWS activists

	(1) op1	(2) op2	(3) op3	(4) op4
Paraphrase				
Freak	-0.235 (0.231)	-0.161 (0.228)	-0.365 (0.289)	-0.371 (0.282)
Ignorant	-0.068 (0.073)	-0.071 (0.077)	-0.007 (0.096)	-0.002 (0.097)
Insanity	-0.261 (0.378)	-0.043 (0.382)	0.117 (0.394)	0.174 (0.376)
Ridicule	0.213 (0.135)	0.184 (0.130)	0.281+ (0.155)	0.270+ (0.152)
Amalgam	0.133 (0.092)	0.097 (0.091)	0.038 (0.098)	0.022 (0.102)
Event		-0.507+ (0.285)	-0.446 (0.293)	-0.474+ (0.285)
FNC			-0.929* (0.369)	-1.015** (0.375)
MSNBC				-0.254 (0.315)
_cons	0.188 (0.157)	0.661* (0.293)	0.672* (0.301)	0.758* (0.297)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.002)
Event		-4.691*** (1.390)	-4.788** (1.758)	-4.967** (1.790)
FNC			-0.431 (1.587)	-0.448 (1.662)
MSNBC				2.384+ (1.370)
_cons	2.341*** (0.630)	7.124*** (1.713)	7.289*** (2.184)	7.636*** (2.267)
/				
lnalpha	-1.989+ (1.121)	-2.252+ (1.332)	-2.531 (1.779)	-3.040 (2.653)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	460.273	445.594	444.615	443.919

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C3. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on covering OWS activists' message

	(1) oe1	(2) oe2	(3) oe3	(4) oe4
Message				
Freak	0.316* (0.159)	0.344* (0.168)	0.314+ (0.190)	0.398+ (0.224)
Ignorant	0.185** (0.063)	0.196** (0.060)	0.210*** (0.060)	0.214** (0.073)
Insanity	0.222 (0.156)	0.187 (0.135)	0.224 (0.143)	0.180 (0.155)
Ridicule	-0.221** (0.072)	-0.225** (0.069)	-0.194** (0.073)	-0.206** (0.077)
Amalgam	0.313** (0.107)	0.319*** (0.091)	0.324*** (0.086)	0.385*** (0.091)
Event		-0.370 (0.325)	-0.420 (0.304)	-0.297 (0.220)
FNC			-0.149 (0.283)	0.124 (0.294)
MSNBC				0.962*** (0.274)
_cons	0.917*** (0.244)	1.208*** (0.285)	1.230*** (0.282)	0.864*** (0.205)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.008 (0.012)	-0.009 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.009)	-0.015+ (0.008)
Event		0.909 (0.762)	1.231 (0.841)	1.839 (1.300)
FNC			1.866 (1.633)	2.691 (1.915)
MSNBC				1.837 (1.532)
_cons	2.163 (2.734)	1.773 (2.024)	2.233 (1.890)	1.979 (1.724)
/				
lnalpha	-0.271 (0.386)	-0.302 (0.270)	-0.252 (0.214)	-0.397* (0.163)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	819.977	819.003	819.794	804.233

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C4. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on quoting TPM activists

	(1) tq1	(2) tq2	(3) tq3	(4) tq4
quote				
Freak	0.721 (0.854)	0.169 (0.744)	-0.005 (0.477)	0.210 (0.428)
Ignorant	0.248 (0.735)	0.460 (1.011)	-0.224 (0.477)	0.215 (0.938)
Insanity	-0.310 (0.552)	-0.032 (0.720)	-0.443 (0.578)	0.041 (0.761)
Ridicule	0.055 (0.645)	0.159 (0.946)	0.733 (0.621)	-0.310 (0.348)
Racism	0.148 (0.576)	0.656 (0.735)	0.295 (0.627)	0.719 (0.760)
Event		1.712+ (0.993)	1.123+ (0.612)	1.771* (0.747)
FNC			-0.946+ (0.557)	-0.841 (0.651)
MSNBC				2.544 (3.619)
_cons	0.434 (0.566)	-0.646 (0.994)	0.564 (0.569)	-0.190 (0.796)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.007+ (0.004)
Event		0.112 (1.834)	-1.038 (0.741)	0.066 (1.361)
FNC			-0.886 (0.919)	-0.798 (1.720)
MSNBC				10.281 (7.030)
_cons	4.173*** (1.171)	4.049** (1.271)	3.744*** (0.812)	4.466** (1.710)
/				
lnalpha	1.223** (0.458)	1.211* (0.546)	0.071 (0.813)	0.621 (0.572)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	240.233	238.408	240.450	229.133

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C5. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on paraphrasing TPM activists

	(1) tr1	(2) tr2	(3) tr3	(4) tr4
Paraphrase				
Freak	-10.685*** (0.935)	-16.829*** (1.254)	-12.142*** (0.997)	-14.913*** (1.021)
Ignorant	0.985 (0.735)	2.191* (1.025)	-0.284 (0.555)	-0.121 (0.284)
Insanity	1.479** (0.543)	1.578+ (0.826)	1.116 (0.744)	0.590 (0.570)
Ridicule	-1.659* (0.772)	-2.209 (1.368)	-0.825 (0.763)	-0.500* (0.230)
Racism	0.271 (0.256)	0.230 (0.178)	0.358 (0.318)	0.105 (0.278)
Event		-1.400 (1.161)	1.406 (1.613)	0.323 (1.115)
FNC			0.590 (1.915)	-2.587+ (1.476)
MSNBC				-1.259 (0.998)
_cons	-1.284 (0.823)	-0.987 (0.654)	-1.697 (1.118)	-1.171 (0.728)
inflate				
WordCount	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.006 (0.005)
Event		-15.687*** (3.986)	0.569 (1.817)	-1.032 (3.757)
FNC			2.204 (1.949)	-3.618+ (2.055)
MSNBC				-18.743*** (2.258)
_cons	1.019 (1.024)	1.427+ (0.808)	0.481 (1.523)	4.158* (1.942)
/				
lnalpha	-16.094*** (0.761)	-15.915** (4.953)	-26.869*** (0.454)	-2.614 (19.770)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	131.274	132.966	135.575	132.607

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table C6. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on covering TPM activists' message

	(1) ts1	(2) ts2	(3) ts3	(4) ts4
Message				
Freak	1.110*** (0.170)	1.006** (0.357)	1.058** (0.334)	1.099** (0.384)
Ignorant	0.506* (0.206)	0.552** (0.208)	0.550** (0.208)	0.557** (0.210)
Insanity	0.449+ (0.267)	0.429 (0.295)	0.450 (0.296)	0.458 (0.292)
Ridicule	0.075 (0.148)	0.112 (0.161)	0.108 (0.165)	0.114 (0.164)
Racism	-0.116 (0.172)	-0.005 (0.177)	-0.023 (0.177)	-0.038 (0.170)
Event		0.826* (0.323)	0.760* (0.317)	0.757* (0.308)
FNC			0.124 (0.356)	0.086 (0.348)
MSNBC				-0.121 (0.239)
_cons	0.555*** (0.144)	0.290* (0.128)	0.266 (0.162)	0.299+ (0.175)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)
Event		-0.669 (1.007)	-1.611 (2.579)	-1.654 (2.079)
FNC			-1.608 (2.807)	-1.953 (2.574)
MSNBC				-1.081 (1.197)
_cons	2.258* (0.886)	2.205* (0.908)	2.624* (1.070)	3.087** (1.197)
/				
lnalpha	-0.299 (0.336)	-0.455 (0.281)	-0.426 (0.268)	-0.420 (0.265)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	671.588	658.166	659.237	661.940

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Appendix D

Tables D1 through D3 show stepwise models for positive frames in OWS transcripts.

Tables D4 through D6 show stepwise models for positive frames in TPM transcripts.

Table D1. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on quoting OWS activists

	(1) oq1	(2) oq2	(3) oq3	(4) oq4
quote				
Normal	0.186* (0.087)	0.183* (0.091)	0.137+ (0.077)	0.150+ (0.082)
Patriotic	0.229 (0.160)	0.223 (0.165)	0.145 (0.176)	0.183 (0.138)
Peaceful	0.164* (0.076)	0.171* (0.081)	0.112 (0.074)	0.106 (0.072)
Event		0.218 (0.552)	0.298 (0.531)	0.279 (0.506)
FNC			-1.358*** (0.381)	-1.410*** (0.376)
MSNBC				-0.482 (0.527)
_cons	0.462* (0.195)	0.247 (0.524)	0.431 (0.505)	0.512 (0.492)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.011** (0.004)	-0.012* (0.006)	-0.010* (0.004)	-0.010* (0.004)
Event		-1.499 (1.281)	-0.722 (1.020)	-1.164 (1.291)
FNC			-1.931+ (1.058)	-2.028* (0.990)
MSNBC				-1.157 (1.828)
_cons	4.305** (1.477)	5.722* (2.235)	4.952** (1.832)	5.504** (2.108)
/				
lnalpha	0.867*** (0.181)	0.893*** (0.196)	0.708*** (0.206)	0.688** (0.212)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	574.544	576.755	571.900	574.502

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D2. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on paraphrasing OWS activists

	(1) op1	(2) op2	(3) op3	(4) op4
Paraphrase				
Normal	0.042 (0.048)	0.040 (0.050)	0.032 (0.052)	0.035 (0.047)
Patriotic	-0.427 (0.298)	-0.402 (0.292)	-0.436 (0.290)	-0.414 (0.330)
Peaceful	0.054 (0.054)	0.038 (0.050)	0.020 (0.051)	0.016 (0.050)
Event		-0.498+ (0.268)	-0.440 (0.275)	-0.461+ (0.267)
FNC			-0.479 (0.476)	-0.537 (0.479)
MSNBC				-0.251 (0.328)
_cons	0.150 (0.182)	0.624* (0.254)	0.650* (0.257)	0.726** (0.250)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005** (0.002)	-0.006** (0.002)
Event		-4.964** (1.602)	-5.050* (2.033)	-5.148** (1.972)
FNC			-0.589 (1.832)	-0.571 (1.866)
MSNBC				2.427+ (1.421)
_cons	2.254** (0.744)	7.366*** (1.954)	7.587** (2.575)	7.838** (2.556)
/				
lnalpha	-1.774 (1.145)	-1.923+ (1.025)	-2.104 (1.280)	-2.487 (1.726)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	457.207	442.393	444.232	443.875

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D3. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on covering OWS activists' message

	(1) om1	(2) om2	(3) om3	(4) om4
Message				
Normal	0.110 (0.083)	0.111 (0.080)	0.120 (0.081)	0.099 (0.076)
Patriotic	0.625*** (0.085)	0.651*** (0.094)	0.694*** (0.101)	0.631*** (0.088)
Peaceful	0.114* (0.054)	0.117* (0.055)	0.137* (0.069)	0.143* (0.060)
Event		-0.218 (0.275)	-0.293 (0.276)	-0.219 (0.237)
FNC			0.176 (0.245)	0.287 (0.242)
MSNBC				0.548* (0.246)
_cons	1.152*** (0.140)	1.321*** (0.238)	1.287*** (0.241)	1.111*** (0.225)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.005+ (0.003)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.010)
Event		0.961 (0.724)	1.306 (0.899)	1.866 (1.296)
FNC			1.788 (2.426)	2.477 (2.457)
MSNBC				1.594 (1.659)
_cons	1.514+ (0.813)	1.027 (1.252)	1.749 (2.397)	1.655 (1.701)
/				
lnalpha	-0.184 (0.251)	-0.180 (0.275)	-0.045 (0.252)	-0.060 (0.183)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	838.359	839.089	840.536	839.220

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D4. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on quoting TPM activists

	(1) tq1	(2) tq2	(3) tq3	(4) tq4
quote				
Normal	-0.069 (0.218)	-0.124 (0.181)	-0.122 (0.198)	-0.125 (0.216)
Patriotic	0.664 (0.511)	0.537 (0.431)	0.752 (0.799)	0.738 (0.566)
Event		0.743 (0.861)	0.849 (0.978)	1.453* (0.665)
FNC			-1.002 (0.624)	-0.738 (0.528)
MSNBC				2.141* (1.049)
_cons	0.375 (0.496)	0.285 (1.087)	0.392 (1.306)	-0.067 (0.901)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.006* (0.002)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.005)
Event		-0.846 (1.565)	-0.931 (1.710)	0.054 (1.622)
FNC			-1.272 (1.652)	-0.684 (1.406)
MSNBC				10.553 (9.037)
_cons	4.177*** (1.139)	3.941*** (1.105)	4.251* (2.101)	4.541** (1.657)
/				
lnalpha	1.258** (0.409)	0.950 (0.808)	0.965 (1.128)	0.559 (0.710)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	234.108	234.789	236.429	222.265

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D5. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on paraphrasing TPM activists

	(1) tp1	(2) tp2	(3) tp3	(4) tp4
Paraphrase				
Patriotic	1.134*** (0.120)	1.181*** (0.147)	1.145*** (0.130)	1.214*** (0.180)
Event		0.695 (0.589)	1.718*** (0.504)	2.170*** (0.535)
FNC			-0.729 (1.081)	-0.487 (1.123)
MSNBC				0.734 (0.711)
_cons	-2.609*** (0.282)	-2.736*** (0.355)	-2.704*** (0.369)	-2.958*** (0.531)
inflate				
WordCount	0.141* (0.062)	0.121*** (0.016)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)
Event		-619.834 (.)	39.302+ (21.409)	39.971* (17.681)
FNC			37.037+ (21.071)	37.791* (17.037)
MSNBC				21.025* (8.532)
_cons	-217.859* (93.700)	-111.257*** (14.363)	-36.838* (18.744)	-37.579* (15.096)
/				
lnalpha	-11.024 (.)	-17.253*** (0.193)	-25.049*** (1.873)	-19.916*** (0.103)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	116.743	117.349	119.902	120.404

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D6. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on covering TPM activists' message

	(1) tm1	(2) tm2	(3) tm3	(4) tm4
Message				
Normal	0.157* (0.075)	0.120+ (0.069)	0.152* (0.069)	0.136+ (0.078)
Patriotic	0.378** (0.136)	0.402** (0.129)	0.385** (0.128)	0.442** (0.135)
Event		0.295 (0.246)	0.214 (0.236)	0.293 (0.237)
FNC			-0.287 (0.338)	-0.118 (0.341)
MSNBC				0.476 (0.323)
_cons	0.670*** (0.127)	0.618*** (0.156)	0.688*** (0.167)	0.498** (0.170)
inflate				
WordCount	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.008** (0.003)
Event		-1.314 (1.143)	-2.902 (2.453)	-2.982 (2.851)
FNC			-2.578 (2.494)	-2.635 (2.548)
MSNBC				-0.310 (1.046)
_cons	2.078** (0.779)	2.007** (0.722)	2.426** (0.835)	2.466* (1.013)
/				
lnalpha	-0.286 (0.267)	-0.345 (0.274)	-0.324 (0.284)	-0.361 (0.289)
N	200	200	200	200
AIC	672.043	671.278	670.107	669.196

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001