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### Philosophy As a Method of Inquiry

Eleanor V. Stubley  
*McGill University*


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**Author(s):** Eleanor V. Stubley

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*It is with pleasure that we inaugurate the reprint of the entire seven volumes of The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning. The journal began in 1990 as The Quarterly. In 1992, with volume 3, the name changed to The Quarterly Journal of Music Teaching and Learning and continued until 1997. The journal contained articles on issues that were timely when they appeared and are now important for their historical relevance. For many authors, it was their first major publication. Visions of Research in Music Education will publish facsimiles of each issue as it originally appeared. Each article will be a separate pdf file. Jason D. Vodicka has accepted my invitation to serve as guest editor for the reprint project and will compose a new editorial to introduce each volume. Chad Keilman is the production manager. I express deepest thanks to Richard Colwell for granting VRME permission to re-publish The Quarterly in online format. He has graciously prepared an introduction to the reprint series.*

# Philosophy As A Method Of Inquiry

By Eleanor V. Stublely

*McGill University*

**S**ome of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good methodology . . . ; to set limits to speculation is treason to the future.

—Alfred North Whitehead

Amidst the controversy surrounding the value of different quantitative and qualitative research methodologies which has become the focus of much theoretical discourse in educational literature in recent years,<sup>1</sup> Alfred North Whitehead's admonition seems particularly apropos. Since the dawn of Western civilization, humans have continually sought to expand and open the frontiers of knowledge in an effort to better understand and thereby use to advantage the world in which they live. At the heart of the quest has been an overriding concern for truth and certainty. Early scholars sought truth through reflection and logic. Later, the scientific method was developed as a means of ensuring that logical deductions were grounded in propositions which could be proven beyond a shadow of a doubt. To know with certainty required objective and reliable measurement devices and the development of stringent research designs which would enable perceptual verification of relationships and generalizations such as cause and effect. The current quantitative-qualitative controversy is an extension of this methodological vigilance, with proponents of both approaches striving to achieve and demonstrate objectivity and reliability within their own context.

Although this vigilant attitude has had a positive impact on methodological development in educational research, it has not always served the better interests of music

education. Our zeal for objectivity and reliability has often emphasized truth at the expense of relevancy, value, and perhaps most importantly, understanding.<sup>2</sup> It has blinded the profession to the fact that research methodologies, like the concepts of knowledge in which they are grounded, are human constructions. These methodologies define particular ways of seeing by designating refined procedures for systematically gathering information and organizing thought. Moreover, insofar as such procedures focus attention on specific aspects of experience to the exclusion of others, research methodologies also represent ways of *not* seeing. As both Nelson Goodman and Lee Shulman have reminded us, understanding requires attention to both;<sup>3</sup> that is, one needs to know not only what is true, but also the lenses through which such truths were observed and those aspects of experience which the lenses have filtered.

Herein lies the value of philosophy as a method of inquiry. Placing understanding as the ultimate end, philosophy works in the realm of "lenses." Whether the particular methodology is that of analytic or linguistic philosophy, process philosophy, experimentalism, or phenomenology, philosophy seeks to identify and evaluate the lenses through which we construct experience. By clarifying the language used to describe experience, it exposes the concepts, ideas, and assumptions underlying our constructions. Critical exploration of these assumptions questions their relevance and value and opens the door for the creation of new ways of seeing which enable the perspectives of different lenses to work together to form a better, more comprehensive understanding. The purpose of this paper is to develop a better understanding of the philosophical method and the role this type of inquiry

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*Eleanor V. Stublely is a member of the Faculty of Music at McGill University in Montreal, Quebec, Canada.*

might play in music education. A definition of philosophy as a method of inquiry is developed through an analysis of its essential characteristics. Its basic techniques and processes are then illustrated through an analysis of the concept of performance and used as a basis for defining potential contributions to and new directions in music education research.

### Philosophy Defined

The term philosophy has its origins in the Greek word *philos*, meaning love of knowledge. Throughout the centuries, it has been used to designate both a system of ideas and a method of inquiry.<sup>4</sup> Philip Alperson defines the method of inquiry as a self-conscious attempt to state clearly the nature and implications of our most basic beliefs about the world and to assess the grounds we might have for holding such beliefs.<sup>5</sup> William James has characterized it as a sustained process of reflection, "a peculiarly stubborn effort to think clearly."<sup>6</sup>

Regardless of the tone of characterization, scholars are generally agreed that philosophy as a method of inquiry has four essential characteristics.

First, philosophy is a reflective, meditative activity. Second, philosophy seeks clarification and understanding rather than binding axioms or universal truths. Third, having no particular subject matter of its own, philosophy takes as its starting point the language used to describe and explain different aspects of experience.<sup>7</sup> Fourth, philosophy achieves its goals by "thrusting ideas against one another" and challenging underlying assumptions.<sup>8</sup> It is an ongoing questioning process, the juxtapositioning of ideas not only identifying contradictions and ambiguities requiring further clarification, but also exposing underlying assumptions and raising questions about the validity and value of those assumptions. Socrates put it succinctly when he likened philosophy to a "heated conversation between earnest minds," a conversation in which value ultimately "lies more often in the uncovering of layers of questions, than in conclusive answers."<sup>9</sup>

### The Philosophical Method

There are as many different approaches to philosophical inquiry as there are different quantitative and qualitative research designs. Each approach, like its scientific counterparts, reflects a different orientation or way of seeing which specifies the aspects of experience and types of questions considered most worthy of clarification and the reflective processes through which clarification will be achieved. Phenomenology, for example, focuses on the intrinsic or essential structures of phenomena as they are directly given in experience. Linguistic philosophy seeks understanding through a critique of language, placing why a particular word or expression is used in different contexts as its primary goal.

At the core of almost all of the different approaches is an analytical process, commonly described as conceptual analysis, which uses paradigmatic examples to define and clarify the meanings of particular terms and concepts. Consistent with the definition of philosophy as a method of inquiry which seeks understanding through the juxtapositioning or challenging of ideas, examples which illustrate the core meaning or most typical usage of a term are thrust against counter-examples that illustrate what the term is not. The search for examples is guided by the motivating need for conceptual analysis, the level of definitional precision or understanding required, and the specific character or types of distinctions being sought.<sup>10</sup> While the process usually begins with a general sense of direction, the selection of examples clarifies and orders thought, making answers to the three guiding questions as much a product of the process as the examples themselves.

The juxtapositioning of examples may involve deductive and/or inductive reasoning, depending on the particular approach. In deductive reasoning, observations or conclusions follow necessarily from stated premises,

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“[P]hilosophy seeks to identify and evaluate the lenses through which we construct experience. By clarifying the language used to describe experience, it exposes the concepts, ideas, and assumptions underlying our constructions.”

with thought grounded in logical rules which define how observations and arguments may be linked or connected and the criteria through which the strength and validity of those connections may be established. Reasoning may proceed from the general to the general, from the general to the particular, and from the particular to the particular. In inductive reasoning, observations and conclusions are connected on the basis of “probable” rather than necessary inference.<sup>11</sup> X does not *necessarily* follow Y on the basis of logical rules as in deductive reasoning, but it may be argued on the basis of certain evidence that X *probably* follows Y. The evidence may involve direct, analogical, predictive, inverse, or universal inference. Analogical and inverse inference have proven particularly useful in philosophical inquiry. Analogical inference, analysis of the properties or attributes which two or more things have in common, helps expose contextual factors which shape meaning, likeness varying not so much with the number of properties two things have in common, but the comparative importance of those common properties in each instance. The identification of examples which illustrate the opposite of that being inferred or which represent exceptions helps expose and illuminate subtle distinctions among examples used to make universal inferences or generalizations.

### **Conceptual Analysis in Action: The Concept of Performance**

An analysis of the concept of performance by Thomas Carson Mark effectively illustrates the different types of reasoning processes involved in conceptual analysis.<sup>12</sup> Mark begins by making a distinction between a work, an instance, and a score as a means of placing the concept of performance in context and identifying the issues involved in its definition. By comparing and contrasting the three terms, he infers that a work has many

instances, an instance being a live or imagined sequence of sounds. A score prescribes the sequence of sounds that instantiates a given work. Performance is a production of a work and proceeds from a score. But, it is not simply an instance of a work in that it is possible to have an instantiating sequence without a performance. By supporting his reasoning with the example of a programmed piano player, Mark focuses attention on the fact that performance is something people do, and in so doing, Mark describes the conditions which distinguish performance from other types of musical activity.

Mark begins his exploration of these conditions by viewing performance as a form of quotation. Quotation is a speech act, and like performance, is something people do. Its context is also similar to that of performance in that it involves a speaker (performer), an utterance (sequence of sounds produced by the performer), and a previously uttered statement (sequence of sounds instantiating work of a composer as prescribed by a score). A more specific definition is derived from a comparison of different types of speech acts illustrating what quotation is and is not. Borderline examples which might or might not be instances of quotation serve to clarify subtle distinctions among the different examples. Mark concludes that quotation is any speech act in which:

- (a) the uttered words are precisely the same as those constituting a particular statement S;
- (b) the speaker intends the uttered words to be the same as those constituting S; and
- (c) the presentation of this intention points to the congruence between the utterance and S.<sup>13</sup>

Mark argues that these conditions or essential characteristics may be applied to the concept of musical performance through analogical inference on the basis of similarities in context, the fact that performance has the same types of elements as those involved in

“[P]hilosophical inquiry...can identify ideas or relationships that require perceptual verification, reveal gaps in scientific knowledge, and suggest new ways of framing or formulating the questions driving scientific inquiry.”

quotation (speech) raising the possibility that the conditions defining the interaction of those elements are also similar. Initial examples support the argument. For a musical activity to be performance, the sound sequence produced by the performer must be identical to that prescribed by the score. The performer must also intend the sequence to be heard as the work prescribed by the score, and the presentation must effectively bring about this identity. As Mark illustrates through inverse inference, while it is conceivable that someone could accidentally or spontaneously present a sequence of sounds identical to that constituting a particular work, the presentation would not be a performance of the work unless the performer was aware of this identity and projected this awareness through the presentation itself.

Having demonstrated a certain degree of congruence between the concepts of performance and quotation, Mark tests the strength of the analogy by considering the ways in which the two concepts differ. He proceeds by attempting to identify examples which satisfy the conditions of quotation but which cannot be considered musical performances. Three such examples are identified:

- (a) the situation where a phrase such as “when Brahms says” is followed by a presentation of a musical passage;
- (b) practice; and
- (c) a technically refined, but musically indifferent, presentation of a work.


Analysis of the three examples, with appeals to personal experience and authoritative critical voices, forces Mark to conclude that, while the conditions defining quotation apply to performance, performance is more than quotation.

The need to distinguish performance from the categories of “practice” and “technically refined,” but musically indistinct presentations of a work leads Mark to re-explore the concept of quotation from the perspective of assertion. Assertion, like quotation, is an in-

tentional speech activity. It involves the utterance of a statement with the intention that the statement will have a certain force or authority, that it will make some sort of claim about the world. The statement does not necessarily have to be true, but rather the manner of its presentation must suggest that the speaker believes it to be true. Quotation can involve assertion when quotation is used to indicate agreement or confirmation of someone else’s words and when the context, the choice of quotation, and/or its manner of presentation becomes a statement in and of itself. For example, a competitor who quotes the famous words of John Paul Jones “I have not yet begun to fight!” in reply to a question says something about his own character as well as his unwillingness to throw down the gauntlet.<sup>14</sup> As Mark observes, when someone makes an assertion by quoting, the assertion is not always the same as that made with the same words by the person quoted:

Sometimes it is the same and sometimes it is not, as when a person uses another’s words ironically. Sometimes the reference of the words is different, so that, though the person uses the same words and makes an assertion with them, the assertion he makes is arguably not the same as the other person’s. . . . Furthermore, when someone makes an assertion by means of a quotation, the total situation takes on a new colour; it is not as if he had simply produced a sentence on his own.<sup>15</sup>

On the basis of these observations, Mark argues, again through analogical inference, that performance is a form of assertion through quotation. What distinguishes performance from both practice and skilled, but musically indifferent, presentations of a work is an intention on the part of the performer that the sounds he or she produces will be taken by others as having some authority, “as making some claim about how things are musically.”<sup>16</sup> Performance involves the attribution of “meaning,” in the broadest sense of the word. It conveys an explanation of the work



**Figure 1.** Summary of Mark's Analysis of Concept of Performance: Conceptual Analysis in Action.

and its elements, an explanation which reflects the performer's view of the values inherent in the work. And, just as a speaker who asserts by quotation will pronounce words and distribute emphasis in such a way that the intended meaning will seem plausible and have a certain authority, performers use subtle nuances in execution to convey and give credence to their particular conception. Different performances of the same work, consequently, differ not so much in what the performers have to say about the composer, but rather in what they take the composer to be saying.

Although this summary (see Figure 1) does not and cannot do justice to the rich detail of Mark's analysis, it does reveal the power of conceptual analysis as a methodological tool in philosophical inquiry. First, by thrusting examples against one another and constantly seeking potentially exceptional cases, conceptual analysis provides a means of evaluating or checking its own effectiveness and thereby avoids the over-simplification and trivialization which often occurs in explicit or operational definition. The fine discriminations made possible through the juxtapos-

itioning of examples also exposes the assumptions underlying traditional definitional lenses and provides a means of assessing the limitations of those lenses. The distinction Mark makes between a performance and an instance by way of the player piano illustration, for example, enables him to understand why performance is frequently defined in terms of technical skills and why this approach is not wholly satisfactory. Such considerations are essential in philosophical inquiry, understanding, as previously noted, ultimately requiring knowledge of lenses as ways of both seeing and *not* seeing.

Perhaps even more importantly in terms of the power of conceptual analysis is the fact that the very act of identifying limitations serves to clarify and order the analytical process itself. It exposes the issues and questions that must be addressed in any adequate definition and thereby suggests different perspectives which could be used to shape new, potentially more effective lenses. The observation that performance is more than mere quotation, for example, leads Mark to re-explore his original analysis from the perspective of assertion. This reconception explains the unique contribution of the performer that Western civilization has attached so much value to and places that contribution in a context which links the composer, performer, and listener. The reconception also explains why the contribution of the performer has so frequently defied definition, any attempt to explicitly define the contribution being foiled by the unique features of different performances. The concept of assertion avoids the problem by making the individuality of different performances the focus of attention rather than the specific differences defining that individuality.

### Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry

Having defined philosophical inquiry as a reflective, meditative activity which scrutinizes the lenses through which we construct experience, and having identified the basic processes involved in this scrutiny, it now becomes possible to consider the role this type of inquiry might and should play in music education. In practice, philosophical inquiry commonly emphasizes one of three

orientations—the theoretical, the synthetic, or the applicative. Together, these orientations define a continuum of potential applications encompassing a variety of critical, speculative, and practical ends. Theoretical studies exemplify pure philosophy, treating the understanding achieved through keen description and analysis as the ultimate end. Synthetic studies use the same techniques and processes to critically explore the value of different lenses as a means of developing new, more comprehensive ways of seeing which begin to overcome the limitations of individual perspectives. Applicative studies emphasize clarification and analysis as a means of identifying the implications of a particular distinction or way of seeing in a particular context, which often may be only tangentially related to the situation prompting the distinction. Such studies often serve as a testing ground for the achievements of the other two orientations.

Mark's analysis of the concept of performance, while containing elements of all three orientations like all good philosophical inquiry, is primarily a theoretical study. A synthetic study involving the same ideas might explore how the conception of performance as assertion through quotation might be modified or reshaped to include some of the distinctions made possible through the definitional lenses which Mark rejects at the outset of his analysis as a means of not only distinguishing performance from practice, but also good performances from great perfor-

1. Has built-in means of self-evaluation which helps avoid oversimplification;
2. Permits fine discrimination and distinctions among examples;
3. Exposes assumptions underlying traditional definitional lenses and enables identification of their weaknesses;
4. Focuses and clarifies analytical process itself;
5. Provides potential routes for reconception and the building of new lenses.

**Figure 2.** The Power of Conceptual Analysis

“Ontological questions have relevance for music education to the extent that they help clarify the nature and origins of music and education as distinct phenomena and the nature of musical and educational experiences...”

mances—the qualities, in other words, which define the force and authority of assertion. A study which explores the implications of Mark’s conception of performance for the development of an evaluation tool which measures growth in performance abilities would be an example of an applicative study. All three orientations have much to offer music education, particularly when they work together over the long term, with basic understandings and discriminations derived from theoretical studies motivating the need for new ways of seeing and the exploration of particular applications.<sup>17</sup>

As for specific directions that might be pursued, philosophical inquiry, while having no particular subject matter of its own, typically addresses three types of questions: the methodological, the metaphysical, and the axiological. The three types of questions define distinct, albeit related, spheres of inquiry which explore the lenses we use to construct experience from slightly different perspectives. In the methodological sphere, lenses are examined from the perspective of knowledge, with exploration guided by questions pertaining to the nature of knowing, understanding, and truth, the origins and definition of knowledge, and the validity of different forms of reasoning.

This sphere has significance for research in music education on several levels. First, it is central to the definition of research as a scientific discipline. As previously noted, different research methodologies represent different ways of seeing and thereby different ways of knowing and not knowing. Philosophical inquiry can increase our understanding of these lenses as modes of knowing and evaluate their potential contribution to knowledge by questioning the assumptions and presuppositions underlying them. Concepts like truth, time, space, motion, growth, proof, cause, and effect are the architectural foundations of science. They are

also human constructions, and, knowledge being in a constant state of evolution, they consequently require clarification from time to time if their value as lenses is to be maximized. Philosophical inquiry, as such, both defines research’s architectural foundations and serves as its conscience or alter ego, continually asking what is this concept, what does it help us to see, and what does it potentially prevent us from seeing.

In the process of achieving these ends, philosophical inquiry in the methodological sphere can also serve as a motivator or source of inspiration for scientific inquiry. It can identify ideas or relationships that require perceptual verification, reveal gaps in scientific knowledge, and suggest new ways of framing or formulating the questions driving scientific inquiry. Mark’s concept of performance as assertion, for example, raises the possibility of there being a correlation between the ability to assert linguistically through quotation and the ability to assert musically. It also raises questions about how performance skills are evaluated. A descriptive study might use survey techniques to explore the extent to which evaluation scales traditionally used to assess development in performance address the capacity to assert. Clarification of the concept of growth and development from this perspective might lead to a reframing of the questions typically used to evaluate the effectiveness of different instructional approaches. Questions concerning the acquisition of technical skills, for example, might be reframed to consider not only the acquisition of a skill, but also how that skill is used to assert. The reframing would acknowledge that, while the acquisition of certain skills is crucial to performance, the acquisition ultimately has value only to the extent that the skill can be used for musical ends. This change in perspective would likely affect the design of different treatments used to assess the effectiveness of

“Cosmological questions can lead to the clarification of issues pertaining to the synthesis of different definitions of music from a world perspective and music’s relationship to the other arts and the arts to other domains of human endeavor.”

an instructional strategy, as well as the criteria through which development and growth are measured.

On another quite different level, the methodological sphere of inquiry has significance for music education as a means of defining music as subject matter and the role of the teacher and learner in relationship to this subject matter. Education, regardless of the specific form it assumes, is commonly defined on the most basic level as the accumulation and transmission of knowledge.<sup>18</sup> Different conceptions of knowledge affect the definition of educational content as subject matter, the methods through which such content is transmitted, and the role or responsibilities of the teacher and learner in this process. Clarification of what it means to know and the different senses in which music and the concept of knowledge may be linked, both as a branch of knowledge and a mode of knowing, empowers us to think critically about what it is we do in the name of education.<sup>19</sup> It helps us to develop a better understanding of what it means to “know about music” and what it means to “know through or in music.” Such understanding can lead to a better connection between instructional practice and the formulation of goals and objectives and stronger, more persuasive arguments which can be used to justify or advocate a place for music in the educational curriculum.

Philosophical inquiry in the metaphysical sphere examines the lenses we use to construct experience in terms of the nature of being and reality. Inquiry is typically guided by two types of questions. Ontological questions explore the nature of existence and the structure of our thought about reality. Cosmological questions pertain to the nature of the world as a whole and the place of humans and self within this context. Ontological questions have relevance for music education to the extent that they help clarify the

nature and origins of music and education as distinct phenomena and the nature of musical and educational experiences from the perspectives of composer, performer, listener, teacher, and learner respectively. Cosmological questions can lead to the clarification of issues pertaining to the synthesis of different definitions of music from a world perspective and music’s relationship to the other arts and the arts to other domains of human endeavor. Cosmological questions can also clarify the role concepts such as self, culture, individuality, freedom, democracy, and choice play in the definition of educational practice. Both ontological and cosmological questions can build on the findings of scientific inquiry by synthesizing empirical observations of music, musical behaviors, and education in different settings. Both types of questions can also inform philosophical inquiry in the methodological sphere. An understanding of what music is in its many different forms and the character of the musical experience as distinct from other types of human experience, for example, is essential for any exploration of music’s status as subject matter, the concept of knowledge being but one lens through which music may be understood.

Inquiry in the axiological sphere is motivated by questions of value. Where inquiry in the other two spheres seeks to determine what something really is and what the lenses through which we construct that something enables us to see and not see, axiological inquiry concerns itself with what should or ought to be seen. It is the sphere of inquiry which facilitates the making of choices, by exposing and clarifying the different social, political, moral, and cultural forces which shape what it means to be beautiful, successful, artistically valid, intelligent, practically significant, effective, and/or educationally worthwhile in different contexts. Such inquiry is essential to both practice and re-




search in music education. Music teaching and learning, like the more basic forms of musical experience in which they are grounded, are value-laden activities in which every action taken and every decision made involves choices. At the instructional level, choices are made when selecting repertoire for performance and teaching purposes, when prioritizing goals and objectives, when identifying instructional activities, and when criticizing, correcting, and evaluating student performance. Many of these same types of choices are involved in the design of research methodologies, the identification of questions requiring scientific or philosophical study, and the interpretation of research results.

Given the current calls to reconsider the goals and objectives of music education, both in practice and research, from a multicultural or world perspective, axiological inquiry can make a particularly important contribution to music education at this time.<sup>20</sup> While it is applaudable to argue that the ultimate task of music education is to awaken students to the full range of meaning or possibilities of expression potential in the musical experience in its many different forms,<sup>21</sup> the goal has a practical reality which must be addressed. To begin with, it is unlikely that music education could ever hope to achieve this goal, given the many different forms and styles of musical experience that currently exist, the fact that music itself is in a constant state of evolution, and the time, economic, and other cultural, social, and political limitations which define the resources available for study. Secondly, regardless of how much music education is able to achieve, it must begin somewhere, and the very act of identifying this starting point involves value decisions about the relative importance of different forms and styles of musical experience in different contexts. By examining the lenses we use to construct music education from the perspective of what music education should or ought to be, axiological inquiry can inform our understanding of these value decisions as a means of ensuring that we have achieved as much as we possibly can and as well as we possibly can.

Before such questions can be addressed, however, it is first necessary to develop an

understanding of what music is, what the lenses we use to construct this concept as subject matter or object of inquiry are, and what those lenses enable us to see and not to see. Axiological inquiry, in other words, needs to know what options exist before it can assess the value of those options in particular contexts. In this sense, axiological inquiry, while a means of determining starting or beginning points, must, at this stage in our development, follow philosophical inquiry in the metaphysical and methodological spheres. It should also follow or be done in conjunction with scientific inquiry. Information achieved through quantitative methodologies, for example, can inform an understanding of the strength of a particular effect or the frequency of different musical behaviors. Qualitative methodologies can provide insight into the contextual conditions and factors which affect strength and frequency. Axiological inquiry, when done in this way, begins, ends, and links philosophical inquiry, scientific inquiry, and practice (see Figure 3).

As for a specific starting point in the search to develop an understanding of the different options and value music has as subject matter, direction can be found in Philip Alperson's assertion that all philosophical inquiry in music and music education should begin with music as it is practiced.<sup>22</sup> Philosophical inquiry in music education has to date built primarily on the Western concept of music as contemplated object as that concept has been explored by philosophical inquiry in the field of aesthetics. Practice in music education, on the other hand, has been grounded in performance. As Francis Sparshott, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Abraham Schwadron have reminded us on more than one occasion, performance has had and continues to have a sense of significance associated with it distinct from that attributed to individual compositions.<sup>23</sup> It is time that music education develop a better understanding of this significance and the lenses through which it is constructed. Thomas Carson Mark's analysis of the concept as assertion represents one possible starting point. Where music education's methodological vigilance and quest for truth have often limited the study of performance to the



**Figure 3.** Value and Interconnection of Different Types of Inquiry.

acquisition of particular skills, the concept of performance as assertion focuses attention on performance as a musical act in which the performer is actively involved in making musical decisions and communicating his or her understanding of how things in a particular composition are musically.<sup>24</sup>

### Notes

1. See, for example, L. S. Shulman, "Reconstruction of Educational Research," *Review of Educational Research*, 1970, vol. 40, 371-393; Elliot Eisner, "Can Educational Research Inform Educational Practice?" *Phi Delta Kappa*, March 1984, vol. 65, 447-452; Donald T. Campbell, "Qualitative Knowing and Action Research: in *The Social Contexts of Method*, Michael Brenner, Peter Marsh, and Marilyn Brenner (eds.). (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978); and N. L. Gage, "The Paradigm Wars and Their Aftermath: A 'Historical' Sketch of Research in Teaching Since 1989," *Educational Researcher*, 1989, vol. 18, 4-10.
2. See, for example, the exchange between Bennett Reimer, George Heller, Peter Webster, Jack Heller, and Warren Campbell in Special Issue of *Council for Research in Music Education Bulletin*, 1985, vol. 83, 1-40. See also recent issues of the *Council for Research in Music Education Bulletin*, "Dissertations in Progress."
3. See Nelson Goodman and Catherine Elgin, *Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences* (London: Routledge, 1988), 25; Lee Shulman, "Ways of Seeing" in *Complementary Research Methods in Education*, Richard M. Jaeger (ed.). (Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association, 1988), 23.
4. "Philosophy," *Encyclopedia Britannica* (Chicago: Encyclopedia of Britannica Corporation, 1987).
5. Philip Alpers, "Music as Philosophy," in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music* (New York: Haven Publications, 1987), 193-210.
6. Cited in Anthony Flew, "Philosophy," in *Collier's Encyclopedia*, William D. Halsey (ed.) (New York: MacMillan, 1981), vol. 18, 701.
7. Until recently this observation has been interpreted to mean that philosophy has concerned itself primarily with verbal statements and been an essentially linguistic activity. The work of Nelson Goodman [*Languages of Art*, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976)] and *Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences* (London: Routledge, 1988)] and Max Wartofsky ("The Liveliness of Aesthetics," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Special Issue on Analytical Aesthetics, 1987, 211-218) suggests that other symbol systems such as movement, gesture, and the arts could also potentially sustain such reflective activity.
8. Jerome Stolnitz, *Aesthetics* (New York: MacMillan Co., 1965), 1.
9. *Ibid.*, 1.
10. Michael Scriven, "Philosophical Inquiry Methods in Education," in *Complementary Research Methods in Education*, Richard M. Jaeger (ed.) (Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association, 1988), 136-139. See also J. Soltis, *An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1978) and Israel Scheffler, *Conditions of Knowledge* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, and Company, 1965).
11. C. Reese, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980).
12. Thomas Carson Mark, "Philosophy of Piano Playing: Reflections on the Concept of Performance," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1981, vol. 4, 299-324. Readers are encouraged to read Mark's original analysis in conjunction with this article for full understanding of both Mark's ideas and the nature of conceptual analysis.
13. *Ibid.*, 305.
14. *Ibid.*, 309.
15. *Ibid.*, 310.
16. *Ibid.*, 312.
17. Unfortunately, however, as A. Schwadron has lamented on more than one occasion ("Philosophy in Music Education: Pure or Applied Research?," *Council for Research in Music Education Bulletin*, 19, 1970, 22-29; "Philosophy in Music Education: State of the Research," *Council for Research in Music Education Bulletin*, 34, 1973, 41-53; "Music Education and Teacher Preparation: Perspectives from the Aesthetics of Music," *Journal of Musicological Research*, 4, 1982, 175-192), philosophical inquiry in music education has generally suffered from a lack of direction and focus, with studies prompted by a particular interest in some scholar than from consideration of the needs or goals and directions of music education itself.
18. J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner (eds.) *The Oxford English Dictionary*, 2nd edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) vol. 11, 688-689.
19. Maxine Greene, "Philosophy and Teaching," in *Handbook of Research on Teaching*, 3rd edition, M. Wittrock (ed.) (New York: MacMillan), 479.
20. See, for example, Maxine Greene, *Landscapes of Learning* (New York: Teachers' College Press, 1978), 161-120; Christopher Small, *Music, Society, Education* (London: John Calder, 1977), 206-209; and A. Schwadron, "Research Directions in Comparative Music Aesthetics and Music Education," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, vol. 9, 1975, 99-109; "Philosophy and Aesthetics in Music Education: A Critique of the Research," *Council for Research in Music Education Bulletin*, 79, 1985, 11-32.
21. Maxine Greene, *Landscapes of Learning*, 161-210.
22. Philip Alpers, "What Should One Expect from a Philosophy of Music Education?" *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 25, 218.
23. Francis Sparshott, *The Theory of the Arts* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982); Nicholas Wolterstorff, "The Work of Making a Work of Music," in *What is Music? An Introduction to the Philosophy of Music*, Philip Alpers (ed.), 101-130; A. Schwadron, "Philosophy and Aesthetics in Music Education: A Critique of the Research," *Council for Research in Music Education Bulletin*, 79, 1985, 11-32.
24. David Elliott, for example, has already begun to move in this direction. See "Music as Knowledge," *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, 25, 21-40 