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The Diversity of Latino Ideology

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The Diversity of Latino Ideology

Juhem Navarro-Rivera, Ph.D.

University of Connecticut, 2015

ABSTRACT

Ideology in American politics is usually measured along a liberal-conservative continuum depending on a person's position on issues such as the role of government in the economy and the regulation of social behavior. This framework has been a poor fit for understanding Latino political behavior. This dissertation argues that to understand Latino political behavior it is necessary to understand Latinos' ideological thinking. I argue that Latinos' shared cultural traits and their core beliefs (rooted in a common experience) inform three distinct Ethno-Ideologies: pan-ethnic, co-ethnic and ethnic. These Ethno-Ideologies sort Latinos depending on how much in common they think they share with other Latinos. To test the theory, I use data from the 2006 Latino National Survey, the largest nationally-representative survey of Latinos. These data are supplemented with qualitative insights from focus groups conducted with Latinos in Phoenix, Arizona. The findings suggest that ideological thinking among Latinos in the U.S. is more rooted in the experience in which the core beliefs are based than in their shared cultural traits.

The Diversity of Latino Ideology

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Chapter 1: Ideology in American Politics

The Research Problem

In 2012, 71 percent of Latinos voted to re-elect Barack Obama as President of the United States (Lopez and Taylor 2012). Four years earlier, two-thirds (67 percent) of Latino voters supported him in his journey to become the first African American elected to the highest executive office in the nation (Lopez and Taylor 2012). Latino support for Obama in these elections was similar to Latino support for previous Democratic candidates for President, with the exception of the election immediately preceding Obama's election. In 2004, exit polls reported that 4-in-10 (40 percent) Latinos voted to re-elect Republican President George W. Bush (Lopez and Taylor 2012). Though the majority of Latinos still voted for the Democratic candidate, John Kerry, the unusually high proportion of the Latino vote for Bush suggested that Latinos' "natural conservatism," as Ronald Reagan once quipped, was coming to fruition. Yet, Latinos' reversal to supporting Obama by historically-wide margins in 2008 and 2012 suggests that, on the contrary, Latinos are becoming a homogeneous group, a cohesive voting bloc.

These electoral margins beg the question: Is this homogeneity a real phenomenon, or are Latino voting outcomes concealing debates within the Latino community about politics, their place in American society, and their role in the American political system? Do these debates culminate in ideologies based on factors other than partisanship or issue positions informing them about their place in American politics *as Latinos*? How does *latinidad*—their shared cultural traits stemming from a common colonial history and core beliefs rooted in the experience of living in the United States— shape these ideologies?

Latino electoral outcomes do not necessarily mean that Latinos are homogenizing politically, but perhaps they are a reflection of choices that must be made when the system only has two viable political parties. I posit that Latinos and Latino voters have diverse views regarding the role of government and their place (as Latinos) in American society, though these views are converging inside one political party, the Democratic Party.

This project aims to explain Latino political behavior by identifying distinctive ideologies that inform how Latinos relate to the U.S. political system based on their demographic characteristics, cultural traits, and core beliefs. I submit four cultural traits that are shared by many Latinos living in the United States: (1) a Catholic religious identity, (2) transnational family ties, (3) the Spanish language, and (4) consumption of Spanish-language media. Latino ideologies are also influenced by five core beliefs, which are informed by their experiences living in America, about (1) their (cultural) identity, (2) their homelands, (3) other Latinos, (4) other minorities, and (5) core American values. These cultural traits and core beliefs vary depending on individual Latinos' demographic characteristics, national ancestry or origin, time in the United States, and generations removed from immigration. These cultural traits and core beliefs will manifest in three distinct Latino Ethno-Ideologies: *pan-ethnic*, *co-ethnic*, and *ethnic*. These ideologies reflect the diverse views Latinos have regarding their place as Latinos in American society and how they view Latinos as potential political allies.

These ideologies run counter to the position that the cause for increasing political unity among Latinos is the result of a pan-ethnic identity formation, meaning that the homogenization of Latino political behavior is due mostly to Latinos identifying as “Latino” (or “Hispanic”) with a basis on *latinidad* or cultural and social commonalities. I argue that a view that consists solely on

identity betrays the diversity and complexity of Latinos' political views and my proposed Ethno-ideologies offer an alternative view of Latino political behavior.

Latinos with a *pan-ethnic* ideological outlook have a strong sense of social and political commonalities with other Latinos. Their sense of commonality is mostly forged by their core beliefs than by their shared cultural traits. Latinos with *co-ethnic* ideological views have a weaker sense of commonality –their commonality may be *just* political or *just* social– with fellow Latinos than those with a pan-ethnic ideology. However, co-ethnic Latinos' sense of commonality has a stronger cultural component than for pan-ethnic Latinos, while their core beliefs are weaker than among pan-ethnic Latinos. An *ethnic* ideology among Latinos means that, while they identify as a “Latino” or “Hispanic,” they do not have a sense that they share much in common with other Latinos. This ethnic ideology suggests that while they acknowledge their ethnic Latino heritage, it does not instill a feeling of kinship with the larger Latino world.

The growth of the Latino population in the United States raises questions about its potential political power. In order for this diverse group of nationalities and generations to become a politically cohesive bloc requires moving away from the regionally-based politics of distinct identities based on national origin to a politics based on shared ethnicity and a sense of linked fate among Latino-origin groups, but there is no theoretical framework explaining how this transition from politics of distinct national groups to a “Latino” politics based on shared ethnicity may be occurring. I argue that this transition in Latino politics is best explained through the lens of ideology. Latinos today are more diverse, with several Central American and Caribbean groups accounting for a larger share of the population than ever before, while also being less geographically-isolated from each other. In addition to these demographic changes within the Latino population, there are also national advocacy and media institutions that form the basis of a

Latino counterpublic. This counterpublic serves to debate which issues are salient to the community at large and what actions should be taken. I argue that distinct Latino Ethno-Ideologies are surging from these debates as a way of organizing political strategies for representing the common interests of the Latino population

Plan of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study of ideology in contemporary American public opinion and how the dominant framework of understanding ideology, the liberal-conservative continuum, does not fit the way Latinos understand politics. Chapter 2 introduces a new way of understanding Latinos' political views as ideologies, these Latino Ethno-Ideologies are rooted in *latinidad*, a mix of cultural traits and core beliefs. There are three Ethno-Ideologies, *pan-ethnic*, *co-ethnic*, and *ethnic*, that vary according to how much in common individual Latinos feel they have with other Latinos. Chapter 3 describes the data that will be used to test the theory of Latino Ethnic-Ideologies and the methods to conduct these tests. Chapters 4 through 6 empirically test the theory, step-by-step. Chapter 4 tests the influence of cultural traits on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. Chapter 5 focuses on core beliefs, while Chapter 6 includes the full picture: the combined effects of cultural traits and core beliefs on Latino Ethno-Ideologies. Chapter 7 consists of a conclusion summarizing the results and outlining the future research agenda on Latino ideologies.

Ideology in American Public Opinion

Ideology has many definitions in the American public opinion literature, and these definitions are often diverse and at odds with each other. Gerring (1997) notes

To some, ideology is dogmatic, while to others it carries connotations of political sophistication; to some it refers to dominant modes of thought, and to others it refers primarily to those most alienated by the status quo (e.g. revolutionary movements and parties). To some it is based in the

concrete interests of a social class, while to others it is characterized by an absence of economic self-interest (Gerring 1997, 957).

What these definitions share in common is that, they agree that ideologies shape a person's worldview and, more importantly, his or her political outlook. In this project I will specifically deal with two definitions of ideology used in the American politics literature. The first definition concerns ideology, as it is studied in the field of public opinion, and comprises a coherent or consistent set of opinions on salient policy matters, as defined by (party and other political) elites. The second definition is experiential concerning beliefs or values based on everyday experiences that help people make sense of their political surroundings.

In the next section, I discuss the liberal-conservative continuum in American public opinion and how ideology is defined by elites. This section discusses the liberal-conservative continuum in preferences for the role of government. Next, I discuss more recent scholarship that argues that the liberal-conservative continuum consists of two dimensions: one focusing on economic policy and a second focusing on social and moral policy preferences. In the following sections, I discuss the relationship between ideologies and political parties with a particular focus on how the social and economic dimensions emerged, as well as the role of race. Then, later, I discuss the way the field of African American politics has critiqued the study of ideology in American politics, with an emphasis on the *experiential* definition of ideology.

The Liberal-Conservative Continuum

The Role of Government

The first conceptualization of ideology, which is dominant in the study of American public opinion, is dependent on processing a combination of historical and policy-oriented knowledge of government functions and placing them in a liberal-conservative continuum. This liberal-

conservative continuum places policies on a single dimension that ranks them from conservative (less spending, less government functions) to liberal (greater government involvement, more spending), as originally espoused by Downs in his seminal work *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957).

In another seminal work, Converse defined ideology –or belief system– as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (2006, 3). Constraint means that an individual’s attitudes toward issues or policies are predictable based on positions on other issues. For example a person opposing “Obamacare” (the 2010 Affordable Care Act) on the grounds that government should not provide social services should also oppose programs such as Medicare or Social Security. Moreover, according to Converse, attitudes should also be stable, meaning that these positions should be held over time.

Converse classified Americans in 5 categories” (1) ideologues, (2) near-ideologues, (3) group interest, (4) nature of the times, and (5) no issue content. The first two categories comprise those who understand politics in an *ideological* way, this is that they understand politics in the same language that elites do. These people tend to be highly educated and comprise just 11.5 percent of Americans (ideologues only account for 2.5 percent of Americans). The largest group (42 percent) was those who reflected some sort of group interest, mainly favor or opposition to some particular group such as “business” or “labor.” The next-largest category (24 percent) was “nature of the times,” comprised by Americans whose political evaluations consisted on blaming or rewarding the political parties for “their temporal association in the past with broad societal states of war or peace, prosperity or depression” (Converse 2006, 16). Finally, the “no issue

content group” focused on policy but on individual qualities of politicians or candidates and accounted for 22.5 percent of Americans.

Converse’s research led him to conclude that the public showed little constraint *and* stability. He reached this conclusion because people’s issues positions were not consistently liberal or conservative and also shifted over time. Moreover, Converse further concluded that the labels “liberal” and “conservative” had hardly any meaning for most Americans. This, he found problematic because the liberal-conservative continuum is what elites use to communicate their cues to the electorate.

Converse was not the only scholar concluding that the liberal-conservative continuum was poorly understood. Lane (1962), a contemporary of Converse, also reached a similar conclusion, with some caveats. Lane’s definition of ideology was broader and included questions dealing with (1) who are the rulers and (2) how do they rule? (Lane 1962, 14). Rather than relying on survey data like Converse, Lane conducted in-depth interviews with 15 men in a middle-class Northeastern city. It was through his conversations with these men that he concluded that people are not ideological in the sense of being guided by grand overarching ideologies which are commonly agreed upon (Lane 1962, 351). Instead, people are guided by individual ideologies which affect their views of politics (Clawson and Oxley 2012, 149). These conclusions, that ideology matters individually and that people understand politics individually is something that surprised Lane, who expected ideologies to derive from group attachments.

Although Lane and Converse had different definitions for ideology, their conclusions share some common ground, particularly that both conclude that most Americans have difficulty identifying along a liberal-conservative continuum and that the nature of ideology is individualistic. In the

case of Converse, the individual nature of ideology is central to its understanding because it is at an individual level that people should experience the political system, as individual preferences. By contrast, Lane expected ideologies to be rooted in some group identity, but he did not find this to be the case.

It is in this regard that the mass public is treated as being non-ideological. Since most people hold views which are not consistent, only elites who define which issues are salient and who control agenda-setting are deemed capable of ideological thinking. Converse noted that:

[T]he individual lacks the contextual grasp to understand that the specific case and the general principle belong in the same belief system: In the absence of such understanding, he maintains psychologically independent beliefs about both. This is another important instance of the decline in constraint among beliefs with declining information (Converse 2006, 33).

Although Converse writes in the 1960s, the public's lack of constraint is still evident today, even in this era of polarized politics. Some authors argue that the public is truly ambivalent about many issues and do not hold strong positions on many of them, leading to a lack of constraint between their issue positions and their ideological identification (Fiorina 2005). Others consider that the public's lack of ideological constraint is the result of social preferences over the definition of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" that lead people to pick one over the other for reasons that are independent of political preferences (Ellis and Stimson 2012; Page and Shapiro 1992).

Under the issues-based definition of ideology, elites are the important conveyors of cues and define which issues are salient and whether these issues fit in a liberal or a conservative ideology. In the case of Zaller (1992), in his R(eceive), A(ccept), S(ample) model, (liberal or conservative), elites convey information that the mass public receive and form their opinions, which is later used to respond to public opinion surveys (Zaller 1992, 190–191). In this case,

opinion elites (often partisan) set the ideological agenda, and people need to follow elite's cues in order to stay current regarding which issues are salient. Thus the RAS model consists of the process of receiving the information –dependent on the flow of information,– accept it and incorporating the information to their knowledge base, and finally sampling this information Against any competing information in order to make a decision (Zaller 1992, 58; 190-191) Moreover, as Carmines and Stimson (1989) claim, issues evolve both in the sense that they can become more or less salient over time and in the sense of how they fit into the dominant liberal-conservative ideological paradigm.

Issue salience matters, because elites may be out of step with the preferences or concerns of swaths of the public. Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that this is the case for racial and ethnic minorities whose leaders are not, by and large, part of the issue-framing elites. Thus, many of their concerns go unattended by party elites at the national level. In the case of Latinos, this means that issues such as immigration or bilingual education, which tend to be discussed by Latino elites, are oftentimes not part of a larger national discussion, and even when the issues are discussed the community's voices are not an important part of such discussion. As ideological cueing misses large segments of the electorate -segments that are expected to increase as a share of the population- its utility as a heuristic, a shortcut, helping people sort political information is diminished.

The Two-Dimensional (Economic/Social) Liberal-Conservative Continuum

Ellis and Stimson (2012) echo Hunter (1991) and Frank (2004), when they argue that today's debates in American politics are not only about matters of spending and resources, as suggested by the traditional liberal-conservative continuum. Instead, there is a social and moral dimension of ideology, regarding policies that deal with the family, sexual behavior and other aspects that

are related to religious belief. Indeed, Ellis and Stimson (2012) argue that much of what they call ideological “mismatching” is the result of people who hold liberal policy positions but call themselves conservatives for religious reasons.

Recent scholarship by Noel (2014) pinpoints the origins of the current American ideological spectrum to the early-to the mid-twentieth century. This process was slow, but it consisted of the convergence of different streams of American political thought. As a reaction to growing corporate power, the Progressive Movement proposed some ideas regarding using the power of government to help people (Noel 2014). While the idea was not necessarily novel, this idea blossomed during the beginning of the twentieth century and eventually led to the New Deal, which used the power, and the resources, of the government to mitigate the effects of the Great Depression and establish a permanent safety net for people in need. Noel's narrative also fits Ellis and Stimson's (2012) theory that to understand contemporary ideology in American politics, it is necessary to explore it in two dimensions — economic and social.

Noel (2014) argues that there are different kinds of conservatism and liberalism. The usual debates about the role and size of government, as well as its involvement in the economy now have a second dimension regarding moral and social politics. Being a “liberal” in contemporary American politics not only means being in favor of using the power of government to improve the *material* lives of people. It also means supporting an array of social policies under the flag of *civil rights* that include equal rights for racial and ethnic minorities, gays and lesbians, and reproductive rights for women. As Carmines and Stimson (1989) demonstrate, issues of civil rights, as they relate to race started to become a “wedge” issue in the 1960s as partisan elites debated these issues in the national spotlight and racial issues became salient for masses to take into account in their political preferences.

Being a “conservative” in America today not only means favoring a smaller government with lower taxes and little spending on services (as well as a strong military) but also means opposing the application of equal rights to some or all the aforementioned groups on the grounds of tradition, often religious tradition, which views the behaviors of some groups like gays and lesbians as anathema to religious moral tradition. This conflation of issues in different dimensions has consequences for the ideological views of the mass public, who may not have constrained ideologies because they may be liberal on one issue domain and conservative on another. In the case of Latinos, they are assumed to have issues conflated in different dimensions, as their religiosity pulls them in a conservative direction on social and moral issues, but their socioeconomic conditions push them in a liberal direction on economic matters (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler 2008). Latinos’ ideological mismatching in turn will affect how their partisan preferences are interpreted as partisan elites become more ideologically homogenous.

Ideology and Political Parties

The contemporary definition of ideology brings together different kinds of liberalism and conservatism under the flag of the two major political parties, which serve as intermediary groups that link citizens to government by providing policy options linked to ideological goals (Aldrich 1995). It was possible in the not so far past to hold conservative views on social or moral issues and want a greater role of government in the economy, or vice versa. Thus, Richard Nixon could be simultaneously in favor of conservative “law and order” measures to deal with issues of civil rights, while also supporting the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency, a favorite target of contemporary conservatives as a business-crushing regulator. The ideological ambiguity of parties was, according to Downs (1957), the result of party competition, in which

the preferences of the median voter were crucial as a way of winning elections, which is the *raison d'être* of political parties.

For example, to the New Deal coalition established during the 1930s, issues of civil rights were of secondary importance, since their discussion could break up the Democrats' hold in the South because white southerners overwhelmingly supported segregation (Lowndes 2008). When the Democratic Party lost its Southern stronghold in 1964 due to its embrace of civil rights, eventually the Republican Party garnered its current hold on the region by way of elite and mass opinion change, what Carmines and Stimson (1989) attributed to a partisan realignment.

The transition from the Democratic “Solid South” to Republican stronghold was due, in part, to the role of Republican elites in exploiting the rising racial tension in the South over segregation and civil rights. The first salvo was the defection of South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond –a former governor and then-US Senator– from the Democratic Party to the Republican Party following the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The bill was also opposed by the eventual Republican Presidential nominee that year, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater (Black and Black 2009, 33). The partisan realignment in the South was further cemented by Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign based on the “Southern Strategy” of courting disaffected Southern voters over the issues of Civil Rights and “law and order” (Black and Black 2009; Lowndes 2008; Perlstein 2010).

The rupture of the Solid South away from the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party was instrumental in consolidating the liberalism and conservatism into each party, respectively, as it is currently comprised. In other words, this consolidation was possible due to an “issue evolution” (Carmines and Stimson 1989). When civil rights, initially for African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities, became a point of contention and debate in the American

political discourse, these issues added a layer of complexity to the already complex ideology debate. Liberalism and conservatism, hence, also entailed whether one was liberal (accepting) or conservative (oppositional) about civil rights policies.

This ideology-party merge was possible thanks to elites driving the change and taking positions that brought different kinds of liberalism and conservatism together (Noel 2014; Zaller 1992).

Race was not the only issue realigning the parties. The moral/social dimension also surged thanks to the emergence of a Christian fundamentalist constituency within the conservative coalition (Hunter 1991; Wilcox 1996). Led by figures such as Virginian pastors Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, who founded the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition, respectively, Christians concerned about the legalization of abortion, the advancement of women's rights, and in more recent times, gay and lesbian rights, flocked to a Republican Party that catered to these concerns. Particularly, white evangelical Protestants concentrated in the South became newer members of the Republican party's coalition (Green 2007; Martin 2005).

At the mass level, these elites communicated their position changes to their voters (Hetherington 2001). This means that elites have constrained ideologies because they define the issues that are salient, and the masses do not process information in the same way; rather, the masses follow cues from elites, as opposed to initiating them, because their ideological thinking functions differently (Campbell *et al.* 1980; Zaller 1992).

Elites may be constrained in their ideology because they are the ones defining which issues are salient, but this clarity is not present among the general public. Ellis and Stimson make the case that, while elites have more consistent ideological views, the "nature of ideology is more complicated" at the individual level (2012, 10). They argue that the complication occurs because


many Americans “cling to conservative symbols while advocating liberal policies” (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 11–12). For example, one of Ellis and Stimson’s explanations is that there is a bias in favor of conservative identification, particularly among religious Americans, who see in a conservative label a way of attaching themselves to the stability and timeliness of religion, but whose political policy preferences do not necessarily align with those of conservative elites (see Ellis and Stimson 2012 chapter 6; Feldman and Johnston 2013). This means that the one-dimensional assessment of ideology along a liberal-conservative continuum is incomplete and that, to account accurately for ideology, it is necessary to look at two dimensions—social and economic domestic policy preferences. Many people are not consistent in their preferences along a conservative and liberal continuum, and instead, have preferences that are liberal on one issue and conservative on another issue.

To test their hypotheses Ellis and Stimson use trends from the General Social Survey, comparing Americans’ responses on symbolic (or self-described) ideology and operational (or issues-based) ideology. They find that only 15 percent of the public are consistent conservatives, meaning that their symbolic ideology matches their operational ideology; interestingly, twice as many are consistent liberals (30 percent) and a similar percentage, roughly 30 percent of Americans, are ideological “mismatchers”: symbolically conservative but operationally liberal (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 95–96). This is important, because, as shown in Figure 1.1 based on a 20-year trend of ideological self-identification by Gallup, 38 percent of Americans identify as conservative, but only 23 percent consider themselves to be liberal (J. M. Jones 2014)¹. This

¹ Although Gallup does not use the term symbolic, these figures are akin to a symbolic ideological identification in Ellis and Stimson’s definitions (2012).

means that more people express their ideologies via liberal issue preferences than express their identification as "liberal."

Figure1.1. Ideological Self-Identification among Americans 1993-2013



Source: Author's analysis of aggregate Gallup polls, 1993-2013

Taking into account this context in which conservative identification is more popular than having conservative positions on policy issues, Ellis and Stimson argue that “[a] conservative identification thus indicates a belief in conservative religious traditions and a conservative lifestyle, not necessarily a “conservative” political worldview” (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 133). This bias toward conservative identification is combined with a bias *against* liberal identification.

As their analysis shows, people are less willing to call themselves liberal even when holding "liberal" positions on issues (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 96). As I discuss later with respect to Latinos, the high levels of religious identification may influence how Latinos understand what it

means to be a “conservative.” However, Ellis and Stimson’s conceptualization does not account for how race affects racial and ethnic minorities’ worldviews.

Race and Ideology Conceptualization: A Critique

The second definition of ideology is *experiential*. This definition focuses on how people interpret their social and political surroundings and determine, to paraphrase Dawson (2001), who are their allies and opponents and who should be assigned blame or credit, as far as addressing racial disparities. Examples of this literature include Dawson (1994, 2001), Hajnal and Lee (2011), and Harris-Lacewell (2004). This literature addresses ideology, as it is experienced by racial and ethnic minorities in the United States, for whom the liberal-conservative continuum may be irrelevant, as their main issues of concern are not often discussed by mainstream political elites, especially from their frames of reference (Hajnal and Lee 2011).

One of the major limitations in the deconstruction of ideology undertaken by Ellis and Stimson (2012) and Noel (2014) is that they do not address how race influences ideology. Noel acknowledges the importance of race in the development of the contemporary ideological cleavages in American politics and the different positions taken by conservatives and liberals in the area of civil rights (Noel 2014, 45) but ignores the role that racial minorities played in those debates and why specific issues regarding race made it into a mainstream ideological agenda. Noel (2014) pinpoints the emergence of race as a major cleavage in American politics, particularly the Democratic Party coalition after World War II, as previous analyses of the historical development of ideology have pointed out (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Lowndes 2008; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), but falls short of explaining how racial issues become part of these cleavages, especially from the perspective of racial and ethnic minorities.

Neither Ellis and Stimson (2012) nor Noel (2014) explore how this ideological disconnect affects minorities, though they hint that minorities may be especially prone to have mismatched ideological identities. As Carmines and Stimson (1989) explain, “[Senator Barry] Goldwater combined opposition to federal activity in civil rights with the self-description “conservative.” Gov. George Wallace clearly linked racial advocacy with “liberalism” in both elections” (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 137). They find that ideological “[m]ismatchers are also substantially younger, more likely to be in blue-collar professions, and *more likely to be foreign-born*” (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 106, emphasis added). Not surprisingly, these are characteristics that identify many Latinos, who tend to be younger than the general population and who comprise the bulk of the foreign-born population in the United States.²

Latinos and Ideological Self-Identification


Latinos also possess other characteristics that make them more likely to be ideological mismatchers. For one, they have higher levels of religious identification than Americans, overall (Kosmin and Keysar 1995; Navarro-Rivera, Kosmin, and Keysar 2010). The religious bias toward conservative identification may explain why Latinos, who by and large prefer Democratic Party candidates, tend also to prefer a conservative or moderate label to a liberal one.

Figure 1.2 shows that Latinos are similarly likely to prefer a conservative identification to a liberal one (27 percent vs. 23 percent). However, while half (50 percent) of Latinos identify as Democrats, only 15 percent prefer the Republican Party (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera

² According to an analysis by the Pew Research Center (Motel and Patten 2013), as of 2011, 36 percent of Latinos are foreign-born, while 47 percent of all foreign-born residents of the United States are of Hispanic origin. Another study by the Center (Motel and Patten 2012b) finds that Latinos (median age: 27 years) are significantly younger than the general U.S. population (median age: 37 years).

2013).³ These numbers suggest that many Latinos may have mismatched symbolic ideological identification and issue preferences, given that their ideological identification does not neatly overlay with the expected outcomes for their partisanship.

Figure 1.2. Ideological Self-Identification of Latinos, 2013



Source: Public Religion Research Institute, Hispanic Values Survey, August 2013
Note: Numbers represent percentages (N = 1,583)

Figure 1.2 also shows that nearly half (45 percent) of Latinos prefer the “moderate” label. This preference for a “moderate” label may be because most Latinos identify religiously as Catholics (Navarro-Rivera, Kosmin, and Keysar 2010; Pew Research Center Religion & Public Life Project 2014), a group likely to feel cross-pressures between their views on social issues such as same-sex marriage or abortion and their views on economic issues such as government aiding the poor. These are issues in which the Catholic Church takes positions that cut across the conventional liberal-conservative continuum (Matovina 2012) and suggests that ideology among

³ Although most Latinos vote Democratic, there is variation between groups. For example, according to Latino Decisions in the 2012 Election 95 percent of Dominicans voted for Barack Obama, highest among all Latinos. Majorities of Latinos of all nationalities voted for Obama with the exception of Cubans, 55 percent of whom voted for Mitt Romney <http://www.latinodecisions.com/2012-election-eve-polls/>.

Latinos could be better understood if measured in two distinct dimensions, as Ellis and Stimson (2012) and Feldman and Johnston (2013) exhort.⁴

This may be due to Latinos having cross-pressures. On the one hand, Latinos have economic interests that make them prefer a larger role of government in the economy, especially a strong social safety net. On the other hand, Latinos' religious beliefs tend to be conservative on moral/social issues. Although recent evidence points out that while Latinos, especially religious Latinos, are morally opposed to issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion, this moral opposition does not mean they are opposed to others having those rights, since a majority of Latinos favor allowing gays and lesbians to marry, and a plurality favors legal abortion (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013).

The electoral context is also important for understanding Latino political behavior. Latinos participate in an American political system that oftentimes does not cater to their needs (Hajnal and Lee 2011). This means that issues of importance to Latinos are not necessarily being discussed by the two major political parties, and party elites or solutions to their unique problems are not addressed in "mainstream" discourses.

Considering the importance of elites in shaping ideology (Noel 2014), this lack of representation should affect what issues are relevant to Latinos and which ones make it onto the political agenda. It also means that when Latinos overwhelmingly choose candidates of one party (Democratic) over the other (Republican), it does not necessarily mean homogeneity of opinion. Instead, it means that they have to choose from the limited options of a two-party system.

⁴ D'Antonio, Dillon, and Gauthier (2012) analyze the Catholic vote and partisanship and find that, as a group, Catholics, while once a solid Democratic constituency, are now a "swing group." However, there are major differences between White and Latino Catholics, the latter slightly leaning toward Republicans and the latter solidly Democratic.

Moreover, understanding why Latinos behave like a voting bloc with a homogeneous opinion requires moving away from a growing paradigm in Latino politics: the assumption of pan-ethnicity—*latinidad*—because this view largely ignores internal debates in the community and, possibly, dissenting views (Beltran 2010).

It is important to note that even taking a two-dimensional ideology model into account, there may be issues relevant to Latinos (other than same-sex marriage, abortion, and religion) that may be overlooked in the literature or in the extant public opinion research. This dearth of research also may miss important information for assessing the relationship between Latinos and partisanship. Most importantly, to date, there are no known studies on the substance of Latinos' ideological thinking. Therefore, there is a dearth of information about what such thinking comprises and its broader implications for Latino political behavior and politics.

Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that the lower levels of partisan affiliation and the ideological inconsistencies among Latinos may be due to a lack of familiarity with the political debates, particularly among recent immigrants. These lower rates of party affiliation may be also due to the two major political parties not addressing issues that Latinos care for, such as immigration, or particular issues important to specific Latino groups, which may make it difficult for Latinos to place themselves ideologically in the American political system (Hajnal and Lee 2011, 23–24). In other words, because minority groups do not define the agenda-setting of parties or have a strong influence on party elites, many feel left out and possibly detached from the two-party system. Without elites ideologically framing issues that appeal to Latinos' political and policy preferences, Latinos also become further alienated from the political process in ways that can affect how they process political information pertinent for ideological sophistication. This view,

however, also proves problematic because it assumes that Latinos require ideological cueing from mainstream elites to form their political opinions.

Hajnal and Lee's arguments (2011) echo Dawson's (2001). According to Dawson, an elite view of ideology, thereby, considers that "the *only* groups *capable* of ideological thinking are the educated and dominant elites" (Dawson 2001, 63–64, emphasis in original). The elite conception of ideology is problematic for Dawson, since the abstract way in which ideology works in his criticism of public opinion research renders the masses incapable of ideological thinking.

Dawson (2001) argues that the elite view of ideology renders most Americans, particularly minorities, incapable of thinking ideologically.

In the case of Latinos, the elite view of ideology discounts the role of their life experiences with the political system in shaping their political views. Otherwise, from the perspective of Latinos, they may be thinking and organizing political information in experientially relevant ideological frames, however, the elites have not yet responded to their ideological framing. In other words, political elites may not be current enough on their constituents' political demands to be politically relevant and complex enough to capture Latinos' worldviews.

Another problem with the traditional (liberal-conservative) view of ideology is that group identification is not relevant to it. People are supposed to be liberal or conservative based on the salient issues of the day. It seems as if policy preferences are taken only on their merits as far as how they benefit people at an individual level without regard to who proposes them and how they affect others. This is important because elites and the mass public have not only formed different intellectual cues and abilities but also have acquired different resources that inform their preferences.

When race is added as a layer to these differences, it becomes clear that, as Ellis and Stimson (2012) note, people and elites think about different things in regards to ideological labels. People think about group identification: religion, society, traditions. As Pamela Conover notes “[p]eople react to explicit and implicit group cues, group identification and consciousness influence on how an individual structure its political thinking sympathy” (Conover 1988, 75). Conover and Feldman (1984) also suggest that certain groups become readily identifiable with the politics of specific policies and vice versa. This includes the nexus between social groups—especially racial groups—and the political parties. Elites, however, think solely about policy.

And, there is evidence that ideological thinking among minorities does not fit the liberal-conservative paradigm. Dawson (1994, 6–7), focusing on African Americans, argues that there are ideological divisions within the African American community, which occur within the context of African American history and politics. These debates include discussions about integration toward the larger American society and how to pursue those goals politically and economically. Moreover, these ideologies are not static, as they shift with and evolve according to the times. In subsequent work Dawson (2001) explained black political behavior as stemming from ideologies that, then, form political identity, next opinions, and subsequently, political action. Furthermore, in a polis where race and racial conflict is an everyday reality, leaving race outside the realm of ideological thinking leaves blacks, and in the case of Hajnal and Lee's research (2011), Latinos and Asian Americans, incapable of ideological thought, at least in the conventional sense of the concept.

Discerning how underrepresented groups in the United States understand American politics requires researching how different groups think about American politics. Harris-Lacewell (2004) follows up Dawson's (2001) work by identifying four ideologies indigenous to contemporary

black political thought (see Harris-Lacewell 2004, Chapter 3). These four ideologies (black nationalism, liberal integrationist, black conservatism, and black feminism), while not exhaustive (Harris-Lacewell 2004, 19) account for most of the different currents of debate within the African American community, as far as solving socioeconomic disparities, that some may argue, are oriented in American race and politics.

The study of distinctive black ideologies becomes particularly relevant in the context of the American two-party system and its binary outcomes. As Harris-Lacewell (2004, 79) notes:

Overwhelming Democratic partisanship masks the internal contestation within black political thought that is not discernable [*sic*] through the binary choices available in American elections, making the heterogeneity within black opinion rarely visible. Black political diversity is unlikely to emerge in electoral contexts; it is embedded instead in the politics of the black counterpublic.

This context is also relevant to Latinos, who increasingly show affinity for the Democratic Party. However, in some ways, the political history of Latinos is different from the history of African Americans in the United States. Latinos, for the most part, do not share a common history of arrival to the U.S. (Gonzalez 2001). Moreover, their means of arrival or incorporation of the populations into U.S. territory also vary as different immigration policies regulate how different national groups are welcomed or rejected into the U.S. (Bedolla 2009). Nevertheless, African American political ideologies become illustrative for studying ideologies because even with these different origins, Latinos in every region of the country have experienced a history of exclusion and discrimination and similar struggles to have their political and civil rights recognized by the state.

With this reasoning, we should be guided by several inquiries: Is the predominate affinity towards the Democratic Party evidence of Latino political homogeneity, or similar to African Americans, do Latino voting patterns mask complex debates within the Latino community over

politics, their place in American society, and their role in the American political system? These inquiries are ones that guide my thoughts about explaining ideology among Latinos.

The Latino Counterpublic and the Contexts for Latino Political Ideology

I submit that these complex debates occur within the boundaries of what may be considered a *Latino* counterpublic. This counterpublic is a “parallel discourse arena” (Fraser 1989, 123), where Latinos espouse their views and alternative explanations regarding the society they live based on their own experiences. This Latino counterpublic conveys messages about who is a Latino, what issues are important to Latinos, and what it means to be a Latino. The messages of the Latino counterpublic are transmitted through a Latino public sphere that include the Latino media—legacy print newspapers and radio and television broadcasters and newer online platforms in Spanish and English— and the everyday interactions of Latinos.

An interesting aspect of the Latino counterpublic, particularly of its media institutions, is their role in reinforcing the multiple identities that Latinos have (Mora 2014). For example, listening to a news broadcast in a Spanish-language radio or television station a Latino may be subjected to three identity-related messages almost simultaneously. First, Latinos hear/watch news about immigration or bilingual education, which sets the tone for a larger Latino political agenda and stresses the salience of these issues to Latinos. Second, there is a roundup of news from Latin American countries, meant to keep Latinos informed about the whereabouts in their home countries. Finally, there may be a human-interest story about Latino homeowners, business owners, or veterans, which transmits a message that Latinos *belong* in America and that Latinos *are also* American with similar dreams, work ethic, and patriotism expected of all Americans.

These three aspects show that Latinos simultaneously receive messages that tell them that they have (1) common interests, (2) that they have different origins, and (3) that they are a collectivity as “Americans.” Depending on how Latinos assimilate these concurrent messages will emerge in three Latino Ethno-Ideologies—*pan-ethnic*, *co-ethnic*, and *ethnic*—which relate to the extent of attachment that Latinos have to one another and the American political system. In the next chapter I provide a discussion of the theory that supports my study of Latino Ethno-Ideologies, which I assert, are based on Latinos' shared culture and experiences in the complex world of the Latino counterpublic and the navigation of *latinidad*.

Chapter 2: The Diversity of Latino Ideology: Culture, Beliefs, and Ideology

The previous chapter briefly reviewed the study of ideology in the contemporary American political behavior. The focus of the chapter was introducing the reader to the problem of measuring mass ideologies in American politics, especially when to many groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities, these ideologies have little meaning in translating issues of major importance to them in a political focal platform . In this chapter I continue that discussion by focusing on how scholars of Latino politics have explained the increasing homogeneity of Latino electoral politics through the lens of identity politics. Specifically, I criticize the view that the cause for increasing political unity among Latinos is the result of a pan-ethnic identity formation, in other words, that the homogenization of Latino political behavior is the result solely of most Latinos identifying as “Latino” (or “Hispanic”) with a basis on *latinidad* or cultural and social commonalities. In addition, I propose that Latino’s political behavior is informed both by identity ideology (or ideologies) rooted in *latinidad*. I elaborate on my theory about this in this chapter.

This chapter is divided into five main sections. The first section discusses the ideology-partisanship disconnect among African Americans and Latinos and the necessity of understanding Latino politics through ideological lenses that are more sensitive to their sociopolitical experiences. The second section introduces the concepts of *latinidad*, pan-ethnicity, and Latino cultural homogeneity. The third section explains the importance of studying ideology among Latinos. The fourth section consists of a critique of using identity as a harbinger of a “unified” Latino politics. Finally, the fifth section introduces Latino Ethno-Ideologies and its component parts: cultural traits, core beliefs, as well as demographic variation.

Ideology, Partisanship, and Race in America

One of the examples of the disconnection between partisanship and ideology is the African American vote. Black Americans have the highest levels of support for the Democratic Party of any racial or ethnic group in the United States. According to a 2013 Gallup report, about two-thirds of African Americans (64 percent) identify as Democrats (Newport 2013). According to the 2012 Presidential Elections exit polls, 93 percent of African Americans voted to re-elect Barack Obama (Ramirez 2012). Yet, a 2010 Gallup poll found that a significant share of African Americans (29 percent) identify ideologically as conservative (J. M. Jones 2010). Such ideological identification, ordinarily, would lead us to predict that approximately the same percentage of African Americans would identify as “Republican” But in reality, just 2 percent do (Newport 2013).

Scholars of African American politics have long been aware of this contradiction. It is clear that when African Americans call themselves “conservatives,” they are not thinking of “small government” conservatism. Although conservatism refers to an ideology of black politics with a very specific meaning rooted in long-standing debates about political action and the social and political uplifting of African Americans (Harris-Lacewell 2004), conservatism may also mean *religious conservatism*. The Black Church has a central place in African American social life, and it is one of the spaces of the black counterpublic, where black people also have contested exclusion and discrimination in broader society (Dawson 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004). On many issues related to human behavior, the church’s leaders have taken traditionalist positions that in contemporary terms may be translated into conservative positions on social/moral matters, particularly regarding sexuality (Berger 2006; Cohen 1999; Harris-Lacewell 2004). Thus, when many African Americans say that they are conservative they may mean that they are religious

traditionalists. This conflation of religious traditionalism is consistent with the findings by Ellis and Stimson (2012) regarding “conservative identification” for Americans in general, who tend to conflate religious traditionalism with ideological conservatism. This religious traditionalism, however, has had little effect on their electoral preferences for the Democratic Party. This contrasts with white evangelical Protestants, whose religious conservatism makes them the largest cohort in the Republican coalition (Green 2007)

The Latino vote, however, is not as skewed toward the Democratic Party as the African American vote. Still, 71 percent of Latinos voted for Barack Obama in 2012 (Ramirez 2012), making it clear that Latinos are a heavily Democratic-leaning group. One important difference between Latinos and African Americans is that Latinos have lower levels of Democratic Party identification. Gallup also finds that Latinos are half as likely as African Americans (32 percent vs. 64 percent) to identify as Democrats (Newport 2013). Latinos have slightly higher levels of conservative self-identification (34 percent) than African Americans (29 percent) (J. M. Jones 2010). Yet, these higher levels of “conservatism” have not translated into stronger support for Republican candidates or into a significant increase in Republican identification among Latinos. This leaves an interesting puzzle to determine: How, if any, role does ideology play in contemporary Latino political behavior?

Latinidad, Pan-ethnicity and Latino Cultural Homogeneity

As a result of these partisan voting trends and the rise in the numbers of Latinos running for and being elected to political office, the scholarship on Latino political behavior has moved away from the traditional understanding of Latino politics and moved toward an understanding of Latinos’ terms of identity politics: as a distinct group with a collective pan-ethnic consciousness rooted in *latinidad*.

Pan-Ethnicity, the traditional study of Latino politics focused on the differences between the various major Latino ethnic groups in the United States (L. R. Fraga et al. 2006; García Bedolla 2009) and an approach in which Latino-origin groups were treated as separate political constituencies. Because of each group's unique history and their geographical concentration in particular parts of the country, it made sense to approach Latino politics as regionally-based struggles (Marquez and Jennings 2000; Uhlaner and Garcia 1998). This means that the study of Puerto Ricans was mostly about those in the Northeast, especially, the New York City metro area; the study of Cubans concentrated in South Florida; and research about Mexican-Americans confined to the Southwestern states.

In addition to the differences based in country of origin and ancestry, there are also differences in the immigration status, socioeconomic characteristics such as class and voting patterns of these different groups (García Bedolla 2009). For example, Puerto Ricans are US citizens by birth, not subject to the travel restrictions required of travelers from other Latin American nations, with the exception of Cubans who have benefitted from various preferential immigration policies as refugees from Castro Communist-regime (García Bedolla 2009; Jennings 1988; Torres 1988). In addition, Latinos vary considerably in their educational attainment, income, and other socio-demographic indicators. For example, while less than 1-in-10 (7 percent) Salvadorans living in the U.S. have a college degree, nearly one-third (32 percent) of Colombians are college graduates (Motel and Patten 2012a). Given this diversity, it made sense understanding Latino politics as the study of different groups under an umbrella term, "Latino."

The umbrella term, "Latino," has become a more unifying way of understanding the interactions among these groups, many from different nations of origin. As the Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban populations have spread to other geographical areas, contact among different groups has

increased, leading to potential political coalitions between members of the different nationalities (Gutiérrez 2013; Manzano and Ura 2013; Mora 2014). The increase in the numbers of national origin groups such as Salvadorans, Guatemalans and Dominicans (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013; Motel and Patten 2012b), who have established themselves in areas where previous Latino groups had previously settled, has also increased the need for understanding how Latinos interact with each other, especially in the building of coalitions.

The rising numbers of Latino voters are also contributing to the increasing number of Latinos elected to political office (M. Barreto 2010; Casellas 2010). The creation of national organizations such as the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO) and the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) fostered an environment in which a national Latino agenda could be debated (Mora 2014). Combining the numbers of all Latino groups seemed like a great idea strategically speaking, since community and group leaders can use this larger constituency to demand government action, particularly, at the national level.

The latest wave of scholarship on Latino politics now focuses on the emergence of a pan-ethnic identity –the formation of a Latino identity that transcends national and ethnic origin and suggests a sense of kinship and unity among Latinos. Scholars like Abrajano (2010), Barreto (2010), and Sanchez (Manzano and Sanchez 2010; Sanchez 2006a, 2006b, 2008) have pioneered the study of Latino political behavior from a pan-ethnic perspective. Borrowing from the African American politics literature, particularly Michael Dawson’s work on black linked fate (Dawson 1994, 2001), research on pan-ethnicity focuses on the role of Latino identity in their political behavior, especially in the areas of vote choice and electoral mobilization.

The body of research focusing on pan-ethnic identity is useful to understand the increasing visibility of Latino voters in national elections, particularly, given the purported importance of the Latino vote in presidential and congressional elections (Leal *et al.* 2005). It also reflects the apparent creation of a common Latino identity as an outgrowth of different national-origin groups comprising this diverse ethnic label based on increased contact among different types of Latinos (Gutiérrez 2013).

One limitation of this literature is its focus on political participation such as turnout in national elections and voting. For example, Barreto's *Ethnic Cues* (2010) explores the role of shared ethnicity in Latino participation and how Latinos use information of candidates' ethnic background as a shortcut for political interests. However, there is little focus on behavior such as attitudes or positions on issues which would be more meaningful for the examination of ideological subscription among Latinos. This focus on understanding voter turnout and participation accentuates a stereotype of Latinos as a commonly-grouped "swing vote."

Public opinion data among Latinos show that, on some issues, there is wide agreement. Recently, the main issue uniting Latinos has been their support for a comprehensive immigration reform bill. Pollsters, asking questions with varied wording have found that Latinos tend to support a path to citizenship for immigrants who entered the country as undocumented persons (Latino Decisions 2014; Public Religion Research Institute 2013). Other issues in which these polls also find high levels of agreement among Latinos include their support for an increase in the minimum wage and their worry about the educational system. These are issues that affect Latinos due to their social class status, their being more likely to have school-age children, and their being more likely to earn lower wages than most Americans (Fry and Lopez 2012; Kochhar 2014).

Latinos may show high levels of agreement on many issues and in their voting patterns in Presidential Elections, but it does not mean there is no thought diversity among them. For example, Cuban Americans are more likely to support Republican candidates than Latinos overall, a link that dates back to the strong anti-communist stances of the GOP regarding the Castro regime (Geron and Michelson 2008; Torres 1988; Uhlaner and Garcia 1998). In contrast Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans are more likely to support the Democratic Party, partially due to their historically stronger support for civil rights and economic rights (Marquez and Jennings 2000; Meléndez 2003; Uhlaner and Garcia 1998). These differences in socioeconomic status suggest that Latinos have diverse economic interests. With this diversity of interest, it is very difficult to fathom why Latinos have such increasingly homogeneous voting behavior, when an understanding of ideology in the traditional liberal-conservative sense should suggest that their voting patterns should be more “bipartisan,” and hence, less lopsided toward one party. These important differences make it hard to reconcile the appearance of a unified Latino identity with political consequences.

While the literature on Latino political behavior borrowed the concept of linked fate from the African American politics literature, the focus of the literature has been primarily on Latino identity –whether Latinos *identify* themselves as “Latinos” or “Hispanics.” It is worth noting, that Latinos still prefer to identify with the nomenclature premised upon their countries of origin or ancestry, and the way Latinos identify themselves should provide clues as to the possibility of political cohesion (Garcia and Sanchez 2008, 12).

The literature on Latino pan-ethnicity, however, has largely overlooked the example of Dawson (2001) and Harris-Lacewell (2004), who explore various ideological currents that exist in black political thought. In other words, although African-American voters form a nearly homogeneous

voting bloc because of their overwhelming support for Democratic Party candidates, this electoral homogeneity should not be confused with homogeneity of interests, ideas, or hence, ideological perspectives. Thus, we should not assume a similar homogeneity of interests or ideas for Latino voters, either. Instead, I propose that *latinidad* informs distinct Latino ideologies, and it is this ideological diversity that helps Latinos navigate the political system.

Why Study Ideology among Latinos?

The nature of a two-party political system blurs the nuances of Latinos' political decisions as far as voting behavior and issue preference and salience. In the study of African American ideology, the importance of allies and enemies is rooted in a common history, first slavery, followed by segregation and other forms of systemic discrimination (Dawson 2001; Harris-Lacewell 2004). Thus, these ideologies act as a way of discerning how and with whom to create alliances, depending on the respective ideologies' views of cooperation with whites and other groups. For Latinos, these ideologies comprise common cultural traits shared by many Latinos and core beliefs based on their experience of life in America, which are the basis of *latinidad*.

Moreover, given the fact that Latinos' ideological outlooks are not constrained along the traditional liberal-conservative continuum, it begs the question of how Latinos make their political decisions. Considering the increasingly skewed voting margins in favor of Democratic candidates (Lopez and Taylor 2012), combined with low levels of trust toward both parties – especially low toward the Republican Party– (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013), and that many issues important to Latinos are not addressed by opinion elites (Hajnal and Lee 2011), there is a case to be made that Latinos have ideological inclinations based on their common culture and social experiences.

Forming a Pan-ethnic Identity

Previous quests for understanding pan-ethnicity tend to focus on identity. Louis DeSipio (1996) submitted a theory of pan-ethnic identity consisting of several building blocks divided in two major themes: (1) cultural and economic linkages and (2) mandated common ethnicity and statutory roles for ethnicity. The cultural and economic linkages affect Latinos in a personal way. Latinos have a sense of kinship because they share cultural linkages like the Spanish language, food or religion, and the shared experience of immigration.

Language and Immigration

The principle of the cultural and economic linkages among Latinos is *language*, in this case Spanish, which DeSipio thinks brings Latinos together because, even if there are Latinos who do not speak the language, they still have the experience of dealing with the language and witness the discrimination that their elders have suffered for its use (DeSipio 1996, 179). In other words, language serves as a bridge that unites generations.

This is a role that immigration also plays. He argues that most Latinos share the experience of immigrating to the United States in some way or another. This experience provides a link between different nationalities within the Latino community, who despite their differences, share this experience. In addition, Latinos have economic linkages due to the fact that most Latinos have a similar lower- or working- class background.

Mandated Common Ethnicity

These characteristics are complemented by a mandated common ethnicity and a statutory role for ethnicity and language. These come from protections for Latinos in the Voting Rights Act of 1975 (which provided voting protections for language minorities), the U.S. Census

categorization of Hispanics, elite efforts to build a Latino identity, common public policy needs and concerns, and geographic overlap. The state-mandated common identity has encouraged Latinos to form a pan-ethnic identity. An official characterization in the Census provided elites with a larger national constituency on behalf which to advocate and be accountable.

History of Discrimination

DeSipio (1996) argues that experiences of discrimination also lead to a potential political unity. However, his analysis of the 1990 Latino National Survey does not find evidence that Latinos feel individually discriminated against. Thus, DeSipio argues that it is the *perception* of discrimination, rather than the experience of it that matters (1996, 181–182).

The Limitations of Pan-ethnicity as an Identity

One of the limitations in DeSipio's (1996) theory is that all of its elements lead to unity. DeSipio is not alone in this regard. Overall, the quest for pan-ethnicity, as a driver of Latino political behavior, tends to minimize the well-known nuances as far as national origin, language, and generations removed from immigration—to mention some—and to maximize the effect of perceived common characteristics among Latinos. Yet, aside from this common identity based on shared culture and history of discrimination, the literature has not examined nor determined what drives Latinos' collective identity.

A recent study by Lavariega Monforti (2014) tests the assumptions put forth by DeSipio (1996). Her analysis consists of understanding the label preferences for Latino identification. These respondents, from the 2006 Latino National Survey, primarily identify as "Latinos" rather than as members of a national group or just being "American." Respondents who identified as "Latinos," tend to be persons who speak Spanish, have a mixed racial background, and have a more recent


immigration experience. Thus, Lavariega Monforti argues that DeSipio was mostly right in his prediction and concludes that pan-ethnicity—the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic”—are socially and politically important concepts because the perception of group identity, she argues, impacts the building of coalitions among Latinos.

While this is an important step in understanding pan-ethnicity beyond an assumption of its existence, the existence of this cohort that identifies with a pan-ethnic identity does not inadvertently explain why the political behavior of Latinos should show signs of pan-ethnic unity. Moreover, measuring those who mention they identify as Latino or Hispanic can be a little problematic because many Latinos prefer both the pan-ethnic label and their own national label. Thus, while admitting that it may be important to have a pan-ethnic identity, this is not a sufficient condition for having or opposing a pan-ethnic ideology.

The Multiplicity of Latino Identities

The main limitation of this line of research and the theory of pan-ethnicity in general, is that it places most of its emphasis on the usage of a pan-ethnic identity. Not only is identity the cornerstone of pan-ethnicity, but an identity that should supersede all other identities. This is problematic because measuring pan-ethnicity using a pan-ethnic identifier assumes that *only* by clinging to the labels “Hispanic” or “Latino” is the way to forge or embrace a pan-ethnic political agenda.

Figure 2.1. The Overlapping Latino Identities: Preferred Primary Identity among Latinos and Percentage of Latinos who Consider each Identity to be “Important” or “Very Important”



Source: Analysis of the Latino National Survey 2006

Note: “Pan-ethnic” means identification as “Hispanic” or “Latino,” “National Origin” means identification as “Mexican,” “Puerto Rican,” “Salvadoran,” etc.

As Figure 2.1 shows, using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey, roughly similar percentages of Latinos prefer the pan-ethnic labels “Hispanic” or “Latino” as their primary Latino identity (38 percent) as they prefer a label based on national origin, such as “Mexican” or “Puerto Rican” (40 percent). To further show how these identities coexist, among the 40 percent of Latinos who prefer a national origin identifier, 90 percent also consider themselves “Latino” or “Hispanic.” By the same token, 84 percent of those who primarily identify with the pan-ethnic labels “Hispanic” or “Latino” also identify with their own national origin labels. This is also true for Latinos who prefer to call themselves “American.” Eighty-two percent of Latinos who prefer to call themselves “American” also identify as a “Latino” or “Hispanic.” This means that pan-ethnic labels are not necessarily *superseded* by national origin labels but that these can *coexist* with each other.

An emphasis on identity considers that a primary identification as a Latino or Hispanic is the precursor for an identity politics which could be the basis for political action. I argue that using a pan-ethnic label is not a sufficient condition to have a sense that Latinos share characteristics and political realities that make them their closest allies in the American political system.

Another example of the variation of ethnic labels and self-identification among Latinos comes from the Hispanic Trends Project of the Pew Research Center, which has conducted an annual National Survey of Latinos since 2002. Their most recent survey, conducted in 2013, finds that only one-in-five Latinos prefer to primarily identify as “Hispanic” or “Latino.” Most Latinos do not prefer a pan-ethnic label, preferring instead their country of origin label as their preferred form of ethnic identification. This finding has led to alarmist headlines from Pew itself, replicated in Latino-oriented media, that Latinos “do not consider themselves to be Latino” considering that, as mentioned above, the prerequisite of being part of a *survey of Latinos* is self-identification as Hispanic or Latino.

The misconception that pan-ethnic identification is a necessary harbinger of pan-ethnic politics extends to the pundit class. A recent example comes from a 2013 report by Third Way which argues that “the “Hispanic” and “Asian” labels are not applicable to these communities. Less than one-quarter of Hispanics primarily use the label “Hispanic” or “Latino.” [...] Rather, they are likely to identify based on their ancestral country of origin or simply call themselves Americans” (Diggles 2013, 24).

One takeaway from the manner or the preferred term that Latinos have to identify themselves is that much of the difference is a matter of emphasis. We do not know the reasons for why people prefer to use a particular identity. Are they living in mainly homogeneous communities where

the label you use matters little? Do they live in diverse communities with Latinos from different origins where a national label provides a marker of pride and difference but not necessarily to denote disdain for other Latinos? These questions are outside of the scope of this project, but it should be worth exploring in the future if context, place, or time are related to Latinos' self-identification.⁵

Identity and Culture

While labels and self-identification are ways for measuring Latino pan-ethnic attachments, cultural attachments are also important. DeSipio's theory of pan-ethnicity (DeSipio 1996) includes several aspects he considers to be cultural, primarily language and a collective immigration experience. Yet, the nature of this culture remains fuzzy. Rather than culture, the literature introduces selected cultural *attributes* such as a deep religiosity rooted in Catholicism (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011; Lee and Pachon 2007; Matovina 2012), traditional family values that stem from those religious values (Abrajano, Michael Alvarez, and Nagler 2008; Garza and Cortina 2007), and the aforementioned usage of Spanish (DeSipio 1996; Robinson 2002), which become linking commonalities among Latinos. Or, other times, pan-ethnicity is brought upon by a network of media sources that cater to them (Abrajano 2010; Mora 2014). What all these characteristics have in common is that these traits only lead to unity and commonality, without addressing the pitfalls of defining a common identity based on cultural traits that can vary from person to person, not to mention from Latino-origin group to group.

⁵ See Wong, Janelle *et al.* 2011. Asian American Political Participation: Emerging Constituents and Their Political Identities. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, where they entertain similar inquiries about ethnicity, race, immigration and political participation

Contesting this search for unity is one of the arguments behind Cristina Beltran's (2010) path-breaking book *The Trouble with Unity*. While scholars of Latino politics are quick to point out that there are differences within the Latino community, the importance of unity still overshadows any claim of diversity. Beltran argues "the impulse toward civic *Latinidad* is based on the belief that racism, racial identity, and class create ties and obligations that exceed and challenge the language of self-interest" (Beltran 2010, 127). Politically, Latino identity should supersede any other identity: national, religious, linguistic, gender, racial. In other words, there is little space for intersectionality of ethnicity with other identities. Yet, as previously seen in Figure 2.1 (page 36), primary identification with a pan-ethnic label or with a national label does not eschew other identities. But how does a Latino identity become politicized? It does so by becoming ideologies based on Latinos' commonalities and shared experiences.

Identity vs. Ideology

Beyond Beltran's critiques of unity as a genesis of political incorporation of Latinos, there is another critique that I put forth as far as "Latino identity" and ideology. While culture is supposed to unite Latinos, this culture works like an invisible force that binds the community. We *know* it is there, we *sense* it is there. Yet, we do not know *how* to explain this culture, especially when culture is only a uniting force that does not take into account the differences in culture among Latinos. For, example, what happens with Latinos who do not speak Spanish or those who are not Catholic? Do they somehow fall out of the "Latino" fold?

With regards to language, DeSipio (1996) washes away the concerns about non-Spanish speaking Latinos not being able to relate to the culture by saying that these Latinos (non-Spanish speakers) understand the discrimination their ancestors have faced. This line of reasoning suggests that DeSipio considers discrimination based on language (or perceived discrimination)

as the binding agent, not the language itself. DeSipio makes a similar argument about immigration. Despite the diversity of immigration or migration experience, different levels of reception or legality of travel, this experience should create a bond. However, we know that language and immigration experiences vary. That there are debates over the importance of language as a way to keep an identity or to blend into the larger American society (De Genova and Ramos-Zayas 2004) and that the immigration experience is not the same for all Latinos who face different government policies and, hence, different political experiences, given their arrival to the United States from different nations (Gonzalez 2001).

The “common culture” referred to in the Latino politics literature has its roots in *latinidad*, or the cultural commonality that encompasses Latino/Hispanic identity attempting to create a coherent Latino constituency out of a historically, racially, and nationally diverse group of people (Beltran 2010; Connaughton 2004; Dávila 2001, 2008; Subervi-Velez 2008).

One of the problems of using culture as a way of explaining increasing pan-ethnic behavior in Latino politics is that, through the lenses of *latinidad*, Latino voters can be both a homogeneous bloc and a swing vote. For example, Dávila (2008) argues that in the aftermath of the 2004 Presidential elections, when a record share (44%) of Latinos reportedly voted for Republican George W. Bush, and in the 2008 Elections when a percentage closer to the historical norm (31%) voted for Republican John McCain, Latino “values” were invoked as the common cause for this ebb and flow of Republican support. In 2004 the conservative religiosity of Bush resonated with the also religiously-conservative Latino voters, while McCain’s, then, anti-immigration stance was perceived as a threat to the community. In other words, *latinidad* suggested that Latino voters can be influenced depending on how the political parties *push particular cultural buttons*, even though those buttons may be ill-defined (Dávila 2008, 61).

Those cultural values that bind Latinos together are just platitudes, a narrative that gives an amorphous group of Americans their own origin story: the Latinos' Mayflower. Like any origin story, there is some kernel of truth, but it is subject to exaggeration.

Dávila's (2008) criticism of the construction of *latinidad* as an ambiguous concept and Beltran's (2010) criticism of *latinidad* as a political strategy with serious limitations resonate with my criticism of pan-ethnicity as a tool for understanding Latino political behavior because it papers over important differences among Latinos. Not only differences are papered over, but also in some cases, traits such as language and religion can be as divisive as they can unite. In other words, we have to account for the fact that even with more unified politics, there is still diversity among Latinos, even in the way that their political choices are made.

For these reasons, following Harris-Lacewell's (2004) work on African American ideologies, I posit that Latino electoral outcomes are a reflection of choices made in the context of a binary party system and not the reflection of an increasing homogenization of Latino interests or points of view. In other words, I posit that there are distinct Latino ideologies. Latinos and Latino voters have diverse views on the role of government and their place (as Latinos) in American society, even if these views increasingly converge within one political party, which in recent elections has been the Democratic Party. I argue that Latinos' views on the role of government and their place (as Latinos) in American society comprise the bulk of Latino ideologies.

The problem lies in disentangling the complexity of a collective identity when there are swaths of Latinos for which collective identity may not resonate. How can Latinos show a sense of collective identity and fate based on a culture so abstract that it defies definition and yet, when it is clearly defined, leaves out swaths of Latinos? I argue that to solve this dilemma we need to

understand Latino ideology, but untangling this ideology requires moving away from the traditional conservative/liberal continuum in American Politics. These ideological differences are rooted in their cultural traits, some of which are shared by many Latinos, but many others of which are not shared. Some Latinos may possess all of these traits, while some may exhibit none of them and still call themselves “Latinos.” This diversity of cultural traits will be reflected in beliefs regarding the importance of their identity, how to relate to other Latinos and other groups, how they relate to their homelands, and their attitudes toward core American values. The ideological framing of these beliefs also reflects the extent to which Latinos are more willing to identify with a larger, Latino group (pan-ethnic), with Latinos but in a selective way, either politically or socially (co-ethnic—arguably feel closer to their own co-nationals), or just acknowledge their heritage without feeling close to the larger group (ethnic). Thus, Latino identity(ies), themselves, comprise ideological perspectives about Latinos' sociopolitical presence in the United States.

A Theory of Latino Ethno-Ideologies

Borrowing from Harris-Lacewell's (2004) model of “everyday black talk,” I argue that Latino ideologies are rooted in Latino culture and beliefs. Unlike the assumptions from the pan-ethnic model of understanding Latino behavior, I argue that Latino culture is not homogeneous and, instead, consists of different traits, each of which affect how Latinos think about their place in American society.

While Latinos may have different opinions about policy preferences and the role of government, they also understand how their lives in America are intertwined. It is this aspect that allies are needed, and those with similar struggles make the best allies. Latinos see other Latinos as allies because they share some cultural affinities that facilitate their communication. But, they also

share a place in American society, they not only have similar cultural backgrounds, but also similar socioeconomic backgrounds, and they share beliefs about their place in America.

I argue that there are four main Latino cultural traits: (1) Catholicism (2) language usage (3) Latino-centered media consumption and (4) the role of family. Alongside these cultural traits there are five core beliefs: (1) tradition (2) link to ancestry (3) linked fate to other Latinos (4) attitudes toward other groups in American society, and (5) attitudes toward the United States. These five core beliefs affect the three distinct Latino Ethno-Ideologies: co-ethnic, pan-ethnic, and ethnic. I explain this process in more detail below (see Table 2.1).

Table 2.1. Latino Ethno-Ideologies

Inputs		
Demographic Controls	Cultural Traits	Core Beliefs
1. Sex	1. Catholicism	1. Importance of identity
2. Age	2. Everyday language use	2. Desire to return
3. Education	3. Spanish news media consumption	3. Linked fate
4. Ancestry	4. Transnational family connections	4. Attitudes toward other racial minorities
5. Immigrant generation		Attitudes toward core American values
6. Citizenship status		
Ideologies (Outputs)		
Ethnic	Pan-ethnic	Co-ethnic

Demographic characteristics

Characteristics such as country of ancestry, immigrant generation, social class, age, and education may affect the political views of Latinos, even among those from the same national background. Some differences should be expected from these demographic characteristics. For example, it is known that Latinos who live in suburbs and tend to be of higher economic status tend to support Republicans at higher levels (Leal *et al.* 2005).

Cultural Traits

Although there are many traits that can be considered part of Latino culture, there are four that appear often in the politics literature. These are religion, language usage, media consumption, and the role of the family. Below, I explain the importance of these four traits to this study.

Catholicism

Catholicism is a trait historically shared by most Latinos, as a result of being colonized by the Spanish Empire from the 16th to the 19th centuries. For this reason, identification with the Roman Catholic Church is considered a common trait among Latinos (F. C. Garcia and Sanchez 2008), and it is one of the traits that is most emphasized by Latino marketers and political consultants as a way to reach Latinos and conjure an image of unified latinidad (Dávila 2001, 2008). Recently, scholarship and public opinion surveys have noted a decline in Catholicism among Latinos, and this has been attributed to two competing forces: Protestant religions, especially evangelical Protestantism and a rise in the number and proportion of Latinos who do not identify with any religious tradition (DeSipio 2007; Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013; Kosmin and Keysar 1995; Navarro-Rivera, Kosmin, and Keysar 2010). Thus, Latinos are less alike in terms of religions than often assumed.

The assumption is that Catholicism is a quintessential Latino trait and that non-Catholic Latinos are influenced by an “Americanization” impulse. In other words, leaving Catholicism is a move toward “acculturation” and assimilation into American society. This view ignores the fact that, for generations, many Latinos have practiced other forms of Christianity that are not linked to Catholicism, and there are others that have never practiced Catholicism yet still consider themselves to be Latinos (Sánchez-Walsh 2003).

The religious differences among Latinos are not only limited to identity: they are also political. While most Latinos identify as Democrats, Latino Protestants, especially those who identify as born-again or evangelical Christians, are more likely to identify as Republican than other Latinos and to vote for Republican Presidential candidates than Latinos, overall (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013; Lee and Pachon 2007; Martinez, Hernandez, and Peña 2012).

In a survey of religion among Latinos of the same ethnic identification, the Pew Research Center (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life and Pew Hispanic Center 2007) asked whether Latinos prefer to identify themselves based on their country of origin, Americanness, or a pan-ethnic identifier but also included an option to say whether Latinos preferred their religion as a primary identifier. Only 16 percent of Latinos mentioned their religion as their main identifier, compared to other national or ethnic ones.

The distribution of that 16 percent who preferred the religion identifier is telling. More than one-quarter (27 percent) of Latino *evangélicos* preferred their religion as their primary identification - nearly twice as likely as Latino Catholics (14 percent) and nonreligious Latinos (nine percent). Overall, 25 percent of those who preferred the religious label were *evangélicos*, although only 15 percent of Latinos were *evangélico* at the time of the survey. This further shows the complicated nature of Latino identity. For many, a religious label may take precedence sometimes over a national one and still feel part of a larger Latino community.

Differences in religious identification and practice should not be considered signs of acculturation among Latinos, but rather another layer of cultural diversity. It should not be assumed that religion is only a unifying aspect of Latino culture, but we must acknowledge that there are important and significant differences between Latinos in this area. These differences

should affect how Latinos view other Latinos and affect Latino linked fate, particularly, if they worship in churches where most congregants are from the same nationality, or mostly Latinos, or a diversity of races.

Religious differences can also cause disunion and resentment. This was a common theme among Protestant and Nonreligious Latino participants in the focus groups that were part of the 2013 Hispanic Values Survey.⁶ One of the topics of discussion in the focus groups was which characteristics they considered important to their identity as Latinos. Religion was among these characteristics, and Catholics gave religion a higher ranking as part of their Latino identity than both Protestants and the Nonreligious. Protestant and Nonreligious Latinos resented the fact that many people expected them to be Catholic. Some Protestants belonging to Pentecostal churches and who believe that Catholicism is a “false religion” were adamant in their rejection of religion as part of their Latino identity. Thus, it is necessary to consider that religion *can* also create tensions that affect visions of *latinidad*, especially when one of those religions (Catholicism) is considered the authentic view of Latino identity. This means that religion—Catholicism—may not be a major cultural force fostering Latino unity, especially feelings of commonality.

Everyday Language Use

The Spanish language is considered a thread that keeps families together across generations (F. C. Garcia and Sanchez 2008). According to DeSipio (1996), it is the cornerstone of pan-ethnicity. Yet, many Latinos do not speak the language, a fact that is more pronounced among younger Latinos (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013b), and this suggests that the language may not be a completely unifying force.

⁶ Public Religion Research Institute, Hispanic Values Survey, September 2013.

In this regard bilingual Latinos become an important bridge in fostering *latinidad* between those who are Spanish monolinguals and those who are English monolinguals. Negrón (2014) shows how *latinidad* is forged in conversations among Latinos of different national backgrounds.

Latinos who are uncertain of the background of other Latinos invoke *latinidad* as a way to signal a “non-specific Latino identity” (Negrón 2014, 4). This means that Latinos use *latinidad* as a way of letting other Latinos know that they have similarities, whether it is for participating in organizations, or for business purposes. Negrón argues that, while the focus of the *latinidad* literature is on its potential political repercussions, little is known about how it is forged. Her research shows that unity and familiarity must be built and negotiated before it can presume any alliance with political overtones, and while that language can serve as a force for unity, it is a complex process. In other words, language unites not just because people speak or understand it but also because people can use it for a common purpose.

Yet, language can also prove to be divisive. Younger Latinos are less likely to use the language. This suggests that Latinos could have differences in their beliefs about their place in American society and to whom they should relate to, according to their use of the language, which should also affect how important they consider this trait as part of their Latino identity. Research by DeGenova and Ramos-Zayas (2004) shows that not only knowing the language is important, but also knowing it well. Their research identifies conflict between Latinos (Puerto Rican and Chicano) in Chicago between those who are fluent in Spanish and those who are not. The nature of the conflict is partially the definition of who is a “legitimate Latino.” Hence, Spanish language use sometimes can be recognized as a form of “Latino authenticity.”

Thus, in the same way that religion can be divisive so can be language. If language is considered part of a tradition worth keeping among those who are fluent in Spanish and make those who do

not speak Spanish feel less Latino, it will not work only as a force fostering *latinidad*, but one that can bring disunion, as well. This disunion could affect the core beliefs, particularly, of keeping traditions such as speaking Spanish and the potential translation of those beliefs into political action. This means that it should be expected to find ideological differences between Latinos who communicate in Spanish and those who primarily use English: the former will be more likely to have a pan-ethnic ideology, while the latter will subscribe more co-ethnic and ethnic ideologies because those who communicate in Spanish should value more the role of Spanish unifying the community, particularly as they receive messages from the Spanish-language media.

Spanish Media Consumption

Spoken language is not the only way that Latinos use language to communicate. The language in which Latinos consume their media, (particularly, radio and television, but also increasingly the Internet) affects what Latinos think of each other. This media also affects which values Latinos stress when making political decisions (Abrajo 2010). Latino-centered media has been essential in the construction of *latinidad* (Dávila 2000, 2001; Mora 2014). It has been in television and radio stations and in ethnic print media where many of the internal debates of the Latino community take place, but one debate is essential to the Latino media: defining *latinidad*.

Mora (2014) narrates how in the late 1970s, Latino/Hispanic media such as the television giant, Univision, were crucial in creating awareness among U.S. residents of Latin American-descent that a new census category existed and why they should choose it. The same impulse for creating a Hispanic/Latino market for statistical and marketing purposes led to targeted political marketing to Hispanics/Latinos (Dávila 2008; Connaughton 2013; Abrajo 2010; Subervi-Velez 2008).

Spanish-language media is politically relevant for Latinos, since most of the political campaigns aimed at attracting Latino voters are conducted in Spanish (Abrajano 2010; Dávila 2008).

Moreover, oftentimes these campaigns instead of addressing issues of importance to the country are rife with platitudes and cultural cues (e.g. values such as faith, religiosity, and patriotism; See Dávila 2008)). These culturally-laden political messages suggest that Latinos are a perennial swing vote, always up for grabs, if the right cultural buttons are pushed (see Dávila 2008). This means that political parties and candidates focus on appealing to values rather than politics: policy does not attract Latino votes, but vague statements about values and family do.

Furthermore, the usage of Latino media affects how Latinos view other Latinos, a way of fostering unity among those who consume these types of media.

Latino-oriented media has been instrumental in fostering *latinidad*, such as publicizing the Hispanic/Latino option in the U.S. Census forms (Mora 2014) and providing political information to Latinos who do not speak English (Abrajano 2010; Eshbaugh-Soha 2014). But, its function in the fostering of *latinidad* is limited to the fact that many Latinos do not tune in to their messages, in part, because of their being mostly English speakers who do not primarily consume Spanish-language media (Pew Research Center 2012). It is in this context that language usage and the language in which Latinos use media become important to Latino politics.

However, only a fraction of Latinos (18 percent) regularly consume Spanish-language media to keep in touch with public affairs and news (Lopez and Gonzalez-Barrera 2013a). This means that we should find variation among Latinos and major differences in ideology between those who get their news from sources in Spanish and those who only get their news in English.

Family Values

A cultural trait that is often mentioned as particularly "Latino" is the role of the family in peoples' lives (Dávila 2001). Latinos are supposed to feel closer to their extended family and to support relatives outside the country (Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation 2002). The importance of family for Latinos has also been linked to their support for traditional family values such as opposition to same-sex marriage (Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada 2011), which have been cited as reasons that Latinos could be potential swing voters between the two parties (Dávila 2008; DeFrancesco Soto 2013). However, as with other traits, such as religiosity, the impact of these values has been widely exaggerated. Latinos are as likely as the general public to support same-sex marriage (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013), and their opposition to abortion is moderated by partisan identification (Navarro-Rivera 2012).

What does it mean to have strong "family values"? The term is often used by conservative activists opposing policies such as allowing the legalization of same-sex marriage and abortion (Abrajano and Alvarez 2011; Ellison, Acevedo, and Ramos-Wada 2011). The phrase is also used to imply connections between different family generations across time and distance, and there is some evidence to back this up. For example, Latino families are more likely to live in multigenerational households than other Americans (Landale, Oropesa, and Bradatan 2006, 138). Many Latinos also keep constantly in touch with family and friends back in their country of origin (Tamaki 2011).

Participants in the PRRI focus groups in Arizona mentioned as very important the subject of family values. To respondents, the importance of family was an important cultural trait because Latino families are more tightly bound than Americans, in general, or at least, they give that impression.

Instead, another way of looking at the impact of family is by considering Latinos' connections abroad: who they visit, how often, and where they visit. Recent research (Gershon and Pantoja 2013, 2014; Pantoja 2005), who finds some evidence that connections to family abroad, mainly through travel may enhance political incorporation of Latinos in U.S. politics and encourages political participation. However, links to the homeland likely hinder incorporation because people who hope to return to their home countries may not incorporate politically into the U.S. system (as citizens) (Jones-Correa 1998). Keeping strong transnational ties should make Latinos feel closer to those like them and reduce feelings of commonalities with other Latinos and suggests that those who have stronger ties abroad should have a co-ethnic or ethnic ideology more than a pan-ethnic ideology, since co-ethnic Latinos should have a sense that their own national group, not Latinos in general, are those closest to them socially and politically.

Core Beliefs

The relationship between beliefs and ideology is a matter of discussion in the political science literature. For example, Converse defined ideology as an interdependent belief system. But as Carmines and D'Amico (2015) point out "Converse's work excluded personality and social structure," while these aspects were important to Lane (44). Likewise, in the study of African American ideologies, beliefs about the group, the role of history shaping group consciousness, and the role of race in helping discern friends and enemies are central to the understanding of these ideologies and African Americans' understanding of American politics. In the case of Latinos, beliefs regarding their place in the U.S., their social standing in the country and how attached they feel to the country and to people like them should influence the ideological inclinations of Latinos.

The cultural traits affect how Latinos place themselves in American society and how they relate to each other. Some traits may lead Latinos to believe that they have many things in common, while others lead them to believe that Latinos have little in common. Core beliefs ultimately affect how Latinos view their role in American life and politics; these beliefs also shape their ideologies.

The five core beliefs that I argue are shaped by cultural traits include the following: (1) importance of identity, (2) desire to return to country of origin, (3) subscription to Latino linked fate, (4) attitudes toward other (non-Latino) groups, and (5) belief in core American values. Each of these beliefs contributes to the formation of Latino ideologies, which I describe in the next section. The core beliefs refer to attitudes toward the different traits of Latino culture, and these attitudes should bring them closer or farther from other Latinos.

Importance of Identity

The core belief of identity refers to how important Latinos consider it is to keep a distinct Latino culture within American society. This could be by preserving traits such as speaking Spanish or other characteristics that show that they embrace their unique identity in American society rather than being absorbed into the mainstream culture. Research on Latino identity has a long history in the field and shows that their shared characteristics and experiences add to the building of a common identity. Padilla's (1985) research on Mexican American and Puerto Rican communities in Chicago demonstrates that stressing a common identity can produce fruitful cooperation on political matters among Latinos of different national origins.

This level of pan-ethnic cooperation and ties based on a common identity is further strengthened by mobilization. Zepeda-Millán and Wallace (2013), using immigration rights marches as a

reference point, argue that Latino perceptions of racialization –that Latinos are a distinct group– has an impact in steering them into actions for a common goal. Thus, considering that a Latino identity is individually important should serve as a building block for a pan-ethnic ideology, while those who do not think this identity is important will be more likely to have an ethnic or co-ethnic ideology because these ideological cohorts see less commonalities among Latinos.

Desire to Return

Nostalgia for the land of origin or ancestry should also affect the ideological tendencies of Latinos. Jones-Correa's (1998) research on Latino political incorporation shows that, for many Latinos, the allure of returning someday provides a disincentive to participate in American politics. These Latinos not only decide not to participate in American politics but also have the desire of returning someday to their homelands. For example, many Latinos send remittances to their homelands (Orozco 2002). Sending remittances is a sign of attachment to the homeland, particularly, if investing in land or property, as “a bequest motive on the part of the emigrant, who may wish to lay claim on family assets when returning home” (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006, 939). Moreover, those in sending communities in the U.S. often become political actors in their home countries as a result of their advocacy and leadership gained from their remittances (Wiltberger 2014). These attachments could foster a sense of nostalgia, of wanting to return, especially if accompanied by constant travel back to their homelands for political activism or by family ties that include regularly sending remittances in order to prepare for an imminent return. Feelings of nostalgia should be associated with co-ethnic or ethnic ideologies. Latinos who do not have feelings of nostalgia –a desire to return back to their homelands– should feel closer to other Latinos because they consider the United States to be their permanent and only home, thus establishing permanent roots and allegiance with the community.

Linked Fate

A belief in Latino linked fate means that a person thinks that what happens to other Latinos affects them personally. In other words, the fate of the individual depends upon how Latinos fare as a group. This concept is well understood in the study of African American politics, as it was developed by Dawson: “the historical experiences of African Americans have resulted in a situation in which group interests have served as a proxy for self-interest” (Dawson 1994, 77).

The main scholar for the study of linked fate among Latinos is Gabriel Sanchez. In several articles (Sanchez 2006a, 2006b, 2008; Sanchez and Masuoka 2010), he has explored the existence of linked fate among Latinos and its salience to Latino political behavior. He finds that there is evidence of linked fate; yet, it is hard to untangle it from other factors such as ancestry, generations removed from immigration, and class, among others. Moreover, the “[r]esults suggest that linked fate for Latinos may be a temporary phenomenon, as linked fate for Latinos appears to be based on marginalization derived from economic status and immigration experiences” (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010, 519). The main reason for this conclusion is because the authors find that the notion of a “Brown utility heuristic” based on linked fate is rooted in “social integration to American society” (Sanchez and Masuoka 2010, 519). Yet, as American society becomes racially polarized and the growth of Latinos continues to be framed as an “invasion” narrative, it is unlikely that Latinos will have “smooth sailing” incorporating into American society.

Regardless of how rooted the concept is among Latinos, what matters is that Latinos who have a sense of linked fate with other Latinos should exhibit a propensity for a pan-ethnic ideology, feeling that their closest allies are other Latinos, while those who do not have a sense of linked fate with other Latinos will tend to subscribe to an ethnic or a co-ethnic ideology.

Attitudes toward Other Minorities

Latinos in contact with other groups should feel closer to them, especially when they are in collaborative situations such as in community organizations or political coalitions. In contrast, if Latinos consider they have a conflicting relationship with other groups, they will have negative opinions and feelings toward them (McClain *et al.* 2006).

There is a wide literature on the potential of conflict and competition between African Americans and Latinos (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; McClain and Karnig 1990; Meier *et al.* 2004; Vaca 2004). Yet, Latinos and other groups (such as African Americans) share a history of discrimination and have oftentimes similar socioeconomic backgrounds. How much do Latinos stress these commonalities in their political options? I argue that Latinos who feel close or that share characteristics in common with African Americans should enhance their feelings of closeness to Latinos, as well. In other words, a sense of commonality with minorities such as black Americans should also strengthen the sense of commonality with other Latinos.

For example, Orr, Morel, and Gamble find that “Latino linked fate and Latino-Black linked fate are positively correlated with perceptions of political and economic commonality” (2014, 165). This finding confirms those from Sanchez (2008) of the role of group consciousness among Latinos and how those with high levels of linked fate also have a sense of commonality with black Americans. Thus, a sense of commonality with minorities should also be associated with an ideology that links Latinos together.

Core American Values

Equal opportunity, personal responsibility, and the American Dream are values that many Americans cherish. Latinos are no exception; surveys find that Latinos, despite their lower

income and educational levels, or perhaps because of these characteristics, are among the groups most strongly to believe in these values (Constable and Clement 2014; R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013), even when the general American population has become more skeptical about the realities of these beliefs (R. P. Jones and Cox 2012). Research on Latinos' belief in American "core values" has also debunked the myth that Latinos do not follow the liberal values of individualism and hard work. For example, in their analysis of the 2006 Latino National Survey, Fraga, Hero and Garcia (2011, 74) find that Latinos are more likely to believe in individual responsibility instead of blaming the system and believe in the value of hard work to have progress in America. Yet, they also find that on values such as personal responsibility or equality of opportunity, Latinos' beliefs are more complex. This means that, while Latinos overwhelmingly believe in the American Dream, in America as a land of opportunity, they are more conflicted regarding whether everyone has similar access to this dream and the fairness of American society. Thus, beliefs about American society refer to how Latinos think life in the United States is fair and whether it provides better opportunities for them. Yet, there is evidence that these beliefs are much stronger among foreign-born than among U.S.-born Latinos, suggesting that differences in these beliefs are associated with experiences of living in the country, such as discrimination (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). The effects of these beliefs on ideology should be negatively associated with pan-ethnicity. This means that agreeing with these core American values should decrease a sense of commonality with other Latinos because agreement suggests a more individualistic view of success in America that should be more in line with an ethnic ideology, because this Ethno-Ideological cohort should not share a sense of group consciousness and commonality, instead having a more individualistic view of success.

The Latino Ethno-Ideologies

The study of Latino politics has largely ignored ideology as a way for understanding the political behavior of Latinos in the United States. If we understand ideology as a concept that explains how the world works and provides a shortcut into who are people's allies and who are people's enemies, then Latinos' political behavior is ideological (and perhaps even how people relate to a nation that may not be their nation of origin).

Latino Ethno-Ideologies are the result of the combinations of cultural factors and core values. I submit three ideologies (1) pan-ethnic, (2) co-ethnic, and (3) ethnic. Each of these ideologies differs on how close individual Latinos feel toward each other and the extent of this connection: social and political. Social closeness means that Latinos believe they share many social characteristics in common, while political closeness means that those commonalities extend to common political goals. Ultimately, these ideologies consist of whether Latinos consider other Latinos as their allies for political struggles, or if they do not see Latinos as their natural allies.

Pan-ethnic

Latinos with this ideological inclination feel strong social and political attachments with other Latinos. Pan-ethnic Latinos' sense of commonality comes mostly from their core beliefs than from their cultural traits. This means that the main sources of pan-ethnicity as an ideology are the beliefs in linked fate with other Latinos, their belief in commonality with other minorities, their skepticism of core American values, the importance of their Latino identity, and their commitment to the U.S. without a desire to return "home" (U.S. is home). This group is less likely to be Catholic or primarily Spanish speaker or consumers of Spanish media. As a group, pan-ethnic Latinos should be younger, and more likely to be second or third generation U.S.-born Latinos. This pan-ethnic ideology suggests that, politically, this group will be very

suggestible to appeals to Latino unity and to behave as a bloc. They should also be more open to coalitions with other minorities.

Co-ethnic

These Latinos consider that they have social and political commonalities with other Latinos but not both simultaneously. The cultural traits of the co-ethnic ideology include a high Catholic identification, consumption of Spanish media and Spanish speakers, these are the most likely to have strong transnational ties. Their core beliefs are weaker than pan-ethnic Latinos, especially the ones on the importance of a Latino identity, linked fate with Latinos, and commonalities with other minorities. They have the weakest beliefs about American core values and are the most likely to prefer to return back home. Because its members should feel closer to those of their own ethnic or national group, this ideological cohort will be more likely to be comprised of foreign-born, first generation immigrants than the others. The impact of co-ethnic Latinos in Latino politics is mixed. To the extent that they feel their closeness to other Latinos is political, they will be open to pan-ethnic solidarity appeals.

Ethnic

Latinos who subscribe to an ethnic ideology have weak or no sense of social or political commonalities with other Latinos. This is due partly to their low cultural attachments, as well as their lower levels of solidarity based on core beliefs. This group will have weaker levels of Catholic identification, Spanish speakers and Spanish media consumption, as well as transnational ties. Those with an ethnic ideology have the strongest attitudes toward American core values and a weak sense of attachment to a distinct Latino identity. These persons are not nostalgic about returning. Demographically, this group will be a combination of older immigrant Latinos and younger (second or third generation) Latinos. They will also have the weakest sense

of linked fate commonality. Their politics should be very individualistic, or at least, they should be informed by other group attachments independent of Latino background. Table 2.3 shows the strength of the relationship of the cultural traits and core beliefs with each of the ideologies.

Table 2.2. Expected Effect of the Different Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Latino Ideology

	Ideology		
	Pan-ethnic	Co-ethnic	Ethnic
Cultural Traits			
Spanish	Weak	Strong	Weak
Catholic	Weak	Strong	Weak
Media	Weak	Strong	Weak
Family	Weak	Strong	Weak
Core Beliefs			
Linked Fate	Strong	Weak	Weak
Attitudes toward minorities	Strong	Weak	Weak
Identity	Strong	Weak	Weak
Core American Values	Strong	Weak	Weak
Desire to return	Weak	Strong	Weak

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter explained the understanding of Latino identity politics rooted in latinidad. I argue that a view that consists solely on identity betrays the diversity and complexity of Latinos' political views. To fill this gap I propose an ideological view of Latino politics in which latinidad works as a heuristic utility informing Latinos. In the next chapter, I will explain how I will measure these cultural traits, core beliefs, and ideologies.

Chapter 3: Measuring the Latino Ethno-Ideologies

This chapter explains the data, variables, and methods used to test the Latino Ethno-Ideologies.

The theory states that the cultural traits and core beliefs produce three ethno-ideologies – pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic. These ideologies are not based on a Liberal-Conservative continuum grounded in policy or the role of government in people’s lives. Instead, the ethno-ideologies’ origins in cultural traits and core beliefs vary according to how strong Latinos believe their social and political links are with other Latinos: The more Latinos feel they have in common with other Latinos, the greater the likelihood that they will subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology. On the opposite end lies the ethnic ideology in which Latinos, while admitting to a Hispanic or Latino heritage, do not extend this heritage into a political or social commonality with other Latinos. In the middle lie those subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology in which individuals feel that they have some social or political commonalities, but do not hold both of these ideas simultaneously.

The chapter is divided into 6 sections. The first section discusses the data sources to be used in the analysis. The second section describes the variables used to construct the dependent variable (Latino ethno-ideologies). The third section explains the independent variables measuring the cultural traits, core beliefs, and the demographic characteristics of respondents. The fourth section describes the statistical analysis and how the variables fit in these models. The fifth section describes how the focus groups will enrich the statistical analysis. Finally, a conclusion serves as a preview of the empirical chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Data Sources

To test the theory, I draw from quantitative and qualitative sources. The selection of the quantitative data source required a study with two main assets. First, it is necessary to include a large sample of Latino respondents because that will produce robust statistical analysis instead of using oversamples that are commonly available in surveys. Second, an asset required of the dataset is that it includes variables that could serve as direct measures or proxies for the cultural traits and core beliefs. The qualitative data complement the quantitative data by providing insights as to what Latinos think about their shared culture and beliefs and how they influence in their view of politics.

Quantitative Data: 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS 2006)

Based on the requirement discussed above, the most appropriate data come from the 2006 Latino National Survey (LNS 2006). The LNS 2006 contains a large sample of adult Latinos ages 18 and older (N = 8,646), the largest of any potential survey database. Moreover, the LNS 2006 was conducted in English and Spanish by bilingual interviewers in the major metropolitan areas with Latino population and states with growing numbers of Latinos. Overall, the 2006 LNS sample covers 87.5 percent of Latinos in the United States (L. R. Fraga et al. 2008). The LNS includes measures for religious identification, batteries of questions about language use at home and of language preferences for media, as well as questions about frequency of contact with family abroad. Although nowadays many surveys have large subsamples of Latinos and several survey organizations such as the 2010 Hispanic Sample of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Latino Decisions, Pew Research Center, and Public Religion Research Institute conduct surveys specifically with Latino populations, these do not have all the variables necessary within the same poll to measure all the different elements of this study. Surveys such as the 2012

American National Election Study (ANES) include important questions related to race in America and oversamples of Latinos that can provide a more contemporary context but lack other questions related to transnationalism and *latinidad* which are necessary for exploring my theoretical framework.

Table 3.1 Summary of Quantitative and Qualitative Data Sources

	Latino National Survey	Hispanic Values Survey
Sample size	8,646	53 (6 groups, 2 of each religious tradition)
Sample type	National Latino adults	Catholic, Protestant, and religiously unaffiliated Latinos age 18-65 in Phoenix, AZ
Study dates	11/17/2005 – 8/4/2006	August 10-11, 2013
Researchers	Fraga, Garcia, Hero <i>et al.</i>	Public Religion Research Institute
Type	Survey	Focus groups

Sources: 2006 Latino National Survey, Fraga *et al.* (2008); Public Religion Research Institute

The 2006 LNS also includes variables that measure the core beliefs such as the importance of Latino identity, as well as specific questions about Latino linked fate and the political, cultural, and social relationships between Latinos and about cooperation and competition with other racial groups in American society. These items can serve as measures for belief in Latino linked fate and about attitudes toward other groups in the United States. There are questions about returning to the country of origin (or ancestry) and links to the country of origin such as sending remittances, having close relatives abroad, and traveling to visit the country. Finally, there are measures about attitudes about the United States, for example about feeling discriminated against, the opportunities available in the country, and how the United States compares to the home country. Moreover, the LNS survey includes demographic information such as country of origin and ancestry, including the country of birth of parents and grandparents, which are

necessary for measuring immigrant generation. Table 3.1 (above) includes a summary of the characteristics of the LNS as well as of the two focus groups, which are described below.

Qualitative Data: Focus Groups from Public Religion Research Institute (2013)

The qualitative component of the analysis comes from focus groups. The focus groups were conducted by Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), which conducted these in August 2013, as part of the 2013 Hispanic Values Survey (HVS 2013) in Phoenix, Arizona. There were a total of 6 groups, which were divided by religious affiliation. Two groups consisted of Latinos who identified as Catholic, 2 groups of Latinos who identified as Protestants or “Christians” (not Catholic), and 2 groups of Latino “nones” or without religious affiliation (atheists, agnostics, or who had no religion in particular). The subject matter of these focus groups explored the cultural links and values that Latinos share and how these relate to their political inclinations. A division by religious affiliation provides insights as far as how much a shared culture matters to Latinos, when many do not exhibit the traits that Latinos are supposed to have (such as Catholicism).

Dependent Variable: Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale

The dependent variable, the Latino Ethno-Ideological scale, was created combining four variables measuring how much in common Latinos feel they have with other Latinos and how much they feel their own national subgroups has in common with other Latinos. All four questions belong to the same battery, which were included in the 2006 Latino National Survey to measure pan-ethnicity. Since the dependent variable indicates commonality, the combination of these four variables will produce a scale ranging from no commonality (ethnic), some commonalities (co-ethnic), to high commonality (pan-ethnic).

These commonalities are divided into two types—social and political. The social commonalities questions are RGCOMM and LATCOMM while the questions about political commonalities are RGPCOMM and LATPCOMM.

Table 3.2. Question Wording and Coding of Variables Used to Build the Ethno-Ideological Scale

	Nothing	Little	Some	A lot	DK/NA
Original Codes	1	2	3	4	5
Recoded Values	-2	-1	1	2	N/A
Categories/Questions	Frequency Distribution of Recoded Variables				
LATCOMM: Thinking about issues like job opportunities, education or income, how much do [YOU] have in common with other [LATINOS/HISPANICS]?	4.7	15.3	35	45	-
LATPCOMM: Now thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and representation, how much do [YOU] have in common with other [LATINOS/HISPANICS]?	6.7	22.5	38.3	32.5	-
RGCOMM : Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do [R's NATIONAL GROUP] have in common with other [LATINOS/HISPANICS]?	6.1	17.8	38.2	38	-
RGPCOMM: Now thinking about things like government services and employment, political power, and representation, how much do [R's NATIONAL GROUP] have in common with other [LATINOS/HISPANICS]?	15.4	23.9	37.8	24	-

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Note: Numbers represent percentages and may not sum to 100 due to rounding.

Table 3.2 (above) shows the wording and coding of these questions, as well as the values used to recode them in order to use them in the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The table also includes the frequencies of each response category.


The original coding of the response categories ranges from “1” to “5.” Values ranging 1-4 indicate if the respondent thinks Latinos have “nothing in common” to “a lot in common.” The responses coded as “5,” the highest possible value, includes refusals and “don’t know” responses.

To create the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale the variables were recoded to range between -2 (“nothing” in common) and +2 (“a lot” in common). Cases in which respondents answered “don’t know” and refusals are coded as missing. When added in a scale, these four variables indicate the intensity of the feelings of commonality, if respondents feel that commonalities are more social or political and at a personal or collective level. The highest possible score is +8. The lowest possible score is -8. The scale was further recoded to range from 0 to 16 by adding an 8 to all the values as a way of avoiding negative values. The final variable is the result of dividing all the values by 16 in order to constrain the values from “0” to “1.” This way the final ideology scale ranges from "0," (indicating that the respondents do not think Latinos share anything in common), to "1"(indicating that the respondents believe there are a lot of commonalities between Latinos in all the questions).

This scoring system is similar to those in analyses conducted by Ellis and Stimson (2012) to measure issues-based ideologies among Americans and Abramowitz (2006) to identify groups of respondents along a policy-item scale. Mondak and Canache (2014) have also used the rescaling of values on ideology and personality scales. The value of coding the dependent variable in this manner is that it allows us to visually show how changes in each of the independent variables increase or decrease in a standardized way, such as percentage changes.

These four questions of commonalities fit well together as a scale. A factor analysis shows that the four variables load on one factor. A subsequent reliability analysis shows a 0.692 Cronbach's alpha for an analysis using the recoded variables.

Figure 3.1 Ideological Score Distribution among Latinos



Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Figure 3.1 shows a histogram of the ideological scale. The scale ranges from “0” to “1.” The bars are color-coded to indicate the range comprising each of the ideology categories. The black bars indicate that respondents in that particular range subscribe to an *ethnic* Ethno-Ideology, the white bars indicate that respondents subscribe to a *co-ethnic* Ethno-Ideology. The gray bars indicate that respondents in those higher values subscribe to a *pan-ethnic* Ethno-Ideology.

As Figure 3.1 shows there are very few Latinos at the low end of the scale. Cumulatively, only 8 percent of Latinos believe that they share little or nothing at all socially or politically with other Latinos (range: 0-0.25). Only 1 percent of Latinos, have the lowest possible score “0,” believing that they or their own groups share nothing at all in common with other Latinos. Instead, the bulk of Latinos are located ideologically on the second half of the scale, with most Latinos leaning toward the higher values (pan-ethnic ideology).

The mean score of .666 confirms that Latinos overall lean toward the higher ideology scores. The most common score is .750, with 14 percent of Latinos. This score falls at the lower end of the scores indicating a pan-ethnic ideology. Respondents, thus, said that they share some characteristics in common in all four questions. One-in-ten (10 percent) Latinos scored the highest possible ideological value of 1, meaning that these respondents believe that Latinos share a lot in common in all four commonality questions. Below, I describe the logic of the category breaks in the Ethno-Ideologies scores.

Pan-ethnic ideology (Score Range from .750 to 1)

At the high end of the scale are those who feel strongly close to Latinos personally and who also feel that their group shares a lot in common with other Latinos. Moreover, Latinos with scores at the higher end of the scale (between .750 and 1) not only feel personally and collectively tied to other Latinos, they also feel that these connections are political *and* social. Latinos with a high ideological score have a *pan-ethnic ideology*.

Co-ethnic Ideology (Score Range from .313 to .688)


In the middle are those who feel close to Latinos on only one of the social or political aspects. For example, they may say that they share a lot in common with Latinos on social characteristics, but also that they have nothing in common with other Latinos in terms of politics. They may also feel that their commonalities with other Latinos are only between them as individuals or only between their own group and other Latinos. Those who score on this middle-range which is .313 to .688 are considered to have a *co-ethnic ideology* because their feelings of commonality do not extend to all Latinos in all aspects. Latinos with a co-ethnic ideology may feel that in social aspects such as income and education, Latinos share a lot in common but that these commonalities do not extend to political aspects. Coethnics may also have a sense that their own

ethnic or national groups share a lot in common with Latinos but that they, as individuals, do not share much in common with other Latinos.

Ethnic Ideology (Score Range from 0 to .250)

At the other end of the scale (scores between 1 and 5) are those who feel that they individually (and people from their own Latino national-origin groups) share nothing in common politically or socially with other Latinos. Latinos who score low on the ideological scale have an *ethnic ideology*. Ethnic Latinos can still admit a Latino or Hispanic ethnic origin, this heritage does not translate into a commonality with other Latinos, since the Latino-Ethno ideologies score is on the lowest score range.

Figure 3.2 Ethno-Ideologies Distribution among Latinos



Source: 2006 Latino National Survey
Note: Numbers represent percentages

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the ideologies among Latinos. Only 8 percent of Latinos subscribe to an ethnic ideology (scores between 0 and .250). Ethnic Latinos identify as having a Hispanic or Latino origin but consider that they or people from their national group have little or nothing in common socially or politically with other Latinos. An additional 43 percent of Latinos

have a *co-ethnic* ideology (scores between .313 and .688). Co-ethnic Latinos generally consider that Latinos have some characteristics in common socially or politically but little or not at all on one of these aspects. The largest ideological group, with nearly half of Latinos (49 percent) subscribing to it, is among those who subscribe to a *pan-ethnic* ideology (scores between .750 and 1). Latinos with an ideological score with this range are considered pan-ethnic because they think that Latinos have –at least– some commonalities socially *and* politically.

Because the dependent variable consists of a linear progression from no social and political commonalities (ethnic ideology) to high commonalities (pan-ethnic ideology), the independent variables predict to what extent they influence the development of a pan-ethnic ideology among Latinos. This means that a positive association with the dependent variable indicates that the independent variables measuring the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics will move *toward* a pan-ethnic ideology. A negative association indicates a move *away* from a pan-ethnic ideology, toward an ethnic ideology. The next section introduces the variables that will measure the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics.

Independent variables

The independent variables measure two distinct aspects of Latino life related to their ideology—their cultural traits and core beliefs. The cultural traits consist of characteristics that many (or most) Latinos share, while the core beliefs are attitudes born out their experience of living in America. I expect to find that, while both aspects will be important to the development of the ideologies, most of the weight will fall in the core beliefs.

The Latino Ethno-Ideology Theory posits that there are four cultural traits and five core beliefs serving as building blocks of the ideologies. The cultural traits are religion, language use,

Spanish language media consumption, and family values. The five core beliefs are the following: importance of identity, desire to return to one's nation of origin, linked fate with Latinos, commonalities with other racial minorities, and beliefs about core American values.

Measuring Cultural Traits

Table 3.3 (page 71) shows the original coding and recodes for the different variables measuring the cultural traits (Catholicism, language use, Spanish media consumption, and family values) and Table 3.4 (page 72) shows the distribution of the cultural traits variables among Latinos. These traits should be positively associated with the formation of a pan-ethnic ideology because these traits are supposed to unite Latinos.

Catholicism

Catholicism is the religious cultural link among Latinos, the result of four centuries of Spanish rule in the Americas. Although Latinos' identification with Catholicism has declined in recent years, Table 3.4. (page 72) shows that Catholic identification among Latinos in the 2006 LNS is 71 percent.

To measure *Catholicism*, I use a dichotomous variable indicating if the respondent is Catholic (coded "1") or not (coded "0"). I expect that Catholicism will be more prevalent among Latinos with a co-ethnic ideology because it is a trait closely aligned with national identity, whereas Catholicism as a cultural trait should be less prevalent among ethnic and pan-ethnic who should be more religiously diverse

Table 3.3. Variables and Coding of Cultural Traits

Variable	Wording	Responses	Recoding
Catholicism			
RELIGION	Stop me when I get to the correct one. What religious tradition do you most closely identify with?	(0) Jehovah's Witness (1) Catholic (2) Assemblies of God (3) Southern Baptist (4) Pentecostal (5) Other Protestant (6) Mormon (7) Jewish (8) Don't identify with any religious denomination (9) Other	(1) Catholic (0) Not Catholic
Language Use			
INTLANG	Language in which interview was conducted	(1) Spanish (2) English	<u>Spanish Dominant</u> (1) If interview conducted in Spanish and speaks "just a little" or "not at all" English. (0) Otherwise
SPANPROF	Would you say you can carry on a conversation in Spanish (both understanding and speaking)	(4) Very well (3) Pretty well (2) Just a little (1) Not at all	<u>Bilingual</u> (1) If respondent can carry on a conversation "very" or "pretty well" in English or Spanish (0) Otherwise
ENGPROF	Would you say you can carry on a conversation in English (both understanding and speaking)	(4) Very well (3) Pretty well (2) Just a little (1) Not at all	<u>English Dominant</u> (1) If interview conducted in English and speaks "just a little" or "not at all" Spanish. (0) Otherwise
Spanish Media Consumption			
RELYMED	For information about public affairs and politics, would you say you rely more heavily in Spanish-language television, radio, and newspapers, or on English-language television, radio, and newspapers?	(1) English more (2) Spanish more (3) Both equally	(1) Spanish or Both equally (0) English
Family Values			
TRVISIT	How often do you visit [Country of Origin/Ancestry]?	(1) More than once a year (2) Once a year (3) Once in the past three years (4) Once in the past five years (5) More than five years ago (6) Never (7) DK/NA	(0) Never (1) More than five years ago (2) Once in the past five years (3) Once in the past three years (4) Once a year (5) More than once a year

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Table 3.4. Frequency Distribution of Cultural Traits Variables

Cultural Traits	Percentage
<i>Catholicism</i>	
Catholic	71
Not a Catholic	29
<i>Primary Language</i>	
Spanish	41
Bilingual	51
English	8
<i>Media Consumption</i>	
Spanish	69
Only English	31
<i>Family Values</i>	
<i>(Frequency of Travel Abroad)</i>	
Never	33
More than five years ago	13
Once in the past five years	7
Once in the past three years	15
Once a year	20
More than once a year	13

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Everyday Language Use

Language, particularly *spoken language*, has been associated with pan-ethnicity for a long time, DeSipio (1996) argues that Spanish is the main cultural characteristic that brings Latinos together. It should be expected that pan-ethnicity is positively associated with Spanish speaking Latinos.

The variable measuring language use indicates if the respondent is primarily a Spanish monolingual, bilingual, or English monolingual. To measure language usage, I use the variables SPANPROF and ENGPROF which asks respondents their proficiency with English or Spanish (see Table 3.3 page 71). Respondents who answered the questionnaire in English were asked about their Spanish proficiency, while those who answered in Spanish were asked about their proficiency in English. After combining the three variables INTLANG (interview language),

SPANPROF, and ENGPORF, I created a variable that measures primary language use. Those who answered in Spanish but report that they are not proficient in English are classified as primarily Spanish monolinguals and account for 41 percent of Latinos. Latinos who claim to be proficient in English or Spanish are classified as bilingual. This trait is shared by 51 percent of Latinos. Finally, those who answered the survey in English but reported they are not proficient in Spanish are classified as English monolinguals, comprising 8 percent of the Latino population.

Spanish Media Consumption

Media, particularly Spanish language television, has been associated with fostering a sense of community among Latinos from different national backgrounds. Media companies such as the television giant, Univision, were instrumental in the creation of the "Hispanic" category in the U.S. Census and were invested in the idea that there was a unique Latino market (Mora 2014). For this reason, consumption of Spanish language news media should be associated with pan-ethnicity. To measure media consumption, I use the language in which Latinos prefer to consume their news media indicated in the variable RELYMED. This variable indicates if a person prefers to consume news media in English, Spanish, or both. This variable was simplified to indicate if the respondent consumes media in Spanish (only in Spanish or in Spanish and English) or only in English. Nearly 7-in-10 (69 Latinos) consume news in Spanish, while 31 percent consume news solely in English.

Family Values

The final cultural trait is *family values*. One of the defining stereotypes of Latinos is how important family is to them. This belief is echoed in political advertisements where Republican and Democratic candidates attempt to appeal to Latinos (Dávila 2001). Since there are no variables that directly measure concepts such as "importance of family," I measure family values

using “transnational family,” a variable measuring how often the respondent visits family in his/her country of ancestry. The reason for using this variable is that, contrary to another variable asking Latino whether they send remittances abroad, this variable was asked to the whole sample and not just to Latinos born outside of the United States. The variable ranges from 0 (never) to 5 (more than once a year).

Overall, one-third (33 percent) of Latinos say they never visit their nation of origin, while another third percent say they visit once a year (20 percent) or more often (12 percent). I hypothesize that the closer the family connections abroad, the less likely a Latino will exhibit a pan-ethnic ideology. The reason for this is that stronger links in the homeland could mean less attachment to the U.S., a life or life in this country. Moreover, constant travel to the ancestral or home country may weaken feelings of commonality between the respondent and other Latinos because constant travel reminds the subject of his/her own heritage distinctiveness from other Latinos’ heritage.

Measuring Core Beliefs

According to the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, along with the four cultural traits, there are five core beliefs affecting Latino ideology. These five core beliefs are importance of identity, linked fate, desire to return, commonalities with other minorities, and belief in core American values. Table 3.5 (page 76) shows the coding and recoding of the variables.

Importance of Identity

Latinos who place a lot of importance on their identity as Latinos in America should have a more pan-ethnic ideology. The usage of a pan-ethnic label, such as Hispanic or Latino, has been associated with feeling that their identity as Latinos is important (Lavariega Monforti 2014).

Importance of identity is measured using DISTINCT, a variable that asks how important it is for

Latinos to keep a distinct culture. I expect that the greater the importance placed on culture will have a positive association with a pan-ethnic ideology. Overall, 78 percent of Latinos said it was very important, while only 3 percent said it was not important. Table 3.6 (pages 78-79) displays the frequencies for the variables measuring the core beliefs.

Linked Fate

Linked fate, the belief that Latinos well-being is connected to the well-being of other Latinos (or Latinos overall), is an important concept of pan-ethnicity. The concept, borrowed from Dawson (1994, 2001), by several Latino politics scholars (Lavariega Monforti and Michelson 2014; Sanchez 2006a, 2006b), is considered the building block of pan-ethnicity for its implications of a sense of unity among Latinos.

Two variables measure linked fate: The first one relates to a personal sense of connection with other Latinos, a belief that the data show is shared by roughly two-thirds (68 percent) of all Latinos. The second one measures how connected the respondents think his/her own group's (ethnic/national) fate is linked to other Latinos. Latino linked fate is measured with the variables LATFATE, which asks if a Latino/a believes that what happens to him personally is related to what happens to other Latinos, and, RGFATE, which asks if what happens to their own nationality group is related to happens to all Latinos. These variables are recoded as indicating whether the respondent believes in Latino linked fate “a lot” (3) or “nothing” (0). Overall just over three-quarters (77 percent) of Latinos share this belief about their own group. A sense of linked fate should be positively associated with a pan-ethnic ideology.

Table 3.5. Variables and coding for the core beliefs

Linked fate			
LATFATE	How much does [Latinos/Hispanics] doing well depend on how other [Hispanics/Latinos] also doing well?	(4) A lot (3) Some (2) Little (1) Nothing	(0) Nothing (1) Little (2) Some (3) A lot
RGFATE	How much does your doing well depend on how other [Hispanics/Latinos] also doing well?	(4) A lot (3) Some (2) Little (1) Nothing	(0) Nothing (1) Little (2) Some (3) A lot
Attitudes toward other groups			
AACOMM	Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do [LATINOS/HISPANICS] have in common with [AFRICAN AMERICANS]?	(4) A lot (3) Some (2) Little (1) Nothing	(0) Nothing (1) Little (2) Some (3) A lot
AAPCOMM	Thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and representation, how much do [LATINOS/HISPANICS] have in common with [AFRICAN AMERICANS]?	(4) A lot (3) Some (2) Little (1) Nothing	(0) Nothing (1) Little (2) Some (3) A lot
Importance of Identity			
DISTINCT	How important is for [Hispanics/Latinos] to maintain their distinct cultures?	(3) Very important (2) Somewhat important (1) Not important	(2) Very important (1) Somewhat Important (0) Not important
Desire to Return			
TRGOBACK	Do you have plans to go back to [Country of origin/ancestry] to live permanently?	(1) Yes (2) No	(0) Yes (1) No
Core American Values			
AHEAD	<i>American Dream</i> “Latinos can get ahead in the United States if they work hard”	(4) Strongly agree (3) Somewhat agree (2) Somewhat disagree (1) Strongly disagree	(3) Strongly agree (2) Somewhat agree (1) Somewhat disagree (0) Strongly disagree
SYSBLAME	<i>Personal Responsibility</i> “Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame”	(4) Agree (3) Somewhat agree (2) Somewhat disagree (1) Strongly disagree	(3) Strongly agree (2) Somewhat agree (1) Somewhat disagree (0) Strongly disagree
CHANCE	<i>Equal Opportunity</i> “Is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others”	(4) Agree (3) Somewhat agree (2) Somewhat disagree (1) Strongly disagree	(0) Strongly agree (1) Somewhat agree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Strongly disagree

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Desire to Return to Nation of Origin

Latinos who feel more attracted to their land of origin should think they have less in common with other Latinos since their hearts lie in other lands and with their respective ancestral nation

of origin. Attachment to homeland is measured with the variable TRGOBACK and indicates if a person is interested in returning to his or her country of origin or ancestry. The variable is recoded as binary to indicate those who answer this question in the affirmative and who want to return (0) and those who do not want to return (1). Overall, more than three-quarters (76 percent) of Latinos say they do not want to return, compared to 24 percent who indicate they want to return.

Commonalities with Other Racial Minorities

The fourth core belief is *commonalities with other racial minorities*. This sense of connection should be associated with pan-ethnicity, since Latinos who feel that other groups in America have common characteristics and goals may also feel that connection with other Latinos, as well, and could be the building blocks for inter-racial coalitions. Previous literature has found mixed evidence for potential inter-racial coalitions, depending on economic threat and competition, perceived common experiences of discrimination, and residential and social proximity (McClain *et al.* 2006; McClain and Stewart 2001; McKenzie 2014; Wilkinson 2014).

Commonalities with other groups are measured by two variables. These ask if respondents think that Latinos have a lot in common socially or politically with African Americans. Attitudes toward other groups in America are measured with the variables AACOMM (socially) and AAPCOM (politically). These variables ask if the respondent thinks that Latinos have a lot in common politically or socially with African-Americans, another underrepresented group in American politics. The variable is recoded to indicate if a person feels close to blacks (1) or not (0). Overall 6-in-10 (60 percent) Latinos say they have social characteristics in common with African Americans and a majority (56 percent) say they have political commonalities with African Americans.

Table 3.6. Frequency Distribution of Core Beliefs Variables

Core Beliefs	Distribution (%)
<i>Identity (Importance of keeping a distinct culture)</i>	
Very Important	78
Somewhat Important	18
Not Important	3
<i>Desire to Return to Country of Origin</i>	
No	76
Yes	24
<i>Linked Fate</i>	
“How much does you doing well depend on how other Latinos also doing (sic) well?”	
A lot	43
Some	25
Little	16
Nothing	16
“How much does Latinos doing well depend on how other Latinos also doing (sic) well?”	
A lot	49
Some	28
Little	14
Nothing	9
<i>Commonalities with Other Minorities</i>	
“Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?”	
A lot	23
Some	37
Little	24
Nothing	16
“Thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and representation, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?”	
A lot	20
Some	36
Little	30
Nothing	15

Table 3.6. Frequency Distribution of Core Beliefs Variables (Continued)

Core Beliefs	Distribution (%)
<i>Core American Values</i>	
American Dream:	
“Latinos can get ahead in the United States if they work hard”	
Strongly Agree	77
Somewhat Agree	19
Somewhat Disagree	2
Strongly Disagree	2
Personal Responsibility:	
“Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame”	
Strongly Agree	50
Somewhat Agree	22
Somewhat Disagree	15
Strongly Disagree	13
Equal Opportunity:	
“Is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others”	
Strongly Agree	36
Somewhat Agree	22
Somewhat Disagree	19
Strongly Disagree	23

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Core American Values

These attitudes are measured using these variables that tackle these concepts: The American Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity. Latinos who believe in these American attitudes should have a higher probability of pan-ethnicity, as they are embedded in the mainstream of America. The variables measuring attitudes toward the United States are CHANCE which asks the respondent to agree or disagree with the statement, “It is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others.” SYSBLAME asks respondents to "agree" or "disagree" with the statement, “Most people who don’t get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame.” Finally, AHEAD, asks Latinos about their beliefs in the American Dream, asking them if they "agree" or "disagree"

with the statement, “Latinos can get ahead in the United States if they work hard.” These variables have been recoded to indicate if a person strongly disagrees (3) or strongly agrees (0) with the statements, with the exception of CHANCE. This variable was recoded in reverse: a score of “3” means that the respondent strongly agrees with the statement that people have more of a chance and a score of “0” that the respondent strongly disagrees. Belief in the American Dream is almost universal, as 95 percent of Latinos believe in it. Seventy-seven percent of Latinos say they believe in personal responsibility and 43 percent in equality of opportunity.

Demographic variables

In addition to the cultural traits and core beliefs, there are important demographic differences between Latinos. A consistent finding in the literature is the differences in policy preferences and attitudes between Latinos of different national-origin groups, as well as differences by immigrant generation. Therefore, I control for these measures. In addition, I add controls for the respondent’s sex, age, and educational attainment. I also control for the respondent’s citizenship status, if the respondent is foreign-born but also a naturalized citizen.

Table 3.7 (page 81) summarizes the original coding and the recodes or combinations used to generate new variables. The age variable was generated by subtracting the respondent’s birth year from 2006 (the year the survey was taken). The sex variable was recoded to indicate if the respondent is a man (0) or a woman (1). Respondents with ancestry from Central American or South American countries were recombined into a “Central America” or “South America” category, respectively, because some ancestries had few respondents. For example, if a respondent’s ancestry is from Panama that person was assigned to “Central America.” The “Other Latino” category which combines persons who indicated their ancestry is from countries

outside Latin America. Respondents from the 4 largest ethnic groups –Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Dominicans– were not recombined into larger categories.

Table 3.7. Variables and Coding of Demographic Characteristics

Variable	Wording	Responses	Recoding
Age			
BIRDATE	What year were you born	4-digit year (9999) Don't know/Refused	2006 - BIRDATE
Sex			
GENDER	Are you male or female? (Ask only if necessary)	(1) Male (2) Female	(1) Woman (0) Man
Latino Origin/Ancestry			
ANCESTRY	Do you trace your Latino heritage, however many generations back, to any country other than the U.S.?	(1) Argentina (2) Bolivia (3) Chile (4) Colombia (5) Costa Rica (6) Cuba (7) Dominican Republic (8) Ecuador (9) El Salvador (10) Guatemala (11) Honduras (12) Mexico (13) Nicaragua (14) Panama (15) Paraguay (16) Peru (17) Puerto Rico (18) Spain (19) Uruguay (20) Venezuela (21) Don't know (22) Refused (23) USA (Don't read)	Dichotomous variables indicate each nationality: (1) Each of these origins Mexico Puerto Rico Cuba Dominican Republic Central America: [Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama] South America: [Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela] Other Latino: [Spain, USA, Don't know, Refused] (0) If respondent does not have the ancestry

Table 3.7. Variables and Coding of Demographic Characteristics (Continued)

Variable	Wording	Responses	Recoding
Generations Removed from Immigration			
BORNUS	Were you born in the mainland United States, Puerto Rico, or some other country	(1) Mainland US (2) Puerto Rico (3) Some other country	<u>First Generation</u> (1) Born in “some other country” (0) Otherwise
PARBORN	Where your parents were born, where they both born in the US, was one born in the US, and were both born in another country?	(1) One parent born in the US (2) Both parents born in the US (3) Neither parent born in the US (4) Don’t know (5) Refused	<u>Second Generation</u> (1) Born in the mainland USA or Puerto Rico AND neither parent born in the US. (0) Otherwise <u>Third Generation</u> (1) Born in the mainland USA or Puerto Rico AND at least one parent born in the US (0) Otherwise
Naturalized Citizen			
NATUSCIT	Are you a naturalized American citizen? [If BORNUS = 3]	(1) Yes (2) No	(0) No (1) Yes
Educational Attainment			
REDUC	What is your highest level of formal education completed?	(0) None (1) Eight grade or below (2) Some high school (3) GED (4) High school graduate (5) Some college (6) 4-year college degree (7) Graduate or Professional degree	(0) None (1) Eight grade or below (2) Some high school (3) GED (4) High school graduate (5) Some college (6) 4-year college degree (7) Graduate or Professional degree

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

To determine generations removed from immigration, I used two variables: USBORN and PARBORN. These two variables indicate where the respondent and their parents were born, respectively. First generation Latinos are those who are born outside of the United States (or Puerto Rico). Second generation Latinos are those born in the United States or Puerto Rico and whose parents were born outside the United States. Finally, third generation Latinos are native-born (USA or Puerto Rico) children of at least one U.S.-born parent. Another control variable

related to generation is naturalization, asked of persons born outside the U.S. or Puerto Rico. The variable was recoded to indicate if the person is a naturalized citizen (1) or not (0).

The final variable is educational attainment, which runs from “0” (no formal education) to “7” (advanced graduate/professional degree). This variable was not recoded for analysis.

Table 3.8 Frequency Distribution of Demographic Characteristics

	All Latinos
Demographic Characteristics	
Age (Means)	34.3
Educational Attainment	
None	2
Eight grade or below	17
Some high school	17
GED	3
High school graduate	26
Some college	21
4 year college degree	8
Graduate/Professional Degree	5
Sex	
Men	47
Women	53
Generation	
First (born outside the U.S.)	65
Second (immigrant parents)	16
Third+ (U.S.-born parents)	19
Citizenship of Foreign-born	
Naturalized Citizen	19
Not Naturalized	81
Latino Ancestry/Origin	
Mexican	70
Central American	9
Puerto Rican	8
South American	4
Cuban	4
Dominican	4
Other/Don't know/Refused	2

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

The distribution of the variables is shown in Table 3.8 (above) The mean age of Latino adults is 34.3 years old, and there is a slight gender imbalance as the majority of respondents are women (53 percent), compared with 47 percent who are men.

Over one-third of Latinos (36 percent) have less than a high school education, 29 percent have a high school degree or GED, while 34 percent have at least some college education. Nearly two-thirds of respondents were born outside the United States, while 35 percent were born in the U.S. Of these 16 percent are children of immigrant parents, while 19 percent are third generation — children of at least one U.S.-born parent. Roughly 1-in-5 respondents (19 percent) are naturalized citizens, meaning that more than half the sample is U.S. citizens (19 percent naturalized and 35 percent born in the U.S. or Puerto Rico).

The national origin or ancestry of Latinos is heavily Mexican, such that Mexican Americans comprise 70 percent of the total sample. Nine percent of the sample is of Central American origin, such as Guatemalan or Panamanian. Eight percent of respondents have Puerto Rican ancestry. Cubans, Dominicans, and South Americans such as Argentineans or Peruvians, each comprise 4 percent of the sample, while an additional 2 percent have other backgrounds.

Distribution of Cultural Traits, Core Beliefs, and Demographic Characteristics by the Latino Ethno-Ideologies

This section shows how the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics are distributed among Latinos depending on their ethno-ideological orientation. It is divided in three sub-sections, one each for the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics. The frequency distributions are shown in Tables 3.9.1 to 3.9.3.

Cultural Traits and Latino Ethno-Ideologies

Table 3.9.1 (below) shows how the different cultural traits are distributed among Latinos subscribing to each of the three Ethno ideologies. For references purposes the table also shows the distribution of these variables among the Latino sample as a whole.

The distribution among Latinos subscribing to these different ethno-ideologies shows that on several occasions, there is little variation among them while on others, the differences are striking and illustrative of how the ideologies develop.

Table 3.9.1. Cultural Traits by Ethno-Ideology

	All Latinos	Pan-ethnic	Co-ethnic	Ethnic
Cultural Traits				
<i>Catholicism</i>				
Catholic	71	72	70	69
Not a Catholic	29	28	30	31
<i>Primary Language</i>				
Spanish	41	36	45	55
Bilingual	51	58	45	37
English	8	7	10	9
<i>Spanish Media Consumption</i>				
Spanish	69	69	69	72
Only English	31	31	31	28
<i>Family Values (Frequency of Travel to Visit Family Abroad)</i>				
Never	33	30	35	41
More than five years ago	13	13	13	13
Once in the past five years	7	8	7	5
Once in the past three years	15	15	15	14
Once a year	20	21	19	20
More than once a year	13	14	12	7

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

The cultural trait of Catholicism shows very little variation. The most Catholic Ethno-Ideology is "pan-ethnic" (72 percent), while the "ethnic" is the least Catholic (69 percent). Although the expectation was to find major differences, especially expecting that the most Catholic cohort

would be those who subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology. However, the differences are not significant.

The variable measuring the respondent's language proficiency shows that more than half of Latinos are bilingual (51 percent), about four-in-ten (41 percent) Spanish dominant with little English proficiency, and just under nine-in-ten (8 percent) primarily communicate in English with little proficiency in Spanish. Pan-ethnic Latinos have a lower proportion of subscribers who are primarily Spanish speakers (36 percent), while a strong majority (58 percent) is bilingual. However, the ideological cohort that has more primarily Spanish speakers is the ethnic cohort: a majority (55 percent) speaks mostly Spanish. Co-ethnic Latinos are evenly divided between those who are primarily Spanish speakers and those who are bilingual (45 percent each).

The media consumption variable has a similar distribution to the Catholicism variable. There are no major differences in consumption of Spanish-language media, though Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology are the most likely to report they watch news in Spanish. The difference is not significant.

The family values variables, frequency of travel abroad to visit family, exhibits major differences. The most likely group to travel to visit family abroad is pan-ethnic Latinos. Just over one-third (35 percent) report they travel at least once a year. By contrast, ethnic Latinos are the least likely to travel frequently (27 percent) and the most likely to report that they almost or almost never travel (54 percent).

The distribution of cultural traits shows that on two of them, there is little variation among Latinos by ideological inclination; yet on two of these cultural traits, the differences are significant and unexpected. Ethnic Latinos, contrary to expectations are not populated

disproportionately by English-dominant Latinos, but by Spanish-dominant Latinos. Moreover, the family values variable, measured as travel frequency shows that, ideologically, ethnic Latinos are the least likely to travel frequently and the most likely to report they travel little. While this is not surprising, their travel frequency is significantly different from pan-ethnic Latinos, who were also expected to have weak family connections. Pan-ethnic Latinos have the strongest connections, as they are the most likely to travel frequently and the least likely to never travel.

Core Beliefs and Latino Ethno-Ideologies

The core beliefs (in Table 3.9.2 on pages 88-89) have findings more consistent with theory expectations. In the core belief of identity, the distribution shows that nearly eight-in-ten (78 percent) Latinos consider it is very important to being a distinct group in America socially. Those subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology are the most likely (81 percent) but, while statistically significant, these differences are not substantial since vast majorities of Latinos indicate that being a distinct group is important to them.⁷

There are no statistical differences between Latinos of these Ethno-ideologies on the core beliefs of desire to return. At least three-fourths of Latinos of all ideological subscriptions do not have a desire to return.

⁷ Statistical differences are determined using a chi-square analysis, and it is available upon request.

Table 3.9.2. Core Beliefs by Ethno-Ideology

	All Latinos	Pan-ethnic	Co-ethnic	Ethnic
Core Beliefs				
<i>Identity (Importance of keeping a distinct culture)</i>				
Very Important	78	81	76	75
Somewhat Important	18	17	20	17
Not Important	3	2	4	8
<i>Desire to Return to Country of Origin</i>				
No	76	77	75	76
Yes	24	23	25	24
<i>Linked Fate</i>				
“How much does YOU doing well depend on how other Latinos also (<i>sic</i>) doing well?”(Personal linked fate)				
A lot	43	50	37	25
Some	25	28	24	7
Little	16	11	20	31
Nothing	16	11	19	36
“How much does LATINOS doing well depend on how other Latinos also (<i>sic</i>) doing well?” (Group linked fate)				
A lot	49	55	45	27
Some	28	32	26	11
Little	14	8	19	34
Nothing	9	5	10	28
<i>Commonalities with Other Minorities</i>				
“Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?”				
A lot	23	27	18	18
Some	37	39	37	24
Little	24	20	27	36
Nothing	16	14	18	22
“Thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and representation, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?”				
A lot	20	24	16	17
Some	36	39	34	22
Little	30	26	34	35
Nothing	15	12	17	26

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Table 3.9.2. Core Beliefs by Ethno-Ideology (Continued)

	All Latinos	Pan-ethnic	Co-ethnic	Ethnic
<i>Core American Values</i>				
American Dream:				
“Latinos can get ahead in the United States if they work hard”				
Strongly Agree	77	77	76	76
Somewhat Agree	19	18	19	18
Somewhat Disagree	2	3	2	3
Strongly Disagree	2	2	2	4
Personal Responsibility:				
“Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame”				
Strongly Agree	50	49	50	59
Somewhat Agree	22	22	23	16
Somewhat Disagree	15	15	15	12
Strongly Disagree	13	13	12	12
Equal Opportunity:				
“Is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others”				
Strongly Agree	36	34	36	46
Somewhat Agree	22	22	21	18
Somewhat Disagree	19	19	20	18
Strongly Disagree	23	24	23	19

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

On the core belief of linked fate, Latinos have major differences depending on their ideological views. Moreover, the directions and extent of these differences are consistent with the theory's expectations. Latinos who subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology are the most likely to believe that their own well-being depends on other Latinos' (78 percent) or that their groups' well-being depends on other Latinos doing well (87 percent). On the other hand, Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology are less likely to believe their own personal well-being and the well-being of their own ethnic groups are related to the well-being of all Latinos. About two-thirds (67 percent) of Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology believe that their personal well-being has little or nothing to do with other Latinos and a majority (52 percent) says the same about their own national origin groups. On both measures, Latinos who subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology fall in

the middle, though a strong majority agrees on both the personal (61 percent) and group (71 percent) measures of linked fate.

The same types of differences are found on the core belief of commonality with other minorities, in this case, African Americans. Consistent with expectations, pan-ethnic Latinos think they share the most in common socially (66 percent) and politically (63 percent) with African Americans. Similarly, a majority of Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology does not believe that Latinos have social (58 percent) or political (61 percent) commonalities with African Americans.

The beliefs of Latinos subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology regarding commonalities with African Americans fall in the middle of pan-ethnics and ethnics and follow a similar pattern to the results concerning Latino linked fate. A majority (55 percent) of co-ethnic Latinos believe that Latinos share “a lot” or “some” social commonalities with African Americans, while half (50 percent) believe they have political commonalities with African Americans.

Finally, beliefs on core American values mostly fall in line with the theory’s expectations. There are no significant differences regarding the American Dream —more than three quarters of Latinos, regardless of ideological inclination, agree that Latinos can get ahead if they work hard. On the other two core beliefs there are some significant differences, though these differences are not particularly strong. Although more than 7-in-10 Latinos of all ideologies agree “people should not blame the system if they do not succeed,” the extent to which they strongly agree to the statement varies according to expectations. Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology are the most likely to strongly agree with the statement measuring the value of personal responsibility,

while pan-ethnic Latinos were less likely to agree with the statement than ethnic-subscribing Latinos (49 percent vs. 59 percent).

Belief in the final core value (equal opportunity) is also widely shared among Latinos. On this value the difference is also a matter of intensity. Latinos subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology are the least likely to agree “that it is not a big problem that some people have more of a chance in life than others (34 percent),” while more than 4-in-10 (46 percent) of ethnic Latinos strongly agree with the statement. This difference in intensity may indicate dissatisfaction with their experiences in American society being higher among groups who exhibit the strongest levels of commonalities with other Latinos.

Demographic Characteristics and Latino Ethno-Ideologies

There are also some demographic differences by ideological subscription, shown in Table 3.9.3 (page 92). Those subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology are the youngest (33.8 years), not very different from Latinos subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology (34.3 years). Latinos who subscribe to an ethnic ideology are the oldest, on average, with a mean age of nearly 37 years (36.7), more than 3 years older than the average pan-ethnic subscriber.

Latinos subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology and an ethnic ideology also differ on educational attainment. Nearly half (47 percent) of Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology have less than high school education. Only one-third (33 percent) of Latinos subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology have less than a high school education and tend also to have the highest levels of education. Nearly 4-in-10 (38 percent) of pan-ethnic Latinos have at least some college education, 10 percentage points higher than the rate for ethnic Latinos (28 percent).

There are no major differences regarding the gender composition of the group, though Latinos who subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology have the greatest gender imbalance (54 percent are women, 46 percent are men).

Table 3.9.3. Demographic Characteristics by Ethno-Ideology

	All Latinos	Pan-ethnic	Co-ethnic	Ethnic
Demographic Characteristics				
Age (Means)	34.3	33.8	34.3	36.9
Educational Attainment				
None	2	2	2	5
Eighth grade or below	17	14	20	24
Some high school	17	17	16	18
GED	3	3	3	2
High school graduate	26	26	27	23
Some college	21	24	18	18
4 year college degree	8	9	8	6
Graduate/Professional Degree	5	5	5	4
Sex				
Men	47	48	46	50
Women	53	52	54	50
Generation				
First (born outside the U.S.)	65	64	65	70
Second (immigrant parents)	16	18	15	11
Third+ (U.S.-born parents)	19	19	20	19
Citizenship of Foreign-born				
Naturalized Citizen	19	21	17	16
Not Naturalized	81	79	83	84
Latino Ancestry/Origin				
Mexican	70	71	70	67
Central American	9	7	10	10
Puerto Rican	8	9	6	7
South American	4	4	5	5
Cuban	4	4	4	6
Dominican	4	4	4	2
Other/Don't know/Refused	2	2	2	3

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Latinos of all ethno-ideological inclinations are similarly likely to be third-generation Americans, meaning that they are children of parents who were also born in the United States. However, Latinos subscribing to an ethnic ideology are the most likely to be first-generation immigrants (70 percent), although about two thirds of co-ethnic (65 percent) and pan-ethnic Latinos (64 percent) are also first-generation.

Latinos who subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology are the most likely to be U.S.-born children of immigrant parents (18 percent), compared to 15 percent among co-ethnic and 11 percent among ethnic Latinos. While there are some minor differences among Latinos by country of origin, these are not significant.

The descriptive analysis of the variables measuring the cultural traits and core beliefs suggests that language use, linked fate, commonalities with African Americans, will have the greater impact on promoting a pan-ethnic ideology. This will be tested in several statistical models that are described in the next section and will be explored on chapter 4, 5, and 6.

Description of Statistical Analysis

OLS Regression

The analysis will consist in ordinary least squares OLS regressions. This method, though simple compared with other statistical methods in use today is perfectly suited to test dependent variables based on scales such as the ideology scale tested in this project.

The dependent variable, ideology, ranges from 0 to 1 (on a scale, see initial part of this chapter) where 0 indicates that the respondent has an ethnic ideology, this means, that people have no feelings of social or political commonalities with other Latinos. At the other end of the spectrum (1) is the pan-ethnic ideology. It is important to remember that the dependent variable is a scale,

and it is not a binary variable that only has values of “0” and “1.” Those who exhibit a pan-ethnic ideology feel socially and politically closer to other Latinos. Those with ideological scores toward the middle are classified as co-ethnic.

A negative association between the independent and dependent variables means that the higher the value of the independent variable, the lower the expected ideology score of the dependent variable. By contrast, if an independent variable is positively associated with the dependent variable, this means that the higher the score of this particular variable, the higher the pan-ethnicity score also will be⁸.

The analysis follows a series of OLS models built in order to highlight the progress of the analysis and the test of the relationships of the cultural traits and core beliefs on ideologies. The baseline model will include only the control variables of sex, age, and educational attainment, respondent’s citizenship status and if the respondent is a naturalized citizen. The next steps then is to add the set of variables related to cultural traits to the baseline model (Chapter 4), the set of variables related to core beliefs to the baseline model (Chapter 5) and then to present a full model including cultural traits and core beliefs. The change in the coefficients in the cultural traits and core beliefs accounts for the change in the relationship of the independent variables and the dependent variables and the robustness on the models’ explanatory power, as indicated through the R squares (for a similar analysis using nested models see Carrigall-Brown, Wilkes 2014, 413).

⁸ In addition to the OLS regression, these different methods were also employed: multinomial and ordinal regressions. The basic relationship between the dependent and the independent variables did not change substantially in the three models. For this reason, I decided to use the simplest and most straightforward of them. The results of the multinomial and the ordinal models are available in Appendix 3.1 for review.

Logistic Regression Analysis

In addition to the OLS models, I include logistic regression analyses exploring how the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics affect the three Latino-Ethno Ideologies (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic) individually. These analysis allow a more nuanced view of the variables influencing the Ethno-Ideologies in ways that the OLS analyses cannot. The logistic analysis take into account the existence of the discrete Ethno-Ideologies rather than just exploring a negative or positive relationship between the independent variables and the scale.

To construct the Ethno-Ideologies, I divide the scale into dichotomous variables in which the Ethno-Ideology of interest is coded “1” and the other two ethno-ideologies “0”. There will be three dependent variables, one for each Ethno-Ideology (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic and ethnic). The dependent variable in the *pan-ethnic model* indicates a coding of “1” if the Latino Ethno-Ideological score ranges from 0.750 to 1 and “0” for lower scores. The *co-ethnic model’s* dependent variable is coded as “1,” when the scale has a range between 0.313 and 0.688, and “0” for those subscribing to the other Ethno-Ideologies. Finally, Latinos subscribing to an *ethnic ideology* are coded “1” if they score between 0 and 0.25.

Focus group analysis

I complement the analysis of the LNS with qualitative data from focus groups conducted in 2013 by Public Religion Research Institute. The conversations in these focus groups include informative discussions about the role of the cultural traits such as religion and family in Latino identity. Moreover, participants also discussed the role that their identity as Latinos plays in their political decisions.

The 2013 focus groups were conducted in Phoenix, Arizona among Catholic, Protestant, and nonreligious Latinos (two groups of each), for a total of 12 groups, as part of PRRI's 2013 Hispanic Values Survey. Phoenix, located in a southwestern border state with a historic Latino population, helps understanding how this old Latino community interprets what binds them together and how much it matters politically.

These focus groups included specific discussions about Latino unity and linked fate, the importance of particular cultural traits such as religion, family, and language. The discussions in these groups provide insights about the importance of particular traits and beliefs in the construction of the Latino ideologies.⁹

The focus groups will provide qualitative evidence in the chapters related to the cultural traits and core beliefs. For example, the focus groups include extensive discussions about the meaning of family and family values which inform how the operationalization of family values in this study.

These groups have some limitations. They were conducted in Phoenix, Arizona, which is a good place, a historical Mexican-American community. But it is not necessarily generalizable to the experience of Latinos in the nation as a whole. This means that while the information that it provides can help shed light on the quantitative (survey) findings, these interpretations must be taken with caution.

Conclusion

⁹ See Appendix 3.2 for the interview guide of the focus groups.

This chapter described the process to select and code the variables that will be used to measure the ideologies in the Ethnic Ideological Heuristic. The dependent variable (ideology) measures how much Latinos feel they have in common with each other socially and politically.

The independent variables will measure the salience of four cultural traits and five core beliefs that are hypothesized to affect Latinos' ideology. In addition to the cultural traits and the core beliefs, there are a series of demographic characteristics that will work as control variables for the differences in nationality, citizenship, and generation that exist among Latinos.

Complementing the statistical models will be focus groups conducted among Latinos in 2013, this will provide context to the statistical findings. The following chapters will consist of the analyses of the cultural traits and core beliefs and their relationship to ideology.

Chapter 4. Cultural Traits: The Heritage that Binds

Chapter 3 described the data sources (2006 Latino National Survey, focus groups from Public Religion Research Institute), variables, and methodology for measuring and testing Latino Ethno-Ideologies. This chapter explores the influence of cultural traits on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies and core beliefs, and it is guided by two research questions: One, how do cultural traits affect Latinos' Ethno-Ideological subscription? And, two, how does the experience of living in America (core beliefs) vary according to Latinos' cultural traits?

The goal of the first question is to understand how the cultural traits affect the Latino Ethno-ideologies. I expect to find that three of the cultural traits (*Catholicism*, *primary language use*, and *Spanish media consumption*) are associated with the development of a *pan-ethnic* Latino Ethno-Ideology, as these should foster a sense of kinship or commonality among Latinos. The fourth cultural trait (*family values*), should be negatively associated with the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology because Latinos who support these values will feel a closer kinship with people who share their own national origin, which should produce a differentiation between them and other Latinos. The closer Latinos feel with family values of their own ethnic group should make them feel disconnected to the idea of sharing the values of “an imagined pan-ethnic Latino family” (Zazueta Martínez 2010, 163).

The goal of the second question is to explore the relationship between the cultural traits and the core beliefs. I expect to find variation in agreement with the different measures of core beliefs depending on Latinos' cultural traits. For example, Latinos who identify as Catholic should have different opinions than non-Catholics on the core beliefs that enhance feelings of commonalities among Latinos. Thus, I am, specifically, interested in knowing if Latinos who exhibit traits

associated with being Latino are more likely to agree with the core beliefs associated with Latino unity.

This chapter is divided in four sections. Section 1 consists of a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies by different values of the cultural traits: *Catholicism*, *primary language use*, *Spanish media consumption*, and *family values*. This analysis should find substantial differences in the distribution of their Ethno-Ideological subscription depending on their cultural traits. The second section consists of a regression analysis exploring the effect of the cultural traits on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. The regression analysis includes controls for the demographic characteristics of Latinos in order to gauge the isolated effect of the cultural traits. The purpose of this regression is to understand the predictive power of the cultural traits on Latino Ethno-Ideologies.

The third section consists of a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the core beliefs among Latinos, depending on their respective cultural traits. For example, I will show how Latinos who are primarily Spanish speakers, bilingual, or English speakers differ on their core beliefs. The chapter's final section is a conclusion summarizing the findings and a preview of Chapter 5.

The Relationship between Cultural Traits and Ideology

In Chapter 3 I explained the construction of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, which consists of a scale that ranks Latinos according to how much in common they think they have with each other. Using the 2006 Latino National Survey, I developed a Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale using questions that ask Latinos about how much in common they have on two respects: political (such as representation and participation in government) and social (such as income, educational

attainment, and employment). These variables produced a scale that ranges from “0” (no commonalities) to “1” (agree that Latinos have “a lot” in common on all dimensions).


From the scale I divided Latinos into three distinct Ethno-Ideologies that vary according to the extent that Latinos think they share commonalities. A majority (53 percent) of Latinos subscribe to a *pan-ethnic* ideology (score: 0.750-1), meaning that they think Latinos share “some” or “a lot” in common. An additional 39 percent subscribe to a *co-ethnic* ideology (score: 0.313-0.688), which means that they think that Latinos have “some” or “a lot” in common in some aspects but not in others. Finally, 8 percent of Latinos subscribe to an *ethnic* ideology (score: 0-0.250). These respondents think that Latinos share “almost nothing” or “nothing” in common with each other. The Latino Ethno-Ideologies Theory predicts that cultural traits that bind Latinos together are associated with fostering a pan-ethnic ideology.

The four cultural traits binding Latinos are (1) *Catholicism*, (2) *the use of Spanish language*, (3) *consumption of Spanish-language media*, and (4) *family values*. I expect that Latinos who have the most distinctive “Latino” cultural traits like speaking Spanish, consuming Spanish-language news media, and identifying with the Catholic religion are more likely to develop a pan-ethnic ideology. By contrast, *family values*—measured as transnational ties by keeping constant contact with family and friends through recent travel to their country of origin or ancestry—should be less likely to feel a sense of commonality between Latinos of different nationalities because of how recent they stay in touch with their ethnic roots which makes them see more distinctions between Latinos of different national origins.

Descriptive Analysis

Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of Latino Ethno-Ideologies by cultural traits. The ideology scale ranges from "0," which indicates that the respondent does not think Latinos share anything in common, to "1" indicating that the respondents believe there are a lot of commonalities between all Latinos. Depending on their score, Latinos are grouped into three distinct Ethno-Ideologies: *ethnic*, *co-ethnic*, and *pan-ethnic*. Overall, as shown in Figure 4.1, a majority (53 percent) of Latinos have a pan-ethnic ideology, about 4-in-10 (39 percent) have a co-ethnic ideology, and less than one-tenth (8 percent) have an ethnic ideology. There is no major variation among Latinos with different cultural traits with some exceptions.

Figure 4.1. Distribution of Ideology by Cultural Traits



Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Catholicism

Catholicism should be associated with a pan-ethnic ideology because it is a trait that many Latinos share regardless of national origin or ancestry, a legacy of Spanish colonial heritage (Garcia and Sanchez 2008, 41). Yet, according to Figure 4.1 (above), Catholic Latinos do not differ substantially from non-Catholic Latinos in their Ethno-Ideological subscription. Both Catholic and non-Catholic Latinos are equally likely to subscribe to an ethnic ideology (8 percent for both). Non-Catholic Latinos are slightly more likely to subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology than Catholics (40 percent and 38 percent, respectively). Catholic Latinos have a slightly higher percentage of pan-ethnic subscription than non-Catholics (54 percent vs. 52 percent). These findings suggest that identifying with the Catholic religion is a cultural trait that, although produces a slightly higher propensity for pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription, is not substantially different from the Ethno-Ideological subscription of non-Catholics.

Everyday Language Use

Language is a trait also expected to be positively associated with a pan-ethnic ideology, as it binds Latinos through generations and countries. The results from Figure 4.1 (on page 100) show that language is an important building bloc of the ethno-ideologies, but the results are mixed. It is expected that those who communicate in Spanish should be more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology. This is partially the case. A majority of bilingual Latinos (60 percent) subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology, the highest among cultural traits. By contrast, Latinos whose dominant language is Spanish are significantly less likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology. Instead, 47 percent of Latinos whose dominant language is Spanish subscribe to a pan-ethnic identity. Moreover, Latinos compared to all other cultural trait categories, who primarily speak Spanish are the most likely to subscribe to an ethnic ideology (10 percent), in which Latinos think they

share nothing in common, though this difference is not significant when compared to the 9 percent of English-dominant Latinos, who also subscribe to an ethnic ideology.

This means that bilingual respondents have greater commonalities and feel closer to Latinos in all social and political aspects. The impact of speaking Spanish does not necessarily produce a pan-ethnic ideology all the time. The expectation that language binds Latinos and produces a pan-ethnic ideology is true among bilingual Latinos but not among monolingual Latinos of either language.

Spanish Media Consumption

Figure 4.1 (on page 100) also shows that Latinos who consume news in Spanish are no more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than Latinos who only consume their news in English (53 percent vs. 54 percent). While the birth and growth of Spanish-language media targets an ample public of Latinos who prefer news and television delivered in Spanish, the use of Spanish language media does not seem to motivate the feeling that Latinos shared a lot of commonalities in a way that deviates from the percentages of Latinos overall. This suggests that, despite being predicted as a cultural trait that should foster feelings of commonality among Latinos, Spanish-language media consumption does not play a substantial role in increasing those feelings of political and social commonalities, compared to Latinos who only consume English-language media.

Family Values

The final cultural trait, *family values*, is measured using how recent was the last visit to their home countries in Latin America. In Figure 4.1 (page 100) the variable is collapsed into two categories: recent travel (within the last three years) and those who last visited 5 years or more

ago or have never visited. Latinos who traveled within the past three years to their country of origin are *more likely* to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than those who last visited 5 years or more ago or have not traveled at all. A majority (56 percent) of Latinos who have traveled recently to visit family and friends in their country of ancestry subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology, whereas only 51 percent of Latinos who report to have last visited 5 years or more ago or never have a pan-ethnic ideology. These differences are surprising because, contrary to the theory's expectations, they suggest that family ties and more recent connections to the old country do not strengthen Latinos' identification with their own group and do not undermine a sense of commonality with other Latinos. Instead, recent contact with family and friends through travel abroad *enhances* the feelings of commonality with other Latinos and more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than originally expected.

Overall, the descriptive analysis of the cultural traits and their relationship with ideology suggests that only two of the four cultural traits –language use and family values- have a positive association with a pan-ethnic ideology. Given the expectation that the usage of the Spanish language should lead to a perception of commonality among Latinos, the fact that those who primarily speak Spanish are less likely to be ideologically pan-ethnic than Latinos overall suggests that Spanish language alone may not be the main linguistic driver of pan-ethnic ideology. It must be noted, however, that 60 percent of bilingual Latinos subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology, the most likely of any group. This suggests that, while Spanish monolingualism is not necessarily a harbinger of pan-ethnic ideology, the Spanish language still has a role in the development of pan-ethnicity as an ideology.

The unique profile of bilingual Latinos in combination with the also distinctive profile of Latinos who traveled recently to visit relatives in the country of ancestry, 56 percent of whom also have a

pan-ethnic ideology (Table 4.1 in page 107), suggests that being in contact with one's roots may be important for the development of a pan-ethnic ideology. These two findings put forward the idea that an ability to move across worlds, literally through travel and figuratively through language, is an important aspect of nurturing the perceptions of commonalities among Latinos of different national origins and backgrounds.

Whether these prominent relationships will remain as strong in a multivariate statistical analysis is the goal of the next part of this section, which consists of a regression analysis to calculate the effect of the cultural traits on the Ethno-Ideologies.

Multivariate Analysis

To assess the effects of the cultural traits on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies I will use two OLS regression models. The dependent variable, Ethno-Ideology, consists of a scale that ranges from "0" to "1" and indicates how much Latinos think they have in common with each other on social aspects such as education and income, as well as in political aspects like representation. Latinos scoring closer to "0" think that Latinos do not share any of these characteristics, while those scoring closer to "1" think Latinos share all of them¹⁰.

The model includes measures for the cultural traits and demographic characteristics. The baseline model includes only the demographic characteristics, while the cultural model includes the demographic characteristics along with the cultural traits. This way it is possible to assess first how much of the variance in Ethno-ideologies is due to the demographic differences between Latinos and then how much of the variance is explained by the cultural traits.

¹⁰ The dependent variable as currently construed is interpreted as an understanding of how close or separated individual Latinos feel toward other Latinos. In Chapter 6, I include logistic analyses that explain how the independent variables relate to each of the three Latino Ethno-Ideologies.

Measuring Cultural Traits

The variables measuring the cultural traits are as follows. *Catholicism* is measured by a dichotomous variable that indicates if the respondent identifies as Catholic (1) or not (0).

Everyday language use is measured by two dichotomous variables. The first variable indicates if the respondent is bilingual (1) or not (0), the second variable if the respondent is primarily a Spanish-speaker (1) or not (0). These variables are compared to the baseline, which indicates if the respondent is primarily an English-speaker.

The third cultural trait, *Spanish media consumption*, is also a dichotomous variable that indicates (1) if the respondent consumes news in Spanish (or in Spanish and English), or (0) that the respondent only consumes media in English. Finally, *family values*, consists of a continuous variable indicating how recent the respondent traveled to his or her home country to visit. The lowest possible value is “0” and means that the respondent “never travels” to the home country. The highest possible value is “5” indicating that the respondent reports traveling “more than once a year.”

Measuring Demographic Characteristics

The models include controls for selected demographic. The *sex* variable indicates if the respondent is a woman (1) or a man (0). The *age* variable indicates the age of the respondent in years. The *education* variable is continuous and indicates the respondent’s educational attainment which ranges from (0) “no formal schooling” to (7) “graduate or professional degree.”

Naturalized citizen is a dichotomous variable indicating if the respondent is foreign-born but became a U.S. citizen through naturalization. *Generation* indicates how many generations removed from immigration respondents are, and it is measured using three dichotomous variables. *First generation* indicates that the respondent was born outside the U.S. or Puerto

Rico (1) or not (0), *second generation* indicates that the respondent was born in the U.S. or Puerto Rico of parents born outside the U.S. (1) or not (0). The baseline for these variables is *third generation*, indicating if respondents are U.S.-born children of parents born in the U.S. (1) or not (0). Finally, *Ancestry* indicates if the respondent was born in or has ancestry from the following countries or regions: Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, South America, Central America, or has any other Latino ancestry with the exception of Mexican ancestry, which is the baseline category. All of these ancestry variables are dichotomous and indicate if the respondent is of a particular national origin (1) or not (0).

Baseline Model Results

Model 1 in Table 4.1 (page 107) shows the baseline model, which only controls for the demographic characteristics. Because the continuous scale ranges from 0 (ethnic) to 1 (pan-ethnic) a positive coefficient in the independent variables indicates a positive association with the Ethno-Ideologies, suggesting that such a variable is associated with a greater association with a pan-ethnic ideology. A negative association of the covariates indicates a decrease in the Ethno-Ideology score, suggesting that such a variable moves away from a pan-ethnic ideology and towards an ethnic ideology. For example, when a respondent has a characteristic indicated by an independent dichotomous variable, such as being a woman, the Ethno-Ideological score will increase (or decrease) according to the coefficient. In the case of a continuous variable like education, an increase (or decrease) in one unit is associated with an increase or decrease in the Ethno-Ideological score. Because the dependent variable's score ranges from "0" to "1" on a continuous scale, the changes can be interpreted as a percentage increase or decrease in the score.

Table 4.1 OLS Regression Analysis Effects of Cultural Traits and Demographic Characteristics on Ethno-Ideologies

Variables	[1] Baseline Model			[2] Addition of Cultural Traits to Model		
	Coeff.	(SE)		Coeff.	(SE)	
Cultural Traits						
<i>Catholicism</i>				0.014	(0.006)	*
<i>Everyday language use</i>						
Spanish				-0.012	(0.014)	
Bilingual				0.042	(0.012)	***
<i>Spanish media consumption</i>				0.033	(0.008)	***
<i>Family Values</i>				0.005	(0.002)	**
Demographic Controls						
<i>Sex (Woman)</i>	0.007	(0.006)		0.007	0.006	
			**			
<i>Age</i>	-0.001	(0.000)	*	-0.001	0.000	**
			**			
<i>Education</i>	0.008	(0.002)	*	0.007	0.002	***
			**			
<i>Naturalized citizen</i>	0.037	(0.008)	*	0.017	0.008	*
<i>Generations removed from immigration</i>						
First generation	-0.004	(0.009)		-0.003	0.011	
Second generation	0.021	(0.010)	*	0.007	0.010	
<i>Latino ancestry</i>						
Puerto Rican ancestry	0.023	(0.011)	*	0.021	0.011	
Cuban ancestry	-0.012	(0.015)		0.011	0.015	
Dominican ancestry	0.026	(0.014)		0.022	0.014	
Central American ancestry	-0.028	(0.011)	*	-0.023	0.011	*
South American ancestry	-0.034	(0.014)	*	-0.034	0.014	*
			**			
Other ancestry	-0.076	(0.021)	*	-0.066	0.022	**
			**			
Constant	0.672	(0.014)	*	0.618	0.016	***
R ²	0.02			0.03		
Number of Observations	7,090			6,928		
Robust standard errors in parentheses						
* p≤0.05, ** p≤0.01, *** p≤0.001						

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

The baseline model in Table 4.1 shows that sex has no significant effect on ethno-ideologies, while age is negatively associated with the Ethno-Ideological scale ($p \leq 0.001$). This means that an increase in age (or the older the respondent) corresponds with a negative impact on pan-ethnic ideology, and that, everything else being equal, younger Latinos are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than older Latinos. Educational attainment is positively associated with the ethno-ideology ($p \leq 0.001$). This means that the ethno-ideological score of a Latino with a law or

medical degree is 5.6 percentage points higher than the ethno-ideological score of a Latino with no formal education, everything else being equal, and corresponds also to an increase in the ethno ideological scale.¹¹

Being a naturalized U.S. citizen is associated with an increase of 3.7 percentage points in a respondent's ethno-ideological score ($p \leq 0.001$). There are also modest generational differences. A respondent who identifies as a second-generation Latino (U.S.-born child of immigrant parents) has an ethno-ideology score 2.1 percentage points higher ($p \leq 0.05$) than a third-generation Latino (U.S.-born child of U.S.-born parents). However, there are no significant differences between third-generation Latinos and first-generation immigrants.

Finally, on the ancestry identification variables, having a Puerto Rican ancestry is associated with a modest, but significant increase in the ethno-ideological score, compared to Latinos of Mexican ancestry ($p \leq 0.05$). By contrast, reporting a Central American, South American, or other Latino ancestry is negatively associated with the ethno-ideological score, compared to those of Mexican ancestry.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) of the baseline model is 0.02. This value indicates that the baseline model containing only demographic variables explains 2 percent of the variance in the ethno-ideological scale, dependent variable.

Cultural Traits Model

Model 2 in Table 4.1 (page 107) includes the variables measuring the cultural traits as well as the demographic variables. Once again, the dependent variable is the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale

¹¹ Since the dependent variable is based on a scale that ranges from 0-1, the changes in the coefficients of the independent variables can be interpreted as percentage changes.

and runs from “0” to “1,” as a categorical variable. The lowest value means that Latinos do not think they share any social or political characteristics and is associated with an ethnic, Ethno-Ideology. The highest value indicates that the respondent thinks that Latinos share a lot in common politically and socially. This is associated with a pan-ethnic, Ethno-Ideology.

The results from Model 2 in Table 4.1 (page 107) show that all of the cultural traits have a positive and significant association with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The descriptive analysis in the previous section (Figure 4.1 in page 100) shows that the differences between Catholics and non-Catholics in their Ethno-Ideological distribution were very small, as both groups tend to be equally likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology. However, the results from Model 2 in Table 4.1 show that, even with this small difference, Catholicism’s effect on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale is positive and significant ($p \leq 0.05$). This means that identifying with the Catholic religion is associated with an increase in the Ethno-Ideological Scale.

The relationship between everyday language use and ethno-ideologies is more complex. Being a Spanish-speaker should be associated with a greater sense of commonalities among Latinos, but the coefficient for Spanish-speakers is negative but not significant, meaning that compared to Latinos who primarily speak English, those who primarily speak Spanish are no different in their ethno-ideological scores. However, compared to English-dominant Latinos, being bilingual is positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale. This means that being bilingual increases a person’s Ethno-Ideological Score by 4.1 percentage points ($p \leq 0.001$), all else being equal. The effect of being bilingual is the strongest of any variable in these models.

Consumption of Spanish-language media, as expected, is positively associated with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale ($p \leq 0.001$). This means that Latinos who consume media in Spanish

have, all else being equal, ethno-ideological scores that are 3.3 percentage points higher than Latinos who solely consume media in English. This finding also suggests that media consumption in Spanish serves as a building block of a pan-ethnic ideology, fostering a sense of commonality among Latinos.

The final cultural trait, family values, also shows a positive and significant association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale ($p \leq 0.01$). Latinos who visit family more than once a year in the country of ancestry have, all else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological Score 2.5 percentage points higher than Latinos who have never visited their land of ancestry. Contrary to what I expected, having transnational family connections also influences positively the development of a pan-ethnic ideology.

The results of the Cultural Traits Model (Model 2) confirm the hypotheses that the cultural traits are generally associated with the development of a pan-ethnic ideology. In one case, the cultural trait of family values positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale. This finding is contrary to the expectation that Latinos who travel often to their country of origin should tend to subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology because they should feel a closer kinship to their own ancestry group rather than the larger Latino community.

In the case of everyday language usage, Latinos who primarily speak Spanish are no different in their Ethno-Ideological Scores than Latinos whose primary language is English. However, Latinos who are bilingual have Ethno-Ideological Scores that are significantly higher from Latinos who primarily speak English.

The results from the statistical test of these two cultural traits (*bilingual everyday language use* and *family values*) suggest that the development of a pan-ethnic ideology is associated with the

ability of navigating cultures linguistically and with staying in touch with their roots through frequent travel. Latinos who travel often tend to have, all else being equal, higher ethno-ideological scores than Latinos who travel less often; bilingual Latinos have, all else being equal, higher Ethno-Ideological scores than Latinos who speak only the English language (the comparison does not account for differences in being bilingual and speaking Spanish). Moreover, the consumption of Spanish-language media is also a harbinger of a pan-ethnic ideology as it is also associated with higher Ethno-Ideological scores. Finally, Catholicism is also positively associated with a respondent Ethno-Ideological score. The combined effect of all the cultural traits at their highest values increases the ethno-ideological score by 11.4 percentage points.

Comparing the Baseline and the Cultural Traits Models

The addition of the cultural traits (Model 2 on page 102) to the baseline demographic model impacts the effect of some of the demographic characteristics on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. For example, the effect of being a naturalized citizen halves from 0.037 ($p \leq 0.001$) to 0.017 ($p \leq 0.05$). The generational effect (being a second-generation Latino) also reduces substantially from 0.021 ($p \leq 0.05$) to 0.007 and loses its significance. The ancestry effects also change to a lesser extent. The effect of having a Puerto Rican ancestry loses its statistical significance. However, although the effects of having a Central American ($p \leq 0.05$), South American ($p \leq 0.01$), or other Latino ancestry ($p \leq 0.001$) also decline, their relationship to the Ethno-ideological Scale is still negative and significant.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) of the Cultural Traits model is 0.03, is not substantially higher than the R^2 of the baseline model ($R^2=0.02$) though the differences are statistically

significant.¹² Thus, while the effects of the cultural traits are significant and positive, their impact on the ethno-ideologies is modest, at best, since it explains just 3 percent of the variance in the Ethno-Ideological Scale compared to the 2 percent explained by the baseline model. This result calls into question the importance of cultural traits in fostering Latino unity, whether by creating a pan-ethnic identity as expected from the literature or, as expected from this study, a pan-ethnic ideology because the explanatory power of the cultural traits is smaller than the explanatory power of just Latinos' demographic characteristics.

In the next section, I explore the relationship between the cultural traits and the core beliefs by looking at the variation in the distribution of the core beliefs by the different cultural traits. This analysis should show whether Latinos' variation in cultural traits suggests a variation in Latinos' core beliefs.

The Relationship between Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs

In addition to the four cultural traits, there are five core beliefs salient to the development of ideologies among Latinos. These five core beliefs are the (1) importance of identity (2) desire to return to the country of ancestry (3) a sense of linked fate with other Latinos (4) a belief in commonalities with other minorities such as African Americans and (5) belief in core American values such as the American Dream, personal responsibility, and equality of opportunity.

The relationship between the cultural traits and the core beliefs is that they reinforce each other. The cultural traits represent the reasons *why* Latinos should see commonalities among them; they have similar origins, share a language and a religion, and consume similar media content. The core beliefs are attitudes that are acquired through the *experience* of living in the United States.

¹² The significant is the result of an F-test. Results are available upon request.

When combined these two concepts produce a sense of commonality among Latinos that develop ethno-ideologies, sorting Latinos into different camps based on their perceptions of those commonalities.

Table 4.2 (page 114), shows the cultural traits in columns and the core beliefs in rows. The rows show concepts in bolded letters, which indicate the core beliefs. For instance, the core belief *importance of identity* is measured by the percentage of Latinos who say that keeping a distinct culture is very important to them. The first column indicates the distribution of the core beliefs among all Latinos.

For example, 78 percent of Latinos say that it is important to keep a distinct culture in America. The other columns encapsulate the cultural traits: column 2 shows the percentage of Catholic Latinos who say that keeping a distinct culture is very important to them (80 percent).

Catholicism (Columns 2-3)

Compared to non-Catholic Latinos, those who identify as Catholic should have attitudes suggestive of Latino unity, since it is a cultural trait salient to Latino identity. Yet, Table 4.2 shows that on most core beliefs, the differences between Catholic and non-Catholic Latinos are within 5-percentage points of each other, meaning that their differences of opinion are a matter of intensity. Catholic and non-Catholic Latinos tend to believe in the core beliefs, but the size of the majorities who agree varies. The greatest differences, of 5 percentage points, are on importance of identity and on linked fate. Eighty percent of Catholics believe it is very important to keep a distinct culture, whereas 74 percent of non-Catholics believe this is very important. On both measurements of linked fate (personal and group levels) there are differences of 5 percentage points between Catholics and non-Catholics.

Table 4.2. Distribution of Core Beliefs by Cultural Traits

	Religion			Primary Language Use			Spanish Media Consumption		Family Values	
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
	<i>All</i>	<i>Catholic</i>	<i>Not Catholic</i>	<i>Spanish</i>	<i>Bilingual</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>Spanish</i>	<i>English Only</i>	<i>Last Travel ≥ 5 Years</i>	<i>Last Travel ≤ 3 years</i>
Core beliefs <i>Unweighted N=</i>	<i>8,634</i>	<i>6,157</i>	<i>2,477</i>	<i>3, 776</i>	<i>4,205</i>	<i>653</i>	<i>5,944</i>	<i>2,610</i>	<i>4,492</i>	<i>3,959</i>
<i>Importance of Identity</i>										
Very important to keep distinct culture	78	80	74	81	78	64	82	71	77	80
<i>Desire to Return</i>										
Do NOT wants to return	76	75	79	61	85	94	69	91	76	76
<i>Linked Fate</i>										
Latinos' well-being connected*	68	69	64	76	65	45	75	52	67	69
Ethnic group well-being connected to Latinos'*	77	78	73	82	75	61	81	68	76	78
<i>Commonalities with other groups</i>										
Share social commonalities with African Americans*	60	59	63	46	67	75	59	72	59	61
Share political commonalities with African Americans*	56	55	57	45	61	71	51	65	56	55
<i>Core American Values</i>										
<i>American Dream: Hard work to get ahead**</i>	95	96	95	97	94	92	96	93	96	95
<i>Personal Responsibility: People who don't succeed should blame themselves**</i>	73	73	71	72	73	75	71	76	73	72
<i>Equal Opportunity: It is a big problem that some people have better chance**</i>	43	41	47	33	48	60	37	54	42	43

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

*Numbers indicate "some" or "a lot."

**Numbers indicate "agree" or "strongly agree."

Sixty-nine percent of Catholic Latinos feel that their well-being is personally connected to Latino's well-being, while 64 percent of non-Catholic Latinos feel that their well-being is connected to all Latinos. There is a similar pattern for the case of ethnic linked fate. Seventy-eight percent of Catholic Latinos feel that their ethnic group's well-being is connected to all Latinos' well-being, whereas 73 percent of non-Catholic Latinos also feels this connection.

Non-Catholic Latinos are less positive on the *core American value* of equal opportunity. Nearly half (47 percent) of non-Catholic Latinos think it is a big problem that some people have a better chance in life, a sentiment shared by 41 percent of Catholic Latinos. These findings suggest that Catholicism is not a trait that leads Latinos to interpret, or experience, life in America in very different ways than non-Catholic Latinos. In sum, Latino Catholics and non-Catholics have some differences of opinion, but these are mostly a matter of intensity as these groups are not strikingly apart from each other.

Everyday Language Use (Columns 4-6)

The largest differences between Latinos on the core belief of the importance of being a distinct group in America are language-related. With the exception of the *core American values* of the American Dream and personal responsibility, in which the differences between English-dominant and Spanish-dominant Latinos are of 5-percentage points and 2-percentage points, respectively, on most of the other core beliefs the gap between Latinos of different language proficiency surpasses a 20-percentage point gap. Latinos who are bilingual *always* fall between both monolingual cohorts, meaning that the extent of their agreement with the core beliefs falls between the percentages of Spanish and English monolinguals.

Spanish-monolingual Latinos are the most likely to agree that it is very important to keep a distinct culture (81 percent), while nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of English-monolingual Latinos also say this is a very important core belief. These language differences indicate that although on balance most Latinos consider their cultural identity to be important, language may be a contentious issue in *latinidad* as far as English-monolingual Latinos feeling left out of the culture.

The second-largest gap –of 31-percentage points– between Spanish monolingual and English monolingual Latinos is on *linked fate*, specifically on the belief that the well-being of *all Latinos* is connected. More than three-quarters (76 percent) of Spanish-dominant Latinos and nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of bilingual Latinos think that Latinos’ collective fate is linked compared to less than half (45 percent) of English-dominant Latinos. The difference between monolingual Spanish and English speakers on the other measure of *linked fate*, that their ethnic groups’ well-being is linked to that of all Latinos, is smaller though still wide. In this case, majorities of both linguistic cohorts agree but differ on the intensity of their agreement: 82 percent of monolingual Spanish-speakers, 75 percent of bilingual speakers, and 61 percent of English monolingual Latinos. Simply put, English monolinguals have the lowest levels of agreement with the measures of linked fate.

Interestingly, on another core belief, the response patterns are reversed. On the core belief of *commonalities with other racial minorities*, English-dominant Latinos are the most likely to agree that Latinos share social or political characteristics with African Americans. Less than half (46 percent) of Spanish-dominant Latinos say they share social commonalities with African Americans compared to two-thirds (67 percent) of bilingual Latinos and three-quarters of English-monolingual Latinos. Similarly, only 45 percent of Spanish monolingual Latinos say

they share political commonalities with African Americans. By contrast, 61 percent of bilingual Latinos and 71 percent of English monolingual Latinos say they share political characteristics with the African American community.

Finally, monolingual English speakers are more likely to say that it is a problem that some people have a better chance in life (60 percent), nearly twice as likely as Spanish-language monolingual Latinos (33 percent).

What these differences suggest is that language matters in the way that Latinos experience life in America. Latinos who primarily speak English and those whose dominant language is Spanish see life in America in different ways and relate to other Latinos and other groups, and their countries of ancestry in ways that lead them in different directions.

Interestingly, bilingual Latinos are always in the middle, but their opinions also *always* align in the direction that should lead to a pan-ethnic ideology according to the theory. This means that on the variables measuring the core beliefs, bilingual Latinos' opinions are constantly in agreement with beliefs that should enhance a sense of commonality among Latinos.

Spanish Media Consumption (Columns 7-8)

Table 4.2 (on page 114) shows that there are some substantial differences by language of media consumption that are similar, though not as wide to those experienced by language usage. The response patterns are similar on core beliefs, where Spanish-dominant Latinos are more likely to agree or to think they share commonalities with other Latinos, Latinos who consume Spanish-language media respond in a similar direction, while the reverse is true for Latinos who only consume English-language media.

In this case, however, the differences are matter of intensity. For example, a majority of Latinos who consume Spanish-language media and only English-language media think that Latinos' well-being is connected to each other, though to a different extent. While three-quarters (75 percent) of Latinos who consume Spanish-language media believe in Latinos' sense of linked fate, a slim majority (52 percent) of Latinos who only consume English-language media agree. So, Spanish-language media engenders a greater sense of group linked fate among Latinos.

In the case of political commonalities with African Americans, a slim majority (51 percent) of Spanish-language media consumers think Latinos share these aspects, while 65 percent of those who only consume English-language media think so, as well. This suggest that Spanish-language media does not cover issues in the community in a way that engenders a sense of commonality between Latinos and other groups, such as African Americans. Yet, among Latinos who only consume English-language media, the agreement of having political commonalities with African Americans increase. This finding taps into Kaufmann's (2013, 202) concept of a "pan-minority affiliation." The pan-minority affiliation may only be part of the English media based since this media may treat all minorities as a whole and members of the public who identify with any of these groups (African American, Asian American, Latinos, etc.) should feel identified with the portrayal. The differences in media consumption suggest that this trait influences how Latinos experience their lives in America and affects the extent to which Latinos feel they have common characteristics.

Family Values

There are no major differences between Latinos who travel often (within the last three years) and those who rarely or never do. These Latinos are equally likely to agree on the core beliefs. This lack of difference suggests that staying in touch with family through travel, while having a

positive and a significant association with the Ethno-Ideologies (as seen in Table 4.1 on page 100), do not lead to different experiences of living in America to the extent that language does.

In summary, Latinos who are Catholic are not much different from non-Catholics on their agreement with the different core beliefs, the same patterns occurs among Latinos who have traveled recently and those who have not traveled in the past five years. These results suggest that these traits do not lead Latinos to experience life in America in different ways.

By contrast, Latinos who primarily speak Spanish and those who primarily speak English, have divergent views regarding the core beliefs. For example, Latinos who are primarily Spanish speakers are more likely to believe in *linked fate* at the personal and collective levels. However, English-dominant Latinos are more likely to believe that they share political and social commonalities with African Americans.

Conclusion

This chapter provided descriptive and regression analyses of the relationship between the cultural traits with ideology. In addition, there was a preliminary descriptive analysis of the cultural traits and the core beliefs.

The descriptive analysis of the relationship between the cultural traits and the Latino Ethno-Ideologies indicate that Latinos conforming to two of the cultural traits, *everyday language use (bilingualism)* and *family values*, have a distinct ideological profile: pan-ethnic.

Contrary to the theory's expectations, *Catholicism* does not seem to be a trait that differentiates Latinos in the development of a pan-ethnic, Ethno-Ideology, as similar majorities of Catholic and non-Catholic Latinos subscribe to a pan-ethnic, Ethno-Ideology. The same occurs with the

consumption of Spanish-language media: there are no major differences in ethno-ideological subscription between Latinos who get their news in Spanish and those who consume news only in English. This finding places doubt on the purported importance of Latino-oriented media in bringing Latinos together, fostering sense of commonality between Latinos of different nationalities.

The usage of Spanish language was also expected to be associated with the promotion of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription, and while bilingual Latinos lend some credibility to the importance of language on the development of a pan-ethnic ideology, the lack of substantial differences between monolingual English and Spanish speakers in their distribution of ideologies suggests that there is more to the Spanish language than just a matter of usage. Finally, while the Latino Ethno-Ideologies Theory hypothesized that family values, measured as frequent family contact through transnational connections, will decrease feelings of commonality with other Latinos the opposite is true: a majority of Latinos who travel frequently subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology.

The cultural traits regression model indicates that identifying as Catholic, being bilingual, consuming Spanish-language media, and traveling more frequently to their country of ancestry are positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale and are building blocks of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. This means, that Latinos with these specific traits are more likely to say that Latinos have some or a lot in common on matters of education and income, as well as on matters of political representation.

The last section consisted of a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the core beliefs by the cultural traits. The results show that there are substantial differences depending on Latinos'

cultural traits, particularly language. English-speaking and Spanish speaking Latinos differ drastically on core beliefs such as linked fate and commonalities with African Americans. Monolingual Spanish-speaking Latinos are more likely to agree on core values such as *linked fate* and *importance of identity* that should enhance the sense of commonality among Latinos. Yet, on others such as *commonalities with other groups*, English monolingual Latinos are the ones who feel they have more in common with African Americans. Moreover, although the differences on *core American values* between these two groups of Latinos are negligible, on the core value of equal opportunity, English monolingual Latinos are the most skeptical about it.

In other words, English monolingual Latinos are less likely to believe there is equal opportunity in society. As Fraga, *et al.* (2010, 74–75) indicate, the value of equality among Latinos is hard to disentangle from their support for the values of personal responsibility and the American Dream. The findings in this chapter indicate that Latinos do not strongly believe that there is an equal chance in American society, suggesting that they experience inequality in their everyday life. This feeling should be associated with the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology as Latinos realize that their chances are limited not by their individual characteristics but by their generally ascribed commonalities.

The differences in core beliefs between Latinos regarding language usage are also present by language of media consumption. The size of the differences of opinion regarding core beliefs between English monolingual and Spanish monolingual Latinos and between Spanish-media and English-media consumers, suggests that Latinos who use different languages experience life in America in different ways. These two conflicting trends, Spanish monolinguals' greater sense of linked fate and the English monolinguals' stronger sense of commonalities with African Americans, may be behind the similar ideological subscriptions of both groups. The differences

in core beliefs by the cultural traits suggest that *latinidad*'s usefulness as a political tool is limited because the experiences of Latinos vary so much, particularly on language, which is supposed to be the greatest unifying force.

In the next chapter I will explore the relationship between the core beliefs and ideology and the differences in the cultural traits among Latinos who agree with the core beliefs. The analysis in Chapter 6 will fully explore these relationships and indicate if the descriptive analysis also holds with a more complex multivariate analysis.

Chapter 5. Core Beliefs: The Experience of Being Latino in America

Chapter 4 consisted of a series of descriptive and regression analyses exploring the relationship between cultural traits and Latino Ethno-Ideologies, as well as the variation in agreement with the core beliefs depending on Latinos' cultural traits. The main finding of the regression analysis is that the cultural traits are positively associated with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale, the dependent variable that measures to what extent Latinos consider they have social and political commonalities, although the explanatory power of the cultural traits is rather small according to the regression analysis, as just 2 percent of the variance in the Ethno-Ideological Scale is explained by the cultural traits.

The findings from chapter 4 also indicate that there are differences on the belief in the several core beliefs depending on Latinos' cultural traits, particularly language. For example, monolingual Spanish-speaking Latinos are more likely to agree on the importance of linked fate and on the importance of their Latino identity. Whereas English-monolingual Latinos are the ones who are more likely to express that they feel commonalities with African Americans. Bilingual Latinos are also more likely to feel that they have greater commonalities in all social and political aspects, though to a lesser extent than Spanish-monolinguals.

In this chapter I explore the impact of core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies and the cultural traits. As in Chapter 4, this chapter is guided by two research questions. The first question is: Do Latinos who agree on the values expressed in the core beliefs differ from Latinos who do not as far as which Ethno-Ideologies to which they subscribe? The second question is: How do the cultural traits of Latinos vary depending on their views on the core beliefs?

The first question's goal is understanding effect of the core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. My expectation is that the core beliefs should be positively associated with the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. For example, when Latinos consider that their *Latino identity is important*; when they consider the U.S. to be home and do not have a *desire to return* or move to their countries of origin or ancestry; when Latinos sense they have a *linked fate* with other [Latinos]; when Latinos think they share *commonalities with other racial minorities*; and when Latinos believe in the importance of *core American values* such as the American Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity, this will indicate that Latinos have similar experiences living in American society and that they share these core beliefs.

The goal of the second question is to explore the relationship between the core beliefs and the cultural traits. The expectation of this analysis is that Latinos will vary in their cultural traits according to the different measures of core beliefs. I want to know whether Latinos who agree with the core beliefs associated with Latino unity tend to present cultural traits also associated with Latino unity or commonality. For instance, those who have a sense of linked fate with other Latinos should present cultural traits that are associated with Latino commonalities, such as being Catholic. Thus, I am interested in knowing if Latinos who exhibit core beliefs associated with Latino unity are more likely to agree with the cultural traits that are associated with being Latino in America.

This chapter consists of four sections. The first section is divided between a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies by different values of the core beliefs (*importance of identity, desire to return, linked fate, commonalities with other racial minorities, and attitudes toward core American values*). The second section consists of a regression analysis exploring the effect of core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. The regression analysis will

control for demographic characteristics of Latinos in order to understand effects of the core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies and to know how much explanatory power the core beliefs model has compared to one that only includes demographic controls.

The third section of this chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the distribution of the cultural beliefs among Latinos who agree on the different values of the core beliefs. In this section I test, for example, whether among Latinos who say their well-being is dependent on other Latinos' overall well-being (*linked fate*) tend to have cultural traits associated with Latinos such as being Catholic or speaking Spanish. The fourth section of the chapter is a summary of the findings and a preview of Chapter 6.

The Relationship between Core Beliefs and Ideology

The Latino Ethno-Ideologies Theory identifies five core beliefs: *importance of identity*, *desire to return*, *linked fate*, *commonalities with other racial minority groups*, and *attitudes toward core American values*. These core beliefs are associated with the experience of being a Latino in America. These core beliefs, along with the cultural traits –which represent the common heritage Latinos share– described in the previous chapter, influence the development of three unique Ethno-Ideologies: ethnic, co-ethnic, and pan-ethnic.¹³

Subscription to these Latino Ethno-Ideologies is determined by the Ethno-Ideological Scale. The scale was built from questions asked in 2006 Latino National Survey, the largest nationally-representative survey of Latinos. The questions ask about how much in common they have on two aspects: politically (such a representation and participation in government) and socially

13 See Chapter 6 for an analysis of how the independent variables affect each of the individual ethno-ideologies


(such as income, educational attainment, and employment). The final scale ranges from “0” (no commonalities) to “1” (agree that Latinos have “a lot” in common on all dimensions).

The Ethno-Ideological scores were collapsed into three distinct Ethno-Ideologies. As noted in Figure 5.1 (page 129), 53 percent of Latinos subscribe to a *pan-ethnic* ideology (score: 0.750-1); this means that they think Latinos share “some” or “a lot” in common. Nearly 4-in-10 (39 percent) subscribe to a *co-ethnic* ideology (score: 0.313-0.688), meaning that Latinos have “some” or “a lot” in common in some aspects but not in others. The smallest category is the *ethnic* ideology, with 8 percent of Latino subscribers (score: 0-0.250) who think that Latinos share “almost nothing” or “nothing” in common with each other. Theory predicts that the five core beliefs (outlined above and listed in Table 3.9.2. in pages 88-89 by ideological subscription) based on similar living experiences should be associated with fostering a pan-ethnic ideology.

Descriptive Analysis

Below, I highlight some of the major differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription according to agreement with the different variables measuring the core beliefs. Contrary to the findings of the Ethno-Ideological distribution of Latinos according to their differences in cultural traits which, for the most part, were small and focus on language usage and Spanish-media preference, Latinos with different opinions on the core beliefs vastly differ on their Ethno-Ideological subscription. The influence of family, language, importance of identity on the Latino Ethno ideology is not as substantial as expected. The broader implication of these findings is that the role that the core beliefs play on explaining Ethno-Ideological variation among Latinos is greater than the influence of the cultural traits. This finding is relevant because culture, or cultural commonality, is often suggested as the glue that binds Latino commonality, as the root of Latino identity.

Figure 5.1. Distribution of Ideology among Latinos who agree on the Measures of Core Beliefs



Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Latinos may see culture as part of their identity but prefer to keep it separated from politics. This point will become apparent when I discuss the findings from the focus groups later in the analysis. Language is the most prominent trait on explaining commonalities with Latinos and with other groups but there are nuances. Monolingual Spanish and English Latinos have different conception of commonalities with Latinos and other groups as well as Bilingual Latinos.

Importance of Identity

This core belief is measured by a variable that indicates how important Latinos consider that it is keeping a distinct culture in American society.¹⁴ Figure 5.1 (on page 127) shows that Latinos who consider that keeping a distinct culture is *very important* are 7-percentage points more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who say this core belief is not very important (55 percent vs. 48 percent), suggesting that placing value on having a distinct Latino identity is important for the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology as expected.

Desire to Return to the country of origin/ancestry

Latinos who indicate that they are not interested in returning (or move) to their countries of origin or ancestry are also more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than Latinos who say they have a desire to return back to their countries of origin or move to their ancestral lands (55 percent vs. 50 percent), though their differences are smaller than among those who differ on their views on the importance of identity. These differences suggest that having (or setting) roots in the United States leads to the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as it was expected.

Linked fate

The core belief of *linked fate* is measured using two variables. The first one indicates if Latinos think that their own well-being is connected to the well-being of all Latinos. The second indicates if Latinos think that their own ethnic groups' well-being depends on how well all Latinos do. As Figure 5.1 (on page 127) shows, the differences between Latinos who think this is the case (agree that the well-being is connected “a lot” or “some”) and Latinos who think it is not the case (and say “little” or “nothing”) in their Ethno-Ideological subscriptions are dramatic.

¹⁴ For full question wording and coding of variables measuring the core beliefs, please refer to Chapter 3.

More than 6-in-10 (62 percent) Latinos who agree on the core belief of *linked fate* for all Latinos subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Only 36 percent of Latinos who do not think this *core belief* is important subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, the plurality (47 percent) subscribes to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Moreover, while 8 percent of all Latinos subscribe to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology, Latinos who do not share this core belief are more *than twice as likely* (17 percent vs. 8 percent) to subscribe to an ethnic ideology than Latinos overall *and over 4 times more likely* (17 percent vs. 4 percent) than Latinos who share this core belief in their ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription.

On the other measure of linked fate (that their own ethnic group's well-being is connected to Latinos'), subscription to a pan-ethnic ideology is similar to those in the personal linked fate measure (61 percent vs. 31 percent pan-ethnic). However, the differences in their ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription are even wider. Over 1-in-5 (21 percent) Latinos who think their groups' well-being has little or nothing to do with Latinos' subscribe to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology. This ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription is *five times greater* than among Latinos who say their groups' well-being is connected to Latinos' overall well-being (4 percent). The results of these two measures of linked fate confirm that this core belief is crucial to the development of a sense of commonality among Latinos expressed in a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

Commonalities with Other Racial Minorities

Latinos also vary in their Ethno-Ideological subscription according to their differences of opinion on the core belief of *commonalities with other racial minorities*. When asked if they share political or social characteristics with African Americans, Latinos who say they share "some" or "a lot" in common socially (in aspects like education or income) or politically (such as political representation) are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who

respond “little” or “nothing.” Fifty-nine percent of Latinos who say they share social characteristics with African American subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology compared to 46 percent among those who think there are no social commonalities between African Americans and Latinos.

The results are similar in regard to political commonalities. More than 6-in-10 (61 percent) Latinos who think they share political commonalities with the African American community subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Latinos who think they do not share political commonalities with black Americans are equally divided in their Ethno-Ideological subscription (45 percent pan-ethnic and 45 percent co-ethnic).

It is worth noting that on both measures of commonality with African Americans, Latinos who think they do not share social (11 percent ethnic) or political (10 percent ethnic) characteristics are about twice as likely to subscribe to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who consider that they have social (5 percent ethnic) and political (5 percent ethnic) characteristics with African Americans. The results of the analysis of this core belief also confirm that this core belief is important for the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Latinos who identify with the African American community are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as this ideology indicates that Latinos also think they share these commonalities with one another.

Attitudes Toward Core American Values

This core belief consists of three American core values: the American Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity. The variables measuring these concepts are part of a battery which asks respondents to what extent they agree or disagree with some statements.

Latinos are said to believe in the “American Dream” if they agree or strongly agree that “Latinos

can get ahead in the United States if they work hard.” Latinos who agree with this core American value are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology than Latinos who disagree (54 percent v. 48 percent).

Latinos believe in “personal responsibility” if they agree that “[m]ost people who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame.” On this core American value are some of the smallest differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription at either end of the scale. Majorities of Latinos who agree (53 percent) and who disagree (55 percent) with the statement subscribe to pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

Small differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription are also evident on the third core American value of “equal opportunity.” Latinos who disagree with the statement “[It] is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others” are classified as believing in equal opportunity, while those who agree with the statement are counted as non-believers in this value. The differences between Latinos who believe and who do not believe in this core American value have very similar Ethno-Ideological subscriptions. A majority of Latinos who believe in equal opportunity (54 percent) and Latinos who do not (53 percent) subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Differences of opinion in core American values do not seem to produce divergent Ethno-Ideological subscriptions among Latinos. In the case of the American Dream, Latinos who agree with this core value are significantly more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. However, the differences in Ethno-Ideological subscription between Latinos who agree or disagree on the other two core American values are very small and not conclusive to say that these core American values are an important aspect of building a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

These results of this analysis suggest that the core beliefs most strongly associated with subscription to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology are *linked fate* and a sense of *commonality with African Americans*. One core belief (*desire to return*) provides limited evidence of its importance in fostering a sense of commonality among Latinos, while two core beliefs (*importance of identity* and *core American values*) provide minimal evidence of boosting a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription. In the next section, I further explore these relationships with a regression analysis to understand the effect of the core beliefs on Ethno-Ideological subscription.

Multivariate analysis

To determine the effects of the core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, I will employ two OLS regression models. The dependent variable is the Ethno-Ideological Scale and indicates how much Latinos think they have in common with each other on social aspects such as education and income, as well as in political aspects like representation. The scale ranges from “0” to “1” on an interval scale, meaning that respondents scoring closer to “0” think that Latinos do not share any of these characteristics, while those scoring closer to “1” think Latinos share all of them. Although this chapter only concentrates on the core beliefs and the Ethno-Ideological scale in chapter 6, I include a logistic regression analysis to test the effect of cultural traits, core beliefs and demographic variables on each of the Latino Ethno-ideologies (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic and ethnic) and how the cultural traits

Model 1, the baseline model, includes only the demographic characteristics, while Model 2, the core beliefs model, includes the demographic characteristics along with the core beliefs. This way it is possible to assess first how much of the variance in Ethno-ideologies is due to the demographic differences between Latinos and, then, how much of the variance is explained by the cultural traits.

Measuring Core Beliefs

The variables measuring the five core beliefs are the following. *Importance of identity* is measured by a continuous variable indicating how important the respondent considers it is to “maintain their distinct cultures,” and its coding ranges from “very important” (2) to “not important” (0). The core value of *desire to return* is a dichotomous variable indicating if the respondent says he or she does NOT want to return or move to his or her country of ancestry (1), or if such a desire to move is expressed (0).

The core belief of *linked fate* is measured using two variables. The first one asks: “How much does Latinos doing well depend on other Latinos also doing well?” The second question asks “How much does your doing well depend on other Latinos also doing well?” Both variables have the same coding which ranges from “nothing” (0) to “a lot” (3).

The core belief of *commonalities with other racial minorities* is also measured by two variables. The first variable consists of a question that asks, “Thinking about issues like job opportunities, educational attainment or income, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?” These are considered “socioeconomic commonalities.” The second question asks, “Thinking about things like government services and employment, political power and representation, how much do Latinos have in common with African Americans?” These are considered “political commonalities.” Both variables follow the same coding scheme as the *linked fate* variables, which range from “nothing” (0) to “a lot” (3).

Finally, the core belief of *core American values* is measured by three variables. These variables indicate the agreement with statements associated with three values: (1) belief in the American Dream (“Latinos can get ahead if they work hard”); (2) personal responsibility (“most people

who don't get ahead should not blame the system, they have only themselves to blame"); and (3) equal opportunity ("is not really a big problem if some people have more of a chance in life than others"). The coding ranges from "strongly agree" (3) to "strongly disagree" (0), with the exception of the "equal opportunity" core value, which has been coded in reverse from "strongly agree" (0) to "strongly disagree" (3) as a way to show agreement with equal opportunity, since the question is worded in a rather awkward way of agreeing with a negative statement.

Measuring Demographic Characteristics

Both models include controls for demographic characteristics. The *sex* variable indicates if the respondent is a woman (1) or a man (0). The *age* variable measures the age of respondents in years. *Education* is a continuous variable that indicates the respondent's educational attainment and ranges from "0" (no formal schooling) to "7" (graduate or professional degree). A dichotomous variable indicates if the respondent was born outside the United States and is now a *naturalized citizen* (1) or not (0). The variable *generation* consists of three dichotomous variables that indicate how many generations removed from immigration respondents are. *First generation* indicates if a respondent was born outside the U.S. or Puerto Rico (1) or not (0), a *second generation* respondent was born in the U.S. or Puerto Rico of parents born outside the U.S. (1), while those who do not meet this criteria are coded "0." The excluded variable is *third generation*. The final concept, *ancestry* consists of several dichotomous variables that indicate a respondent's birthplace or ancestry in the following countries or regions: Puerto Rico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, South America, Central America, and other Latino ancestry. Latinos who indicate that any of these nations is his or her ancestry are coded "1," while the rest are coded "0." Latinos of Mexican ancestry are omitted from the model, as this is the baseline category (0), to which the coefficients of all other ancestry groups will be compared.

Baseline Model

Model 1 in Table 5.1 (on page 136) shows the baseline model which only controls for the demographic characteristics. Since the scale ranges from “0” (nothing in common) to “1” (a lot in common), when an independent variable shows a positive coefficient this indicates an increase in the scale score and movement toward a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. If an independent variable indicates a negative association with the Ethno-Ideology score, it means that such a variable is associated with a decrease in the Ethno-Ideological score. Thus, the score moves away from a pan-ethnic ideology and toward an ethnic ideology. Since the score has a range from “0” to “1” on an interval scale, the coefficients can be interpreted as a percentage increase or decrease in the score.

The results of the baseline model show that the sex of the respondent is not significantly associated with the Ethno-Ideological score. In the case of age, it is negatively associated with the Ethno-Ideological scale ($p \leq 0.001$). In other words, all else being equal, younger Latinos are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic ideology than older Latinos. Higher levels of educational attainment increase Latinos’ ethno-ideological scores. Being naturalized as a U.S. citizen also enhances a respondent’s embrace of pan-ethnicity.

The generational differences are modest. Being a second-generation Latino (U.S.-born child of immigrant parents) increases Ethno-Ideological score by 2.1 percentage points ($p \leq 0.05$) compared to a third-generation Latino (U.S.-born child of U.S.-born parents). However, the differences between third-generation Latinos and first-generation immigrants are not significant.

Table 5.1 OLS Regression Analysis of Ethno-Ideologies by Demographics and Core Beliefs

Variables	[1] Baseline Model			[2] Addition of Core Beliefs to Model		
	Coeff.	(SE)		Coeff.	(SE)	
Catholic						
Media Language (Spanish)						
Spanish						
Bilingual						
Freq. visiting family						
Imp. Of being distinct in America				0.011	(0.006)	
Do not want to go back				0.015	(0.007)	*
Personal linked fate				0.042	(0.003)	***
Group linked fate				0.060	(0.004)	***
Commonalities w/Blacks				0.018	(0.003)	***
Political commonalities w/Blacks				0.031	(0.004)	***
Latinos get ahead w/hard work				0.013	(0.005)	**
People who don't get ahead should blame themselves				0.006	(0.003)	*
It is a problem that others have more of a chance in life				0.008	(0.003)	**
Women	0.007	(0.006)		0.004	(0.006)	
Age	-0.001	(0.000)	***	-0.001	(0.000)	***
Education	0.008	(0.002)	***	0.010	(0.002)	***
Naturalized citizen	0.037	(0.008)	***	0.027	(0.008)	**
First generation	-0.004	(0.009)		-0.019	(0.009)	*
Second generation	0.021	(0.010)	*	0.013	(0.009)	
Puerto Rican ancestry	0.023	(0.011)	*	0.018	(0.010)	
Cuban ancestry	-0.012	(0.015)		-0.003	(0.015)	
Dominican ancestry	0.026	(0.014)		0.005	(0.015)	
Central American ancestry	-0.028	(0.011)	*	-0.028	(0.012)	*
South American ancestry	-0.034	(0.014)	*	-0.043	(0.014)	**
Other ancestry	-0.076	(0.021)	***	-0.045	(0.022)	*
Constant	0.672	(0.014)	***	0.266	(0.032)	***
R ²	0.02			0.21		
Number of Observations	7090			5216		

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Among the ancestry variables, being of Puerto Rican ancestry modestly increases a respondent's ethno-ideological score, when compared to Latinos of Mexican ancestry ($p \leq 0.05$). This is the only ancestry with a positive and significant association. Three ancestries, Central American, South American, or other Latino ancestry, are negatively associated with the ethno-ideological score when compared to Latinos of Mexican ancestry.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) of Model 1 is 0.02, which means that the demographic variables explain 2 percent of the variance in the Ethno-Ideological Scale, the dependent variable.

Core Beliefs Model

Model 2 in Table 5.1 (page 136) consists of the variables measuring the core beliefs and the demographic characteristics. The dependent variable is the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale, which is an interval scale that ranges from “0” to “1.” A score of “0” indicates that Latinos do not think they share any social or political characteristics with each other; this score is associated with an ethnic Ethno-Ideology. A score of “1” means that respondents think Latinos share a lot in common politically and socially, which is associated with a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

The results from Model 2 in Table 5.1 show that all the core beliefs are positively associated with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale, with the exception of one-- importance of identity, which does not show a significant relationship with the dependent variable. Below is a summary of the findings of the significant relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable. Latinos who indicate that they do not want to return to their countries of ancestry have Ethno-Ideological scores 1.5 percentage-points higher ($p \leq 0.05$) than Latinos who indicate a *desire to return*.

The variables measuring the core belief of *linked* fate have the strongest effect on the Ethno-Ideological score. The effect of linked fate is 0.042 ($p \leq 0.001$) meaning that a Latino who says that the well-being of all Latinos has “a lot” to do with the overall well-being of Latinos has an Ethno-Ideological score 12.6 percentage-points higher than Latinos who say there is no relation between Latinos’ overall well-being, all else being equal. Latinos who say that their personal

belief in “doing well” depends “a lot” on other Latinos “doing well” show a coefficient of 0.06 ($p \leq 0.001$) suggesting that, all else being equal, their Ethno-Ideological scores are 1.8 percentage points higher than Latinos who say their “doing well” is not dependent on other Latinos.’

The core belief *commonalities with other racial minorities* also shows a significant increase in a respondent’s Ethno-Ideological score. Latinos who say they share “a lot” socially with African Americans have an Ethno-Ideological score 5.4 percentage points higher than Latinos who say they share “nothing,” all else being equal (coefficient 0.018; $p \leq 0.001$). The effect of sharing political commonalities is even greater. The Ethno-Ideological scores of Latinos who think they share “a lot” in common politically with African Americans increase by 9.3 percentage points compared to Latinos who think they share “nothing” politically with African Americans (coefficient 0.031; $p \leq 0.001$).

As for the three variables measuring the *core American values*, all are positively associated with the dependent variable. Latinos who strongly agree with the “American Dream” show a coefficient of 0.013 ($p \leq 0.001$) and have Ethno-Ideological scores 3.9 percentage points higher than Latinos who strongly disagree. Strongly agreeing with the core American value of “personal responsibility” increases the Ethno-Ideological score by 1.8 percentage points, compared to a person who strongly disagrees (coefficient 0.006; $p \leq 0.05$). Finally, when a Latino strongly disagrees that the value of “equal opportunity” is “not a big deal”—indicating that he or she considers it is a big problem that some people have a better chance in life—his or her score will be, all else being equal, 2.4 percentage points higher than a person who strongly agrees (coefficient 0.008; $p \leq 0.01$).

Results from the Model 2 (on page 127) confirm the expectation of the core beliefs being associated with the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as all the values are positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale. The core belief of *linked fate*, consisting of two measures has the greatest effect of all variables and among Latinos who say Latinos' linked fate is "a lot" connected on both variables will be reflected in, all else being equal, an increase of 30.6 percentage points. Moreover, the R^2 of the core beliefs model is 0.21, or that these variables explain 21 percent in the variance of the dependent variable.

Comparing the Baseline and the Core Beliefs Models

When adding the core beliefs (Model 2 on page 127) to the baseline demographic model (Model 1) the effects of some of the demographic variables on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale are impacted. The effect of education marginally increases from 0.008 to 0.01 ($p \leq 0.001$).

The negative associations of some other variables also change. Being a first-generation Latino now decreases a person's Ethno-Ideological score by 1.9 percentage points ($p \leq 0.05$), while this effect before was .04 percentage points and not significant. The effect of having a South American ancestry also becomes more negative from -0.34 to -0.043 ($p \leq 0.01$). Being a second-generation Latinos is now not significant, and being Puerto Rican also loses its significance.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) of the core beliefs model is 0.21, significantly higher than the R^2 of the baseline model ($R^2=0.02$).¹⁵ This result reiterates the importance of the core beliefs in the development of the Latino Ethno-Ideologies, particularly in fostering a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology and how experience shapes the sense of commonality required for the production of this Ethno-Ideology. The next section explores the relationship between the core beliefs and the

¹⁵ The significant is the result of an F-test. Results are available upon request.

cultural traits. It specifically looks at the variation in the distribution of the cultural traits according to differences of opinion on the core beliefs.

The Relationship between Core Beliefs and Cultural Traits

The relationship between the core beliefs and the cultural traits is that they should reinforce each other. The core beliefs represent attitudes that are acquired through the experience of living in the United States, whereas cultural traits indicate the commonalities that Latinos see among themselves in shared ancestry, language, media consumption and religion. The combination of core beliefs and cultural traits should help to develop the Latino-Ethno ideologies based on how Latinos perceive these cultural and experiential commonalities.

Table 5.2, on pages 142-143, shows the core beliefs in columns and the cultural traits in rows. The names of the core beliefs are shown in bold letters and each column is numbered. The first column indicates the distribution of the cultural traits among all Latinos, while column 2 shows the percentage Latinos who say that keeping a distinct culture is very important to them. This summary will highlight some of the most important differences.

Importance of Identity (Columns 2-3)

Table 5.2 (on page 142) shows the differences between Latinos who say it is very important to keep distinct culture compared to those Latinos who do not think this is very important. Latinos who say keeping a distinct culture is important are more likely to be Catholic (73 percent vs. 66 percent) and 8 percentage-points more likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers (43 percent vs. 35 percent). The largest difference is of 14 percentage points on Spanish media consumption. Latinos who say it is very important to keep a distinct culture are more likely to say they consume media in Spanish than Latinos who do not think it is very important to keep a distinct

culture. These findings suggest that the cultural traits associated with a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology are also important to the core belief of importance of identity.

Desire to Return (Columns 4-5)

There are some substantial differences in the cultural traits of Latinos who do not desire to return to their home country and those who want to return. Those who do not want to return are less likely to be Catholic (69 percent vs. 74 percent). The largest difference (33 percentage points) is language-related, as only 32 percent of Latinos who do not want to return to their country of ancestry are primarily Spanish speakers, while nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of those who want to return are Spanish monolinguals. Similarly, Latinos who do not express a desire for returning to the country of ancestry are less likely to consume media in Spanish (62 percent) compared to Latinos who want to return to their country of ancestry (88 percent). Yet, it would be important to note that still over a majority do consume Spanish media. The differences on the core belief of *desire to return* indicate that Latinos who want to go back or move to their countries of ancestry or origin tend to have the cultural traits associated with Latino unity but are also the characteristics of Latinos who are nostalgic about life outside America.

Table 5.2. Distribution of Cultural Traits by Core Beliefs

	Identity			Desire to return	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	<i>All Latinos</i>	<i>Very important to keep distinct culture</i>	<i>Not very important to keep distinct culture</i>	<i>Does NOT want to return</i>	<i>Wants to return</i>
Cultural traits					
Religion					
Catholic	71	73	66	69	74
Family Values					
Never travels	53	52	56	52	52
Primary Language Use					
Spanish	41	43	35	32	65
Bilingual	51	50	51	58	33
Spanish Media Consumption					
Spanish Media	69	72	58	62	88

	Linked Fate				Commonalities with other groups			
	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
	<i>Latinos well-being connected (some or a lot)</i>	<i>Latinos well-being NOT connected (little or nothing)</i>	<i>Ethnic group well-being connected to Latinos (some or a lot)</i>	<i>Ethnic group well-being NOT connected to Latinos (little or nothing)</i>	<i>Share social commonalities with African Americans (some or a lot)</i>	<i>DOES NOT share social commonalities with African Americans (little or nothing)</i>	<i>Share political commonalities with African Americans (some or a lot)</i>	<i>DOES NOT Share political commonalities with African Americans (little or nothing)</i>
Cultural traits								
Religion								
Catholic	73	68	72	66	70	73	71	72
Family Values								
Never travels	51	54	48	55	51	54	52	52
Primary Language Use								
Spanish	45	30	43	32	30	52	31	48
Bilingual	50	55	50	54	60	43	58	46
Spanish Media Consumption								
Spanish Media	76	54	73	57	61	77	62	74

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Table 5.2. Distribution of Cultural Traits by Core Beliefs

	Core American Values					
	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)
	<i>American Dream: Hard work to get ahead (strongly agree or agree)</i>	<i>NO American Dream: Hard work to get ahead (strongly disagree or disagree)</i>	<i>Personal Responsibility: People who don't succeed should blame themselves (strongly agree or agree)</i>	<i>NO Personal Responsibility: People who don't succeed should blame themselves (strongly disagree or disagree)</i>	<i>Equal Opportunity: It is a big problem that some people have better chance (strongly agree or agree)</i>	<i>NO Equal Opportunity: It is a big problem that some people have better chance (strongly disagree or disagree)</i>
Cultural traits						
Religion						
Catholic	71	67	72	70	68	73
Family Values						
Never travels	53	48	53	51	52	53
Primary Language Use						
Spanish	42	25	40	41	31	48
Bilingual	50	62	51	51	57	47
Spanish Media Consumption						
Spanish Media	70	55	67	73	60	75

Source: 2006 Latino National Survey

Linked Fate (Columns 6-9)

Table 5.2 on (on page 142) shows significant differences on the cultural traits of Latinos, depending on their opinions regarding the core belief of *linked fate*. Those who believe that all Latinos' well-being is connected are more likely to be Catholic (73 percent vs. 68 percent), monolingual Spanish speakers (45 percent vs. 30 percent) and consumers of Spanish-language media (76 percent vs. 54 percent), than Latinos who do not think Latinos' collective well-being is connected.

Among Latinos who differ whether their personal well-being is associated to other Latinos also doing well, the cultural traits distribution are similar to the patterns on the other measure of core belief. Those who think their well-being is connected to other Latinos' are more likely to be Catholic (72 percent vs. 66 percent), less likely to have traveled 5 years ago or more to their countries of origin (48 percent vs. 55 percent), more likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers (43 percent vs. 32 percent), and more likely to consume Spanish-language media (73 percent vs. 57 percent), compared to Latinos who do not think their well-being is connected to the well-being of other Latinos.

This means that cultural traits commonly associated with Latinos are also related to the sense of linked fate among Latinos. This is particularly true in the case of language traits such as everyday language use and Spanish media consumption. In this case Latinos who believe in linked fate are the most likely to consume Spanish-language news and to speak primarily Spanish compared to those who do not agree on this core belief. As Barreto, Manzano, Ramírez and Rim (2009) explain, Spanish language media during the 2006 resulted as an important factor to Latino mobilization. The media outlets in Spanish were informing about the importance of the immigration policies and the importance of mobilizing all Latinos, not just Mexicans. It is

possible that Latinos are more likely to feel commonalities with other Latinos when exposed to media outlets that foster pan-ethnicity.

Commonalities with other Groups (Columns 10-13)

While Latinos who believe in a sense of linked fate are more likely to present cultural traits commonly associated with Latinos, Table 5.2 (on page 142) shows the reverse when it relates to the core belief of commonalities with African Americans. Latinos who share socioeconomic commonalities with African Americans are less likely to be Catholic (70 percent vs. 73 percent). Latinos who say they share social commonalities with African Americans are also less likely to be primarily Spanish speakers than those who think that they do not share social commonalities (30 percent vs. 52 percent). Moreover, Latinos who share social commonalities with African American are more likely to be bilingual (60 percent vs. 43 percent) than those who do not share this sense of commonality. Latinos who share social commonalities with African Americans are less likely to consume media in Spanish than Latinos who say they do not share those characteristics (61 percent vs. 77 percent).

Regarding the belief that Latinos and African Americans share political characteristics in common, the pattern is similar to the responses regarding social characteristics. Once again, the major differences in cultural traits are associated with language usage and Spanish media consumption. Latinos who do not share political commonalities with African Americans are more likely to use Spanish as their primary language (48 percent) than Latinos who believe they share political characteristics with African Americans (31 percent). Latinos who believe that Latinos share commonalities with African Americans are more likely to be bilingual compared to those who do not see commonalties between both communities (58 percent vs. 46 percent). People who think blacks and Latinos share political commonalities are less likely to consume

media in Spanish (62 percent) as nearly three-quarters (74 percent) of Latinos who do not see commonalities with blacks consume Spanish-language media.

Core American Values (Columns 14-19)

Columns 14-15 on Table 5.2 (on page 143) show the differences between Latinos who believe in the American Dream –agree that that hard work gets you ahead– and those who do not. Latinos who believe in the American Dream are more likely to be Catholic (71 percent vs. 67 percent) and to report that they have not traveled recently (53 percent vs. 48 percent). Latinos who believe in the American Dream are also more likely to be primarily Spanish speakers (42 percent vs. 25 percent) and to consume Spanish-language media (70 percent vs. 55 percent) than those who do not believe in the American Dream.

On the core American value of personal responsibility, there are no major differences between Latinos who believe in this core American value and those who do not believe in this value. The largest difference is 6-percentage points in Spanish media consumption, as Latinos who believe in this value are less likely to consume Spanish media than Latinos who do not believe in the value of personal responsibility (67 percent vs. 73 percent).

The major differences in the core American value of equal opportunity are by language use and Spanish media consumption and quite similar to differences in the belief of the American Dream, although in the opposite direction. Latinos who think it is a big problem that some people have a better chance in life are less likely to be Catholic (68 percent vs. 73 percent), less likely to be Spanish monolinguals (31 percent vs. 48 percent), and less likely to consume Spanish-language media (60 percent vs. 75 percent).

These distributions of the cultural traits suggest that the traits I expected to be the building blocks of a pan-ethnic ideology diverge on the belief in core American values. This means that beliefs in values such as the American Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity are not embraced by Latinos with similar cultural profiles. In the case of the American Dream, those Latinos who present cultural traits associated with being Latinos such as Catholicism, and speaking Spanish are the most likely to subscribe to this value. This result is probably because Spanish-language monolinguals and Catholics are more likely to be first-generation (foreign born), who tend to be more positive toward the value of the American Dream. In the case of personal responsibility, the profile of the cultural traits is very similar between Latinos who believe in the value and those who do not. Finally, the Latinos who are more likely to agree on the core value of equal opportunity have lower percentages of cultural traits associated with Latinos: They are less likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers and less likely to consume Spanish media.

In summary, Latinos who believe that it is very important to keep a distinct culture are different from Latinos who do not believe in keeping culture distinctness with their different cultural traits, in particular, on primary language use and Spanish media consumption. Likewise, Latinos who have a desire to return to their country of ancestry are more likely to speak Spanish and consume media in Spanish.

On the linked fate variables, in both the personal and the group linked fate, again, the influence of language and media usage is present. Latinos who strongly feel connected to Latinos' well-being at a personal and group level are more likely to speak Spanish and consume their media in this language. On the core belief of sharing commonalities with other groups the effect of language reverses. Latinos who see more social and political commonalities with African

Americans are less likely to be monolingual Spanish speakers (and more likely to be bilingual) and also less likely to consume news in Spanish.

On the core American values, there are interesting results, too. Latinos who believe in the American Dream are more likely to use Spanish as their primary language and consume Spanish media. The core American value of personal responsibility shows that there are no major differences by language usage, although Latinos who believe in personal responsibility are slightly more likely to consume media in Spanish. Among Latinos who believe in equal opportunity, the pattern reverses compared to belief in the American Dream, as Latinos are more likely to be bilinguals, less likely to being monolingual Spanish speakers and to consume media in Spanish.

This finding on the reverse pattern of the core American values may reflect how Latinos experience society. On one hand, they are strong believers in the American Dream. This makes sense because, compared to their experiences in their countries of origin, many Latinos – immigrants in particular– feel that the U.S. is a land where hard work is rewarded. Yet, the experience changes when the value is related to equal opportunity. Latinos perceive that there is not an equal chance in society, because their chances are limited, even when these are better than in other countries.

Conclusion

The analysis of the distribution of ideologies by the different core beliefs suggests that there are two core beliefs that are highly salient as far as being associated with a pan-ethnic ideology. These core beliefs are the belief in *linked fate* among Latinos and a belief in *shared common characteristics* with African Americans. Latinos who agree on the other three core beliefs of

importance of identity, desire to return, and core American values also show a higher propensity of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. However, these differences are much smaller and sometimes negligible as a majority of Latinos who agree or disagree with these core beliefs may also subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. The fact that all these core beliefs are associated with a higher propensity of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology lends credibility to the hypotheses that each of these core beliefs are building blocks of a pan-ethnic ideology.

These results are confirmed by the multivariate analysis which consisted of two OLS regression models testing the relationship between the demographic characteristics and the core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies —measured using the Ethno-Ideological Scale. The combined effects of the two variables measuring the core beliefs of *linked fate* are greater than the cumulative effect of *all other core beliefs*. This finding implies that *linked fate* is an essential aspect of a sense of commonality among Latinos that could later express itself in a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology and, potentially, in a pan-ethnic political coalition; as Latinos feel that their success in the country is a matter of communitarian impulse: that to get ahead in America is necessary to improve the conditions of all Latinos.

When contrasted with the distribution of cultural traits the analysis shows that, consistent with the previous chapter, language is the most distinct cultural trait for Latinos. Latinos who differ on their agreement regarding the core beliefs almost always also vary in their language or media usage, sometimes in contradictory ways. For example, in the case of *linked fate*, those who agree with the two measures (personal and collective) of this core belief are more likely to speak Spanish primarily and to consume Spanish-language media than those who do not agree with linked fate. But on another core belief, *commonalities with other racial minorities*, Latinos who think they share characteristics in common with African Americans are less likely to exhibit the

cultural traits of being primarily Spanish speakers or consuming Spanish media. The differences in media consumption suggest that while watching or listening Spanish-media works as a way of showing that Latinos share common characteristics or interests, it may not stress the same for other non-Latino groups. On the flip side, Latinos who solely consume English media may perceive that racial minorities are treated in similar ways, compared to whites. In the next chapter I will test how the cultural traits, core beliefs along with the relevant demographic characteristics affect Latinos' Ethno-Ideological orientation.

Chapter 6: Predicting Latino Ideologies

The previous chapters explored the effect of the cultural traits and core beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. Though in those chapters I analyzed separately the cultural traits and core beliefs, the goal of this chapter is to include both aspects, as well as the demographic characteristics, to understand the combined effects of these aspects on the Latino-Ethno Ideologies. In addition, I include a logistic regression analysis in which I explore how the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics affect each of the three Latino-Ethno Ideologies (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic).

This chapter proceeds, as follows. The first section consists of a description of the OLS analysis, including the variables and a summary of findings from earlier iterations of the analysis conducted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, leading up to the analysis of the full model including all the measures for cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic controls. The second section consists of the interpretation of the full model, including insights from the focus groups conducted by Public Religion Research Institute as part of the 2012 Post-Election American Values Survey and the 2013 Hispanic Values Survey. The chapter continues with an analysis consisting of logistic regression models which will bring insights as far as the relationship particular cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics with specific Ethno-Ideological subscriptions. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings and prefaces the discussion in the next chapter, which outlines the conclusions of the dissertation and future research.

The Combined Effects of Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale

Description of Analysis

The analysis consists of linear regression models that show the progression of how the different aspects associated with the Latino Ethno-Ideologies affect Latinos' subscription to these ideologies. The data come from the 2006 Latino National Survey, a large-sample ($n = 8,646$), nationally-representative survey of Latinos.

The dependent variable is the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The interval scale values range from "0" to "1," and at its extremes, the scale indicates how much in common Latinos think they have with each other on social and political aspects. Latinos who score closer to "0" think Latinos do not have anything in common, while Latinos who score closer to "1" think Latinos share a lot in common on both dimensions. The scale was constructed using four questions that asked how much Latinos think that they personally share with other Latinos on social aspects like educational attainment and income (2 questions), and two additional questions asked how much Latinos from their own ethnic groups share politically with the overall Latino population.¹⁶

The independent variables consist of measures for the four cultural traits, five core beliefs, and six demographic characteristics that are expected to be associated with the formation of Latino Ethno-Ideologies. The four cultural traits are (1) *Catholicism*, (2) *everyday language use*, (3) *Spanish media consumption*, and (4) *family values*. Several variables measuring these concepts are dichotomous. *Catholicism* indicates whether the respondent is Catholic (1) or not (0).

¹⁶ For more information about the wording of the questions and coding of the variables used in the models refer to Chapter 3.

Primary language, consists of two variables: variable that indicates if the respondent is primarily a Spanish speaker (1) or not (0), or bilingual (1) or not (0). These two variables are compared against the reference category primary English speaker. The last two variables of the cultural traits measure whether the respondent consumes Spanish media (1) or media only in English (0) (*Spanish media consumption*), and a continuous variable about how often the respondent travels to the country of ancestry (*family values*) that ranges from “never” (0) to “more than once a year” (5).

The five core beliefs are *importance of identity*, *desire to return* (to country of ancestry or origin), *linked fate*, and *attitudes toward core American values*. The importance of Latinos to keep a distinct culture (*importance of identity*) is a variable that ranges from “not important” (0) to “very important” (2). Desire to return to the country of ancestry (*desire to return*) indicates if the respondent does NOT want to return (1) or want to (0). Two variables measuring *linked fate* (whether the well-being of all Latinos or the respondents’ are connected to the well-being of Latinos overall), and *commonalities with other racial minorities* (if the respondents think Latinos share social or political commonalities with African Americans) range from “nothing” (0) to “a lot” (3). Three variables measure *core American values* range from “strongly disagree” (0) to “strongly agree” (3). These variables measure Latinos' agreement with a belief in the American Dream, personal responsibility, and equal opportunity.

In addition to these two concepts, the statistical analysis will include controls for demographic characteristics. These demographic characteristics are sex, age, education, generations removed from immigration, naturalization (if respondent was born outside the United States but is a now a U.S. citizen), and ancestry (if the respondent is of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Dominican, South American, Central American, or other Latino origin).

The analysis will consist of four OLS regression analyses shown in sequence. The first regression, known as the *baseline model*, consists of the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale regressed by the demographic characteristics. This will provide a sense of how much the various demographic differences between Latinos affect their Ethno-Ideological scores, and it is identical to the baseline model in chapters 4 and 5. The second model (*cultural traits model*) explores the effects of the cultural traits on the dependent variable similar to the second model in Chapter 4. The third regression, known as the *core beliefs model*, analyzes the association between the core beliefs and ideology and replicates the results from Model 2 in Chapter 5. Both, the cultural traits and core beliefs models control for the demographic characteristics. The final model, known as the *full effects model*, includes all variables, cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics. An additional small section discusses the findings of the demographic effects, which are consistent across all three models.

Once the full model is established in a second section I analyze the Latino Ethno-Ideological scale through logistic regression analyses. I separate the scale into dichotomous variables in which the ethno-ideology of interest is “1” and the other two ethno-ideologies “0”. Thus, in total there will be three dependent variables, one for each ideology (pan-ethnic, co-ethnic and ethnic). The dependent variable in the first logistic model indicates if respondents subscribe to a *pan-ethnic* ideology and was coded “1” if the Latino Ethno-Ideological scale ranges from 0.750 to 1 and “0” for all other lower scores. The second model’s dependent variable indicates whether respondents subscribe to a *co-ethnic* ideology and was coded as “1” when the scale has a range between 0.313 and 0.688, and “0” else. The dependent variable in the third model indicates subscription to an *ethnic* ideology and was coded “1” for scores between 0 and 0.25 and “0” else. The next sections consist of the interpretation of the results of the regressions analysis and its

implications for the understanding of Latino ideology. The ways in which these variables are associated with Latino ideologies suggests that, when controlling for the core beliefs, the cultural traits for the most part lose a significant part of their predictive power. Instead, it is the core beliefs, especially the core belief of linked fate, what is more strongly associated with a pan-ethnic ideology.¹⁷

Earlier Findings

Chapter 4 shows that all cultural traits are positively associated with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale; these associations are also statistically significant. These results mean that having a particular set of traits associated with Latino culture (being Catholic, bilingual, consuming Spanish-language media, and visiting family abroad) are associated with an increase in the Ethno-Ideological Scale. One caveat of the results is that although their effects are significant, they are not particularly substantive as far as on explaining the variance on the Latino Ethno-Ideological scale.

The coefficient of determination (R^2) for the cultural traits model is 0.03, meaning that the variables in the model measuring the cultural traits and the demographic characteristics explain 3 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. This model represents, a marginal improvement from a baseline model that only includes the demographic characteristics ($R^2 = 0.02$). By contrast, the results of core beliefs model in Chapter 5 show that these variables have a stronger effect on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale than the cultural traits model. The R^2 of the

¹⁷ In addition to these OLS models I also conducted alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Two models consisting in ordinal logistic regression analysis and multinomial analysis were conducted by recoding the values of the ideology scale and collapsing them into specific ideology categories (e.g. ethnic, co-ethnic, pan-ethnic, see Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3). The relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable are similar to those in the OLS models, lending robustness to the OLS model. Similar examples favoring the use of OLS as a continuous variable with a range from 0 to 1 includes Weber et al. (2014) and Cizmar et al. (2014).

core beliefs model is 0.21, which means that this model explains 21 percent of the variance in the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale.

These OLS models are presented again in Table 6.1 (page 167) including the baseline model (Model 1) controlling only by the demographic variables. Model 2 adds the cultural traits variables to the baseline model. Model 3 includes the core belief variables along with the demographic variables. Finally, Model 4 is the full model with the cultural traits and core beliefs along with the demographic variables.

Model 2 in Table 6.1 shows that, among cultural traits, *everyday language use* (being bilingual) has the strongest positive effect on the Ethno-Ideological Scale. In Model 3, the two variables measuring *linked fate* (overall and personal) stand out for its strongly positive association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale. Moreover, the analyses also show that, while core beliefs and cultural traits have, on balance, an overall positive association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, the effect on the scale of the core beliefs is much stronger than the cultural traits. These findings suggest that the building blocks of a pan-ethnic ideology are not their cultural commonalities but rather the experience of being a unique minority in the United States.

Results from the Full OLS Model (Model 4)

Model 4, the full model, in Table 6.1 shows the combined effects of the variables measuring the cultural traits, the core beliefs, and the demographic characteristics relevant for the formation of ideologies according to the Latino Ethno-Ideologies theory.

Table 6.1. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Analysis of Latino Ideology

Variables	[1] Baseline Model Coeff. (SE)	[2] Cultural Traits Model Coeff. (SE)	[3] Core Belief Model Coeff. (SE)	[4] Full Model Coeff. (SE)
Cultural traits				
<i>Catholicism</i>		0.014 (0.006) *		0.009 0.007
<i>Primary language use</i>				
Spanish		-0.012 (0.014)		-0.024 0.015
Bilingual		0.042 (0.012) ***		0.028 0.012 *
<i>Spanish media consumption</i>		0.033 (0.008) ***		0.005 0.008
<i>Family Values</i> (Frequency of travel)		0.005 (0.002) **		0.004 0.002 *
Core beliefs				
<i>Importance of identity</i>			0.011 (0.006)	0.009 0.007
<i>Desire to return</i> (Does NOT want to)			0.015 (0.007) *	0.011 0.007
<i>Linked fate</i>				
All Latinos			0.042 (0.003) ***	0.042 0.003 ***
National group's			0.060 (0.004) ***	0.059 0.004 ***
<i>Commonalities with African Americans</i>				
Social			0.018 (0.003) ***	0.017 0.003 ***
Political			0.031 (0.004) ***	0.029 0.004 ***
<i>Core American Values</i>				
American Dream			0.013 (0.005) **	0.014 0.005 **
Personal responsibility			0.006 (0.003) *	0.006 0.003 *
Equal opportunity			0.008 (0.003) **	0.008 0.003 **
Demographic Characteristics				
<i>Sex</i> (Women)	0.007 (0.006)	0.007 0.006	0.004 (0.006)	0.004 0.006

<i>Age</i>	-0.001	(0.000)	***	-0.001	0.000	**	-0.001	(0.000)	***	-0.001	0.000	***
<i>Education</i>	0.008	(0.002)	***	0.007	0.002	***	0.010	(0.002)	***	0.007	0.002	***
<i>Naturalized citizen</i>	0.037	(0.008)	***	0.017	0.008	*	0.027	(0.008)	**	0.008	0.009	
<i>Generation</i>		(0.009)						(0.009)	*			
First generation	-0.004	(0.010)		-0.003	0.011		-0.019	(0.009)		-0.002	0.011	
<i>Ancestry</i>	0.021	(0.011)	*	0.007	0.010		0.013	(0.010)		0.005	0.010	
Puerto Rican	0.023	(0.015)	*	0.021	0.011		0.018	(0.015)		0.018	0.011	
Cuban	-0.012	(0.014)		0.011	0.015		-0.003	(0.015)		0.008	0.015	
Dominican	0.026	(0.011)		0.022	0.014		0.005	(0.012)		0.005	0.015	
Central American	-0.028	(0.014)	*	-0.023	0.011	*	-0.028	(0.014)	*	-0.024	0.012	*
South American	-0.034	(0.021)	*	-0.034	0.014	*	-0.043	(0.022)	**	-0.043	0.014	**
Other Latino Ancestry	-0.076	(0.014)	***	-0.066	0.022	**	-0.045	(0.032)	*	-0.043	0.022	*
Constant	0.672	(0.014)	***	0.618	0.016	***	0.266	(0.032)	***	0.259	0.032	***
R ²	0.02			0.03			0.21			0.21		
Number of Observations	7090			6928			5216			5147		

Among the cultural traits, being bilingual is still positively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, but compared to Model 2, the size of the coefficient decreases from 0.042 to 0.028 ($p \leq 0.05$). The coefficient of family values remains positively associated with the scale and its effect drops slightly from 0.005 to 0.004 ($p \leq 0.05$).

Among the variables measuring the core beliefs in Model 4, results are similar in both their positive association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, and in their levels of significance compared with Model 3. The variables measuring linked fate remain the strongest positive predictors of the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale.

The coefficients of determination of both models (3 and 4) are indistinct from each other. Both the R^2 of Model and the R^2 of Model 3 are 0.21 —explain 21 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Below, I will explain with more detail the effects of these variables on the Ethno-Ideological Sale. These results will include quotes from the focus groups in Phoenix, Arizona. The discussions that occurred in these groups will help provide some context to the statistical results.

Cultural Traits and Ethno-Ideologies

The regression analysis in Table 6.1 (page 159) show that the most notable changes in the statistical significance happen in the Catholicism and Spanish media consumption variables. *Catholicism*, while still having a positive association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, is no longer statistically significant. The weak effect of this variable is not very surprising. The descriptive analysis in Chapters 4 shows that the differences between Catholic Latinos and non-Catholic Latinos in their Latino Ethno-Ideological subscription are negligible. Moreover, the descriptive analysis of the cultural traits and core beliefs in Chapters 4 and 5 also demonstrated

that Catholic Latinos do not vary substantially in their agreement with any of the core beliefs from non-Catholic Latinos, or that Latinos who differ in their agreement on the various core beliefs do not vary much in their identification with Catholicism.

The lack of statistical evidence of the impact of Catholicism as a common cultural trait in the Latino community was reflected in the focus group discussions. Latino Catholics and non-Catholics talked about their faith, or lack of it, but they had different conceptions of what it means as part of their cultural identity of being Latino. Latino Catholics sometimes mentioned their faith as an important part of their Latino identity, as a Catholic woman from Phoenix noted:

I think because as far back as I can remember it [religion] was always really important in our family. I mean we had to go to church at least every Sunday. My dad went to church every single day. You know a lot of times I felt like it was just shoved down my throat but ... after a while I just realized, and I still make my children go to church. *It's just like a Hispanic thing also.* I mean I think everybody in here probably had that experience. (Emphasis added).

But this belief in the importance of Catholicism is very different for non-Catholic Latinos of Protestant and non-religious identities. At times they resented the assumption that they are Catholic by default. A former Catholic Latino man from Phoenix talks about his relationship to his former religion and how it somehow makes him less Latino:

Well, faith and religion's very important to me, I don't go to Catholic church. I grew up Catholic; I went to Catholic school. But, you know, I'm a Christian now. *I'm not so much a Catholic, and I think that that kind of changed my connection with the Hispanic community, because, you know, most Hispanics are predominantly Catholic.* So, by my religion, or my faith, actually, disconnected me a little bit [from the community]. (Emphasis added)

Nonreligious Latinos also resent the assumption that they are all Catholic. An atheist Latino from Phoenix said:

[Non-Latinos] think that because I'm Hispanic, usually when you're Mexican, it's almost given that you're going to be Catholic, because it's a cultural thing, it's not really a religious thing at this point. I was raised Catholic. I was raised, my mom took me to church, to catechism the

whole thing, but I started reading at a very young age, and I think that's the worst thing that you can do to religion ... education. I don't talk about religion or anything like that out in public or anything, but I'm proud to say I'm an atheist, 100 percent, and there's no doubt about that.

These opinions suggest that more than a unifying force for Latino identity, religion is a contentious issue. As the religious diversity of Latinos continues to increase, these differences should make it harder to appeal to Latinos with messages of cultural unity based on religious heritage. It will become harder to use the Catholic religion as a marker of Latino identity and its weight as a cultural trait that binds Latinos together will decrease even more.

Model 4 (on page 148) finds that being bilingual has a positive and significant association with the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale, when compared to monolingual English speakers. This means that being a bilingual Latino is associated with an increase of his/her Ethno-Ideological score. However, compared to the results from Model 2, the strength of the effect diminishes by one-third from 0.042 to 0.028. This means that while in the Cultural Traits Model (Model 2) being bilingual was associated with an increase of 4.2 percentage points in a respondent's Ethno-Ideological score, all else being equal, when the core beliefs are added to the regression (Model 4), the score increase associated with bilingualism is just 2.8 percentage points.

While I expected to find that being Spanish monolingual would have had a positive relationship with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, this is not the case (as it was not the case in Chapter 4). The results from Model 2 and Model show that being a Spanish monolingual is negatively associated with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, though these results are not statistically significant. The salience of bilingualism suggests that Latinos who are fluent and able to communicate in both English and Spanish have a different relationship with their roots and their community. Bilingualism can help Latinos navigate and connect with the larger pan-ethnic community, as Negrón (2014) suggests it occurs among Latinos in New York City, when they use linguistic

cues such as talking in *Spanglish* or directly approaching a person and speaking in Spanish with a person, who they think is also a Latino, and after assessing which language the interlocutor feels more comfortable with speaking and switching the conversation to that particular language.

In Model 2, consuming Spanish-language media has a positive and significant association with the Ethno-Ideological Scale, as it was associated with a 3.3 percent increase in a respondent's score. Model 4 shows that, while the association between the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale and Spanish media consumption remains positive, it is no longer significant. Instead, the addition of the cultural traits reduces the effect of Spanish media consumption by 85 percent, from 0.033 to 0.005.

Although Spanish-language media that caters to the tastes and interests of first-generation Latinos in the United States has been instrumental in the development of a Latino market and identity (Mora 2014), the evidence regarding the potential of these media in creating a pan-ethnic ideology with political implications is lacking. In fact, for some Latinos, like those in the Phoenix focus groups the Spanish-language media works against the interests of Latinos:

And I can't believe there's people here that have been here most of their life and they don't speak any English, they don't even try. Why? Because they get home, they watch soap operas, soccer, and the thing in the media like Telemundo they keep people ignorant, they don't want you to learn. If you do, you're not going to watch their shows anymore.

This quote from a Protestant woman encapsulates the core of a discussion about language in the focus groups. Latinos who were monolingual English speakers resented the suggestion that Spanish is a trait that defines Latinos. In fact, they find speaking "Spanish-only" to be a limiting quality for personal advancement.

Contrary to expectations, Model 2 in Table 6.1 (page 167) shows that there is a positive and significant, association between family values and the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale.

Frequency of travel to the land of ancestry or origin is associated with an increase of Latinos' Ethno-Ideological scores: those who have closer ties to their homeland and family, this way, are more likely to feel closer to other Latinos. Moreover, the addition of the cultural traits does not impact the effect of family values on the Ethno-Ideological Scale substantially. Respondents who travel more than once a year have Ethno-Ideological scores that are, all else being equal, 2 percentage points higher than Latinos who never travel. This represents a small reduction, compared to the 2.5 percentage-point increase for frequent travelers in Model 2, without taking into account the effect of the cultural traits.

Core Beliefs and Ethno-Ideologies

The analysis of the core beliefs shows that these components have more weight in explaining the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. As discussed in Chapter 5 and recreated in Model 3 in Table 6.1 (page 167), the addition of the core beliefs, to the baseline model improves the explanatory power of the model. The coefficient of determination (R^2) improves from 0.02 in the baseline model (Model 1) to 0.21 in the core beliefs model (Model 3).

Once again, the concept of *importance of identity* has no significant effect on the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. Another core belief, *desire to return* loses its significance when the cultural traits are added in the full model.

On the other hand, the effect of *linked fate* does not diminish with the addition of the cultural traits. A person who says that Latinos doing well depends “a lot” on other Latinos doing well has, all else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological score 12.6 percentage points higher than a Latino

who says that Latino's doing well has nothing to do with the well-being of other Latinos. Among Latinos who think the well-being of their own national group members' depends "a lot" on how well other Latinos do will have, everything else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological score 17.7 percentage points higher than a Latino who thinks that there is no link between his/her group's wellbeing and that of Latino overall. These results stress the importance of *linked fate* and the ethnic consciousness the concept represents for the formation of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

While Latinos in the focus groups did not use the term "linked fate," the discussions about politics and political parties suggest that for many of them, there is a sense that Latinos' political future lies together.

I think the Republicans view us like a thorn in their side. The Democrats need us, but neither party knows exactly what to do with us or what to make of us, except for the fact that about the next 25 years, the Census shows that we will be a majority, so they need to kind of think ahead. The Democrats have I think our betterment in mind, but they don't know how to go about it, and the Republicans just want to keep us where we are while we still elevate their control, their power, whatever it is, the top one percent. We need to generate money for the top one percent. So I think it's—I don't think there's a solution, and I don't think that they know what to make of us, except that they both realize that they need us in some way. The Republicans I think more negatively than the Democrats.

This quote, from a religiously unaffiliated Latina summarizes many of the sentiments regarding political parties. Latinos' feelings toward the Republican Party have soured in recent years as surveys by the Pew Research Center and Public Religion Research Institute have found. Yet, Latinos, while voting for the Democratic Party, have not really warmed up to a party that they feel is weak (Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). They feel that they have to vote for the lesser of two evils. However, they feel that the future of the community and their well-being depends on Latinos being able to come together.

Latinos who think they share "a lot" in common socially with African Americans have Ethno-Ideological scores that are, all else being equal, 5.1 percentage points higher than Latinos who

think they have “nothing in common” socially with African Americans. The effect of political commonalities with African Americans is even stronger. Latinos who say they share “a lot” in common with African Americans on political matter have scores that are 8.7 percentage points higher than Latinos who think they do not share anything in common politically with African Americans, all else being equal.

These commonalities may be borne out of a sense of both groups having experienced discrimination in the country. As a Catholic Latino from Phoenix said about the 2008 Republican National Convention:

When the Republicans had their convention and they put Sarah Palin up there on stage, her husband was unemployed, her mother was living with them, her daughter was pregnant, the boyfriend was there and somebody said ‘Could you imagine if they were either black or if they were Hispanic what people would have said,’ and yet nobody said anything. But if it would have been a different skin color, you, I mean, they would have ridden it to the hilt[op].

Thus, a sense of linked fate among Latinos and a sense with commonalities with African Americans turn political as Latinos feel threatened, that the system has not been fair with them and that there are people actively trying to bring both groups down. It is in this way that linked fate becomes a political statement. Latinos and African Americans are judged differently, by other standards. The effects of the *core American values* remain similar to the findings in Chapter 5, replicated in Model 3 in Table 6.1 (page 167) Latinos who strongly agree that to get ahead in America it is necessary to work hard have, all else being equal, an Ethno-Ideological score 4.2 percentage points higher than Latinos who do not believe in the American Dream.

As Figure 6.1 (page 176) shows, the effect of the core belief of linked fate is the largest of any of the traits and beliefs associated with a pan-ethnic ideology. The effect of linked fate is more than

twice as larger than the effect of feelings of commonalities with African Americans, which has the second-largest effect on ideology.


The salience of these two core beliefs: linked fate and commonalities with African Americans suggests that pan-ethnicity as an ideology is less linked to shared identity based on common culture and history and more often ideology based on context and circumstance. Latinos' ideology is built on the belief that their well-being is tied to being together. Their ideology is further strengthened by the belief that they share a lot in common socially and politically with African Americans.

Agreement with the American core values has a positive association, with a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology as expected (Equal opportunity and American Dream). However, the effect is modest and not as strong as the effect of the variables related with linked fate and attitudes toward other racial minorities. The value more strongly associated with a pan-ethnic ideology is the agreement that Latinos should get ahead by working hard. The agreement with the belief that Latinos should not blame the system and that there is not a problem with others having more chances to get ahead have a similar but modest association with the pan-ethnic ideology.

Figure 6.1 (page 176) shows the relative effects of the cultural traits and the core beliefs. All of the cultural traits are in the upper half of the chart (in gray color). The combined effect of all the cultural traits is 6.2 percentage points. By contrast, the combined effect of the core beliefs is nearly *ten times greater* (55.4) than the combined effect of the cultural traits.

The effect of being bilingual, the greatest of all the cultural traits, is only 2.8 percentage points. Its effect pales when compared to the effect of linked fate the strongest of the core beliefs, which is also about *ten times greater* (30.7 percentage points) when both measures are combined.

Figure 6.1. Relative Effects of Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Ideology



Demographic Characteristics and Ethno-Ideologies

Age and education are two of the main demographic predictors of pan-ethnicity. That the relationship between age and pan-ethnicity is negative means that pan-ethnicity is associated with younger Latinos. The relationship between education and pan-ethnicity is positive, meaning that better educated Latinos are those with higher levels of pan-ethnic ideology.

There are not many differences by nationality or citizenship and generation. Regarding ancestry, Central American, South American, and other Latino ancestry have a negative association with pan-ethnic ideology. Central American and South American-origin Latinos are significantly less likely to have a pan-ethnic ideology compared to Mexican Americans.

These smaller groups have a shorter history in the U.S. than Latinos of Mexican, Cuban, and Puerto Rican origin and as their experience in America reflects the experience of others with longer time in the country, pan-ethnicity ideology may become more prevalent among those smaller groups.

Of the demographic variables, being a naturalized citizen loses significance in the full model. Age and education remain significant. Age remains with a negative association with a pan-ethnic ideology, whereas education is still associated positively with a pan-ethnic ideology.

Predicting Ethno-Ideological Subscription

The full OLS model in the previous section demonstrated how the cultural traits and core beliefs affect the dependent variable, the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale. The OLS models show that a model including the core beliefs and demographic characteristics explains 21 percent of the variance in the Ethno-Ideological Scale. A model that includes the cultural traits and demographic characteristics explains just 3 percent of the variance in the dependent variable. While these models tell us how the cultural traits and core beliefs influence the overall score in the Ethno-Ideological scale, they do not say how they affect each of the ideologies.

In order to test how the independent variables measuring the cultural traits, core beliefs, and demographic characteristics influence each of the Ethno-Ideologies, I recoded the Latino Ethno-Ideological Scale into three dichotomous variables indicating if the respondents subscribe to a particular Ethno-Ideology (1) or not (0). To test the effects of the independent variables on these three dependent variables I employ logistic regression analysis, which is appropriate for the study of categorical dependent variables.

Unlike the OLS regression coefficient, the coefficient of a logistic regression analysis cannot be interpreted directly to understand its impact on the dependent variable. While it is possible to interpret the direction of the association –positive or negative– and its significance, it is necessary to convert the coefficients into probabilities for proper interpretation of the effect.

These predicted probabilities are based on fixed values of the independent variables. The probabilities are calculated according to the changes in the values of the independent variables. Interpretations are based on a set of baseline characteristics which provide the basis for understanding the changes in probability of subscribing to each Ethno-Ideology. For example, if the baseline model uses English-language monolingual Latinos as the default *everyday language usage* cultural trait, we can measure the effect of being bilingual or a Spanish-language dominant Latino by changing language in these baseline characteristics.

The baseline model consists of the following values of the independent variables. The demographic characteristics of the baseline individual are: male, the means for age and educational attainment, not a naturalized citizen, third generation, and Mexican ancestry. The cultural traits are: non-Catholic, English-language dominant, consumer of English media only; the frequency of travel is held at its mean. The core belief values of the baseline model are: a person who thinks a distinct culture is important and who wants to return to the country of ancestry; the variables measuring *linked fate*, *commonalities with African Americans*, and *core American values* are held at their means.

Pan-ethnic Model

Model 1 in Table 6.2 (page 180) shows the results of the logistic regression analysis predicting a *pan-ethnic* Ethno-Ideological subscription. Latinos who score between 0.750 and 1 in the Ethno-

Ideological scale are coded as subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology (1) while those with scores lower than 0.750 as coded as not subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology (0).

Cultural Traits and Pan-ethnic Ideology

Of the four cultural traits, only one has a positive, statistically significant, association with a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Being bilingual (coefficient 0.364; $p \leq 0.01$) has the greatest effect among the cultural traits.

Compared to Latinos who primarily speak English, Latinos who are fluent in both English and Spanish, are more likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. This result is similar to those in the OLS models discussed in Chapter 4 and earlier in this chapter.

Being a Catholic, consuming Spanish-language media, and frequency of travel (measuring family values) have a positive association with pan-ethnic subscription, but the association is not statistically significant. The remaining language indicator, being a primarily Spanish-language speaker, shows a negative association with a pan-ethnic subscription when compared to primarily English-speaking Latinos but the effect is not significant.

Core Beliefs and the Pan-ethnic Ideology


All of the measures of the core beliefs are positively associated with a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, but only three have a statistically significant association. The three core beliefs with a significant association with a pan-ethnic ideology are *desire to return*, *linked fate*, and *commonalities with African Americans*. One of the *core American values*, belief in the American Dream, is also positively associated with a pan-ethnic ideology. The core belief of *importance of identity* and two *core American values* –personal responsibility and equal opportunity– have a positive effect on pan-ethnic subscription but are not statistically significant.

Table 6.2. Logistic Regression Analysis of Latino Ethno-Ideologies

Variables	[1] Pan-ethnic Model		[2] Co-ethnic Model		[3] Ethnic Model	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
Cultural Traits						
<i>Catholicism</i>	0.059	(0.069)	-0.026	(0.068)	-0.069	(0.125)
Primary Language Use						
Spanish	-0.153	(0.154)	0.029	(0.152)	0.433	(0.293)
Bilingual	0.364	(0.126) **	-0.334	(0.123) **	-0.129	(0.222)
<i>Spanish Media Consumption</i>	0.066	(0.085)	-0.129	(0.084)	0.144	(0.173)
<i>Family Values</i> (frequency of travel)	0.010	(0.018)	0.002	(0.017)	-0.043	(0.035)
Core Beliefs						
<i>Importance of Identity</i>	0.064	(0.064)	-0.052	(0.063)	-0.055	(0.113)
<i>Desire to return</i> (Does NOT want to)	0.155	(0.077) *	-0.179	(0.075) *	0.174	(0.151)
<i>Linked fate</i>						
All Latinos	0.338	(0.032) ***	-0.224	(0.032) ***	-0.376	(0.059) ***
National group's	0.386	(0.037) ***	-0.129	(0.036) ***	-0.671	(0.061) ***
<i>Commonalities with African Americans</i>						
Social	0.145	(0.034) ***	-0.083	(0.033) *	-0.184	(0.064) **
Political	0.261	(0.036) ***	-0.180	(0.035) ***	-0.257	(0.072) ***
<i>Core American Values</i>						
American Dream	0.123	(0.047) **	-0.113	(0.047) *	-0.007	(0.095)
Personal responsibility	0.050	(0.030)	-0.040	(0.029)	-0.037	(0.059)
Equal opportunity	0.032	(0.028)	-0.006	(0.027)	-0.079	(0.055)
Demographic Characteristics						
<i>Sex</i> (Women)	-0.003	(0.061)	0.085	(0.060)	-0.306	(0.116) **
<i>Age</i>	-0.007	(0.002) **	0.002	(0.002)	0.013	(0.004) ***
<i>Education</i>	0.067	(0.019) ***	-0.050	(0.019) **	-0.041	(0.036)
<i>Naturalized citizen</i>	0.176	(0.091)	-0.108	(0.090)	-0.267	(0.178)
<i>Generation</i>						
First generation	0.025	(0.117)	-0.063	(0.115)	0.191	(0.228)
Second generation	0.053	(0.111)	-0.032	(0.108)	-0.012	(0.216)
<i>Ancestry</i>						
Puerto Rican	0.323	(0.119) **	-0.292	(0.116) *	-0.115	(0.234)
Cuban	0.109	(0.158)	-0.151	(0.161)	0.099	(0.260)
Dominican	-0.146	(0.161)	0.220	(0.156)	-0.551	(0.436)
Central American	-0.223	(0.114)	0.128	(0.112)	0.292	(0.201)
South American	-0.133	(0.142)	-0.077	(0.146)	0.551	(0.230) *
Other Latino Ancestry	-0.231	(0.214)	0.019	(0.218)	0.709	(0.323) *
Constant	-3.226	(0.337) ***	1.852	(0.327) ***	-0.151	(0.617)
R ²	0.10		0.04		0.16	
Number of Observations	5147		5147		5147	

Figure 6.2 (below) shows the change in the probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology depending on the effects of the cultural traits and core beliefs. The dark area of the pie charts indicates the percentage probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. A Latino with the characteristics described in the baseline model has a 43 percent chance of subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology.

Figure 6.2. Predicted Probabilities of a Pan-ethnic Latino Ethno-Ideology



Note: Numbers represent percentages

Effect of the Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Pan-ethnic Subscription

When the cultural traits characteristics are at their minimum values, for example, a respondent who primarily speaks Spanish and who never visits family abroad, the probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology declines to 39 percent. However, if the respondent's cultural traits are at their maximum positive effects, such as being bilingual, the probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology increases to 56 percent. This means that the different

between a respondent with none of the characteristics positively associated with a pan-ethnic ideology are 17 percentage points less likely to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

Latinos who reflect the minimum values of the core beliefs variables, by contrast, have a 5 percent chance of subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology. By contrast, if a Latino's values on the core belief variables are set at their maximum, his or her probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology improves to 79 percent, a difference of 74 percentage points.

These results confirm the previous findings in this chapter regarding the salience of the core beliefs in the development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, relative to the core beliefs. Setting the cultural traits at their maximum values improves the probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology by 30 percent compared to the baseline model, from 43 percent to 56 percent. However, the increase in the probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, when the core beliefs are set at their maximum values, is 84 percent (from 43 percent to 79 percent), compared to the baseline model.

Co-ethnic Model

Model 2 (page 161) shows the logistic regression analysis predicting a *co-ethnic* Ethno-Ideological subscription. Latinos who score between 0.313 and 0.688 on the Ethno-Ideological scale are coded as subscribing to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology (1) while those with scores lower than 0.313 or higher than 0.688 are coded as not subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology(0).

Cultural traits


Of the cultural traits coefficients in Model 2 (on Table 6.2, page 180), being bilingual has a negative and significant, association with a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription ($p < 0.05$). This means that Latinos, who are bilingual, are less likely to subscribe to a co-ethnic ideology

compared to a Latino who is primarily an English- speaker (the omitted variable). None of the remaining cultural traits have a significant relationship with the dependent variable.

Core beliefs

Of the variables measuring core beliefs, the importance of being distinct in America is not significant in the model but, contrary to the cultural traits model, all the variables associated with core beliefs are negatively associated with subscription to a co-ethnic ideology. Similar to the pan-ethnic Model 1, the core beliefs of *linked fate* have the greatest effect on the co-ethnic Model 2. However, its relationship with a co-ethnic ideology is negative. The core belief of *commonalities with African Americans* has the second-strongest effect ($p < 0.001$ for both variables) and is also negatively associated with subscription to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

Figure 6.3. Predicted Probabilities of a Pan-ethnic Latino Ethno-Ideology



Note: Numbers represent percentages

Effect of the Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Pan-ethnic Subscription

Figure 6.3 (page 183) shows the change in the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology depending on the effects of the cultural traits and core beliefs. Once again, the dark area of the pie charts indicates the percentage probability of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. A Latino with the characteristics described in the baseline model has a 50 percent chance of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology. Changing the values of the cultural traits to their minimum increases the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology by one-percentage point, to 51 percent. When the cultural traits are changed to their maximum values, the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology declines to 38 percent.

When the core beliefs values are set to their minimum the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideology is 82 percent. Increasing the core beliefs variables to their maximum values decreases the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology to 26 percent. Thus, a co-ethnic Ethno-Ideological subscription also shows the importance of the core beliefs in Ethno-Ideological subscription, though to the reverse extent of the pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

Ethnic Model

Finally, Model 3 in Table 6.2 (page 180) is the ethnic model. Latinos classified as subscribing to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology scored between “0” and 0.250 on the Ethno-Ideological Scale and are coded as “1” in the logistic models. Latinos who scored more than 0.250 are coded as “0.”

Cultural Traits

In Model 3, none of the cultural traits demonstrate a significant association with an ethnic Latino Ethno-Ideological subscription. This shows that culture bears little importance in the development of an ethnic Ethno-Ideology, as expected by the theory.

Core Beliefs

Of the variables measuring core beliefs, the variables measuring the Model 3 in Table 6.2 (page 180) shows that measure of linked fate are negatively associated with subscription to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology ($p < 0.001$ for both). The variables measuring social and political commonalities with African Americans are significant ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.001$ respectively) and negatively associated with an ethnic ideology.

Effect of the Cultural Traits and Core Beliefs on Ethnic Subscription

A Latino with the characteristics described in the baseline model has a 4 percent chance of subscribing to an ethnic ideology. Changing the values of the cultural traits to their minimum, increases the probability of subscribing to an ethnic ideology to 7 percent. However, when the cultural traits are changed to their maximum values, the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology is again 4 percent, showing that the cultural traits have no positive effect on the formation of an ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

When the core beliefs values are set to their minimum the probability of subscribing to an ethnic Ethno-Ideology is 49 percent, but moving the core beliefs variables to their maximum values decreases the probability of subscribing to a co-ethnic ideology to just 1 percent. These results provide further evidence of the importance of the core beliefs in the formation of the Ethno-Ideologies.

Conclusion

This chapter explained the relationship between the cultural traits, core beliefs and demographic characteristics with the Latino Ethno-Ideologies. The results of the regression analysis show that the effects of core beliefs are greater than the impact of cultural traits. Language is the most

salient cultural trait in producing a pan-ethnic ideology, but it is not associated with monolingual Spanish speakers. Instead, it is bilingual Latinos with whom pan-ethnic ideology is associated. Other variables such as religious affiliation and media are not significantly associated with pan-ethnicity. The discussions in the focus groups support this assessment, particularly about religion. However, transnational family connections are positively associated with pan-ethnicity, contrary to expectations.

The effects of the cultural traits pale in comparison to the effects of the core beliefs, especially linked fate. This core belief has a strong and positive association with a pan-ethnic ideology that is greater than the combined effects of the other beliefs and traits. Another core belief strongly associated with pan-ethnicity is a belief in social and political commonalities with African Americans. The salience of these two core beliefs suggests that pan-ethnicity is not only an ideology that could help Latinos build multiethnic coalitions with other Latinos but also possibly serve as the building blocks for broader cross-racial coalitions.

Further evidence was provided by the discussion of the focus groups, particularly on the cultural traits. The discussion on cultural aspects such as language and religion shows that Latinos have varying opinions on how much these traits matter in their identity. An important portion of the discussion in the focus groups was on the core beliefs and centered on the core American values. Latinos are also conflicted about these values, which are reflected in the statistical analysis, as the effect of core American values varies in magnitude and direction. There are also hints about the sense of linked fate, particularly in discussions about political parties and the necessity of unity for political purposes. Moreover, there is a sense of unity with African Americans in terms of experience that lends credence to the importance of the sense of commonality with blacks as an important building block of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology.

Finally, the demographic effects were constant across the three models. A pan-ethnic ideology is associated with younger and highly educated Latinos. Interesting, immigrant generation and citizenship had no substantial effect on ideology. It is worth noting that, when controlling for national origin, two groups showed a negative relationship with ideology, suggesting an ethnic ideology: Latinos of Central American and South American ancestry. These are the minorities within the Latino community and could suggest that among the smaller and most recent Latinos the feelings of commonality have not developed, or that, alternatively, they do not feel welcome by Latinos in the larger groups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans). In the following and last chapter I will discuss the implications of Latino ideology for politics and the potential future developments concerning ideology among Latinos.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

This dissertation is a project of *Latinidad* and the study of Latino political behavior that considers cultural traits and core beliefs essential to the formation of ideology among Latinos. These cultural traits and core beliefs allow Latinos to discern how much they have in common with each other and the potential to see Latinos as allies because they share cultural affinities and experiences that facilitate their communication.

The question driving this project is: Does *latinidad* –Latinos shared cultural traits and core beliefs rooted in experience– shape distinct ideologies informing Latinos about how to relate to the U.S. political system? I argue that this is the case and propose a theory that explains how a combination of cultural traits and core beliefs divide Latinos into three distinct Latino Ethno-Ideologies: pan-ethnic, co-ethnic, and ethnic. These ideologies indicate how Latinos perceive other Latinos as social equals and political allies.

The cultural traits and core beliefs are the building blocks of *Latinidad*, a belief in a commonality that transcends national-origin labels and brings Latinos together as a community. I submit four cultural traits (1) the Catholic religion, (2) Spanish language usage, (3) consumption of Spanish-language media, and (4) family values. These traits represent the characteristics that Latinos share based on a common colonial history and that facilitate contact among Latinos. Additionally, there are five core beliefs –(1) the importance of a Latino identity, (2) a lack of a desire to return to the country of ancestry or origin, (3) linked fate with other Latinos, (4) a sense of commonality with other racial and ethnic minorities, and (5) attitudes toward core American values– that represent the experience of living in America as a Latino. The cultural traits and core beliefs may vary according to individual Latinos' demographic characteristics, their national

ancestry or origin, citizenship status, and how many generations their family has lived in the United States.

Theoretical Expectations

Latinos with a *pan-ethnic* Ethno-Ideological subscription share a strong sense of social and political commonalities with other Latinos, mainly forged by their core beliefs but also affected by their cultural traits. A *co-ethnic* Ethno-Ideology suggests a weaker sense of Latino commonality—which is *just* political or *just* social, but not both simultaneously. The commonalities co-ethnic Latinos have with other Latinos should be based more on their cultural traits than by their core beliefs. Finally, an *ethnic* Ethno-Ideology indicates that they do not share anything in common with other Latinos, even though they acknowledge their ethnic Latino roots.

In recent elections, Latinos have voted as a cohesive bloc in favor of Democratic Party candidates, suggesting that Latinos are—or are becoming—a politically homogeneous group. But, is this apparent homogeneity a reality, or is it a mirage? Are Latinos having debates about their place in American society and their role in the American political system? I argue they are, and they have attitudes about these politics that form ideologies shaped by *latinidad*—their shared cultural traits and core beliefs rooted in their experiences.

The electoral environment is important for understanding Latinos' participation in a political system in which issues that matter to Latinos may not be a part of elite discourse. While elites shape mainstream discourse (Hetherington 2001; Zaller 1992), for Latinos the causal mechanisms between mainstream discourse and politics are far more complex. Mainstream elite discourse oftentimes does not address the issues of concern for racial and ethnic minorities or address them in ways that do not align with their preferences (Hajnal and Lee 2011). Moreover,

even if mainstream elites address issues that Latinos care about, the discourse may be perceived or felt as a threat to ethnic identity. In the case of immigration, Pérez explains, mainstream discourse produces a political engagement contrary to the intended as Latinos “sense their ethnic identity is besmirched” (2013, 172).

However, ideological thinking among minorities is often incompatible with the liberal-conservative continuum of mainstream ideological thinking. When race and racial conflict is the basis of some groups’ political alignments, excluding issues that concern groups such as blacks, Latinos and Asian Americans implies that these groups are incapable of ideological thinking. This view is simultaneously colonial and elitist, as it suggests that people outside of these groups are better at understanding what issues really matter to them. Thus, Latinos’ –and African Americans’– seemingly contradictory ideological and partisan alignments –conservatives who are Democrats or Democrats who are not liberals– may be the result of a lack of representation of their salient issues in the parties’ discourses, suggesting that Latinos’ skewed electoral outcomes are not the result of homogeneity of opinion but of limited options in a two-party system (Hajnal and Lee 2011).

This does not mean that Latinos do not take any cues. Rather than from mainstream elites, Latino ideological cues come from the institutions of the Latino counterpublic that includes national advocacy groups and Latino-oriented media organizations. Latino elites emerge from this counterpublic, which functions as a forum where issues salient to the community at large are debated, as well as actions to be taken. The Latino Ethno-Ideologies stem from those debates.

The theory of Latino Ethno-Ideologies is not only useful to understand how the usual ideological terms and labels used in American politics fit Latinos poorly. The Ethno-Ideologies also help us

understand why Latinos appear to behave as a political bloc. Current theories for understanding Latino political behavior make the assumption that cultural ties help Latinos unite and form coalitions, but these cultural claims have not been put to the test. There are also arguments regarding the role of experiences, such as discrimination, playing a role in fostering a sense of commonality among Latinos that may have political repercussions. The Latino Ethno-Ideologies bring together these two aspects –cultural and experiential– and put them to the test in order to understand how much, if any, these aspects have in bringing Latinos together politically.

Applying the Ethno-Ideologies

Using data from the 2006 Latino National Survey I conducted a series of OLS nested models that highlighted the progress of the inclusion of cultural traits and core beliefs on ideologies. The dependent variable was an Ethno ideological scale ranging from “0” to “1” where the highest value indicates that Latinos believe they share a lot in common, socially and politically, with other Latinos. The lowest value indicates that Latinos believe they share nothing in common with other Latinos. Additionally, I tested how the cultural traits and core beliefs affect each of the Ethno-Ideological subscriptions in a series of logistic regressions. A series of variables acting as proxies for the cultural traits and core beliefs indicate how much these concepts impact the feelings of commonalities among Latinos. The results show that the core beliefs have a stronger effect on Latino Ethno-Ideology than the cultural traits. In other words, agreement with statements measuring the core beliefs is positively and strongly associated with having a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, whereas the effect of having cultural traits that are perceived as important to Latino identity is much smaller.

I operationalized the Ethno-Ideologies using two sets of questions which asked Latinos about how much they have in common with other Latinos on political matters (such as political

representation) and on social aspects (such as education and income). These two questions are the basis of the Ethno-Ideological Scale, which ranks Latinos according to how much in common they think they share. At the lower end of the scale are Latinos, who think they share nothing in common with other Latinos. The higher end of the scale consists of Latinos who think they share a lot in common. Toward the middle are Latinos, who think they share some characteristics in common but not others.

Latinos with an “ethnic” ideology (the lower end of the scale), though they acknowledge their Hispanic or Latino heritage, rarely feel they share any social or political characteristics with other Latinos. Roughly one-in-ten (8 percent) of Latinos subscribe to this ideology. A “co-ethnic” ideology consists of the belief that Latinos share some characteristics (social or political) in common. This ideology is shared by 39 percent of Latinos. Finally, a “pan-ethnic” ideology, or the opinion that Latinos share many social *and* political characteristics is present among a majority of Latinos (53 percent).

Cultural Traits

Among the cultural traits, only language is a strong and significant predictor of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, and this effect is only among bilingual Latinos. Bilingual Latinos appear to be able to move in different worlds, between Latinos who are monolingual in Spanish or in English, and in mainstream American society. However, Latinos who primarily speak Spanish are no more likely than Latinos who primarily speak English to subscribe to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. The findings suggest that language does not follow a linear pattern depending on a person’s linguistic proficiency. Bilingualism is the most salient cultural trait influencing the development of a pan-ethnic ideology. However, understanding why there are no major differences in ethno-ideological scores or ethno-ideological subscription between Latinos who

are monolingual speakers in English or Spanish requires further research, including the possibility that the importance of language is more social than political. As Negrón argues in her study of Latino language use “people can employ multiple strategies and resources to affiliate and connect with each other when trying to establish and exercise a shared Latino identity” (2014, 103), yet these relationships may be only social and not necessarily political. While the role of language, bilingualism, is strongly associated with a pan-ethnic ideology, the role of Catholicism is more complicated.

Being a Catholic is not a cultural trait that greatly enhances the feelings of commonalities expected in development of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology though, contrary to expectations, it is more associated with pan-ethnicity than co-ethnicity. However, given the time in which the survey was taken (nearly 9 years ago) and the rapid changes in religious identification among Latinos suggest that the small but significant effect of Catholicism may have disappeared already. While in the LNS sample 71 percent of Latinos were Catholic, today just a small majority, 53 percent, is Catholic and the religion is not growing among Latinos (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). The discussions about Latino culture in the Phoenix, AZ focus group provide further evidence that on traits such as religion, Latino Protestants and the non-religious resented that people constantly assumed they are Catholic and that in order to have a connection with a Latino community “Catholicism” is part of the requirements. These findings suggest that, as the percentage of Catholics decline and the percentage of Protestant and secular Latinos increase, the value of stressing Catholicism should decrease.

One of the surprising findings of the analysis is that family values, measured as frequency of visiting family abroad is associated with an increase in a sense of commonality among Latinos, contrary to expectation. These results regarding the cultural traits suggest that Latinos who move

in different worlds through language or by visiting Latin America frequently realize the force of a group identity. Maybe travel to their countries of origin make Latinos realize how much they have in common in America, maybe because they face a double burden of discrimination—as foreigners in the United States and as American-born (or raised). This has been the case with Puerto Ricans as a division between those from the “island” [of Puerto Rico] and from “the mainland” [United States], with the latter claiming to be more “authentic” or “real” Puerto Ricans by virtue of being born in the island (Ramos-Zayas 2004).

Latinos who are not “authentic” members of their national groups due to being raised or born in the United States may face rejection when they fly back “home,” while also being rejected at home [the United States] as not being “real” (i.e. white) Americans.

The ability or capacity of moving between worlds by travel or by language (or both) may be the key cultural trait(s) in the development of a pan-ethnic ideology. Language is the most salient cultural trait in producing a pan-ethnic ideology. But contrary to expectations—or to general assumptions in the literature—the Spanish language is not a harbinger of a panethnic ideology by itself. Monolingual Latinos, of either language, were ideologically similar, as there are no statistical differences in the Ethno-Ideological subscription of these groups. Instead, a pan-ethnic ideology is associated with bilingualism.

This means that Latinos who are able to communicate with their own family and the larger Latino community as well as the larger American society have insights from both of these worlds. These insights provide bilingual Latinos with the knowledge of the debates in the Latino counterpublic and what the mainstream discourse (or lack thereof) on Latinos in mainstream

culture. The ability of putting these perspectives together may generate a sense of solidarity that transcends cultural similarities and moves toward political action.

Core Beliefs

While culture, on balance, has a positive effect on the sense of commonality among Latinos, it is not a particularly strong predictor. Instead, the strongest predictors of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology and of a sense of commonality between Latinos are the core beliefs. The analysis of the different core beliefs indicates that there are two core beliefs that are particularly salient: linked fate and shared common characteristics with African Americans.

Linked fate is the strongest predictor of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology, while it is also negatively associated with the co-ethnic and ethnic ideologies. This means that the stronger the belief in linked fate among Latinos, the greater the likelihood of subscribing to a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology. Those who do not share these beliefs tend to have a co-ethnic or an ethnic ideology. To a lesser extent, a feeling of shared commonalities with African Americans also increases a propensity of subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology.

The influence of these two core beliefs in the formation of a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology suggest that a shared experience is, as expected, a harbinger of a sense of unity not only among Latinos but also as an extension to other marginalized groups in America, as well. As we move toward a future in which racial and ethnic minorities are expected to become the majority of the population by the middle of this century, understanding inter-group solidarity –particularly among racial minorities– becomes an important aspect of the future of American politics. The analysis of the core beliefs uncovered the makings of a cross-racial coalition. In practice this is already happening as vast majorities of African American, Latinos, and Asian Americans voted

for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2. This may also explain why English-speaking and bilingual Latinos are more likely to feel connected to African Americans. The ability of these Latinos to speak English and to consume English media may expose them to others with similar experiences, or to identify with the experiences and portrayal of other people of color in the mainstream media.

The findings on the core beliefs also inform why the effects of the cultural traits are so small. Migration to new destinations is placing more Latinos from various ethnic origins in contact with each other (Manzano and Ura 2013). While cultural traits such as language may help in establishing connections with other Latinos and possibly forging a sense of social commonality, it is their common experiences as “the other” that forges the sense of political commonality necessary to the formation of a pan-ethnic ideology. Likewise, migration to new destinations also exposes Latinos to other marginalized groups such as African Americans (McClain et al. 2006). To the extent that increasing contact between Latinos and other groups continues to occur, and they consider the similarities in their experiences, a pan-ethnic ideology could become a cross-racial ideology.

Among the other core beliefs, the belief that Latinos should have a distinct identity does not substantially increase the likelihood of subscribing to a pan-ethnic ideology, although it is a positive and significant predictor. The same was the case as far as not wanting to return to their country of origin or ancestry and belief in core American Values.

Insights from the Phoenix focus groups show that Latinos have contradictory views about the core American values. Latinos believe in concepts such as the American Dream and personal responsibility, but believe that there is lack of opportunity. These findings are also evidenced in

the mixed results of these values in the statistical analysis, which vary in magnitude and the direction of the effect. Latinos still believe that it is necessary to work hard to succeed but, even when they work hard, there is a lack of opportunity that limits what people can achieve. The findings confirm what Fraga *et al.* (2010) found regarding Latinos and their belief in American values, that Latinos are strong believers in the American Dream but are less certain about equality of opportunity. While their study focused on Latinos' views of American society, the results also suggest that Latinos' feelings toward American values have political implications. Latinos are feeling left behind and they are witnessing how those left behind look increasingly like themselves.

Demographic Characteristics

Subscription to a pan-ethnic ideology is mostly associated with younger Latinos who have high levels of education. The main negative predictors are ancestry indicators. Latinos of Central American and South American ancestry, who are minorities within the Latino community, are less likely to identify a pan-ethnic Ethno-Ideology and more likely to have an Ethnic Ethno-Ideology. These findings confirm results by Masuoka (2006) regarding the lower levels of pan-ethnic identification among Central and South American Latinos. This suggests that these smaller groups, comprising the most recently arrived Latinos, have not developed feelings of commonality with the larger groups. However, this can also mean that members of these groups do not feel welcomed by Latinos in the larger groups (Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans). These findings make unique contributions to the study of Latino politics, but also raise question that need to be explored further.

Further Research

This study contributes to the political science literature in two unique ways. First, it contributes to the discussion of ideology in American politics and how to incorporate the experiences of racial and ethnic minorities into this discussion as an extension of similar work like the ones pioneered by Hajnal and Lee (2011) on partisanship among minorities, and Dawson's (1994, 2001) and Harris-Lacewell's (2004) work on black political ideology. As a diverse group of racial minorities continue influencing American politics, all supporting the same party by overwhelming margins, it is important to understand the nature of these political alignments. Thus, this work is part of a wider scholarship understanding how race influences political behavior.

Second, this work also provides an important contribution to the study of Latino political behavior, particularly at the crossroads in which the field stands today. This dissertation continues furthering the understanding of how Latinos think about politics in America and how they make political decisions using cues taken from their shared identity and experiences from the research already undertaken by Marisa Abrajano (2010), Matt Barreto (2010), and Gabe Sanchez (2006b, 2008).

While African Americans have a long history in the United States and, as the scholarship by Michael Dawson (1994, 2001) and Melissa Harris-Lacewell (2004) that inform this project shows, this history informs black political thought and behavior. Many recent immigrants and their descendants come from African countries (Gambino, Trevelyan, and Fitzwater 2014), Afro-Caribbean nations where the populations have African ancestry (McCallister 2014), or even Afro-Latinos (Latinos with African ancestry).

The growing diversity of people with African ancestry in the United States raises a number of questions: (1) Will the growing numbers of these new Americans form a pan-ethnic (or pan-racial) ideology based on perceived commonalities? (2) What type of coalitions will these groups form with Latinos? Is the experience of an unequal society that permanently discriminates against certain groups, the norm for a shared experience?

Some research suggests this may be the case. Nunnally (2010) finds some evidence of the development of linked fate between African Americans and the more recent black diaspora, however, the strongest evidence is located in the Northern United States, in areas where there is contact between African Americans and more recent members of the diaspora. More recent work from Smith (2014) on black pan-ethnicity argues that generational status and levels of acculturation are also factors explaining the politics of group identification and consciousness that affect how blacks immigrated from Africa or the West Indies feel they share commonalities with black Americans who descend from slaves.

The fact that Latinos have ideologies rooted in shared traits and experiences opens the possibility of studying Ethno-ideologies ideology from this perspective among other groups. One could think about replicating this study among Asian Americans. Like the terms Latino or Hispanic, the label “Asian American” includes a mix of nationalities and generations whose only common denominator is ancestral in a faraway continent. Unlike Latinos, who at least share historically a common colonial history with Spain which brought an official language and religion with it, Asian Americans have a variety of languages, religions, and political histories.

Yet, like “Latino,” “Asian American” is an umbrella term, and this grouping may also, as it occurs with Latinos, generate a sense of commonality with political repercussions. Recent voting

patterns suggest that Asian Americans are a strongly Democratic bloc, as Latinos have become. Is this the case of a pan-ethnic ideology germinating? In such case, this study could contribute to further the work on Asian-American pan-ethnic identity and how it can become political (Espiritu 1992; Ah Kwon 2013).

But there are also two limitations in this study that should be addressed in the future in order to improve its applicability and potential explanatory power. The first limitation concerns the data. The second limitation is theoretical.

The Latino National Survey is the richest and largest study of Latino political behavior, but it was conducted in 2006. While this does not seem a long time ago, chronologically many salient events have occurred in Latino politics and race and ethnic politics, since then. For example, in 2008 Barack Obama, the first African-American President, was elected (and reelected in 2012) with strong Latino support. This is not captured by the LNS data, and we do not know if the core belief of attitudes toward black Americans have shifted and potentially becoming stronger, since.

Two other events with respect to elites have also taken place. In 2009 Sonia Sotomayor, the New York-born daughter of Puerto Rican parents, became the first Supreme Court justice of Latino descent in U.S. history. Justice Sotomayor's nomination was strongly supported by Latino elites and advocacy organizations (Beltran 2010), suggesting a turning point in the development of pan-ethnicity and pan-ethnic collaboration. On the other side of the political spectrum has been the rise of Republican Latinos in Congress, including Texas Senator Ted Cruz, of Cuban descent, and Idaho Congressman Raul Labrador, of Puerto Rican descent, who were elected by non-Latino constituencies. The election of these politicians, given their high profile in the Republican

Party, needs to be explored further, as it concerns Latino political behavior and its potential impact on pan-ethnicity and partisan choice.

Another data limitation consists of the focus groups. Although the data is very useful in helping contextualize the findings of the quantitative data, it is drawn from a mostly Mexican-American sample in the American Southwest. Moreover, the political of Latinos in Arizona has been unique in many ways. The enactment of laws targeting immigrants and ethnic studies in Arizona, make it very different from places like Connecticut where the population is mostly Puerto Rican, that passed a state Dream Act, and where some municipalities have issues identification to undocumented immigrants. Thus, while the data is illustrative, it is not generalizable to all Latinos in all parts of the country.

The theoretical limitations of this work concern the small role that history and political theory play in the development and definition of the Ethno-Ideological Heuristic. The works that most influenced this dissertation are rich in political theory and history. For example, the works by Dawson (2001) and Harris-Lacewell (2004) on black ideologies are rooted in black history. Dawson's work is also steeped in political theory, particularly *Behind the Mule* (1994). Cristina Beltrán's *The Trouble with Unity* (2010) is a work of political theory with historical references that place the theory in context for many Latinos experiences in the U.S. In the case of this work, it is rich in political behavior, as it reflects the training of its author, but also the behavioral debates to which it responds. While the theory and the analysis (as they stand) fit this behavioral literature well, in order to fulfill its potential, it is necessary to improve on the areas of history and theory. Historically, it is necessary to provide more context on how the respective histories of Latinos –their origins in the United States, the ways in which they were treated, and the reactions to such treatments– affect the development of contemporary Latino politics, including

the formation of the Ethno-Ideologies. Additionally, a further research agenda needs to include a more specific theoretical account of how Latino elites shape the Latino counterpublic.

The Ethno-Ideologies reveal that most Latinos consider that they share a political destiny, which are reflected in the recent electoral results. The partisan identification trends of Latinos show that they have no strong attachment to the Democrats and that they increasingly distrust the Republican Party (R. P. Jones, Cox, and Navarro-Rivera 2013). This distrust of the GOP is rooted in its discourse against immigrants, against working Americans, against the social safety net, messages that Latinos take personally to be against them. They are skeptical of the Democrats, but a pan-ethnic ideological perspective makes this Party the lesser of two evils. This is the way in which the Ethno-ideologies affect Latino political behavior. They provide a shortcut for Latinos to discern who are their friends and foes in the political system.

The liberal-conservative continuum does not work for Latinos because they do not see politics in those terms, as the results of the 2006 LNS show. This may be due to what Hajnal and Lee (2011) argue that parties do not cater to the concerns of Latinos and other Americans of color. The Ethno-Ideologies show that Latinos do think in terms of who their allies and foes are. More research on these ideologies should expose how they affect Latino political behavior. The diversity of Latino ideology ultimately lies in how the diversity of its people and their experiences bring them together or apart politically.

Appendices

Appendix 3.1. Ordinal Regression Models

Variables	Ordinal Probit		Ordinal Logistic	
	Coeff.	(SE)	Coeff.	(SE)
Catholic	0.048	(0.037)	0.095	(0.064)
Media Language (Spanish)	0.018	(0.047)	0.032	(0.081)
Spanish	-0.152	(0.083)	-0.247	(0.144)
Bilingual	0.152	(0.066)	0.270	(0.114)
Freq. visiting family	0.011	(0.010)	0.017	(0.017)
Imp. Of being distinct in America	0.045	(0.035)	0.069	(0.061)
Do not want to go back	0.044	(0.042)	0.096	(0.073)
Personal linked fate	0.189	(0.017)	0.330	(0.030)
Group linked fate	0.267	(0.020)	0.454	(0.034)
Commonalities w/Blacks	0.088	(0.018)	0.147	(0.031)
Political commonalities w/Blacks	0.146	(0.020)	0.256	(0.034)
Latinos get ahead w/hard work	0.049	(0.026)	0.093	(0.044)
People who don't get ahead should blame themselves	0.025	(0.016)	0.044	(0.028)
Not a problem if others have more of a chance in life	0.023	(0.016)	0.046	(0.027)
Female	0.026	(0.034)	0.032	(0.057)
Age	-0.005	(0.001)	-0.009	(0.002)
Education	0.035	(0.010)	0.059	(0.018)
Naturalized citizen	0.111	(0.051)	0.194	(0.086)
First generation	0.007	(0.064)	0.026	(0.111)
Second generation	0.065	(0.060)	0.123	(0.103)
Puerto Rican ancestry	0.096	(0.066)	0.186	(0.113)
Cuban ancestry	0.016	(0.088)	0.024	(0.152)
Dominican ancestry	-0.068	(0.085)	-0.136	(0.142)
Central American ancestry	-0.142	(0.063)	-0.229	(0.107)
South American ancestry	-0.156	(0.079)	-0.251	(0.136)
Other ancestry	-0.211	(0.112)	-0.350	(0.193)
Constant				
Cut 1=Ethnic	0.233	(0.180)	0.418	(0.312)
Cut 2=Coethnic	1.770	(0.183)	3.119	(0.315)
R ²	0.094		0.093	
Number of Observations	5383		5383	

Appendix 3.2. Interview Guide for 2013 Hispanic Values Survey Focus Groups (Phoenix, AZ)

Introduction (3 minutes)

Opening Question (5 minutes)

[Goal: Get basic information, establish commonalities and sense of community between the participants.]

1. Please tell me your name and one of your favorite things to do outside of work.

Introductory Question

[Goal: Broad open-ended question designed to open the topic for discussion.]

2. Shared connections among Hispanic Americans (10 minutes). The Hispanic community in America is certainly very diverse in many ways.
 - Do you think there are any distinctive things that most Latinos hold in common that differentiate us from white, black, or other Americans of different ethnicities?
[PAUSE for discussion]
3. Now, please take out handout #1 [PAUSE]. Please indicate on the handout how important each item is to you personally when you think about your own connection to the wider Hispanic community in America. Then, on the left side, please order these connections from those you think are most important to least important--#1 being most important and #7 being least important.
 - Who would like to share what item they see as the most important connection?

Key Questions

4. Top of Mind: Political Parties and Religious Groups (20 minutes). Please take out the index card #1[SHOW AND PAUSE]. I'm going to say the name of some groups. When you hear the name of the first group, please write down two or three feelings that come to mind on the front of the index card. The first group is, "the Republican Party."
[PAUSE until writing generally stops].
Now, turn the card over and use the back to record your feelings about another group. The next group is, "the Democratic Party." Please write down two or three feelings come to mind when you hear "the Democratic Party."
[PAUSE until writing generally stops].
 - Who would like to share first what they wrote down about the Republican Party or the Democratic Party? _____, what about you?
 - As you may know Hispanic voters have increasingly been supporting Democratic candidates for public office. In 2012, for example Barack Obama received 71% of the Latino vote. In the next presidential election, do you think Democratic candidates will receive a higher proportion of the Hispanic vote, the same proportion, or do you think Republican candidates may make inroads among Hispanic voters?
 - F/U: What do you think Republican leaders think about Hispanic Americans?
 - F/U: What do you think Democratic leaders think about Hispanic Americans?
5. Issue Priorities (15 minutes). Please take out handout #2 [PAUSE]. You'll see that it lists a number of issues that are facing the country. Now, imagine that when Congress returns from its summer recess that it will base its decisions solely on the priorities you outline

on this sheet. First, on the right side of the form indicate how important you think each issue is by checking the appropriate box. Then, on the left side, please order these issues from those you think are most important to least important--#1 being most important and #8 being least important.

[PAUSE until writing generally stops].

- Can someone tell me about the issue you listed as the most important priority for Congress? How did you come to rate this issue as the most important?
- What about the issue you listed as least important? How did you decide to rate this issue as the least important?
- F/U: Is one party better than the other at handling specific issues?

6. Church and Religious Leaders (15 minutes).

Please take out index card #2. Now, we'll read the names of two different groups. The next group is "the Catholic Church." On the front of the card, please write down two or three feelings that come to mind when you hear "the Catholic Church."

[PAUSE until writing generally stops]. Now, we'll use the back of the card to record your feelings about one final group.

[FOR CATHOLIC AND UNAFFILIATED GROUPS] The next group is, "Evangelical Christians." Please write down what feelings come to mind when you hear "Evangelical Christians."

[FOR PROTESTANT GROUPS] The next group is, "Atheists." Please write down what feelings come to mind when you hear "Atheists."

[PAUSE until writing generally stops].

Let's have a quick show of hands.

[FOR CATHOLIC GROUPS] How many of you think that you can disagree with Church teachings on political issues and still be a good Catholic?

- Follow-up: Is this truer of some issues than others?

[FOR PROTESTANT GROUPS] How many of you think that you can disagree with the teachings of your pastor and church on political issues and still be a good Christian?

- Follow-up: Is this truer of some issues than others?

[FOR UNAFFILIATED GROUPS] How many of you think that religious leaders speaking out on important political and social issues facing your community is a good thing? How many think it is a bad thing?

- Follow-up: Is this truer of some issues than others?

Final Question (5 minutes)

[Goal: Elicit responses about potentially missed information and to bring closure to the discussion.]

- As we're wrapping up, what's the main thing you think you are taking away from this discussion today?

Prompt: Have we missed anything important in this discussion?

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