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
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Solving Music Education's Rationale Problem

By J. Terry Gates

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The lack of vision of the human significance of music, and of a wisdom concerning how it may be imparted to others, has greatly impaired the whole status of the music teacher. . . . [In most music teaching] there is no informing and compelling sense of a mission to influence and enrich the life of the child through the experience of beauty.

—James Mursell, 1934

This situation [the weak impact of general music education on American musicality] is due in large measure to the failure of music education to develop a sound theoretical and philosophical orientation for the music program. Most music-education professional literature gives assent to the importance of music in education and attempts to justify it by showing a more or less tenuous connection between music and the general objectives of education. . . . [T]he weakness of attempts to justify music in this way lies in the fact that none of these objectives is unique to music. . . .

—Charles Leonhard, 1959, (p. 5)

If the response of music educators, nationwide, [to education's critics] is to be constructive, rather than defensive, then it must be recognized that our fundamental aesthetic commitments have not been met. There is evidence of philosophical inconsistency between what ought to be done and what is done; between desirably conceived educational purposes and actual programs and practices; between intramusical and extramusical understanding; between music education by media fallout and by public school instruction.

—Abraham Schwadron, 1988 (p. 86)

It is clear from these professional leaders' views that the profession has yet to bring its philosophy and its practice into alignment. If their comments adequately characterize their times, things are, at least, getting better. We have moved from Mursell's conten-

tion, that music education lacked a humane vision and a related rationale, through Leonhard's assertion that music education had not yet developed a unique orientation within education, to Schwadron's belief that while music education's aesthetic commitments existed, they had not yet been fulfilled. The current status of what I will call "our rationale problem" suggests that a further course correction in music education theorizing is needed. I believe that the current era is characterized by our field's failure to express rationally what our best teachers do skillfully and with conviction. The reasons for this amendment to Schwadron's view will become apparent below.

The apparent recalcitrance of our rationale problem can be attributed to the limits that we ourselves have placed on our thinking about our work. Either that, or we expect that philosophical discourse will yield outcomes that such discourse is ill-equipped to deliver. My assumption is that we should find a way to develop a sound contemporary rationale, and that the next step toward the solution is to remove certain methodological limitations from thinking about the theory, intent, and practice of music education.

Studies such as Yarbrough's (1984) suggest that we have attempted to solve our rationale problem by avoiding it. In 30 years (1953-1983), the *Journal of Research in Music Education* has devoted only 2.7 percent of its pages to philosophical research. We, however, have hardly avoided writing rationales for music education in other venues during that period. *Basic Concepts in Music Education* (Henry, 1958) focused attention on the issue of principles. Led early in this period by Harry Broudy, Charles Leonhard, Bennett Reimer, Abraham Schwadron, and others,

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and encouraged by new outlets for speculative writing such as the *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, music educators have built a literature that deals philosophically with many professional issues. The Music Educators National Conference's Society for Research in Music Education approved a philosophy special research interest group in 1990, and some excellent philosophical studies in music education are available (see Rainbow & Froehlich, 1988, pp.128-158). Thus, it would seem that the beginnings of a remedy are now in sight.

Unless we adjust our profession's view about the philosophical method and its purposes, however, we will continue to under-utilize this method with the result that solutions to our rationale problem will continue to evade us. An adequate rationale seeks to integrate what we value with what we propose to do, to connect action with belief. But shallow rhetoric in the service of this goal abounds. Feel-good convention speakers and sloganeering professional leaders use phrases that often are as entertaining and uplifting as they are bereft of intellectual rigor. Curriculum after curriculum is introduced with high-sounding rhetoric that parades as a philosophy but which fails to explain the curricular details that follow. We must caution the profession against thinking of these utterances as philosophical in spite of their being labeled as such.

Our rationale problem cannot be solved by philosophers if the purpose for solving it is to deal emotionally or rhetorically with the musical, educational, and social values that practitioners merely find interesting--this business is best left to sloganeers. It cannot be solved if the purpose for doing it is merely to legitimize the professional preferences of influential people--this business is best left to our profession's politicians. For these reasons, doing philosophy well will seem like unrewarding business to most practitioners.

An adequate rationale for the work of music educators deliberately integrates musical, educational, and social values with each other and with professional practice. If, in the process of doing so, it engages practice and theory thoroughly and dialectically, it would amount to a professional philosophy. The intriguing danger in doing professional philosophy is that it creates a sound criticism of some of our profession's most cherished habits.

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Professional philosophy and professional practice are distinct but interpenetrating systems. To paraphrase Beardsley,¹ philosophy of music education deals with questions of the meaning and truth of critical statements about music education; music education methodology deals with questions of research and the efficacy of professional methods. Our profession's thinkers must deal rigorously with critical statements, but they need not use preselected philosophic methods or conventional categories of professional concern to do so.

Whitehead (1958) advises philosophers to use speculative reason as a basic philosophical strategy, rather than to preselect a method:

The speculative Reason is in its essence untrammelled by [philosophic] method. Its function is to pierce into the general reasons beyond limited reasons, to understand all methods as coordinated in a nature of things only to be grasped by transcending all method. This infinite ideal is never to be attained by the bounded intelligence of mankind. . . . Reason which is methodic is content to limit itself within the bounds of a successful method. It works in the secure daylight of traditional practical activity. It is the discipline of shrewdness. Reason which is speculative questions the methods, refusing to let them rest (pp. 65-66).

Composers who set musical trends, and who are at their most courageous, let their musical ideas create artistic forms, rather than the reverse. Solving our rationale problem will take the same kind of courage. As

Whitehead cautions, our intelligence must be left unbounded by preselected forms and categories so that it may transcend method if necessary and “pierce into the general reasons” for our profession’s permanence and uniqueness in human history.

Whitehead goes on (pp. 85-89) to discuss two forms of speculative reason. The first “. . . accepts the limitations of a special topic,” the categorical ideas of which it “. . . seeks to enlarge and recast” (p. 85). The second “. . . seeks to build a cosmology expressing the general nature of the world as disclosed in human interests” (p. 85). Our profession’s current philosophers have properly engaged in the first form of speculative reason, accepting music education’s special limitations. But they have tended to do so “within the bounds of a successful method,” a strategy that has introduced the *a priori* limits that Whitehead cautions against (pp. 65-66).

If we accept, for example, that “The branch of philosophy concerned with questions of the nature and value of the arts is called ‘aesthetics’” and attempt to base a professional philosophy on this one principle (Reimer, 1989, pp. 1-2), we limit anthropology and psychology as sources of knowledge about the nature and value of music to the widely varied extent that aestheticians have filtered findings in those fields through their philosophical methods. If we believe, with most aestheticians, that art works are presentational rather than discursive, that their aesthetic values are realized in perception without analytical mediation, then warranted assertions from psychologists about perception cannot be ignored. And if we believe, with most aestheticians, that the perceiver participates in the aesthetic experience, then we cannot ignore what the perceiver brings to the experience from his or her culture.

To solve our rationale problem and to develop a professional philosophy for music educators, we must recapture Whitehead’s enthusiasm for speculative reason and hold that it is independent of a preselected method. If professional philosophy is worth doing, then let us start, as Mursell and Leonhard (and Reimer, to a degree) did, with critical ideas about practical music education. The reasons for this seem obvious. The ap-

propriate beginning standard for a music education professional philosophy is that music teachers’ direct experiences in a professional context must provide its basis. Otherwise, the term music education will have become meaningless in the rationale and critical statements made about it will fail tests of their validity. A professional philosophy can bring integrity to—can integrate—professional practice only if it deals with the realities of a music teacher’s professional life.

Doing professional philosophy, thankfully, is a limited pursuit. It doesn’t need to include cosmic problems (Whitehead’s second form of speculative reason) but it must accept the intellectual rigor of philosophers who do. If it is to fulfill its role, it must be done seriously. It must embrace all that can be called music education and regard as worthy of analysis every widely practiced, skilled, sincere attempt of music teachers to accelerate and guide musical growth in others.

The Need for a Professional Philosophy

Anyone who takes on this task will find it formidable. Is the effort justified? In my view, there is not only justification, but also great satisfaction ahead for those who try. In spite of our profession’s well-documented ability to adjust its rationales to accommodate changing social and educational values,² the need for a new professional philosophy is most acute (i.e., there is a rationale problem) when at least four conditions exist:

1. Existing philosophies do not explain, unify, or illuminate practice;
2. there is confusion or ongoing dispute over basic principles in the training of new professionals;
3. experienced professionals treat daily teaching events as isolated, unusual incidents; and
4. professionals are inarticulate about the connections among beliefs, ideas, and actions.

The discussion that follows takes up each of these conditions as they apply to contemporary music teaching.

1. Existing philosophies do not explain, unify, or illuminate practice. How can one distinguish between a music education practice and something else? Are there principles other than those of the work environment that allow us to decide the issue of

“Curriculum after curriculum is introduced with high-sounding rhetoric that parades as a philosophy but which fails to explain the curricular details that follow.”

relevance for specific professional actions such as fund raising or providing entertainment for school events? Direct experience is important in theorizing about music education. We cannot, therefore, omit ordinary professional tasks that are rightly assigned to us from an adequate theory. Our profession's theorists must assume that such tasks are ours because they are associated with our discipline; and theorists must take this kind of fact seriously. The means-ends relationship is an easy explanation for doing these tasks; but an adequate professional philosophy can establish other, more meaningful connections between actions such as these and professional beliefs.

Why should music instruction be mandated for most American children? Is it because music would die in America without such a mandate? This is doubtful. If music study is to be mandated, are the schools the most efficient framework for the transmission of cultural content to the next generation? Unlike many other public school subjects, music instruction is available in a variety of other institutional settings. There are few “mathematics conservatories” springing up in American storefronts. In the long list of “educational enrichments,” alternative delivery systems can be found within reach of most interested students. Is music an educational enrichment? Philosophical attempts to illuminate the distinction between basics and “frills” in American education have been unconvincing at best and misleading at worst. Our profession has historically lavished vigorous intellectual effort on the problem of justifying our place in schooling. Why is not our place more secure after literally centuries of such effort?

Part of the answer lies in the overly optimistic expectations we have carved out for our existing rationales. Aesthetic theorizing, for example, is an important means of deciding certain policy issues such as materials selection and teaching methods within music

education. We expect that curriculum writers, most of whom are the teachers who must enact the curricula, are deciding professional questions of importance in shaping good, durable educational plans. They have the option of using or ignoring sound aesthetic and educational principles when selecting materials and methods. Such “curriculum engineers” must make judgments in these and other contexts. Yet these applications of aesthetic theory inherent in the curricula are difficult to understand by those outside our field; such theories in themselves don't explain the worth of the curriculum. But most consumers buy autos, for instance, based on values other than engineering principles—although we trust that the automotive engineers have done their work well—and those outside our field are obliged to trust that music education professionals have engineered the curriculum well. A good professional philosophy recognizes that others perceive us differently than we perceive ourselves (see Reimer, 1989, pp. 214-242).

Within music education, aesthetic theory provides guidance for those who must answer certain curricular questions, perhaps the most important ones; but it leaves those professional issues untouched that involve music's integration with other aspects of general education and with the extramusical interests of music students. Furthermore, aesthetic theories leave untouched the multitude of everyday details that an aesthetic philosophy of music education implies to be irrelevant, but that music educators are obligated by professional circumstances to treat as important.

Of the four major theoretical systems in music education today (aesthetic education, progressive education, developmental education, and enculturation) only enculturation connects belief clearly with action. The others have (arguably) serious discontinuities between their theoretical and practical forms. Enculturation, alive and well in our performing groups, is an ancient habit that is less ra-

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tionalized than legitimized by its cultural strength and societal usefulness (Gates, 1991). Its traditions include musical content as well as teaching methods. It is, perhaps, our profession’s most integrated means-ends system. Except as aesthetic principles apply to musical results, there is unfortunately little effort to examine the meaning and value of critical statements about performance music education. In spite of some recent conferences on the topic,³ a well-considered, applicable philosophy of performance music education has not been formulated.

Critics of performance music education often use criteria from other music education systems, including those theoretical systems listed above, in calling some of its practices ill-advised. These critics fail (therefore) to reveal this system’s internal weaknesses, and the system’s proponents fail to reveal its strengths intellectually. Attempts to outfit performance music with borrowed rationales, no matter how “politically correct” they might be at the time, do several kinds of professional damage: Professionals fail to analyze those activities that don’t happen to fit the borrowed rationales; they introduce conflicting rationales to their programs; they substitute slogans for substance; or they avoid entirely the obligation to think and write critically about performance music education. This must change.

Existing philosophies, with the possible exception of the combined writings of Mursell, Leonhard, and Reimer, do not sufficiently unify practice. Their writings touch base with details of professional practice on nearly every page. Leonhard (1988) describes five processes of music educators: program development, instruction, administration, supervision, and evaluation. More than the others, his varied writings discuss critical issues in each of these areas. Regelski (1981, 1986); Abeles, Hoffer, and Klotman (1984); Tait and Haack (1984); and many others give excellent rationales for

their advice about practical music education processes. But it is beyond the purposes of most such books to deal philosophically with the critical issues within them.

The basic questions are these: What values energize and explain music teaching and learning in our culture? What inconsistencies and incompatibilities exist among these values? Can music educators integrate conflicting values and practices in a broader set of values? If so, how?

2. There is confusion or ongoing dispute over basic principles in the training of new professionals.

What sets music teaching apart from other occupational pursuits? Is it a profession, really—with intellectual content, a body of professional criticism and precedent, practitioner supervision of entrance into it, and practitioner control over those who are allowed to stay in it? Or is music education a subspecies of teaching? Does teaching in general have professional characteristics? What is the basis of our belief that music teacher education should be separate from other teacher education programs? Why do we find it so easy to attack the differences between the music teacher training curriculum and on-the-job experience?

Thomas Kuhn (1970), writing about the scientific professions from a historical perspective, describes how science differs from skilled, amateur puzzle-solving. He writes that the difference lies in the degree to which the profession has developed a “. . . strong network of commitments—conceptual, theoretical, instrumental, and methodological. . . that tell the practitioner of a mature specialty what both the world and his science are like” (p. 42). Professionals share these paradigms. Paradigms serve as broad areas of common belief that, in this case, energize professional activity and that regulate standards. Rules and standards of practice derive acceptance and legitimacy to the degree that they are rooted in these paradigms. Kuhn goes on to state that these paradigms reveal themselves

to the historian through the community of practitioners':

. . . textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises. By studying them and by practicing with them, the members of the corresponding community learn their trade. . . . Despite occasional ambiguities, the paradigms of a mature scientific community can be determined with relative ease (p. 43).

We should not be surprised that the paradigm emerging from a study of music education's "textbooks, lectures, and laboratory exercises" is the conservatory model of a performer-analyst-teacher. When a music teacher must make a choice of content for example, between skills and knowledge, usually because of limited contact time with students, conservatory values prevail. Most choose to get the students to perform the music with maximum skill and therefore sacrifice the time spent on building the students' music-related knowledge base. The profession seems to be in agreement on this value, and teacher training reflects this emphasis.

If this assertion is warranted, there is less uncertainty about how to train new professionals than there is widely perceived disparity between training programs and professional practice.³ In spite of the many strong proposals for change in teacher education that continue to come from practitioners, administrators, panels and commissions of authorities, state legislators and state school officials, and from music education leaders, the content of music teacher education programs has changed little in several decades. Reasons for this vary, but the pervasive acceptance of the National Association of Schools of Music's (NASM) standards for undergraduate music programs is an indication that there is basic agreement among its membership of nearly 500 music administrators about the professional preparation of music teachers (see Glidden, 1988). At least, there seems to be the widely held notion that profound changes in music teacher education programs are pedagogically and politically ill-advised. In addition, we have successfully maintained our unprecedented curricular uniqueness among subject-matter fields in teacher preparation curricula, a uniqueness not enjoyed, nor apparently sought, by other fields. Our isolationism in teacher education is a stance that should be

viewed as problematic. Its consequences deserve thorough exploration.

What are the shared paradigms of music educators? Are the paradigms' principles clear? Do they constitute a system? Are they accommodated in our philosophies? Can these paradigms be identified in music education at all levels? Do they provide the foundation for the preparation of new professionals? Are they clear enough to be used to criticize professional practice?

3. Experienced professionals treat daily teaching events as isolated, unusual incidents. Too often we act as if we were alone with our problems.⁴ We often deal successfully with our daily difficulties; but, equally often, we neither consult each other nor appeal to precedent in solving them. Books on how to teach music abound, all containing practical examples that illustrate their authors' rationales. In other fields, these would constitute a set of case books; in our field, they seem not to have attained that status. The college methods class, widely distrusted because it is considered either too narrow or too broad to be of use, seeks to be the repository of the profession's methodological solutions. Workshops and clinics are another repository. When we uncritically accept these as definitive, or proclaim that time-worn solutions for ordinary problems are revolutionary, or ignore practical books on how to teach music, we perpetuate our feelings of isolation from other music educators, past and present. When we overprotect music education students by using the music departments' autonomy from school/college education courses, we predispose them to accept as "natural" their isolation from their future professional colleagues in other fields.

We cannot continue to avoid discussing the precedents and consequences of practical applications and policies such as these, however, without inflicting several kinds of professional harm:

1. We deny the existence of unifying professional ideas.
2. We reduce decision-making to *ad hoc* remedies.
3. We create no precedent, no case book of adjudicated professional examples for indoctrination, regulation, value-setting, and evaluation.
4. We allow little interaction between prin-

ciples and practice.

5. We permit no sense of history to emerge in our professional culture.

6. We confuse even the most interested and intelligent “outsider” about our status as a profession.

The emphasis on prepackaged, often commercialized teaching methods has been strong in American music education from its early eighteenth-century beginnings. Perhaps this is why we find it difficult to build the framework for an American music educator’s case book. Convention-corridor anecdotes about teaching problems and their solutions reflect the oral theory of our professional practice. These anecdotes are unrecorded, but they provide the raw material for the effort to formulate a case book. Once an adequate philosophical framework gives each story the possibility for critical review, it is on its way to attaining the status of a case, worthy of recording for its instructive potential in teacher training and professional evaluation.

4. Professionals are inarticulate about the connections among beliefs, ideas, and actions.

Music education theorists must explain how beliefs basic to being a music teacher are expressed in curricular and methodological ideas and are implemented in professional actions, and they must constantly update these explanations. We currently find it too easy to lose sight of the connection between deep-seated, regulative beliefs (Kuhn’s paradigms) and the well-known curricular and methodological ideas that guide our work. Beliefs are so basic that they are rarely brought to awareness unless they are challenged. Because ideas are discussed and argued about, they have labels, terms, axioms, and hierarchies. Policy choices must be made at the level of ideas, and for this reason curricula and methodologies have advocates and detractors. Curriculum proposals become politicized. When this unfortunate outcome happens, as it too often does, ideas become too readily uprooted from the profession’s beliefs and take on lives of their own, rooted in polity. Professional criticism, taken seriously, functions best when it discourages this outcome.

Reimer (1982) reported to the International Society for Music Education that one of the major dichotomies in American education

... is the wide disparity that continues to exist between belief and action. Perhaps never before has there been a more deeply shared philosophical orientation in American music education, an orientation characterized by the phrase “aesthetic education.” Yet, ironically, traditional non-aesthetic practices continue to be followed to a disturbingly high degree in both general music classes and performance groups (pp. 47-48).

Bengt Holmstrand of Sweden, in his response to Reimer’s analysis, observed that “The individual teacher may very well profess adherence to several, superficially disparate codes of values simultaneously” (1982, pp. 49-50).

Why did Reimer find it ironic that certain aesthetic education practices became embedded in other value systems, some of which have little to do either with music or with aesthetics-based criticism? Perhaps aesthetic education is not so “deeply shared” a belief as Reimer indicated. Another explanation could be that music educators do believe in aesthetic principles, but the interpretations and curricular applications don’t reflect those beliefs. (See Reimer, 1988, p. xii). A professional philosophy can mediate these conflicts both through criticism and through embracing them in a broader ideational system.

Reimer spoke later (p. 48) of another major issue: One side argued that music is at least as unique as the other arts, and should be taught separately; the other argued that all the arts should be taught to the general student as a single unified discipline. After almost a quarter century of effort to unify arts education content, the idea of a unified, widely accepted pan-arts or multiarts curriculum must be declared all but dead. Individual states, colleges, or school systems mandate arts study periodically, and some of us find it necessary to create (or assist with) comparative arts courses to comply with such mandates. It is as difficult to find the roots of this practical requirement in our profession’s beliefs about the arts as it is easy to find its roots in aesthetic theory. If there were a deeply shared belief among arts educators that a unified arts curriculum is necessary or even possible, it would have happened by now more broadly than in a few teachers’ classrooms and lecture halls.

“Convention-corridor anecdotes about teaching problems and their solutions reflect the oral theory of our professional practice.”

The curriculum reform movement of the 1960s gave impetus to the production of a large number of music curriculum documents. Most of us have been involved at one time or another in curriculum development projects that ended in excellent, but ignored, curriculum reports. Each writing team earnestly seeks a sound rationale that would connect highly prized educational activities with each other in a seriously considered system. Curriculum writing is intensive, complicated work. Sometimes teachers can avoid it by adopting a well-established curriculum. In typical practice, however, such adoptions are partial: Adopted curricula are selectively implemented. Regardless of the local or commercial source of the curriculum guide, teachers select the materials and activities from the guides that fit their specific pedagogical needs or views. Because most “real” curricula are developed for local use, and because well-established curricula are seldom fully implemented, there is little theorizing and almost no critical discussion about music curricula.⁵

Some Conclusions

It is my view that, to a disturbing degree, all four of these conditions are current in music education: Existing philosophies do not sufficiently explain, unify, or illuminate contemporary practice; the consistency imposed by NASM administrators and by inertia on the training of new professionals masks the widely perceived disparity between training programs and professional practice; practitioners treat professional situations as isolated occurrences rather than as cases; and we find it too easy to base actions on ideas that have lost their connection with the beliefs that generated them.

“Shopping around” for a set of philosophical ideas that seems to solve our rationale problem is a limiting solution. This approach limits us to what is currently on the shelf in the discount houses of educated thought. Our hunch is that as long as an idea has “brand-name recognition” and some endorse-

ments by persuasive colleagues, it will provide sufficient guidance, but we’ve already found that this does not lead to an integration of personal beliefs with practice. Unfortunately, our professional forum for discussing these issues is limited; engaging in ongoing critical dialog and upholding acceptable standards of insight present discouraging practical difficulties. This issue of *The Quarterly* and Indiana University’s 1990 summer symposium seek to fill this void.

If we want an integrated professional theory, we will have to create one. We must seriously and courageously take Whitehead’s advice about speculative reason as the core of philosophic method and the *sine qua non* of good theorizing. With this in mind, the philosophical method provides the most thorough way to begin the process of solving our rationale problem. The rationales for music education that are reflected in most curricula not only ignore the difficulties of good theorizing and the advantages of doing it well, but their rhetorical attractiveness also permits us to leave our rationale problem untreated. There is a need to articulate our profession’s beliefs and criticize its ideas, thus using philosophical methods to develop a coherent theory of professional practice. Holmstrand (1982) may have been right in his observation about the plurality of teachers’ values systems. A philosophy of music education needs to account for this kind of observation, and we need to see it as a problem which will only be exacerbated by producing and legitimizing an eclectic collection of theoretical explanations.

As professionals, we need to feel that all we are called upon to do in the name of music education is rationally integrated and has agreed-upon purpose. Because musical learning and teaching always occur in rather specific socio-historical and cultural contexts, rather than in vacuums, these contexts must become part of the philosophy. Most importantly, music teachers live the belief that musical behavior is regarded in all cultures as vital to living a successful human life, and

that it is organically connected with all other ways we live in the cosmos.

It is the primary position of this article that renewed energy must be directed toward expressing rationally the integration of music teaching practices with professional beliefs. A sound rationale draws on warranted assertions (ideas) about such matters as music's role in culture and the society, teaching effectiveness, aesthetic sensitivity and music criticism, musical performance technique and literacy, and human individuality and social structures. Such a broad-ranging paradigm, the principles of logic, and the results of good research provide the bases for the development of a sound professional philosophical critique of music education. The ideas that emerge from this rigorous process can reveal an adequate, defensible professional theory and provide a rationale for the music education profession.

Articulating the connections among belief, idea, and action has never been more important. Our profession needs the nourishment of a sound rationale now more than ever. "The degradation of work [in our society]," observes Lasch (1991, p. 33), "represented the most fundamental sense in which institutions no longer commanded public confidence." The effects of this on people like us, who are called to our professions rather than driven there by mere economic necessity, is to place each of us on our own moral resources in meeting this loss of public confidence in institutions. We are in a society-wide "crisis of authority" (Lasch, 1991, p. 33) in response to which we must accept that appearance, to many in authority, seems equal in importance with truth. This is a bitter moral dichotomy, and dealing with it depends upon our personal abilities to integrate belief, idea, and action. To retain career-long enthusiasm for our work in the face of the general social degradation of work, enough to motivate all the generations of our students, we must keep our ideas and actions firmly rooted in our profession's beliefs. So that we can strengthen new music educators for this struggle, our theorists and our veterans must show how this can be done.

Notes

1. "[It is] useful to make a distinction between

psychological aesthetics, which deals with questions about the causes and effects of works of art, and *philosophical aesthetics*, which deals with questions about the meaning and truth of critical statements. . . . Nevertheless, we shall see that we cannot ignore psychology; its data and conclusions bear on ours at many points" (Beardsley, 1958, p. 7; Beardsley's italics).

2. Combine Mark's anthology (1982) with Birge's history (1939) for a digest of primary sources from ancient Greek times to the late twentieth century. The triple thread that binds these writings is the attempt to convince public policy makers, in different times and places, of music's moral, physical, and intellectual benefits and dangers. In spite of its importance to current music education thinking and its advocates' claims to the contrary, our current interest in aesthetic rationales for music education is no diversion. It is embedded in humanist morality (the individual can live a better life with a good aesthetic education) and intellectual skill (aesthetic education improves the perceptual abilities and expands the information that supports other forms of thinking). The psychophysical focus of aesthetic education is taking shape now (see Sloboda, 1985; Smith, Reisburg, & Wilson, in press; Reisburg, Smith, & Wilson, in press; and Gates, 1991). These theorists will eventually apply aesthetic theory to the psychophysiological states of performers rather than listeners.


3. These conferences include the Crane Symposium (Fowler, 1988) and one at Yale (Werner, 1973). Three recent SUNY at Buffalo conferences on the training of conductors, organized by Harriet Simons, may produce similar publications. The papers presented there have treated this aspect of the issue in great detail.

4. DeLorenzo's (1991) is the most recent of several studies on this topic. She found (p. 15) that beginning music teachers typically felt isolated and sought answers to their questions in their teaching environments rather than in their collegiate preparations. For this reason, they viewed as most helpful the advice they received from mentor teachers and experienced colleagues, evidence that they needed substantive access to music education's oral traditions (pp. 16-17). Colwell (1988) and Leonhard (1988) provide other recent critiques of the connection of practice with preparation.

5. See Runfola and Rutkowski (accepted) for a discussion of curriculum research and issues related to curriculum evaluation.

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